This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the decree of the Courts below which dismissed his suit as barred by O. 23, R. 1, Civil Procedure Code. This objection arises in consequence of what happened in O. S. No. 325 of 1917 on the file of the District Munsif of Yellamanchili. The present defendants were defendants 4 and 5 in that suit. That suit had been instituted against two sets of defendants, in respect of two sets of properties and an objection was accordingly raised that the suit was bad for multifariousness. This objection was made the subject of the fifth issue in that case and when the case came on for trial what happened is thus recorded in paragraph 6 of the judgment in that suit (Ex. C).
“The defect is cured by the plaintiff's own admission that there is multifariousness inasmuch as he practically concedes that he cannot prove any collusion between the two sets of defendants. He has accordingly confined this suit to item 1 in which defendants 1 to 3 alone are interested. Defendants 4 and 5 are given up and they are awarded their costs.”
At the end of the judgment the District Munsif took care to say “Plaintiff will pay defendants 4 and 5 their costs of this suit.”
When the present suit came on for trial, the learned District Munsif thought fit to raise an objection of his own accord, that what happened in the former suit amounted to a withdrawal of the suit as against the present defendants and that as it was done without the permission of the Court or leave obtained to bring a fresh suit, the present suit was barred under O. 23, R. 1, Civil Procedure Code. I can only express my regret that the learned District Munsif should have thought fit to go out of his way to discover this objection. The learned District Judge sympathised with the plaintiff, but he thought that in the absence of authority directly covering the point, it was not in his power to help the plaintiff. I do not think the law is so helpless as that.
Order 23, R. 1, must be read consistently with the other provisions of the Code. It is well established law that if a suit is so framed as to be open to the charge of multifariousness, the plaintiff must elect the cause of action which he is prepared to prosecute or the defendants against whom he will proceed. In respect of the cause of action which he is bound to give up, as a result of the Court's decision that the suit is bad for multifariousness, he cannot be regarded as a voluntary agent who withdraws his claim in the sense contemplated by O. 23, R. 1. It is no doubt open to him to choose which cause of action he shall pursue but the law compels him to give up one cause of action or the other. Therefore, to the extent to which he gives up one or the other of the causes of action in the suit, he is really acting under compulsion of the law and not by voluntary choice. It is therefore unreasonable to apply O. 23, R. 1 to cases in which a plaintiff is obliged to give up certain defendants and the cause of action against them, in obedience to the Court's view that the suit as framed is bad for multifariousness.
The argument of the Courts below in the present case, if I understand it aright, is that the plaint was not in fact amended pursuant to the decision on the issue of multifariousness. I do not see that that makes any difference. We are only concerned with the question whether there has been an abandonment within the meaning of O. 23, R. 1. But even in answer to this form of stating the objection, it is sufficient to refer to the reasoning of the Full Bench in Abdul Sac v. Sundara Mudaliar (1) and the cases referred to therein, that in determining the effect of what has happened, the Court should not confine its attention merely to see whether particular names or paragraphs have been scored out or not but interpret the situation in the light of the pleadings and the judgment in the case. Where the Court has held that the parties and causes of action have been improperly combined and the plaintiff thereupon elects to confine the suit to one of the causes of action, the result in the eye of law is that the suit is non-existent so far as the parties and the cause of action given up are concerned. There is no question of any withdrawal. The learned District Judge has read the District Munsif's judgment in the former suit as amounting to a ‘dismissal’ of that suit as against defendants 4 and 5. As I have pointed out above, the District Munsif has taken care not to say so and paragraph 6 of his judgment which I have set out already makes it clear that defendants 4 and 5 were awarded their costs only on account of the decision on the misjoinder issue. If however it should be taken that the suit was dismissed as against them, the plaintiffs' position is certainly better. The dismissal on the ground of misjoinder cannot certainly operate as res judicata; and there will be even less scope for the application of O. 23, R. 1, if the Court is held to have dismissed the suit, for no question of ‘abandonment’ will then arise.
The Second Appeal is allowed, the decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the case remanded to the Court of first instance for disposal on the merits. Refund of stamp duty both here and in the lower Appellate Court. The plaintiff will be entitled to his costs here and in the lower Appellate Court. The costs in the first Court will be provided for in the revised decree.
N. R. R.Appeal allowed.