Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

S.A No. 1960 of 1945.

Advocates

Mr. C. Unikanda Menon for Appt.
Messrs. D.A Krishna Variar and C. Vasudeva Mannadiar for Respt.

Judges

Somayya, J.

Acts

provisions of the Code, Order 20, Rule 12
Rule 18 of Order 20, Rule 12
Order 20, Rule 12
Order 20, Rule 18
Order 20, Rule

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for partition and recovery of a half share in the properties scheduled in the plaint. The reliefs claimed included (a) division of the properties into two equal shares with delivery of possession of the plaintiff's share, and charging the first defendant's share for Court costs and other amounts due to the plaintiff; (b) payment of the plaintiff's costs with interest by the first defendant; and (c) other ancillary reliefs.

A preliminary decree was passed which (1) identified items 1 to 16 as properties available for partition and declared a jenm (usufruct) right only over item 17, and (2) directed division into two equal shares, one for the plaintiff and one for the first defendant. Paragraphs of the preliminary decree dealt with liabilities and outstandings.

After the Commissioner prepared a scheme of division, the plaintiff sought an account of profits subsequent to the date of the plaint (seeking 350 paras of paddy per annum with 2% interest from the date of plaint until actual possession). One objection taken was that there was no specific prayer in the plaint for profits from the date of suit; another was that the preliminary decree did not direct enquiry into subsequent profits.

The trial Court denied relief on two grounds: (1) the plaint did not ask for mesne/profits subsequent to the date of suit, and (2) the preliminary decree did not contain any direction about such profits and therefore the plaintiff could not seek it at the stage of the final decree. The trial Court relied on Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296. On appeal the Subordinate Judge followed that decision and affirmed the trial Court. The matter then reached the High Court, which considered multiple authorities and reversed the two lower Courts.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a plaintiff in a partition suit can obtain an enquiry and award of profits (mesne profits or account of profits) for the period subsequent to the date of the plaint at the stage of the final decree when (a) the plaint did not contain an express prayer for such subsequent profits, and (b) the preliminary decree was silent on the question of subsequent profits.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

The plaintiff asserted a right to an account of profits for his half share for the period after the date of the plaint because the defendants were holding possession and enjoying profits; the plaintiff quantified the entitlement as 350 paras of paddy per annum with 2% interest from the date of plaint until actual possession.
Implicit in the plaintiff's position (as expressed in the affidavit) was that the right to an account is appurtenant to the plaintiff's asserted proprietary right in his share and thus need not be separately prayed for in express terms in the plaint.

Defendants' / Objecting Position (as recorded)

One objection was that the plaint contained no specific prayer for mesne profits from the date of suit, and therefore the claim for profits at the stage of final decree was not maintainable.
The other objection (adopted by the trial Court and the Subordinate Judge) was that the preliminary decree did not deal with profits subsequent to the date of suit and did not contain any direction for enquiry, and therefore such an enquiry could not be ordered at the final decree stage; authority relied upon for this position was Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296	Authority that if a preliminary decree (or a decree for possession) does not contain a direction for enquiry into mesne profits, an application to enquire into such profits cannot be entertained later (principles drawn from Order 20, Rule 12 and applied by analogy to Order 20, Rule 18).	The two lower Courts relied on this decision to refuse the claim. The High Court examined it but held that subsequent decisions of this High Court had not followed Ghulusam Bivi on the point and that the Subordinate Judge had misread later authorities.
Bapa Lakshmamma v. Koteswara Rao (1931) M.W.N. 846	Addressed a final decree directing enquiry into mesne profits though preliminary decree was silent; held that a final decree, once become final, is binding and cannot be questioned in execution even if the inclusion of mesne profits was procedurally erroneous.	The High Court observed Cornish, J.'s view that the final decree's direction for enquiry was binding because it had become final; the Court noted this did not amount to affirming Ghulusam Bivi as a correct principle in all respects.
Subbiah v. Kotamma (1945) 1 M.L.J. 204	In a suit for possession (not partition) King, J. held that where a decree for possession did not contain a direction for enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12, it was not open to order such an enquiry at a later stage; the ruling followed Ghulusam Bivi to the extent applicable to bare possession suits.	The High Court observed that Subbiah had followed Ghulusam Bivi insofar as it applied to bare possession suits, but that it did not establish the same rule for partition suits.
Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 406 : I.L.R. 46 Mad. 47	Held that in a partition suit it is competent for the Court to entertain a claim for enquiry into subsequent profits at the stage of the final decree even though the preliminary decree did not contain such a direction; also held the plaintiff was not entitled to interest on such profits (on the facts of that case).	The High Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that in partition suits the right to an account of profits is appurtenant to a sharer and may be dealt with at the final decree stage despite preliminary silence. The Court treated this as a direct contrary view to Ghulusam Bivi on partition suits.
Swaminatha Odayar v. Gopalaswami Odayar (1938) 2 M.L.J. 704	Held at length that a final decree for mesne profits, although not preceded by a preliminary decree dealing with them, is competent; stated that such a contention (incompetency) was untenable and referred to earlier High Court authorities, including Ramaswami Aiyar. Emphasised implied reservation of leave in non-final adjudications to apply for further directions (accounting).	The High Court placed considerable reliance on this decision, treating it as an authoritative exposition that the preliminary decree's silence does not bar enquiry into subsequent profits at a later stage in partition suits.
Ramanathan Chetti v. Alagappa Chetti (1929) 59 M.L.J. 102 : I.L.R. 53 Mad. 378	Referenced in Swaminatha Odayar as one of several decisions supporting the proposition that preliminary silence does not preclude later enquiry into profits.	Used in Swaminatha Odayar and thereby indirectly supports the High Court's conclusion that enquiry at final decree is permissible. The present Court cited it as part of the cluster of decisions favouring the plaintiff's position.
Maulvi Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Abdul Aziz (1896) I.L.R. 19 All. 155 : L.R. 24 I.A. 22 (P.C.)	Held that decision on title is primary and accounting (such as profits) is incidental; in practice title is decided first (preliminary decree) and accounting can follow at a later stage for the advantage of all parties.	The High Court (through Swaminatha Odayar's reasoning) relied on this principle to justify treating preliminary decrees as not excluding later applications for accounting and profits; the Court cited this as authority for sequencing title first and accounting later.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first identifying the two discrete grounds on which the trial Court refused relief: (1) absence of an explicit prayer in the plaint for post-suit mesne profits, and (2) absence of any direction in the preliminary decree requiring enquiry into such profits, so that the matter could not be raised at the final decree stage. The Subordinate Judge affirmed the trial Court and placed reliance upon Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296.

The High Court then examined the subsequent and earlier authorities of this Court and concluded that the Subordinate Judge had misread and overlooked decisions which took a different view from Ghulusam Bivi on partition suits. Key elements of the Court's analysis include:

Distinction between bare suits for possession and partition suits: decisions construing Order 20, Rule 12 in the context of possession suits (e.g., Ghulusam Bivi and Subbiah v. Kotamma) cannot be mechanically applied to the specific regime of partition suits under Order 20, Rule 18.
Authority of Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922): that Court held at length that even though a preliminary decree was silent on enquiry into subsequent profits, it was competent for a Court to entertain the claim at the stage of the final decree in a partition suit; further, the right to an account of profits is appurtenant to a sharer and need not be separately pleaded as mesne profits.
Swaminatha Odayar v. Gopalaswami Odayar (1938) was treated as a clear, extended examination endorsing the competence of a Court to grant a final decree for mesne profits even when no preliminary decree dealt with them. The reasoning included reliance on Ramaswami Aiyar and the principle that non-final adjudications carry an implied reservation permitting later applications for directions necessary for complete disposal.
Where a final decree erroneously contains a direction for enquiry into mesne profits but the decree has become final (as in Bapa Lakshmamma), the resulting direction may be binding on the parties in execution, but that was a different point and did not amount to endorsing Ghulusam Bivi as correct on partition suits.
The Court emphasized Sadasiva Aiyar, J.'s reasoning that every sharer has a right to an account of profits received by the person in possession, and that the right to an account is appurtenant to the substantive proprietary right asserted in the partition suit; hence absence of an express prayer in the plaint does not defeat the claim when the substantive relief (partition and vindication of title) is sought.

On this combined basis, the High Court concluded that the lower Courts had erred in applying Ghulusam Bivi (and decisions limited to possession suits) to bar the plaintiff's claim in a partition suit. The Court therefore reversed the decrees and directed that the trial Court hold an enquiry into the amount of profits payable to the plaintiff for his half share from the date of the suit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court REVERSED the decrees of the trial Court and the Subordinate Judge, and DIRECTED an enquiry by the trial Court into the amount of profits payable to the plaintiff for his half share from the date of suit.

Direct consequences and reliefs ordered by the High Court (as recorded in the opinion):

The decree of the two lower Courts is reversed.
An enquiry is directed before the trial Court into the amount of profits payable to the plaintiff for his half share from the date of the plaint.
The Court-fee paid on the memorandum of second appeal in this Court and on the memorandum of appeal in the lower appellate Court will be refunded.
The appellant (plaintiff) will have his costs in all the Courts up to date; further costs to be provided for in the decree of the trial Court.

Broader implications (as discussed in the opinion):

The opinion aligns with earlier High Court authorities (notably Ramaswami Aiyar and Swaminatha Odayar) which hold that in partition suits an enquiry into profits subsequent to the date of suit can be entertained at the stage of final decree even if the preliminary decree is silent on the matter.
The Court criticized the lower Courts for not taking into account the current and contrary decisions of this High Court and observed that the point (as stated in Swaminatha Odayar) was well-settled; it also remarked on the duty of the judiciary to keep informed of the current decisions of the High Court.

Show full summary ...

Panikkathe Kutti Pennu Maruvalamma'S Son Raghava Mannadiar v. Panikkathe Kutti Pennu Maruvalamma'S Son, Theyyunni Mannadiar.

1. The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for partition and recovery of a half share in the property. The prayer in the plaint runs thus:

(a) Directing that the properties mentioned in the sub-joined schedule be divided into two equal shares and the properties allotted to one of such sharers be given to the possession of the plaintiff and that the properties belonging to the first defendant's share be made a charge for the Court costs and other amounts due to the plaintiff by the first defendant;

(b) Directing the first defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs of this suit with interest; and

(c) Granting other reliefs which the plaintiff may pray for in the course of this suit and which the Court might deem fit to allow.

2. The preliminary decree declared (1) that the properties available for partition are items 1 to 16 and the jenm right only over item 17 of the plaint schedule; (2) that they are to be divided into two equal shares, the plaintiff getting one share and the first defendant getting the other share. Paragraph (3) dealt with the liabilities. The other paragraphs dealt with outstandings. After the Commissioner prepared a scheme of division, the plaintiff-appellant asked for an account of the profits subsequent to the date of the plaint. In paragraph 9 of the affidavit filed in support of the petition it was stated thus:

As defendants 1 and a are thus holding possession of the properties in the schedule to the decree and enjoying the profit, the plaintiff is entitled to get towards his share 350 paras of paddy per annum with interest 2 per cent from the date of plaint to the date of his getting actual possession of his half share, and accordingly having ascertained the amount, the same may be directed to be paid by the first defendant or if necessary by the second defendant.

One of the objections was that there was no specific prayer in the plaint for profits from the date of suit and the other was that the preliminary decree did not deal with the question of profits and did not contain a direction that the defendants should be liable for profits. The trial Court refused relief on two grounds : firstly that the plaint did not ask for mesne profits subsequent to the date of suit and secondly that as the preliminary decree did not contain any direction about the profits subsequent to the date of suit, the plaintiff was not entitled to ask for it at the stage of the final decree. In support of this proposition, the decision of this Court in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296, was relied upon. On appeal the Subordinate Judge followed the decision in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296, and confirmed the decision ofthe trial Court. The Subordinate Judge saysthatthedecision in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 was confirmed in a later decision in BapaLaksh-mamma v. Koteswara Rao 1931 M.W.N. 846 and that it was again referred to with approval in Subbiah v. Kotamma (1945) 1 M.L.J. 204. When his attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in Rama-swami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J.406: L.L.R. 46 Mad.47 the Subordinate Judge says this:

The decision in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J.406: L.L.R. 46 Mad.47, does not really seem to be an authority for the opposite position in any direct way. That case if at all can apply to the present one only by an extension of the principles actually laid down therein. I do not think that in the light of the direct authorities on the question it would be proper to apply the case in Ramaswami v. Stibramania Iyer (1922) 43 M.L.J.406: L.L.R. 46 Mad.47 as laying down a contrary proposition.

In Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 the suit was one for partition and the preliminary decree did not contain any direction as to the profits subsequent to the date of suit. At the stage of the final decree a request was made for enquiry on that matter. The learned Judges referred to two provisions of the Code, Order 20, Rule 12 and 18. They first referred to Order 20, Rule 12 which applies to a bare suit for possession. It was pointed out that if the decree for possession did not contain a direction for an enquiry into mesne profits an application under Order 20, Rule 12 cannot be filed after the decree. Then the learned Judges refer to Order 20, Rule 18 which deals with preliminary decrees in partition suits and they applied the principle of Order 20, Rule 12 to a case of partition decree under Order 20, Rule 18. That no doubt is an authority for the position that if the preliminary decree does not contain a direction for enquiry into subsequent profits, it should not be gone into at the stage of the final decree.

3. But this case has never been followed by this Court on the question of profits subsequent to the date of suit in partition actions. The Subordinate Judge has not correctly read the later decisions which he says follow the decision in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296. The first of the decisions referred to by the Subordinate Judge as confirming the principle contained in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 is Bapa Lakshmamma v. Koteswara Rao 1931 M.W.N. 846. In that case there was a preliminary decree for partition which did not contain any direction for subsequent profits. At the stage of the final decree, the question was mooted and the final decree directed an enquiry into mesne profits under Order 20, Rule 12. Then an application under Order 20, Rule 12 was filed. At that stage objection was taken that no enquiry into subsequent profits could be directed. Reliance was placed on the decision in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 and Cornish, J., while referring to it held that whether the final decree in the case before him was right or wrong, it was binding on both parties as it had been allowed to become final and that therefore the direction as to an enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12 was not open to question. Referring to the decision in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 the learned Judge said this:

That principle is not disputed by Mr. Raghava Rao, who appears for the petitioner, but he contends that though the inclusion of mesne profits in a final decree is erroneous as a matter of procedure still the decree having become final and the judgment-debtor having taken no steps to vacate it or revise it, it is not open to any one to go behind that decree in execution. I think that this contention is right. It is not open to an executing Court, if on the face of the decree there is no want of jurisdiction, to question the decree.

Rightly or wrongly the position was conceded by the advocate and it cannot possibly be stated that the principle of Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296, was affirmed by Cornish, J. When it is not necessary to deal with the correctness of an earlier decision and the case could be disposed of on another point, judges are not anxious to deal with the correctness of the earlier decision particularly as the learned advocate who appeared for the decree-holder conceded the correctness of the decision in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 and proceeded to distinguish the case before him on the ground that' the final decree had become final. Nor are advocates anxious to question the correctness of earlier decisions when it is not necessary to do so.

4. The next case relied on by the Subordinate Judge is Subbiah v. Kotamma (1945) 1 M.L.J. 204. That was a suit for possession pure and simple. The decree for possession did not contain a direction for an enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12. Subsequently an application was filed asking for the determination of future mesne profits. The trial Court dismissed the application but on appeal the Subordinate Judge held that the application under Order 20, Rule 12 was maintainable. The matter was brought before King, J., and the learned Judge held that as the decree for possession did not contain a direction for an enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12, it was not open to order such an enquiry at a later stage. The suit comes to an end with the decree and there can be no further application for such an enquiry. Reference was made before the learned Judge to the decision in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 and referring to it the learned Judge says this:

That ruling deals primarily with a preliminary decree and a final decree in a partition suit but in order to analyse the significance of an order under Rule 18 of Order 20, Rule 12 is also referred to by the learned Judges; and it is held that unless the decree in a suit for possession directs an enquiry, there can be no such enquiry ordered in any final decree.

A decision of Varadachariar, J., which seemed to lay down a contrary proposition was then discussed and King, J., held that he would prefer to follow the decision in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 on this point. If the decision in Subbiah v. Kotamma (1945) 1 M.L.J. 204 had only been scrutinised, the appellate Court would have seen that King, J., followed the decision in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 only so far as it laid down that in a bare suit for possession where the decree did not contain a direction for an enquiry under Order 20, Rule 12, no later application under that rule can be made.

5. It is rather unfortunate that the Subordinate Judge did not deal with the other decisions of this Court which have taken a view contrary to the decision in Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296. The first of these decisions is Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J.406: I.L.R. 46Mad. 47. to which reference has been made by the Subordinate Judge. In that case there was a suit for partition and a preliminary decree was passed. It did not contain any direction as to the enquiry into subsequent profits. At the stage of the final decree, the question was brought up. It was first dealt with by Sadasiva Aiyar and Napier, JJ. and that judgment is reported in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J.406: I.L.R. 46Mad. 47. There the learned Judges dealt with the argument that as the preliminary decree did not contain a direction for an enquiry regarding profits, the Court was not competent to entertain that claim at the stage of the final decree. The question was considered at length from various aspects and it was held that it was competent for a Court to entertain the claim at the stage of the final decree even though the preliminary decree did not contain such a direction. A finding was then called for as regards the quantum and on other questions. When the matter came up after the findings were returned by the lower Court, it was dealt with by Oldfield and Venkatasubba Rao, JJ., and this is reported in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J.406: I.L.R. 46Mad. 47. What is relevant to this purpose is not what is reported in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J.406: I.L.R. 46Mad. 47. but the earlier judgment which is reported in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar4. In Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J.406: I.L.R. 46Mad. 47. the question was whether interest could be claimed in respect of the profits and the learned Judges held that the plaintiff was not entitled to interest. The Subordinate Judge says that a view contrary to Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 could be deduced from the decision in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 406: I.L.R. 46 Mad. 47 only by way of extension of the principle laid down in that case. It is very unfortunate that the subordinate Judge's attention was not drawn to the earlier decision in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 406: I.L.R. 46 Mad. 47.

6. In Swaminatha Odayar v. Gopalaswami Odayar (1938) 2 ML.J. 704 this question was dealt with at length by Venkatasubba Rao and Venkataramana Rao, If. At page 726, the learned Judges say this:

It is then contended that the final decree for mesne profits, not having been preceded by any preliminary decree relating to them, is incompetent. This contention is in our opinion untenable.

Then they discussed the question at great length and referred to the decision in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 406: I.L.R. 46 Mad. 47 and the other decisions. At page 728 they proceeded to say this:

It is then contended, the preliminary decree of 1924 being silent on the question of mesne profits, the Court was precluded at a later stage from going into it. That such a contention cannot: prevail, has been held in several decisions, with which we agree.

Reference was made to Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar(1922) 43 M.L.J. 406: I.L.R. 46 Mad. 47, Ramanathan Chetti v. Alagappa Chetti 1929) 59 M.L.J. 102: I.L.R. 53 Mad. 378. It was pointed out that as observed by Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 406: I.L.R. 46 Mad. 47, in all adjudications which are not intended to be final, there is, and ought always to be, an implied reservation of leave to alt parties, to apply for further directions, necessary for a complete disposal of the litigation. Then they referred to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Maulvi Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Abdul Aziz (1896) I.L.R. 19 All. 155 : L.R. 24 I.A. 22 (P.C.)., where it was held that the decision on the question of title was the primary question and the question of accounting was. incidental to it and that it was for the obvious advantage of all the parties that the question of title must first be decided and embodied in a preliminary decree and the second in a later stage of the proceedings.

7. As pointed out by Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 406: I.L.R. 46 Mad. 47 Every sharer has a clear right to an account of the profits received by the person in possession of the whole, and to be awarded his share thereof, not as mesne profits received by a person in wrongful possession but as appurtenant to the plaintiff's right in his share of the lands.

When the plaintiff asked for establishment of his right to a share in the lands, what is appurtenant to it, namely, a right to account need not be separately asked and hence there is no substance in the complaint that the plaint did not ask for it. As regards Ghulusam Bivi v. Ahamadsa Rowther (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 296 it is unfortunate that the attention of the Subordinate Judge was apparently not drawn to the decisions in Ramaswami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 406 : I.L.R. 46 Mad. 47 and Swaminatha Odayar v. Gopalaswami Odayar3. There is also a duty on the part of the judiciary to keep themselves informed of the current decisions of at least this High Court.

8. The result is that the parties are put to heavy expense and trouble to obtain, a proper decision on a point which as stated by Venkatasubba Rao, J., and Venkataramana Rao, J., in Swaminatha Odayar v. Gopalaswami Odayar (1938) 2 ML.J. 704 is well-settled.

9. I reverse the decree of the two lower Courts and direct an enquiry by the trial. Court into the amount of profits payable to the plaintiff for his half share from the date of suit. The Court-fee paid on the memorandum of second appeal in this; Court and on the memorandum of appeal in the lower appellate Court will be refunded. The appellant will have his costs in all the Courts up to date. Further costs will be provided for in the decree of the trial Court.

Panikkathe Kutti Pen... v. Panikkathe Kutti Pen...