Chamier, C.J:— This appeal arise out of a suit brought by the respondent to have a satta executed by him on September 25th, 1913, in favour of the appellant set aside on the ground that it was obtained from him under what he described in his plaint as “dabao najaiz.” The satta binds the respondent for a period of fifteen years to grow sugarcane on 12 cottas of his holding a very year according to the directions of the servants of the appellant. The Respondent was to get 3 annas per maund for the sugarcane produced and was to receive Ss. 30 as taccavi in certain instatements. If he failed in any year to cultivate the requisite area with sugarcma, he was to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 50 par bigha. The satta expressly provides that the appellant's servants shall be entitled to select the land on which the respondent was to grow the sugarcane. The respondent in his plaint allege that there was a dispute between him and a pattidar named Jagan Ghoudhuri, that Jagan Ghoudhuri went to Mr. MacDonald, the Manager of the appellant company and that Mr. MacDonald sent for a Sub Inspector of Police, who took the respondent to the Factory and directed him to go to the Manager and settle the dispute. The respondent accordingly went to the Manager's bungalow. When he arrived there the Manager was told by the Munshi of the Factory that the respondent was not willing to pay damages on account of the sugarcane. Thereupon the Manager asked the respondent to put his thump-impression upon a certain stamped paper. The respondent refused to do so and thereupon the Manager threatened him and said that he would cite the respondent's wife and daughter as witnesses in the casa with Jasen Chondhuri. The respondent says that he was alone when the employees of the Factory and the Manager himself threatened him that it was in that state of affairs that he put his thumb-impression on the printed stamped paper. Ultimately the Manager let the respondent go after taking Rs. 6 from him as a fine. The respondent says, that he subsequently learned that the stamped paper was in fact satta binding him to grow sugarcane on the terms above stated. He says that he was not willing to sign any such satta but was induced to do so by “dabaonajaiz” and that if the satta were left outstanding it would prejudice him greatly. He therefore asks that the satta may be set aside.
2. The appellant pleaded that the satta represented a fair contract and denied all the material allegations in the plaint and pleadings. The Munsif fixed four issues one of which was “was the satta in suit executed by the plaintiff under duress or coercion.” The Munsif found in favour of the respondent on that issue and decreed the claim. There was an appeal to the Court of the District Judge. Mr. Scrooge, who was presiding in that Court at the time examined the satta and gave it as his opinion that it was a most one sided arrangement. He declined to accept the respondent's story that he had been forced by Mr. MacDonald or his servants to execute the satta by means of threats but he found that it was proved that just before the satta was executed there was a criminal case pending against the respondent. He points out that Mr. MacDonald himself had stated that there was such a case and that the Sub-Inspector of Police had visited the Factory in connection with it. Mr. Scroope went on to say that in his opinion it was probable that the Factory servants took advantage of the respondent being in a tight place and there master being President of the patch to threaten the respondent and so got the satta out of him. “Anyhow,” said the learned District Judge:
having regard to the fact that the plaintiff was mixed up in a criminal casa at the time that the said company was his immediate landlord and that is Manager Mr. MacDonald was a president of the bench in the habit of dealing with such criminal cases, one must hold that the defendant company was in a position to dominate the will of the plaintiff and that it was in such circumstances that the satta was executes”
3. In the opinion of the learned Judge, the relative position of the parties being such as he describes, the appellant was bound to show that the terms of the satta were fair and reasonable under Section 16 of the Contract Act. Mr. Scroope was of opinion that there was no proof that the term were fair and reasonable and he accordingly dismissed the appeal. There was then a second appeal to this Court which came before Kiugsford. J., That learned Judge was of opinion that a case had been made out for the present respondent which had not been put forward by him in his plaint and that what the Munsif and the District Judge should have dona was to set themselves to enquire whether the respondent had proved the allegations contained in the plaint which amounted in the opinion of Kingsford, J., to a definite charge of coercion, whereas they had disposed of the case as if it was one of undue influence. Kingsford, J., therefore directed that the record should be returned for a fresh finding upon the third issue, which I have sat out above. The case then came before Mr. Sheepshanks. He also was of opinion that the circumstances afforded good ground for supposing that the execution of the satta was not altogether a voluntary one but had been induced by pressure of one kind or another. He went on to carry out the orders of this Court and see whether the respondent had proved the allegations made by him in his plaint. He came to the conclusion that the respondent had not proved that the Manager had taken any part in obtaining the execution of the satta, or had used any threats of the kind suggested in the plaint and he therefore founded that the definite case of coercion had not been established. The case was then returned to this Court and it came before Atkinson. J., That learned Judge was of opinion that the case ought not to have been remanded for re-trial of the third issue, that the findings recorded by Mr. Scroope were sufficient and should have been accepted and that the appeal should have been dismissed. He accordingly disregarded the remand order made by Kingsford, J. and accepting the findings recorded by Mr. Scroope he dismissed the appeal.
4. The case now comes before us as an appeal under the Letters Patent. The first point taken in appeal was that if the respondent was dissatisfied with the order of remand made by Kingsford, J., he should have appealed against it. In my opinion there was no right of appeal under the Letters Patent against the order of Kingsford, J., which was not an order of remand at all but merely an order directing the rial of a certain issue. The learned Takil, for the appellant, admits that he is unable to produce any authority to the effect that an appeal could have been maintained against the order of Kingsford, J., In my opinion no appeal could have been filed under the Letters Patent and therefore the question whether the order made by Kingsford, J., was right or wrong may be considered by us. Having heard the arguments on both sides I have come to the conclusion that the judgment under appeal is right and should be affirmed. It is true that the respondent made certain definite allegations against the Manager of the appellant company and the servants of the company which amounted to a charge of coercion as defined in the Contract Act, and that he failed to prove those allegations, but he also pleaded and proved a number of facts and circumstances which in the opinion of Mr. Scroope brought the case within the purview of Section 16 of the Contract Act. I agree with Mr. Scroope that the facts as found show that the manager of the appellant company was in a position to dominate the will of the respondent at the time when the satta was executed. I agree with him also that the contract is on the face of it unconscionable. In my opinion he was right in holding that it was the duty of the appellant company to prove that the contract was induced by undue, influence. The company did not prove this. It is suggested that they were misled by the terms of the third issue into supposing that they had to meet a charge of coercion and nothing else.
5. I cannot accept the suggestion. The respondent's case was that the execution of the satta had been brought about by “dabo najaiz” and he set out the whole of the facts which he proposed to prove. The appellant company must have known that proof of some only of the respondent's allegations would be sufficient to require them to show that the execution of the satta had not been obtained by unfair means. I would affirm the decision of Atkinson, J., and dismiss this appeal with costs.
6. Chapman, J.:— I agree.
7. Jwala Prasad, J.:— I agree.
V.S/R.K
8. Appeal dismissed.