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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Clause (d) of Section 3(2) of the Estates Land Act
  • Sub-clause (c) of Sub-section (16) of Section 3
  • Clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section
  • (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3
  • Sub-clause (16)(c) of Section 3
  • Sub-clause (e) of Section 3(2)
  • Clause (e) of Section 3(2)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Clause (d) of Section 3(2) of the Estates Land Act
  • Sub-clause (c) of Sub-section (16) of Section 3
  • Clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section
  • (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3
  • Sub-clause (16)(c) of Section 3
  • Sub-clause (e) of Section 3(2)
  • Clause (e) of Section 3(2)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns two connected civil miscellaneous appeals and eight connected civil revision petitions. The revision petitions arise from suits originally filed by the mokhasadars of Chilakapadu and Muppavaram in the District Munsiff's Court, Tanuku, against their tenants for recovery of rent and for ejectment. The tenants pleaded that they had occupancy rights because the lands formed part of an "estate" within the meaning of the Estates Land Act, and that the Civil Courts therefore lacked jurisdiction. The District Munsiff sustained that plea and directed the plaints to be returned for presentation to the proper Court. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge of Ellore confirmed the District Munsiff's decrees. The revision petitions challenge the Subordinate Judge's decision, raising the question whether the lands form part of an estate in which the defendants have occupancy rights.

Separately, two civil miscellaneous appeals arise from orders of the District Judge refusing to set aside dismissals entered on memos that the matters had been adjusted out of Court. Some trustees (managing trustees) reported a settlement with tenants; other trustees who claimed they were not consulted sought reopening. The District Judge held that the managing trustees' report of settlement was final and binding. The appellate review of that conclusion was rendered unnecessary in view of the court's substantive finding that the lands form part of an estate.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lands in Chilakapadu and Muppavaram form part of an "estate" within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Estates Land Act (i.e., whether Clause (e) or Clause (b) applies), thereby affecting the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in suits for rent and ejectment.
  2. Whether Clause (d) of Section 3(2) (grant expressed to be of an entire village) can be relied upon by petitioners in view of Madras Act II of 1945, which deems certain grants of a named village to be an estate even if some lands in that village were excluded from the grant.
  3. Whether the definition of "ryoti land" in Sub-section (16)(c) of Section 3 (which excludes certain service-tenure grants) prevents the Civil Courts from having jurisdiction in cases where the mokhasa grant is of a service tenure.
  4. Whether a reported compromise or settlement by managing trustees is final and binding on other trustees who were not consulted (i.e., whether the District Judge erred in refusing to set aside dismissals on that basis).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The lands are not part of an "estate" within the Estates Land Act for two reasons: (1) Clause (d) of Section 3(2) does not apply because there is nothing to show the grant was of an entire village; (2) Clause (e) of Section 3(2) is not applicable because the grant was only of specific lands/fields within the villages and not of one or more entire villages.
  • Reliance was placed on entries in the inam fair register (Ex. I) and the inam statement (Ex. I-a) showing specific field numbers and omissions, which was said to indicate that only particular fields, and not whole villages, were granted as mokhasa.
  • Argued that insofar as mokhasa grants are of the nature of service tenure, the definition of "ryoti land" (Sub-section (16)(c) of Section 3) excludes mokhasa grants from being "ryoti land", implying the Civil Courts may not have jurisdiction.
  • In the appeals concerning reported compromise, the trustees who were not consulted contended the compromise was effected without their consultation and therefore not binding on them; they sought to set aside dismissals that were recorded as adjustments out of Court.

Respondents' / Court's Counter-Position as Stated in the Opinion

  • Clause (d) as relied upon by petitioners was rendered unavailable by Madras Act II of 1945, which deems a grant expressed to be of a named village to be an estate even if certain lands in that village were excluded (e.g., granted on service or reserved for communal purposes).
  • The entries in the inam register and inam statement do not warrant the inference that only particular fields were granted; instead, the registers treat the villages as mokhasa villages and the boundaries and extent deductions (porombokes, dharmadayam, service inams) show an intention that the villages were the subject of the grant except for specific excluded inams.
  • Even if Clause (e) were not applicable, the mokhasa grant would fall within Clause (b) as a portion of a permanently settled estate in Nuzwid, and therefore be an "estate" under the Act.
  • The contention that mokhasa grants, being service tenure, necessarily exclude the lands from being "ryoti land" is misplaced: there is no allegation that the specific lands in suit are held under a resumable service tenure; and Sub-section (16)(c) contemplates resumable service tenures — permanent, irresumable under-tenures fall within Clause (e) and remain "estates".
  • As regards the trustees' compromise, the District Judge held the managing trustees' report of adjustment was final and binding; however, the court noted that it was unnecessary to decide whether that conclusion was correct because the lands were held to be part of an estate on the merits, which would independently dispose of the appeals.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Veeraswami v. Seetharama Kanthayya (1926) 51 M.L.J. 394 Held that certain villages (Gotenu, Komavaram, Surampudi) were "estates" within the meaning of the Act. Cited as a direct authority dealing with similar features in mokhasa villages; supports the conclusion that the villages in question may properly be treated as an "estate".
Sadasivarayudu v. Venkitaswami (1931) 62 M.L.J. 598 Decision involved a resumable service grant. Distinguished by the court: it was an instance of a resumable service grant and therefore inapplicable to the present facts where resumable service tenure is not shown.
Lakshminarasimham v. Veerabadrudu (1923) 19 L.W. 671 Dealt with a holding in another mokhasa village within Nuzvid zamindary and treated it as an "estate". Applied to show consistent judicial conclusion that similar mokhasa villages were "estates"; used as supporting precedent.
Narayanaraju v. Suryanarayudu (1939) 2 M.L.J. 901 : L.R. 66 I.A. 378 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad. 1 (P.C.) Authority that the mokhasadar is the landholder within the meaning of the Act and that cultivating tenants under mokhasadars have the position of ryots with occupancy rights unless the lands are held under a resumable service tenure. Relied upon by the court to support the proposition that mokhasadars are landholders and that tenants have occupancy rights unless a resumable service tenure is proved.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of statutory interpretation, factual analysis of the inam records, and application of precedent:

  1. Statutory change considered: The court observed that Clause (d) of Section 3(2) could no longer be relied upon by petitioners because Madras Act II of 1945 provides that where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area shall be deemed to be an estate even if it did not include certain lands already granted on service or reserved for communal purposes. This removed the first ground advanced by petitioners.
  2. Interpretation of Sub-clause (e) of Section 3(2): The court set out the language of Sub-clause (e) which covers "any portion consisting of one or more villages of any of the estates specified ... which is held on a permanent under-tenure." Petitioners relied on the inam fair register (Ex. I) and inam statement (Ex. I-a) showing field numbers and omissions to argue only parts of villages were granted. The court rejected the inference that only scattered fields were granted.
  3. Documentary/factual analysis: The court examined Ex. I, Ex. I-a and other exhibits (Exs. X and XI) and noted that these registers entered the villages under the heading of mokhasa villages. The registers give total extent for the villages, make deductions for porombokes and for dharmadayam and service inams, and identify the remainder as the mokhasa grant. The court concluded these entries indicate the villages themselves were the subject of the grant, excluding certain specially-deducted inams. The omission of certain field numbers was explained as relating to devadayam and service inams not taken into account in calculating the jodi or quit rent.
  4. Application of Sub-clause (e): Given the factual record, the court held that Clause (e) applied — the grant comprised villages or portions consisting of villages held as permanent under-tenure and therefore constituted an "estate."
  5. Alternative application of Clause (b): The court also held that, even if Clause (e) were not held applicable, the mokhasa grant would fall within Clause (b) as a portion of a permanently settled estate in Nuzwid, again making it an "estate" within the Act.
  6. Analysis of "ryoti land" definition: Petitioners argued that Sub-section (16)(c) of Section 3 excludes mokhasa grants from "ryoti land" because they are service tenures. The court rejected this line of argument as inapplicable: there was no allegation that the specific lands in suit were held under resumable service tenure; Sub-section (16)(c) contemplates resumable service tenure; permanent and irresumable under-tenures fall within Clause (e). Thus the definition of "ryoti land" does not deprive the lands of their character as "estates" where the tenure is permanent and not resumable.
  7. Precedential support: The court cited Veeraswami v. Seetharama Kanthayya and Lakshminarasimham v. Veerabadrudu as authorities where similar mokhasa villages were held to be "estates". It distinguished Sadasivarayudu v. Venkitaswami as a case concerning resumable service grants and invoked Narayanaraju v. Suryanarayudu for the proposition that mokhasadars are landholders and cultivating tenants are ryots with occupancy rights unless a resumable service tenure is proved.
  8. Trustees' compromise issue: The court observed that although the District Judge had held the report of settlement by managing trustees was final and binding on other trustees, it was unnecessary to decide whether that view was correct because the substantive conclusion that the lands form part of an estate would have disposed of the appeals even if the procedural question about compromise had been decided differently.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED WITH COSTS

Holding: The two civil miscellaneous appeals and the several civil revision petitions were dismissed with costs. The court concluded on the merits that the lands in Chilakapadu and Muppavaram form part of an "estate" within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Estates Land Act (applying Sub-clause (e) of Section 3(2), alternatively Clause (b)), and that the petitioners' arguments based on the inam registers and on the definition of "ryoti land" did not prevent that conclusion.

Implications: The direct effect is the dismissal of the appeals and petitions with costs. The opinion explains that, having held the lands to be part of an estate, the outcome would be the same irrespective of the procedural contention about the reported compromise by managing trustees. The court did not purport to lay down a new principle beyond applying existing statutory provisions and precedent to the facts; it relied on prior decisions addressing similar mokhasa grants.

Additional note in the opinion: "No leave." (i.e., leave to appeal was refused).

    Dronamraju Seshagiri Rao v. Godithi Rammayya And Others

    1. These two civil miscellaneous appeals and eight civil revision petitions are connected. I shall deal with the revision petitions first as all of them raise the same point.

    2. The mokhasadars of Chilakapadu and Muppavaram filed suits in the District Munsiff 's Court of Tanuku against their tenants for the recovery of rent and for ejectment. The tenants pleaded that they had occupancy rights in the lands as they form part of an "estate " within the meaning of the Estates Land Act and that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction. This plea was upheld by the District MunsifF who directed the plaints to be returned for presentation to the proper Court. On appeals preferred by the mokhasadars, the Subordinate Judge of Ellore, reached the same conclusion and confirmed the decrees of the District Munsiff. These revision petitions are from the decision of the Subordinate Judge and raise the question whether the lands form part of an estate in which the defendants have occupancy rights. It was contended for the petitioners that the lands were not part of an estate for two reasons : firstly, because Clause (d) of Section 3(2) of the Estates Land Act will not apply as there is nothing to show that the grant was of an entire village and secondly, that Clause (e) of Section 3(2) is not applicable, as the grant was only of specific lands in the villages and not of one or more villages of any of the estates specified in Clauses (a), (b) and (c):

    3. The first ground has ceased to be available to the petitioners because of the new Madras Act II of 1945 which enacts that

    " where a grant as an in am is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes."
    Therefore even in a case where we find that certain lands in a named village were not included in the grant for some reasons, the land granted as in am would still be an estate.

    4. Sub-Clause (e) of Section 3(2) speaks of

    " any portion consisting of one or more villages of any of the estates specified above in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) which is held on a permanent under-tenure."
    The contention of the petitioners is that in the cases before us we have not got an entire village or villages forming part of the estates as defined in Sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) and which are held.on a permanent under-tenure. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the entries in the in am fair register and the inam statement printed in C.R.P. No. 1506 of 1943, The inam fair register is Ex. I and the inam statement is Ex. I-a. Mr. Satyanarayana Rao referred to the fact that, besides giving the total extent comprised in the mokhasa grant, the inam register specifies the several numbers of the fields also which is consistent only with the theory that the villages, Chilakapadu and Muppa-varam, in their entirety, were not treated as the subject of the mokhasa grant but only some fields in those villages. He further referred to the fact that the numbers of the fields were not consecutive and some numbers like 12, 13, 18, 28, 32, 33, etc., in Chilakapadu and numbers 4, 6, 20, 28, 37, 38, etc., in Muppavaram were omitted. Such an inference, viz., what was granted is not the entire village of Chilakapadu or Muppavaram but only certain fields in those villages--does not appear to me to be warranted by the entries. The register and the statement speak of the villages as mokhasa and the boundaries given indicate that the grant comprised the villages themselves. It was necessary for those who prepared the inam register to specify the extents and the fields for the purpose of arriving at the cist or jodi that had to be paid as it was then believed that these mokhasas were excluded from the assets of the zamindari at the time of the permanent settlement and that the Government had the right of reversion. Subsequently this belief was found to be ill-founded and the Government gave up further steps as regards the mokhasa grants in pursuance of reports made by the Commissioner (Mr. Taylor) on enquiries made by the Board of Revenue of the Collector and the final sanction of the Secretary of State on a letter addressed to him by the Madras Government about the true state of affairs which turned out to be that these mokhasa grants were included in the assets when the peshcush was calculated. :

    5. The Subordinate Judge has in this connection rightly drawn attention to the fact that in Exs. X and XI, these villages are entered under the heading of mokhasa villages. The omission of certain numbers in the inam register is explicable on the basis that they perhaps relate to the devadayam and other inams of a like nature which could not be taken into account in settling the jodi or quit rent. Ex. I refers in column 4 to certain inams and gives the extent as 12-12. In Ex. I-a under: column 9 we get the real clue for answering this question. The total extent, of Chilakapadu village is given as 48-4-1 kandies. Out of this, some extent is deducted lor porombokes and out of the remainder two extents are deducted under the head of dharmadayam and service inams. The remainder is the mokhasa grant. Similarly with reference to Muppavaram. This shows fairly clearly that the villages were the subject of the grant excluding of course, dharmadayam and service inams. Therefore, I am of the opinion that Clause (e) applies to the facts of this case.

    6. Assuming for any reason that it does not, the mokhasa grant will come within Clause (b), as it is a portion of a permanently settled estate in Nuzwid. It is undoubtedly, therefore, an " estate " within the meaning of the Act. But it was urged that this does not by itself oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court because of the fact that the mokhasa grant is of the nature of a service tenure and the definition of " ryoti land " as given in the Act excludes mokhasa grants. Sub-clause (16)(c) of Section 3 provides that " ryoti land " does not include " lands granted on service tenure either free of rent or on favourable rates of rent if granted before the passing of this Act or free of rent if granted after that date, so long as the service tenure subsists." The position taken for the petitioners is that in a case where the grant is irresumable and is permanent, the service tenure still subsists either because it had not been put an end to, or because it could not be put an end to, and therefore the land is not ryoti land and the landholder cannot bring a suit for rent or ejectment in a revenue Court. This argument is, however, based upon a double fallacy. We have nothing whatever to do with the question whether the mokhasa as such is resumable or irresumable service tenure. We are concerned with lands in a mokhasa village and the question is whether those lands form part of an estate. Obviously they do, for the reasons already given. If the particular lands in respect of which the suits are brought for rent or ejectment have been granted on service tenure, it is no doubt true that they may not be " ryoti land " within the meaning of the Act. But there is no allegation in this case that the lands in question are held under any such tenure. Whether the mokhasa grant is itself on the basis of a service tenure is a question which does not concern us. Secondly, Sub-clause (c) of Sub-section (16) of Section 3 clearly contemplates a case where the service tenure is of such a nature as can be put an end to. If it is permanent and irresumable, it falls within Clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3. What has been made an " estate" by reason of Sub-clauses (b) and (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 could not have been intended to be deprived of its character by the definition of " ryoti land " in sub'-section (16) of Section 3. If the lands are held under a tenure which the landholder can put an end to by a unilateral act of his own, the Act says that the tenant holding possession of such a land does not possess occupancy rights therein but, if the land is held under a tenure which cannot be terminated by the landlord, then it is held on a permanent under-tenure and is an "estate" within the meaning of the Act.

    7. In the inam fair register there is a note under column 21 that the two villages of Chilakapadu andMuppavaram stand on the same footing as the mokhasa villages of Gotenu, Komavaram and Surampudi. The inam register extract of these three villages has been filed as Ex. II and it is the same as Ex. I as regards the features relied on for the petitioners, namely, the giving of the numbers of the fields and the omission of certain numbers. Veeraswami v. Seetharama Kanthayya (1926) 51 M.L.J. 394 was a case which dealt with lands in those three villages and it was held that they were an " estate " within the meaning of the Act. The case in Sadasivarayudu v. Venkitaswami (1931) 62 M.L.J. 598 relied on by the petitioners was an instance of a resumable service granted and has no application to the facts before us. A holding in another mokhasa village called Arungolanu within the ambit of. the Nuzvid zamindary was the subject-matter of the decision in Lakshminarasimham v. Veerabadrudu (1923) 19 L.W. 671 and there also the same conclusion was reached. The Privy Council decision in Narayanaraju v. Suryanarayudu (1939) 2 M.L.J. 901 : L.R. 66 IA. 378 : I.L.R. (1940) Mad. 1 (P.C.) is authority for the position that the mokhasadar is himself the landholder within the meaning of the Act; and the cultivating tenants under them are in the position of ryots with occupancy rights in respect of the holdings in their possession, unless it can be shown that the lands are held by them under a service tenure which the landholder can resume or put an end to.

    8. The civil miscellaneous appeals are from the orders of the District Judge in two cases refusing to set aside orders of dismissal passed by him in two civil miscellaneous appeals on memos filed that they had been adjusted out of Court. Some of the trustees interested in a temple, which was the landholder, compromised the matter with the tenants and reported the cases as settled. Other trustees who were not the managing trustees at the time and whose right to become trustees in rotation would arise only later, applied for the dismissal being set aside, stating that the compromise was effected without their being consulted and it was therefore not binding against them. The District Judge negatived their prayers on the ground that the action of the managing trustees in reporting adjustment was final and binding on the petitioners. Whether this view is right or wrong, is really unnecessary to consider now, for the simple reason that it has been held even on the merits that the lands form part of an estate; and this would be the conclusion which would have been reached even if the appeals had been heard instead of being dismissed on the basis of a reported compromise or settlement.

    9. For the reasons given above, the two civil miscellaneous appeals and the several civil revision petitions will be dismissed with costs.

    10. No leave.

    (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3
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    Comments

    Dronamraju Seshagiri Rao v. Godithi Rammayya And Others
    (Feb 22, 1945)