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  • 1930.The provision of the Limitation Act applicable is Art. 156
  • Sect. 5 of the Limitation Act.
  • 14 etc., of the Limitation Act,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • 1930.The provision of the Limitation Act applicable is Art. 156
  • Sect. 5 of the Limitation Act.
  • 14 etc., of the Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Timeliness of Appeal under Article 156 (Limitation Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from a preliminary mortgage decree originally passed ex parte by the Subordinate Judge of Madura in O.S. No. 128 of 1926 on 8 August 1928. The defendants (appellants, described as defendants 1 and 4) applied under Order IX, Rule 13 on 9 August 1928 to set aside that ex parte decree; the Subordinate Judge set the decree aside on 12 October 1928. On 9 August 1928 the appellants also applied for copies of the judgment and decree; the copies were ready for delivery on 27 September 1928.

The plaintiff (respondent) petitioned this Court in C.R.P. No. 116 of 1929 for revision of the Subordinate Judge's order setting aside the ex parte decree. This Court, by order dated 22 November 1929, set aside the Subordinate Judge's order, thereby restoring the original preliminary decree. The appeal under consideration in this opinion was presented on 6 January 1930.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. When, for the purpose of computing the 90-day limitation period under Article 156 of the Limitation Act, is the relevant "date of the decree or order appealed from"—the date when the decree was originally passed (8 August 1928) or the date when the decree was restored in revision by this Court (22 November 1929)?
  2. Whether the appellants' appeal, presented on 6 January 1930, was within the period of limitation measured from the correct starting date.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The starting point for the 90-day appeal period under Article 156 should be taken as 22 November 1929, the date when this Court restored the preliminary decree by its order in C.R.P. No. 116 of 1929.
  • Because the decree had been set aside by the Subordinate Judge within the original appeal period, no appeal to a higher court was competent at that time; the decree only regained appealability when restored by this Court.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The relevant date of the decree for limitation purposes is the original date of the decree, 8 August 1928, and subsequent events (setting aside and later restoration) do not alter the commencement of the limitation period.
  • If the appellants were out of time, their remedy would be to seek condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (no such application was before the Court in this matter).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Muthu Korakhai (Korakkai) Chetty v. Madar Animal (Madar Ammal) Held (by a Bench of five) that where an earlier order (e.g., ex parte confirmation) was set aside and later proceedings terminated in a later date, the terminis a quo for limitation may be taken as the later date; courts should date the cause of action from when the remedy is actually available to the party. The Court relied on this decision as directly analogous and supportive of the appellants' contention that the limitation period should start when the decree was restored and became appealable (22 November 1929).
Baijnath Sahai v. Ramgut Signh Privy Council authority cited for the principle that there is no final or definitive confirmation of a sale/order until the final review order; used to determine when a right is finally crystallized for limitation purposes. Cited (via discussion in Muthu Korakkai Chetty) to support the proposition that the final operative date for limitation may be the final order in a sequence of proceedings.
Bassu Kuar v. Dhum Singh Privy Council authority holding that a debt or right may assume a new character for limitation purposes when intervening arrangements fail, and that it would be inconvenient to require futile litigation merely to preserve rights. Appears in the chain of authorities considered in Muthu Korakkai Chetty; used to support a liberal/realistic construction of limitation starting points where earlier proceedings made initiation of proceedings futile.
Ammathayi Ammal v. Sivarama Pillai Case cited by respondent's advocate; it discusses Privy Council decisions including Mani Singh Mandhata and deals with accrual of the right to apply for final decree under a mortgage context. The Court considered the reliance on this case but held it inapplicable to the present dispute because it concerned Article 181 (final decree in mortgage suits) rather than Article 156 (appeals).
Mani Singh Mandhata v. Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad Held that under Article 181 the right to apply for a final decree in a mortgage suit accrues at the date fixed for payment and not only when the mortgagor's title as against strangers is established. The Court distinguished this authority as dealing with Article 181 and the accrual of a right to apply for final decree; it was not applicable to the Article 156 appeal-timing question in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying Article 156 of the Limitation Act as the applicable provision, which prescribes a period of 90 days from the date of the decree or order appealed from. Two rival starting points were presented: (a) 8 August 1928 (the original date of the ex parte preliminary decree), urged by the respondent; and (b) 22 November 1929 (the date when this Court restored the decree in revision), urged by the appellants.

The Court observed that no decision exactly in point had been cited to it, but it considered the legislative and doctrinal principles underlying limitation law: limitation periods should be measured from the time when a remedy is available and it would be contrary to principle to require parties to begin futile proceedings. The Court relied principally on the Full Bench decision in Muthu Korakkai Chetty v. Madar (and the Privy Council authorities discussed therein, notably Baijnath Sahai and Bassu Kuar) for the proposition that the starting point for limitation may properly be the date when a right or remedy becomes finally available, not necessarily the date of an earlier order that was rendered non-existent by subsequent valid proceedings.

The Court expressly analyzed and rejected the respondent's reliance on Ammathayi Ammal and Mani Singh Mandhata. Those authorities dealt with Article 181 (the accrual of the right to apply for final decree in mortgage suits) and held that the right to apply accrues at the date fixed for payment rather than upon the resolution of title disputes with strangers. The Court held that those decisions were inapplicable to Article 156 questions about when an appeal period begins where a decree was set aside within the appealable period and later restored on revision.

The Court then explained the practical absurdities that would follow from adopting the respondent's view: if the limitation period were held to start from the original decree date even though the decree had been set aside within the appeal period, a defendant would be deprived of the opportunity to appeal because there would have been no competent appeal while the decree was set aside; similarly, a decree-holder's right to execute the decree could be barred before the decree was restored. A construction of the Limitation Act producing these results could not, the Court held, have been intended by the legislature.

On this reasoning, and applying the principle that limitation should be dated from when the remedy is truly available (as explained in the authorities cited), the Court concluded that the appropriate starting point for Article 156 in this case is the date when the decree was restored in revision by this Court, namely 22 November 1929. Measured from that date, the appeal presented on 6 January 1930 fell within the 90-day period.

V. C. S. — Appeal admitted.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: APPEAL ADMITTED. The Court held that for the purpose of Article 156 of the Limitation Act the "date of the decree or order appealed from" in the circumstances of this case is the date when the decree was restored by this Court in revision (22 November 1929), and that the appeal presented on 6 January 1930 was within the prescribed 90-day period.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellants' appeal was held to be timely and was admitted.
  • Scope: The Court applied existing authorities (notably Muthu Korakkai Chetty and the Privy Council decisions discussed within it) and distinguished cases concerning Article 181. The opinion focuses on applying established principles to the factual situation and does not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond that application.

    Peer Ammal v. N.S. Nallusami Pillai

    The question is whether this appeal was presented in time. The material dates are as follows:

    The appeal is from a preliminary decree on a mortgage, passed ex parte by the Subordinate Judge of Madura in O. S. No. 128 of 1926 first on 8th August 1928. The appellants (defendants 1 and 4) applied under O. 9, R. 13 on 9th August 1928 to set aside the ex parte decree and the Court set it aside on 12th October 1928. Meanwhile the appellants had also on 9th August 1928 applied for copies of the judgment and decree and they were ready for delivery on 27th September 1928, so that, had the appellants wanted to appeal, they had out of the 90 days available about 1½ months more after 12th October 1928. As the decree was set aside by the Sub-Judge himself, no appeal was preferred. But the plaintiff (respondent) applied in C.R.P No. 116 of 1929 to this Court to revise the Order of the Sub-Judge setting aside the ex parte decree and this Court on 22nd November 1929 set aside that order thus restoring the preliminary decree to effect. This appeal was presented on 6th January 1930.

    The provision of the Limitation Act applicable is Art. 156 which prescribes a period of 90 days from the date of the decree or order appealed from. The appellants contend that the date of this decree for the purpose of appeal must be taken as 22nd November 1929 when this Court by its order in C.R.P No. 116 of 1929 restored force and effect, including appealability, to the original decree which it had lost by its being set aside. The respondent contends that the date of the decree is 8th August 1928 the date when it was originally passed, and that its subsequent vicissitudes have no effect on the period of appealability and that the only course open to the appellants is to induce this Court to excuse the delay under Sect. 5 of the Limitation Act. No application under Sect. 5 being now before us, we have to decide between the two above contentions as to the starting point of limitation.

    No decision exactly in point has been brought to our notice But we entertain little doubt that the appellants' contention must be accepted. It is not only in consonance with the principle underlying the law of limitation that suits, appeals and other legal proceedings are possible only when there is some cause of action, or ground of appeal or other grievance on which the plaintiff, appellant or applicant has a right to come to Court and ask for relief but the opposite view would lead to the absurd result that an appellant's right to appeal and the decree-holder's right to execute the decree are both barred before the decree to he appealed from or to be executed came into legal being.

    In Muthu Korakhai Chetty v. Madar Animal , a Bench of five Judges dealt with the question whether for an application for delivery of properties sold in Court auction, limitation ran from the date of an ex parte confirmation of the sale (26th April 1913) or from the termination of proceedings taken by the opposite party to set aside that confirmation (25th June 1915). It was held by four of the learned Judges that the latter date was the terminis a quo although the result of the proceedings in respect of the properties subsequently sought to be recovered was that the order of 26th April 1913 was confirmed by that of 25th June 1915. The other learned Judge contented himself with answering the question put in the negative as it was put in the form whether the cause of action for application was suspended during the pendency of the proceedings. The decisions of the Judicial Committee bearing on this question, an apparent conflict between which was the cause of the reference to a. Full Bench, were so fully gone into in that case, that it is needless to refer at length to them again. To understand the ground of decision of the Court it is sufficient to refer to the citations from the Privy Council decisions in Baijnath Sahai v. Ramgut Signh and Bassu Kuar v. Dhum Singh . In the former case which was one of revenue sale by the Collector in 1882 confirmed by the Commissioner in 1884 and set aside by the Board of Revenue in 1884 and confirmed by the Board in review in 1886 their Lordships said that for the purpose of limitation, there was no final or definitive confirmation of the sale till the final order on review by the Revenue Board in 1386. In Bassu Kuar v. Dhum Singh , it was held that money due on an account stated which would, as such, have been barred in 3 years from the statement became for purposes of limitation a debt of a new character when it having been retained by the debtor as part of the consideration for a proposed sale of land, that arrangement failed, the sale not being specifically enforceable and so declared by the decree between the parties. Their Lordships said as to the defence that the suit for the money should have been brought while the arrangement for setting it off against the purchase money was still in force that “it would be an inconvenient state of the law if it were found necessary for a man to institute a perfectly vain litigation under peril of losing his property if he does not. And it would be a lamentable state of the law if it were found that a debtor who for years had been insisting that his creditor shall take payment in a particular mode, can, when it is decided that he cannot enforce that mode, turn round and say that the lapse of time had relieved him from paying at all”. Reading the judgments pronounced in Muthu Korakkai Chetty v. Madar Ammal , it becomes clear that while on the one hand no ‘suspension’ in the proper sense, of a period of limitation which has begun to run is permissible except as provided in Sects. 14 etc., of the Limitation Act, the Courts will place a liberal or in the language of Oldfield, J., an accurate construction on the somewhat loosely expressed words in column 3 of the first schedule which prescribe the starting point of the period of limitation by not requiring parties to start legal proceedings in circumstances when it would be futile for them to do so. As Seshagiri Ayyar, J., put it “subject to the exemption, exclusions, mode of computation and excusing of delay etc., which are provided in the limitation Act, the language of the third column of the first schedule should be so interpreted as to carry out the true intention of the legislature, that is to say, by dating the cause of action from a date when the remedy is available to the party:” page 213.

    The respondent's Advocate relied on Ammathayi Ammal v. Sivarama Pillai and the Privy Council decisions referred to in it, Mani Singh Mandhata v. Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad . In that case the plaintiff had obtained a preliminary decree on a hypothecation under which the time for payment of the mortgage money was fixed for 6th March 1917. Meanwhile the mortgagor's (defendant's) husband brought a suit in 1916 against the mortgagor and mortgagee for declaration that the mortgaged property belonged to himself and that the mortgage was therefore not binding on the property. That suit was decreed in the first Court in favour of the husband on 26th April 1917 and by the first Appellate Court but was dismissed in second appeal by the High Court on 28th April 1920. The plaintiff applied for a final decree on 10th September 1920, more than three years after the date fixed for payment but less than 3 years after the defendant's title to the mortgaged property was affirmed in the Second Appeal. The argument put forward for the plaintiff in this Court was that he had lost the right to apply for a final decree by the decisions of the first Court and the first Appellate Court in the husband's suit, that the property belonged to him and that it revived on the decision of the second appeal that it belonged to the mortgagor. The Court did not accept this on the ground that the Court when it sells property in execution of a mortgage decree does not guarantee the title of judgment-debtor as against strangers and that Art. 181 which prescribed the starting point of limitation for such an application as the time when the right to apply accrues, does not say (mean) that the right to apply accrues only when the mortgagor's title as against strangers is clear. Therefore it was held that the right to apply for final decree accrued on the date fixed for payment and that as no ground of suspension of limitation could be urged under the Limitation Act and no other ground of suspension was available according to Manx Singh Mandhata v. Nawab Bhadur of Murshidabad the application was barred.

    This decision has in our opinion no application to this case. It merely decided that under Art. 181 the right to apply for a final decree in a mortgage suit accrues not when the disputes between the decree-holder and strangers to the decree about the title to the mortgaged property terminate and the mortgagor's title as against such strangers is established, but from the date fixed in the decree for payment of the debt. In this case we have to deal with a different Article, namely 156 and the question is what is the meaning to be given to the words ‘date of the decree or order appealed from’ when the decree has been set aside by the Court which passed it within the appealable period and therefore no appeal is thereafter competent to the defendant and the decree is afterwards restored by a higher tribunal. In our opinion the case clearly falls within the class of cases when a fresh starting point of limitation for appealing has necessarily to be found. The opposite view would lead to the absurd result, that the defendant would be deprived of the right of appeal because he did not appeal against a decree which had ceased to exist and against which therefore he could not have appealed after it was set aside. But it was suggested that he ought to have appealed before the decree was set aside under O. 9, R. 13, Assuming he had done so, as soon as the decree was set aside under O. 9, R. 13, the appeal would become infructuous and would necessarily have to be dropped and the position after the decree was restored in revision by the High Court would be the same as if he had not appealed at all. It is not to be supposed that the appeal should be kept pending in contemplation of the double uncertainty that the plaintiff might take the order setting aside the decree to the High Court in revision and that this Court might interfere in revision. If we look at the matter from the point of view of the decree-holder, it becomes still more absurd if we have to suppose that his right to execute the decree under Art. 182 is in the circumstances of the present case to begin from the date of the first decree which was subsequently set aside and later restored. If between the date of the original decree and the restoration in revision a period of more than 3 years has expired, it would follow that as there is no allowance for the intervening period according to the Act or any other clauses of Art. 182 his application for execution would be barred before he succeeded in getting his decree restored. A construction which leads to such results could not have been contemplated by the legislature. We think therefore that the date of the decree appealed from must be taken as the date when the decree was restored in revision by this Court. On this footing, we hold that the appeal was presented in time and it will be admited.

    V. C. S.Appeal admitted.

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    Comments

    Peer Ammal v. N.S. Nallusami Pillai
    (Nov 19, 1930)