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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit by the plaintiff seeking a declaration that (a) a partition-deed dated 8th December 1907 (Exhibit III and attached sheets Exhibit III(a)) alleged to have been executed between the deceased Subba Naicken, his paternal uncle, and Nagammal (the plaintiff's mother, acting on behalf of the minor plaintiff) is not genuine and (b) a will of Subba Naicken dated 27th December 1907 is not genuine or, alternatively, that both instruments are invalid and ineffective to defeat the plaintiff's right of survivorship in the joint family properties.

Relevant background facts (as set out in the opinion): Ramasami Naick (the plaintiff's father) and Subba Naicken were undivided brothers. Ramasami Naick died on 27th December 1906 leaving his widow Nagammal and a minor son (the plaintiff). Nagammal lived with Subba Naicken. Shortly before the partition-deed date, Nagammal executed a power-of-attorney (7th December 1907) to effect a division of her son's share. Subba Naicken went to Mallankinar in December 1907, statements were taken by police and magistrate on 4th and 7th December, and Subba Naicken died on the night of the 9th or 10th December 1907. Exhibit III recites a division into two equal moieties (valued at Rs. 80,000), is signed by Subba Naicken and (purportedly) by Nagammal by mark, and is attested by witnesses; the attached schedules (Exhibit III(a)) are not signed by the parties.

Procedurally: The Subordinate Judge of Madura dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The District Judge found Exhibit III genuine but held Exhibit III(a) was not written in Subba Naicken's lifetime and therefore Exhibit III effected only a division in status; the will was found genuine but inoperative because no partition of properties had been carried out before death. Registration proceedings followed (a separate suit to compel registration was dismissed on the ground that Subba Naicken's widow was not competent to present the document), and the present appeal was heard in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Exhibit III (the partition-deed dated 8th December 1907) is genuine.
  2. Whether Nagammal (the minor's mother) was competent to consent to the partition on behalf of the minor and whether her consent was valid given the proximity of Subba Naicken's death.
  3. Whether a declaration effecting a division in status (severance of co-parcenary) requires registration under the provisions of the Registration Act to be admissible or to operate in respect of immovable property.
  4. Whether, if Exhibit III effected only a division in status, the subsequent will (Exhibit IV) could operate to defeat the plaintiff's right of survivorship.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The partition-deed (Exhibit III) and attached schedules (Exhibit III(a)) are not genuine; Nagammal denies her signature/mark and denies presence at Mallankinar when document was executed.
  • The partition-deed, insofar as it affects immovable property, requires registration; Exhibit III was not registered and therefore cannot be admitted or effect partition of immovables.
  • Because Subba Naicken died shortly after the partition, Nagammal must have known of his impending death and thus should not have been allowed to consent to a partition that defeats the minor's right of survivorship.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Evidence (multiple defence witnesses including the writer of the document, panchayatdars, the Village Munsif, the karnam, and statements made by Subba Naicken before the magistrate/police) supports the genuineness of Exhibit III; Subba Naicken and Nagammal both signed (Nagammal by mark).
  • The partition was effected in presence of panchayatdars and by agreement; Exhibit III effects a division in status (severance of co-parcenary) even though schedules were not signed.
  • Even if unregistered, a document effecting a division in status does not itself create or transfer specific immovable property rights; registration is not required for a change of status that is not an instrument conferring a specific property right.
  • The will (Exhibit IV) is genuine; its operation is dependent on whether a partition (or division in status) existed prior to Subba Naicken's death.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain Privy Council authority that a definite and unambiguous declaration of separation by a member of a Mitakshara family may amount to separation; intention must be unequivocal and clearly expressed. The court relied on this authority to hold that a member may effect a separation by declaration and used it to support the proposition that Exhibit III could effect a division in status by declaration.
Bulakee Lal v. Mussamat Indurputtee Kowar; Mussamat Vato Koer v. Rowshun Singh; Ram Dhyan Koonwar v. Musammat Phoolbas Kooer; Raghubanund Doss v. Sadku Churn Doss; Radha Churn Doss v. Kripa Sindhu Doss Earlier Calcutta High Court decisions taking a view (before Suraj Narain) consistent with the possibility of separation by declaration. Referenced as part of the body of authorities considered in relation to the legal question whether a declaration can effect separation; used to show historical support for the rule relied upon in Suraj Narain.
Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhalu Maistri; Thandayuthapani Kangiar v. Raghunantha Kangiar Madras High Court decisions taking a contrary view to the Privy Council on the effect of a mere declaration of separation. Noted as contrary authorities placed before the Privy Council and considered by the court; these conflicting precedents were weighed in assessing the law.
Jiwan Ali Beg v. Basa Mal Principle that only documents which on their face show they fall within the sections of the Registration Act require registration. Cited (Cf.) to support the proposition that registration is required only where the instrument on its face confers or affects immovable property within the meaning of the Act.
Ramaswamy Iyer v. Thirupathi Naick Illustration that where a custom or incidental rule operates to create a right (e.g., occupancy) the document itself may not be the operative source; if document itself does not confer the right, registration may not be necessary. Used to argue that where operation of Hindu custom or law produces an interest, registration of the instrument may not be compulsory if the document itself does not confer the right.
Lakshmamma v. Kameswara Decision that an unregistered partition-deed cannot be received in evidence to affect even the movable property referred to therein (on view that such partition was an indivisible transaction). Cited by appellant; the court noted this authority but also observed that its force was weakened by later authority (Thandavan v. Yalliamma) and distinguished it on facts and principle.
Thandavan v. Yalliamma Authority holding that a document inadmissible to affect immovable property (for want of registration) may nonetheless be admissible to prove transactions concerning movable property. Relied on to challenge the absolute rule in Lakshmamma; used to support the proposition that inadmissibility for immovables does not necessarily prevent admissibility for movables.
Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai Authority cited in the context of admissibility and separability of documents affecting different kinds of property. Referred to alongside Thandavan as supporting the limited admissibility of unregistered documents for collateral (movable) matters.
Upendra Nath Banetjee v. Umesh Chandra Banerjee Statement that an unregistered document in that case was not produced to prove any collateral transaction. Cited to distinguish cases where an unregistered document was not being relied on for collateral matters; referenced in discussion of admissibility.
Ayyakutti Mankondan v. Periasami Koundan Previously considered in this Court on similar questions of registration and the effect of unregistered partition-like instruments; contains contrasting judicial views. Referred to as a prior decision with arguments on both sides that resemble those in the present case; used in comparative discussion of the law.
Subramania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal Decision relevant to whether a separation in status effected by instrument requires registration; contains reasoning relied upon by one judge in this case. Discussed and relied on by the majority judge for the view that a document effecting only a division in status need not be registered to be operative as a change of status.
Mahashoya Shosinath v. Siramati Krisha Soondari Dasi Authority raising doubt whether adoption is effected by deed or by the act of giving and taking; used in analogy to question whether some rights arise by operation of law rather than by deed. Discussed in the dissenting reasoning (Oldfield, J.) as part of weighing whether certain rights (like those from adoption) arise by operation of law rather than by the instrument.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two principal judgments: Sankaran Nair, J. (majority view on the key questions addressed) and Oldfield, J. (concurring in some facts but dissenting as to the effect of registration on immovables). Their reasoning as stated in the text is summarized below.

Sankaran Nair, J. — Reasoning (majority on admissibility/registration point)

  1. Genuineness of Exhibit III: The District Judge believed the defence evidence. The majority carefully examined the evidentiary record: witnesses for defendants (including the writer of the document, panchayatdars, Village Munsif, karnam and other defence witnesses) supported execution of Exhibit III in Mallankinar with Subba Naicken signing and Nagammal affixing her mark; this evidence was corroborated by Subba Naicken's earlier statement (Exhibit II) made before his death. The plaintiff's oral denials and limited contradictory evidence were held insufficient to rebut the defence case. On balance of probabilities the court held Exhibit III genuine.
  2. Competence and validity of Nagammal's consent: The court accepted that the mother of a minor is ordinarily a proper representative entitled to agree to partition on behalf of the minor. The contention that her assent was invalid because she knew of Subba Naicken's imminent death was rejected: the law will not refuse effect to a valid demand for partition because of a contingency (probability) of another's death. The court relied on Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain to support that a clear declaration of separation can effect severance of status.
  3. Whether Exhibit III required registration: The court defined a "division in status" as a severance of co-parcenary where property remains unapportioned and in joint enjoyment but shares are fixed in amount and no longer liable to increase or diminution by births/deaths; such a document may have no reference to specific property and thus "does not in itself create any interest." On principle the majority held that a document merely creating separation in status does not fall within registration provisions requiring registration, because it does not itself create or transfer specific immovable property rights — any effect is by operation of Hindu law rules, not by the instrument.
  4. On estoppel and prior registration proceedings: The court observed that the plaintiff had previously contested registration before the Registrar and in earlier suits; having defeated the widow's attempts to register the document, the plaintiff could not belatedly contend in this appeal that for want of registration the document is invalid. Further, no decisive showing was made that the Registrar's conclusion that Exhibit III could not be registered was wrong. Thus the majority considered the registration objection to be an argument the appellant should not be permitted to raise on appeal, though the judge also gave an independent opinion on the legal question of whether registration was required.
  5. Application of authorities: The majority relied on Privy Council authority (Suraj Narain) to hold a declaration may effect separation; they discussed and distinguished authorities concerning admissibility of unregistered documents — rejecting the absolute applicability of Lakshmamma v. Kameswara by relying on Thandavan v. Yalliamma and other decisions which allow limited admissibility (e.g., for movables or collateral matters). The majority concluded Exhibit III operated only to change status and therefore did not require registration under the Registration Act.
  6. Result: On these grounds Sankaran Nair, J. held Exhibit III genuine and operative to effect a division in status; the will was genuine but inoperative for want of prior partition of properties (as held below); the appeal was dismissed with costs (the judgment notes disagreement among the judges on registration but proceeds to dismissal).

Oldfield, J. — Reasoning (partial concurrence; dissent on registration/immovables)

  1. Concurrence on facts and genuineness: Oldfield, J. agreed with Sankaran Nair, J. that Exhibit III was executed and that Nagammal's consent was valid. He concurred in the finding as to execution and the need for mother's consent.
  2. Dissent on registration and immovables: Oldfield, J. considered Exhibit III (on its face) to declare that movables and immovables valued at Rs. 80,000 had been divided into two moieties, and that lists (Exhibit III(a)) giving particulars were not properly part of Exhibit III. He held that the greatest direct effect of Exhibit III, unregistered, would be to convert the joint holding into tenancy-in-common (a vested title to each member's share), i.e., that Exhibit III did affect property within the meaning of Section 17 and Section 48 of the Registration Act. Therefore, in his view, Exhibit III should have been registered to be operative in relation to immovable property.
  3. Policy and statutory considerations: Oldfield, J. emphasized the Registration Act's policy and protections for purchasers, and considered that an instrument which changes the nature of rights in immovable property falls within the registration requirements. He rejected the majority view that operation of Hindu law should be treated independently of the instrument; if the instrument invokes the operation of law to create substantive rights in immovable property it must satisfy registration formalities.
  4. Application of authorities: He examined authorities on adoption and leases and stressed that some unregistered documents may be inoperative as affecting immovables; he considered objections to relying on procedural defects (e.g., incompetent presenter) as precluding later objection on registration grounds to be unsustainable.
  5. Conclusion: Oldfield, J. would have allowed the appeal as regards immovable properties (i.e., would have found Exhibit III inadmissible/unoperative for immovables due to non-registration) but stated he would do so without costs. Nonetheless, the final order recorded in the text is dismissal of the appeal; Oldfield's view is recorded as a dissent on the registration point.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and practical implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The court (by majority reasoning) held Exhibit III to be genuine and that it effected a division in status (severance of co-parcenary in status) — consequently the will (Exhibit IV) though genuine was inoperative insofar as it attempted to affect rights dependent on a prior partition of properties.
  • The majority held that a document which effects only a division in status — i.e., fixes shares without apportioning specific immovable properties and without creating specific proprietary rights by the instrument itself — does not require registration under the Registration Act to be admissible for proving that change of status.
  • On the registration point there was a clear judicial split: Oldfield, J. disagreed and held that where an instrument on its face effects a change in the nature of rights in immovable property (within the meaning of Section 17 and Section 48 of the Registration Act), registration is required; he would have allowed the appeal with respect to immovables (without costs).
  • The plaintiff is therefore unsuccessful in the claim to set aside Exhibit III; the decree of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the suit is affirmed by this Court (final order: appeal dismissed). Costs were awarded as indicated in the judgment (the majority refers to costs under Section 98(2) CPC).

Broader precedential effect: The opinion discusses and applies established authorities concerning (a) the capacity of a declaration to effect a division in status and (b) the interplay between instruments affecting co-parcenary and registration requirements. The judgment records a division of judicial opinion on whether a separation-in-status instrument that operates with respect to immovables must be registered. The court did not purport to lay down a novel, uncontested rule that resolves all future cases: a significant difference of view between the judges on the registration point is explicitly recorded.

    Pothi Naicken v. R. Naganna Naicker

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Sankaran Nair, J.:— This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a decree passed by the Subordinate Judge of Madura, dismissing his suit for a declaration that a partition-deed alleged to have been executed between the deceased Subba Naicker, his paternal uncle, and Nagammal, the mother of the minor, plaintiff acting on his behalf, on the 8th December, 1907, and a will alleged to have been executed by Subba Naicken on the 27th December, 1907 are not genuine; and in the alternative, that they are invalid and ineffective to affect the plaintiff's right of survivorship to the joint family properties. Ramasami Naick, the plaintiff's father, and Subba Naicken, his brother, were undivided brothers. Ramasami Naick died on 27th December, 1906 leaving his widow, Nagammal, and a minor son the plaintiff. She continued to live in the family house with Subba Naicken. On the 7th December, 1907 she executed a power-of-attorney in favour of her sambandhi, Ramasami Naicken, who is the defendants' 2nd witness. The power-of-attorney was executed in order to effect a division of her son's share of the joint family property with Subba Naicken. The partition, however, was not carried out. Subba Naick was ill for some time and he went to Mallankinar, the village of his brother-in-law, Kuppusami Naicken, in December 1907. A telegram was sent to the Sub-Magistrate of Aruppukottai by one Vyravan Asari, P.W No. 5, to the effect that Kuppusami Naicken had carried away the properties of Subba Naicken which were deposited for safe custody at Aruppukottai. The Station House Officer went to Mallankinar and took a statement from Subba Naicken on the 4th December, Subsequently the Magistrate also came to the village and took another statement on the 7th. Subba Naicken went back to his village, Ramanujapuram, and died there either on the night of the 9th or on the 10th. The partition-deed is dated 8th. It consists of two parts Exhibit III and Exhibit III(a). Exhibit III recites that as the family properties valued at Rs. 80,000 had been divided in the presence of Panchayatdars into two equal moieties. “Our connection shall hereafter be only by relationship, but we shall have no monetary concern in respect of these properties.” It purports to have been signed by Subba Naicken and by Nagammal by affixing her mark. It is attested by 12 witnesses and by the writer. Attached to that Exhibit III are certain sheets of paper which contain the schedules of properties. They are admittedly not signed either by Subba Naicken or Nagammal. They are attested by about fifteen witnesses. The District Judge has held that Exhibit III was signed by Subba Naicken and Nagammal, that Exhibit III(a) was not written in Subba Naicken's life-time and, therefore, no effect can be given to it: and he finds, therefore, that Exhibit III effects only a division in status. He finds the will is genuine, but it is inoperative because there was no partition of properties before the death. He accordingly dismissed the suit. After Subba Naicken's death the will was presented for registration and though the Registrar found that Exhibit III was genuine, he was of opinion that under the provisions of the Registration Act the document could not be registered as it did not contain any particulars of properties. A suit was then filed (Original Suit No. 26 of 1909, Subordinate Court of Madura) to get the document registered. The Subordinate Judge and in appeal the High Court held that Subba Naicken's widow was not competent to present the document for registration, the Registrar was right in refusing to register the document. The first question that arises for determination is whether Exhibit III is genuine. The evidence adduced on behalf of the defence shows that about ten days before Subba Naick's death he went to Aruppukottai where he had kept some property in an iron safe and his cash box in charge of one Sankara Kumara Pillai. He was accompanied by the plaintiff's mother, Nagammal, P.W No. 1 his own wife, Seethammal, D.W No r, plaintiff, Nagammal's brother, P.W 6, and Kuppusami Naicken who is Seethammal's brother. He went to Mallankinar for treatment taking the safe with him. There the Station House Officer and Sub-Magistrate came to him and took certain statmems from him. After they left he told his friends and relatives that even during his life-time his enemies were creating trouble and, therefore, it was in the interests of all parties that there should be a partition. Nagammal had in the meantime left for Ramanujapuram. She came back to Mallankinar. According to Ramasami Naick, Subba Naick had sent for her and told her that there would be trouble about her son's property after his death and she had better effect a partition. Nagammal agreed to this. Certain persons were sent for and the partition-deed, Exhibit III, was drawn up. Subba Naick signed it and Nagammal touched the pen, the writer writing her name. After that the lists, Exhibits III(a), were prepared but Subba Naick and Nagammal did not sign, as the former said as it was panchayatdars that divided the property, it was enough if they signed and they alone accordingly signed. There is considerable body of evidence in support of this case. Seethammal, the widow of Subba Naick, D.W No i, Ramasami Naicken, D.W No. 2 whose son is married to plaintiff's sister and who evidently enjoyed the confidence of the plaintiff's mother as it was in his favour that she executed power-of-attorney to demand partition from Subba Naick and who is alleged to be worth 2 or 3 lacs of rupees, defendants' 7th witness, the Village Munsif of Mallankinar who attested Exhibit III(a) and the will, Exhibit IV, 9th witness who is the karnam of Kovilangulam and has also attested Exhibit III(a), and many other witnesses, who are panchayatdars, support this case. The plaintiff's mother no doubt denies her signature. She says she does not know whether Subba Naicken went to Aruppukottai at all, and she denies that she went to Mallankinar herself. This is directly contradicted by the statement of Subba Naicken made before his death when he had no motive for uttering any falsehood. See Exhibit II. The evidence of the 2nd witness is no doubt in her favour. He says that the plaintiff's mother remained in Ramanujapuram all the time and that it was he himself who took Subba Naicken and his wife and children to Mallankinar. The plaintiff's 3rd witness is the writer of Exhibit III. His evidence strongly supports the defence case so far as Exhibit III is concerned. He is a writer of documents. He says he gets 8 annas or one rupee for writing a document and at the request of one of the defence witnesses D.W No. 8, he wrote Exhibit III in the presence of a good number of people from Mallankinar, Kovilangulam and Ramanujapuram. He says that the plaintiff's mother, her brother, Narayana Naick, were present; they had the deed written. Subba Naick signed it and the plaintiff's mother affixed her mark. Narayana Naick, plaintiff's maternal uncle, also attested it. Exhibit III(a) was signed by the witness only two or three days after Subba Naick's death. The next two witnesses, plaintiff's witnesses Nos. 4 and 5, are examined to show that the telegram to the Sub-Magistrate that Kuppusami Naick had removed his iron safe, was sent at the instance of Subba Naick. This is opposed to the evidence of Subba Naicken himself and does not directly bear on the genuineness of Exhibit III. The last witness, P.W No. 6, is the brother of P.W No. 1, who is alleged by the defence witnesses to have attested Exhibit III. He says that the signature in Exhibit III looks like his, but denies that he signed it. He was not examined before the District Registrar who commented strongly on the omission, and there is no doubt it was on that account that he has now been examined. This oral evidence of the plaintiff is not sufficient to rebut the evidence given on behalf of the defendants. The probabilities are in favour of the genuineness of Exhibit III. The plaintiff's mother had been demanding partition. Subba Naicken had stated before the Station House Officer, Exhibit II, that the bulk of the property belonged to himself and did not form family property. There is little doubt that it was in the interests of the plaintiff himself that the matter should be settled during Subba Naick's life-time in the way she wanted it herself. There is nothing, therefore, improbable in the evidence of the defendants that when Subba Naicken suggested to her the desirability of a partition she agreed to it. The Judge has believed the defence evidence and I see no reason to differ from him. I, therefore, hold that Exhibit III is genuine.

    2. It is next argued that the plaintiff's mother was not justified in consenting to a division of properties on that date. It is not denied that under ordinary circumstances she would be entitled on behalf of her minor son to enter into an agreement of partition. If a partition cannot take place among the members of a Hindu family when there is a minor, then a partition would, in many cases, be impossible. In this family there can be no doubt that his mother was his proper representative. But it is said that Subba Naicken died within a few days after the partition and that she must have known of his impending death, and, therefore, she was wrong in consenting to this partition, which had the effect of defeating the right of the minor to take by survivorship the entire property of Subba Naick who has no sons. I am not able to accept this contention. The law will not recognise the contingency or probability of a person's death as a reason for not consenting to a demand for partition which a person is entitled to claim. It was argued before us that as she was not entitled to give her assent to the partition, a declaration by Subba Naick alone of severance of interest would not be of any avail. This question does not arise, as I have found that the minor's mother was a consenting party to the partition. But as the question is fully argued and I do not feel any doubt on the question I proceed to give my opinion.

    3. I think the question is really concluded by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain(1). Their Lordships say in that case that a definite and unambiguous indication by one member of intention to separate himself and to enjoy his share in severalty may amount to separation, but to have that effect the intention must be unequivocal and clearly expressed. In my opinion it clearly means that it is open to a member of an undivided family governed by the Mitakshara Law to effect a separation between himself and the other members of the family by a declaration to that effect made to the other members. Of course, the declaration must be clear and in such a form that it is not open to him afterwards to say that he still continues to be a member. It is said that their Lordships must not be taken to have decided this question as their statement of law itself is not clear and it is opposed to their own prior decisions and to the accepted principles of the Hindu Law of co-parcenary. Before that decision in a series of cases, Bulakee Lal v. Mussamat Indurputtee Kowar(2), Mussamat Vato Koer v. Rowshun Singh(3), Ram Dhyan Koonwar v. Musammat Phoolbas Kooer(4), Raghubanund Doss v. Sadku Churn Doss(5), Radha Churn Doss v. Kripa Sindhu Doss(6), the Calcutta High Court had taken this view. The Madras High Court in Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhalu Maistri(7) and in Thandayuthapani Kangiar v. Raghunantha Kangiar(8) had taken the contrary view. Both these views were placed before their Lordships. The opinion of one at least of the commentators of Hindu Law is clear on the point. In Vyavahara Mayuka—Mandlik on Hindu Law, page 38—it is said that “even where there is a total absence of any property, a partition is effected by the mere declaration, ‘I am separate from thee.’ For partition is a particular condition of the mind and this declaration is indicative of the same.” In these circumstances I cannot disregard the expression of opinion by their Lordships of the Privy Council. I am, therefore, of opinion that this contention cannot be allowed. The next question that is argued before us is that Exhibit III requires registration and is, therefore, not admissible in evidence to prove even a division in status. This objection was not raised in the lower Courts. Subba Naick's widow, Seethammal, presented the document for registration and on the Sub-Registrar's refusal she appealed to the District Registrar before whom the plaintiff contended that the document should not be registered. After hearing both sides the District Registrar refused her application on the ground that neither Exhibit III nor Exhibit III(a) can be registered, though he found that Exhibit III was genuine. She then filed a suit for an order to direct registration, the plaintiff contested the suit. It was decided in appeal by the High Court that she was not entitled to present the document for registration or to get it registered. It would be unjust to allow the plaintiff now, after defeating all her attempts to get her documents registered both before the Registration officers and before the Civil Courts, to contend that for want of registration the document is invalid. The decision that she could not get the document registered is binding on him and he is estopped from raising the plea. Moreover the Registrar has decided that Exhibit III cannot be registered under the provisions of the Registration Act. Assuming that decision is not binding on the parties, it is not shown to be wrong and that the document could be registered. In that case the objection is not of any force. It was while the litigation was pending that the present suit was filed and I have no doubt that the objection was not raised in the lower Court, because it was then thought that the question of registration would depend upon the result of that decision. For these reasons I am of opinion that the appellant should not be allowed to raise this question in appeal. But as my learned brother disagrees with me, I proceed to give my opinion on the main question whether a will effecting a division in status requires registration.

    4. For the decision of this question a division in status may be taken to be a severance of co-parcenary between some or all of the members of an undivided family, although the property is unapportioned and left in joint enjoyment as before. The act may be unilateral as we have already decided. A definite and unambiguous declaration by a member is sufficient to constitute him a divided member though this, in my opinion, makes no difference in principle. The only changes effected by a division in status are that the share is fixed without liability to increase or diminution by deaths or births and that on the death of a member without sons, his share so fixed devolves on his widow or the other heirs who take according to the rule of Hindu Law of succession in the absence of sons. A document declaring such division in status may be taken for this purpose to have no reference to property at all. It effects only a change in status. On principle such a document does not require registration, as a person's power of dealing with any specific property is not affected thereby.

    5. It is argued that the joint tenancy has been converted into tenancy-in-common. The differences between the joint tenancy of a Hindu family and as it is understood in English Law must be borne in mind. In the former the joint tenancy has its origin in birth and not by conveyance there is no unity of possession, the managing member being alone entitled to it against the others. There is no unity of title, as the members do not derive their interest at the same time. There is no unity of time, as they do not hold for the same time and from the same time. There is no unity of interest, as some may be entitled to larger shares than others. The chief characteristic of survivorship does not exist, as a co-parcener's interest devolves not on all the others but only on his sons if any. A co-parcener's interest is again liable to diminution unlike the interest of a joint tenant in English Law. The notion that a document effecting a severance in status requires registration is due apparently to the notion derived from English Law that the member thereby takes a specific part of the whole as-his exclusive property. But a division in status only fixes the share without liability to fluctuation and introduces a new rule of devolution of property in the absence of sons. The rights of the co-sharers are not otherwise varied. The entire property remains common stock, the co-sharers continue interested in every part of it. Whatever increment is made to the common stock becomes part of it as before severance, no matter by whose exertions it may have been made. The expressive words of Apararka that partition does not create any new right but has only the effect of rendering visible the right already existing, applies strictly to this kind of partition. I am of opinion that a document merely creating a separation in status does not fall within the provisions of the Registration Act requiring registration. It does not in itself create any interest and if any is created it is by operation of rules of Hindu Law, not by virtue of the instrument.

    6. Exhibit III itself does not in terms divide any specific property. Neither Subba Naick nor the plaintiff derives any title to any specific property under it. It is only documents which on their face show that they come within the terms of the sections of the Registration Act that require registration. Cf. Jiwan Ali Beg v. Basa Mal(9). This is also the view taken by this High Court. Mere possibility or probability is not enough. For the same reason if it is a custom or a rule of Hindu Law that in conjunction with the deed operates to create a title to immovable property, registration is not compulsory. Grant of waste lands or dharkhast in zemindaris and certain estate carries with it according to custom a right of occupancy. But if the document itself does not confer the right no registration is necessary. Ramaswamy Iyer v. Thirupathi Naick(10). Similarly a deed of adoption does not require registration, though adoption confers on the adopted son an interest in the immovable property of the family of the adoptive father. Reliance is placed on Lakshmamma v. Kameswara(11). In that case, it was decided that an unregistered partition-deed cannot be received in evidence to effect even the movable property referred to therein. It proceeds on the view that the partition therein effected was an indivisible transaction and if therefore it cannot be received to affect immovable property, it cannot be received to affect movable property either. Here the question is not whether the transaction is one and indivisible. A transaction effecting a division in status is very different from one effecting a division of properties. Further the authority of Lakshmamma v. Kameswara is greatly shaken by the decision of Thandavan v. Yalliamma(12), in which it was laid down that a document which is inadmissible to effect a transaction, in so far as it affects immovable property, may be received in evidence so far as the other properties are concerned. See also Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai(13). In Upendra Nath Banetjee v. Umesh Chandra Banerjee(14) it is distinctly stated that the unregistered document there in question was not produced to prove any collateral transaction. The cases deciding that a lease or a sale cannot be received in evidence in order to prove the nature of the possession of the party who held under that document, have no application. They proceed on the principle that as the possession of the land in such cases can only be proved by proof of the transaction directly and in terms affecting immovable property, the documents are not thereby admissible. I, therefore, disallow this contention.

    7. But as my learned brother disagrees with me, the appeal is dismissed with costs under Section 98(2) of the CPC.

    Oldfield, J.:— I have had the advantage of reading my learned brother's judgment and I can add nothing in support of his finding, in which I concur, as to the execution of Exhibit III and the validity of, and necessity for, the plaintiff's mother's consent to the partition. I regret that I differ from his conclusion that the partition can be established as regards the immovable property in suit notwithstanding that Exhibit III is unregistered.

    8. The facts are that the deceased Subba Naick could dispose of his property by will in 2nd defendant's favour, only if he possessed a separate interest in it, that is, if he was at the date of his death divided in estate from the plaintiff, his minor nephew. Exhibit III is alleged to have effected such a division. Its terms include statements that “the cash, movables and immovables, Court decrees, etc., of which these two coparceners are possessed, valued at Rs. 80,000,” have been divided into equal moieties, that their connection shall hereafter be only by relationship and that they will get the pattas relating to the lands allotted to their respective shares transferred to their names separately. There is no further specification of the properties dealt with or which fell to each share. Such specification is wanting also in the will, Exhibit IV, and is given only in the lists, Exhibit III(a). But they are useless because, we agree with the lower Court, they were not part of Exhibit III and were not executed by or part of the act of the deceased.

    9. The objection that Exhibit III is unregistered was first taken in this Court; and the arguments for and against it have mainly followed those relied on by Sadasiva Aiyar, J., on the one side in Ayyakutti Mankondan v. Periasami Koundan(15) and on the other by Spencer, J., in that case and my learned brother, Sankaran Nair, J., in Subramania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal(16). I am unable to regard the question as concluded by the authority of the latter decision because I understand Pinhey, J., who also took part in it, to have proceeded, not only on the unregistered documents then in question, but also on the other evidence that a partition had occurred and on the defendants' admissions and to have dissented as regards some items, in respect of which such evidence or admissions were not available.

    10. An attempt has indeed been made in the present case to support the partition by reference not merely to Exhibit III, but also to the parties' conduct. It is, however, unnecessary to decide whether a decision could be founded on the evidence of the latter with or without reference to the former, because in fact no such evidence has been referred to. The deceased died on the day after the execution of Exhibit III; and though there is nothing definite as to the entry of the defendants on the immovable properties, there is nothing to show that those in charge of the plaintiff's interests acquiesced in their possession, the evidence being that they contested their right without delay in registration and guardianship proceedings. The defendants, therefore, must succeed, if at all, with direct reference to Exhibit III alone.

    11. Exhibit III, alone and unregistered, effected, I concede, a division in status and might perhaps have entitled the defendants to claim a division of the movables. But as regards immovables the greatest direct effect that can be claimed for it is that it converted the joint holding into one in common. That is, it gave each member of the family a vested title to his share, as it then existed, instead of a right merely contingent on his surviving till a partition might take place.

    12. It is not, in my opinion, possible to hold that this change did not extinguish one kind of right in the property and create another within the meaning of Section 17 of the Registration Act and affect it within the meaning of S. 48. For I see no escape from the dilemma that Exhibit III either does affect the property and should be registered or does not affect it and cannot support a claim to it.

    13. The alternative view, supported by my learned brother in Subramania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal, is that “it is not the written instrument, which makes the alteration” in the nature of the tenancy, because, “when by virtue of it the members of the family become divided in interest, then the rule of the Hindu Law converts their relation into one similar to a tenancy-in-common.” But with all due deference I cannot follow him. For it does not seem to me possible to treat the rule of law as operating independently of the instrument, when it is the clear effect of the one to invoke the operation of the other. The reference to a rule of law can mean only that the meaning of the document is determined with regard to it by necessary implication; and there is still no reason why such determination should be recognised, as conferring substantive rights, and neglected, when the necessity for registration is considered.

    14. We have been pressed with two alleged instances of titles to immovable property, originating in unregistered documents, but alleged to be completed by operation of law. Deeds of adoption, no doubt, do not require registration. But it is doubtful whether even in the case of Sudras the adoption and creation of rights under it are not effected by the giving and taking of the son and not by the deed which merely evidences it: Mahashoya Shosinath v. Siramati Krisha Soondari Dasi(17); and in any case an, adoption must be regarded as equivalent to the birth of a son, whose right may, therefore, be considered as arising by operation of law. The authority as to leases is Ramaswamy Iyer v. Thirupathi Naik and it decides only that when they are operative to transfer possession as they stated and only the right to possession is in question, you are not to read into them an additional term in order to attract the provisions of the Registration Act, not that they are any other document, relied on as operative on property, is exempt from registration, because such operation is merely implicit.

    15. It is observed in Subramania Aiyar v. Savitri Ammal with regard to the general policy of the Act that with reference to the object of Ss. 17 and 48, the protection of intruding alienees, it can make little difference in the investigating of title whether the property is being held by a Hindu joint family as joint tenants or tenants-in-common. But it is clear that the alienee of a share takes it as it stood on the date of his transfer and that he may be prejudiced if the fact that it has been ascertained already, possibly before the death of some co-parcener, which he would naturally assume has increased it, is withheld from his knowledge. Lastly with reference to the policy of Ss. 21 and 32 in particular and the facts that Exhibit III could not have been registered, because (1) it did not contain the detailed description of the property required by the former and (2) was not, as this Court had held, presented for registration by a competent person in conformity with the latter. As regards (1) the argument adopted by Spencer, J., in Ayyakutti Mankondan v. Periasami Koundan is relied on as entailing that a document, which cannot be registered with reference to immovable property for defects in the description, must on that account be treated as operative with reference to it and for other purposes. With great respect this seems to me to confuse an objection to registration on formal grounds with the argument on a distinct point, the necessity for registration with reference to the subject-matter of the document, and to involve the anomaly that, whilst a document may be operative in spite of the omission of all the particulars, which S. 21 requires, it might be refused registration and be useless on account of the absence of one only and as regards (2), the presentation by an incompetent person, the suggestion that the plaintiff's successful opposition to the registration on that account debars him from objecting here to the document as unregistered seems to me unsustainable. For there is no inconsistency between his contentions that Exhibit III should have been registered and that no one concerned to register it did so; and the defendants' argument amounts to no more than this, that the document should be admitted because two objections to it, instead of one, are available. It may be matter for regret in the circumstances of the case that defendants' expectations have been disappointed and the deceased's intention rendered abortive. But that is the result of the latter's postponement of his dispositions, until he had no time to make them in a legal way; and the fact that he chose to risk postponement cannot entitle the Court to dispense with the requirements of the law for the advantage of his beneficiaries.

    16. The question of registration was first raised in this Court. It is possible that the disposition of movables contained in Exhibit III may be separable from that of immovables and the document may be operative as regards the former. But as my learned brother's decision prevails, I do not consider further whether the defendants are entitled to an inquiry on this point. I would in any case allow the appeal, as regards the immovable properties, but without costs. In the circumstances the appeal is dismissed with costs.

    S.N/R.K

    17. Appeal dismissed.

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