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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These two applications concern Rs. 6,218-14-3 representing income from mortgaged properties (other than Misquith Buildings and Cathedral Gardens) credited to O. S. No. 229 of 1924. One application asked the court to direct the receiver to deposit the sum in court; the other (Application No. 244 of 1931) asked that the sum be paid to the plaintiff (the Maharajah of Pittapuram), who is petitioner in both applications. The Official Assignee of Madras and the plaintiff in C. S. No. 622 of 1923 opposed the applications.

Essential background facts (from the opinion):

  • In 1922, Gokuldoss, manager of a joint Hindu family trading as Murlidoss Ramdoss & Co., on behalf of the firm executed an equitable mortgage (depositing title-deeds of ten properties) with the Maharajah of Pittapuram and borrowed Rs. 3,85,000.
  • The Maharajah filed C. S. No. 229 of 1924 to recover principal and interest. Separately, a minor (third defendant) had earlier filed C. S. No. 622 of 1923, a partition suit against other firm members.
  • Mr. E. R. Krishnan was appointed receiver on 31st August 1923 over all properties alleged to belong to the joint family, including those mortgaged to the Maharajah. The firm was later adjudicated insolvent in 1924 and the Official Assignee was impleaded.
  • At the petitioner's request, the trial judge directed the receiver to keep a separate account of income from the mortgaged properties (25th July 1928) and to exclude that income from maintenance payments in O. S. No. 622 of 1923.
  • On 2nd May 1929 a mortgage decree in favour of the petitioner for about Rs. 7,00,000 was passed, and the existing receiver and another advocate were appointed as joint receivers for sale of the mortgaged properties (except Cathedral Gardens and Misquith Buildings). The sum now in the receiver’s hands represents income realised after that decree.
  • The mortgaged properties (except Cathedral Gardens) were sold and the petitioner purchased them; affidavits state only about three lakhs were realized by sale.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the income realised from properties mortgaged to the petitioner and held by the court-appointed receiver should be treated as additional security for the petitioner's mortgage debt and therefore applied in his favour.
  2. Whether a simple mortgagee (as opposed to an equitable mortgagee) in India is entitled to proceed against rents and profits in the hands of a receiver appointed in a mortgage suit—i.e., whether the principle granting such rights to an equitable mortgagee extends to a simple mortgagee, and consequentially whether the Official Assignee has any preferential right to that income.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Maharajah of Pittapuram)

  • The petitioner contended that the income realised from the mortgaged properties should be treated as additional security for the mortgage debt because the receiver was appointed at his instance in his mortgage suit.
  • He argued that possession by a receiver appointed in a mortgage suit is prima facie for the benefit of the party who obtained the appointment, so the receiver holds the property (and its income) for his benefit and must hand over the income to satisfy his dues.

Opposing Arguments (Official Assignee and other opponents)

  • The Official Assignee contended that the petitioner has no preferential rights to the income in question and that his rights are the same as ordinary creditors.
  • Mr. Duraiswami Ayyar (opposing counsel) accepted that an authority (Rameshwar Singh v. Chuni Lal Shaha) was against him but argued that the decision was wrong and that the English principle (allowing an equitable mortgagee to proceed against income in the receiver’s hands) should not be extended to a simple mortgagee in India because a simple mortgagee lacks the right of foreclosure enjoyed by an equitable mortgagee in England.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Player v. Crompton & Co. Ltd. (Crompton & Co. Ltd., In re Player v. Crompton & Co. Ltd.) Equitable mortgagee has the right to ask for appointment of a receiver where the security has become realisable. The court cited Warrington J.'s statement supporting that the appointment of a receiver is an ordinary right accruing to a mortgagee, using it to affirm the petitioner's entitlement to seek a receiver.
Kerr on Receivers (seventh edition), page 37 Textual authority supporting a mortgagee's right to appointment of a receiver. Referenced as supportive literature corroborating the right of a mortgagee (including an equitable mortgagee) to obtain a receiver.
Ethirajulu Chetty v. Rajagopalachariyar Held that the right to appointment of a receiver (ordinarily available to an equitable mortgagee) may be extended to a simple mortgagee. The court relied on this decision to justify treating simple mortgagees as entitled to appointment of a receiver.
Khubsurat Koer v. Sawda Charan Guha (also referenced as Saroda Charan Guha) If decree is for sale and security insufficient, a receiver will be appointed; and a receiver appointed in a mortgage suit is bound to apply proceeds for the mortgagee's benefit. Quoted to support the principle that a receiver's proceeds should be applied for the mortgagee's benefit and that a receiver will be appointed where necessary to protect the mortgagee's interest.
Rameshwar Singh v. Chum Lal Shaha (also cited as Rameshwar Singh v. Chuni Lal Shaha) Possession of a receiver in a mortgage suit is prima facie for the benefit of the party who obtained the appointment; a receiver appointed at the instance of a mortgagee holds the properties for his benefit and must make over the income to him. The court described this decision as a clear authority supporting the petitioner's contention and relied on it to rule that the income in the receiver's hands should be devoted to satisfaction of the petitioner's dues.
Penney v. Todd Held that possession of a receiver in a mortgage suit was prima facie for the benefit of the party who had obtained the appointment (invoked in Rameshwar Singh). Used as a supporting precedent (via Rameshwar Singh) for the proposition that a receiver's possession is prima facie for the benefit of the appointing party.
High on Receivers (third edition), paragraph 643 A mortgagee who procures a receiver to be appointed for protection of his lien is entitled to the rents and profits in the receiver's hands in preference to an assignee or purchaser, if sale proceeds are insufficient. Quoted to support the conclusion that the petitioner (who procured the receiver) has a preferential right to the income over the Official Assignee.
Coote on Mortgages (eighth edition, Vol. II, p. 823) Explains that an equitable mortgagee cannot take actual possession of the land mortgaged to him (context used to compare positions of equitable and simple mortgagees). Invoked to show that equitable and simple mortgagees are similarly unable to take possession, undermining the argument that foreclosure rights uniquely justify income claims.
In re Potts - Ex parte Taylor; Pearce. In re The Official Receiver; Gershon and Levy In re Authorities cited by opposing counsel (Mr. Duraiswami Ayyar) in support of his contention (specific rules not detailed in the opinion). The court expressly stated that these authorities "do not support the principle on which he has based his contention" and therefore did not accept them as defeating the petitioner's claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, relying on cited authorities and reasoning explicitly stated in the opinion:

  1. Characterisation of the petitioner's position:
    • The petitioner is an equitable mortgagee; his rights are treated as those of a simple mortgagee in that he is not entitled to possession and can only realise his dues by decree for sale.
  2. Recognised legal principle that mortgagees have the right to ask for appointment of a receiver:
    • The court cited English authority (Player v. Crompton & Co. Ltd.) and text (Kerr on Receivers) confirming that equitable mortgagees have a right to a receiver when security becomes realisable.
  3. Extension of receiver-related rights to simple mortgagees:
    • The court acknowledged prior Indian authority (Ethirajulu Chetty v. Rajagopalachariyar, Rameshwar Singh v. Chum Lal Shaha) that extended the right to appointment of a receiver to a simple mortgagee.
    • The court focused on the holding in Rameshwar Singh that the possession of a receiver is prima facie for the benefit of the party who caused the appointment, and that the receiver should make over the income to that party.
  4. Specific application to the present facts:
    • The receivers in C. S. No. 229 of 1924 were appointed at the petitioner's instance; paragraph 6 of the appointment order directed the receivers to pay "net receipts into Court to the credit of this suit (C. S. No. 229 of 1924)," which the court regarded as significant.
    • High on Receivers was invoked to show that a mortgagee procuring a receiver is entitled to rents in the receiver's hands in preference to an assignee or purchaser when sale proceeds are insufficient.
  5. Rejection of opposing contention that principle should not be extended to simple mortgagees:
    • Mr. Duraiswami Ayyar argued that the English principle should not be extended to simple mortgagees in India because a simple mortgagee lacks the right of foreclosure. The court rejected this, finding no necessary connection between the right of foreclosure and entitlement to appointment of a receiver or to claim income in the receiver's hands.
    • The court observed that equitable mortgagees themselves cannot take actual possession; hence, the similarity in incapacity to possess undercut the argument distinguishing the rights of equitable and simple mortgagees on that basis.
    • The court also expressly found that the authorities relied on by Mr. Duraiswami Ayyar (In re Potts - Ex parte Taylor; Pearce. In re The Official Receiver; Gershon and Levy In re) did not support his contention.
  6. Conclusion from authorities and facts:
    • Given that the receiver was appointed at the petitioner's instance and that the petitioner could not realise his decree amount by sale of the mortgaged properties alone, the court concluded the petitioner was entitled to proceed against the income in the hands of the receiver as a step to realise his security.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court ordered that the receiver deposit the sum of Rs. 6,218-14-3 in his hands to the credit of C. S. No. 229 of 1924, and also ordered that the same amount be paid over to the petitioner (the Maharajah of Pittapuram).

Costs:

The petitioner was awarded his taxed costs to be paid from the estate of the insolvents.

Implications:

  • The immediate practical effect is that the contested sum in the receiver's hands is to be deposited to the credit of the petitioner's mortgage suit and paid over to the petitioner.
  • The court applied and relied on earlier authorities to hold that where a receiver is appointed at the instance of a mortgagee, the income in the receiver's hands may be applied in preference to claims of an assignee/Official Assignee when sale proceeds are insufficient to satisfy the mortgagee's debt.
  • The opinion explicitly rejects the argument that the absence of a foreclosure right for a simple mortgagee defeats a claim to receiver-held income; the court extended the principle allowing equitable mortgagees to pursue rents in a receiver's hands to the case of a simple mortgagee in India (as applied to the facts of these applications).

All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion text and does not add information beyond that text.

    Rajah Rao Venkatakumara Mahipathi Surya Rao Bahadur Garu v. Gokuldoss Goverdhan Doss

    These two applications relate to the same subject-matter, that is, a sum of Rs. 6,218-14-3 standing to the credit of O. S. No. 229 of 1924 and representing the income from the mortgaged properties involved in that suit other than Misquith Buildings and Cathedral Gardens. In the one, the receiver is asked to deposit the amount in Court and in the other, that is, Application No. 244 of 1931, a request is made that the same sum may be paid over to the plaintiff in the suit, the Maharajah of Pittapuram, who is the petitioner in both the applications. The Official Assignee of Madras and the plaintiff in C. S. No. 622 of 1923 oppose these applications.

    The facts necessary for the disposal of these applications may be stated very briefly as follows: One Gokuldoss, manager of a joint Hindu family, trading under the style of Murlidoss Ramdoss & Co., effected on behalf of the firm an equitable mortgage by depositing title-deeds of ten items of properties with the petitioner, the Maharajah of Pittapuram, and borrowed from him a sum of Rs. 3,85,000 in the year 1922. For the recovery of the principal and interest due under this mortgage the Maharajah filed a suit, C. S. No. 229 of 1924, on 27th March 1924. In the meanwhile, the third defendant in the suit, a minor, had already filed C. S. No. 622 of 1923 against the other members of the firm for partition of the joint family properties. For disposing of these applications it is not necessary to state anything about the contentions of the parties in these suits. The suits were eventually decreed and appeals against the decrees are now pending in the Appellate Court. In C. S. No. 622 of 1923, the partition suit, Mr. E. R. Krishnan, an Advocate of this Court, was appointed on 31st August 1923, receiver of all the properties alleged to belong to the joint family of Messrs. Murlidoss Ramdoss and Co., including the properties mortgaged to the plaintiff in C.S No. 229 of 1924. Subsequently the firm was adjudicated insolvents in 1924 and the Official Assignee was impleaded as its legal representative. The receiver appointed by the Court continued in possession of the properties. On 18th July 1927, the petitioner (plaintiff in C.S No. 229 of 1924) made an application for the appointment of an independent receiver for the properties mortgaged to him; but, it would appear, the learned judge took the view that an independent receiver was unnecessary and that the plaintiff's interest could be safeguarded by directing the receiver in O. S. No. 622 of 1923 to keep a separate account of the income of the properties mortgaged to him and this was accordingly ordered on 25th July 1928. The receiver was also directed that none of the income from these properties should be spent in giving the maintenance allowed to the plaintiff in O. S. No. 622 of 1923. The petitioner again filed on 23rd April 1929 another application (Application No. 1524 of 1929) for the appointment of a receiver for the properties mortgaged to him. Both the suits were tried together by Venkatasubba Rao, J. On 2nd May 1929, a mortgage decree was passed in favour of the petitioner (plaintiff in C. S. No. 229 of 1924) for Rs. 7,00,000 and odd and for the sale of the items of mortgaged properties except Cathedral Gardens and Misquith Buildings; and on the same date the learned judge appointed Mr. E. R. Krishnan (the receiver in C. S. No. 622 of 1923) and Mr. P. Kameswara Rao, an Advocate, as joint receivers of the mortgaged properties for the sale of which the petitioner had established his right in the suit. The sum now in the hands of the receiver is stated to be the income from these properties realised subsequent to the date of the decree. The mortgaged properties except Cathedral Gardens were sold and were purchased by the petitioner himself. The affidavits stated that only a sum of three lakhs and odd were realized by the sale.

    The petitioner now claims that the income realised from the mortgaged properties should in law be treated as additional security for the amount due to him under the mortgage, inasmuch as the receiver was appointed at his instance in his mortgage suit and, as such, the income from the said properties should be considered to be ear-marked for his own use, it now having been found that his title to those properties has been established by the decree. His argument is that the possession of a receiver in a mortgage suit is prima facie for the benefit of the party who obtained the appointment, and on this principle he argues that the receiver who was appointed at his instance holds the property for his benefit and is bound to make over to him the entire income for the satisfaction of his dues. The Official Assignee, on the other hand, contends that with regard to this income the petitioner has no preferential rights and that his rights to it are only the same as those of the ordinary creditors. The question for division is, which view is right. If the petitioner's contention is to be upheld, he will be entitled to an order for the payment of the sum in question to him.

    Admittedly, the rights of the petitioner, who is an equitable mortgagee, are the same as those of a simple mortgagee, that is, he is not entitled to the possession of the properties under his mortgage; he can realise his dues only by getting a decree for selling them. In England it is well understood that an equitable mortgagee, though he is not entitled to take possession of the mortgaged properties, has the right to ask for the appointment of a receiver: Crompton & Co. Ltd., In re Player v. Crompton & Co. Ltd., (1). Warrington. J., observes at page 967:

    “I think the right to the appointment of a receiver is one of the ordinary rights which accrue to a mortgagee, and especially to an equitable mortgagee who has no means of taking possession and whose security has become realisable as one of the steps in such realization.”

    See also Kerr on Receivers (seventh edition), page 37. For some time there was some doubt in this Court as to whether a simple mortgagee is entitled to ask for the appointment of a receiver in his mortgage suit. It was held in Ethirajulu Chetty v. Rajagopalachariyar (2) that the right to the appointment of a receiver, which an equitable mortgagee has, may be extended to a simple mortgagee also. The fact that he is not entitled to have possession of the properties which was urged as an objection against his claim to the appointment of a receiver cannot be considered as of any importance having regard to the reasons for the appointment of a receiver. As pointed out in Khubsurat Koer v. Sawda Charan Guha (3),

    “If the decree is for sale, and if it is established that the security is not sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt, a receiver will be appointed almost as a matter of course, specially if there has been default in the payment of interest.”

    In Rameshwar Singh v. Chum Lal Shaha (4) Mukerjee and Panton, JJ., observed:

    “There is no foundation for the contention that a mortgagee who is not entitled to possession of the mortgaged properties is not entitled to ask for the appointment of a receiver. Whether the mortgagee is or is not entitled to possession, he may invite the Court to appoint a receiver, if the demands of justice require that the mortgagor should be deprived of possession.”

    If the object of appointing a receiver in a mortgage suit is to look after the interest of the mortgagee, though he is only a simple mortgagee, is he not entitled to claim that the profits of the mortgaged properties should be applied for his benefit when his security has become realisable, as one of the steps for such realisation? This point was considered in Rameshwar Singh v. Chuni Lal Shaha* , which I have already referred to. In that case, a receiver was appointed in a mortgage suit instituted by a simple mortgagee. The second mortgagee of the same properties was a party to the suit. The first mortgagee obtained a decree for the amount claimed by him; Meanwhile, the second mortgagee, who had a mortgage of only half of the property, had instituted a suit to enforce his security without joining the first mortgagee as a party. He obtained a decree and in execution of it he purchased the equity of redemption in relation to his mortgage. On an application made by him, the income of the property purchased by him in the hands of the receiver was ordered, in spite of the opposition of the first mortgagee, to be handed over to him by the Subordinate Judge of Dacca. This order was set aside in appeal. In the course of the judgment, Mukerjee and Panton, JJ., observed as follows:—

    “Our attention has been invited to the case of Penney v. Todd where it was ruled that the possession of a receiver in a mortgage suit was prima facie for the benefit of the party who had obtained the appointment. On this principle it has been argued that a receiver who was appointed at the instance of the first mortgagee holds the properties for his benefit alone and is bound to make over to him the entire income for the satisfaction of his dues. In our opinion, this contention is clearly well founded.”

    This decision is a clear authority in support of the contention urged by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the petitioner. If, according to this decision, the receivers in C. S. No. 229 of 1924 are to be considered as having been appointed for the benefit of the petitioner at whose instance they were appointed, then it must follow that the income in their hands from the mortgaged properties should be devoted to the satisfaction of his dues. I may here refer to paragraph 6 of the order of the learned Judge appointing the receivers which is somewhat significant. It states subject to certain expenses the receivers “shall pay the net receipts into Court to the credit of this suit” (i.e, C. S. NO. 229 of 1924). In Khubsurat Koer v. Saroda Charan Guha , Mukerjee, J., observes thus:

    “If a Receiver is appointed in a mortgage suit, he is bound to apply the proceeds for the benefit of the mortgagee.”

    In High on Receivers (third edition), in paragraph 643, it is stated that a mortgagee who procures a receiver to be appointed in a mortgage suit is entitled to the income from the mortgaged properties in the hands of the receiver in preference to the assignee. This statement of law is very relevant to the present proceedings, as objection to the payment of the money is here raised by the Official Assignee. The passage in which the statement of law is made runs thus:

    “When, therefore, a mortgagee, upon proceedings for a foreclosure, obtains a receiver of the rents and profits, if the amount obtained upon a sale of the premises proves insufficient to pay the mortgage indebtedness, he is entitled to so much of the rents in the receiver's hands as will make up the deficiency. And this is so, even though the mortgagor's rights in the premises have passed to his assignee in bankruptcy, and have been sold by him; since the mortgagee, who procures a receiver to be appointed for the protection of his lien, is entitled to the rents in preference to the assignee or purchaser at his sale.”

    These authorities would show that the learned Advocate-General's contention that the petitioner is entitled to the payment of the amount claimed should be accepted. Since the receiver in this case was appointed at the instance of the petitioner and since he was not able to realise his decree amount by the sale of the mortgaged properties, it must be held that he is clearly entitled to proceed against the income in the hands of the receiver as one of the steps for realisation of his security.

    Mr. Duraiswami Ayyar frankly concedes that the decision in Rameshwar Singh v. Chuni Lal Shaha* , is against him, but he argues that the decision is wrong and the principle of the English decision, which grants the right to an equitable mortgagee to proceed against the income of the mortgaged properties in the hands of the receiver for realising his debt when the security is insufficient, should not be extended to the case of a simple mortgagee in India who does not possess the right of foreclosure, which an equitable mortgagee has in England. I do not think this is a sound contention. If this is the correct principle to be applied, then it must also follow that a simple mortgagee is not entitled to the right of appointment of a receiver in a mortgage suit; but this I have already shown is not the case. It is true that a simple mortgagee has no right of foreclosure; but, in my opinion, it has not been established that there is any connection between the right of foreclosure and the right of getting a receiver appointed and the right of appropriating the income in the hands of the receiver, in the case of an equitable mortgagee. As already pointed out, a receiver will be appointed, if the demands of justice require that the mortgagor should be deprived of possession. In this connection, it may be observed that the right of foreclosure possessed by an equitable mortgagee, so much emphasized by Mr. Duraiswami Ayyar in his argument, is a right enforceable only by means of an action for the recovery of land; he cannot take actual possession of the land mortgaged to him as he is not entitled to it (see Coote on Mortgages, eighth editition, Volume II, page 823) and, in this respect, he is exactly in the same position as a simple mortgagee. The right of an equitable mortgagee to get a receiver appointed in a mortgage suit having been extended to a simple mortgagee, neither of them having any right to possession of the properties, I think his admitted right to proceed against the income of the mortgaged property in the hands of the receiver for realizing his debt, when the security is insufficient for that purpose, may also be extended to the case of a simple mortgagee in India. In my opinion, the authorities cited by Mr. Duraiswami Ayyar, In re Potts-Exparte Taylor Pearce. In re The Official Receiver , and Gershon and Levy In re , do not support the principle on which he has based his contention.

    For the above reasons, I order the receiver to deposit the sum of Rs. 6,218-14-3 in his hands to the credit of C. S. No. 229 of 1924; and I also order that the same amount may be paid over to the petitioner in these applications. The petitioner is entitled to his costs (taxed costs) from the estate of the insolvents.

    King and Partridge. Attorneys for the seventh defendant.

    N. R. R.Order made.

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    Rajah Rao Venkatakumara Mahipathi Surya Rao Bahadur Garu v. Gokuldoss Goverdhan Doss
    (Mar 3, 1931)