JUDGMENT
Seshagiri Aiyar, J. — The plaintiff impounded the defendant's cattle. Thereupon the latter complained under Sect. 25 of the Cattle Trespass Act. But the plaintiff was acquitted. The present suit is for damages for malicious prosecution on the ground that the defendant instituted proceedings falsely and maliciously, Both the Courts below have held that such a suit would not lie. Hence this second appeal.
It is not with reference to criminal proceedings alone that a suit for malicious prosecution lies. An action will lie for the institution of bankruptcy proceedings, for filing an ungrounded petition to wind up a Corporation, for procuring the arrest of a person even for a civil debt, and for instituting proceedings to declare a person a lunatic. (See Whilworth v. Hall(1), Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre(2), Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley(3) and Lockenour v. Sides(4).) But neither would an action of this nature lie for all criminal prosecutions. A man may be prosecuted for driving a motor-car without lights, for laying down a drain in an improper manner, &c. If the prosecution fails in such cases, the prosecutor will not be held liable for malicious prosecution.
Lord Davey explained in Allen v. Flood(5) on what basis an action for malicious prosecution rests: “In my opinion the somewhat anomalous action for malicious prosecution is based on the same principle (referring to defamation). From motives of public policy the law gives protection to persons prosecuting, even where there is no reasonable or probable cause for the prosecution. But if the person abuses his privilege for the indulgence of his personal spite, he loses the protection, and is liable to an action, not for the malice, but for the wrong done in subjecting another to the annoyance, expense, and possible loss of reputation of a causeless prosecution.” This is also the view of Lord Herschell (See page 125). Sir F. Pollock in his book on Torts says that this is the true foundation of the action. According to these authorities, the gist of the action is not the prosecution, but the aspersion on character or reputation which the prosecution involves.
I shall now proceed to consider the present case in the light of the above principles. The proceedings under the Cattle Trespass Act are of a criminall nature; but no imprisonment is provided for the offence under Sect. 20. A fine in the nature of a solatium is to be levied. A complaint under Sect. 20 is included in the definition of the term ‘offence’ (Sect. 4 (o) of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Under Sect. 260, cl. (m) it is triable summarily. Therefore all the ingredients of a criminal prosecution are to be found with reference to the complaint; but the question still remains whether a complaint of this nature involves moral turpitude or stigma on character. In the well-known case of Quartz Hitl Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre, Brett, M. R. and Bowen, L. J., accept the dictum of Lord Holt in Savile v. Roberts as practically exhausting the classes of cases for which a suit for malicious prosecution would lie. There must be in the previous proceedings either (a) damage to a man's reputation or (b) danger to his liberty or (c) damage to his property. There can be no question in this case of danger to a man's liberty. Under Sect. 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the fine that was imposed is not paid, there may be a distress of property: See per Lord Buckley in Wiflen v. Bailey and Ramford Urbon Council. The accused is not liable to be sent to jail. It is conceivable that cl. (c) may cover this case, As Lord Justice Bowen says, as the theory is that in ordinary-civil actions, the costs awarded to a successful litigant are intended to compensate him for the trouble incurred by him, there will be no action for malicious prosecution in such cases. See also per Buckley, L. J., in Wiffen v. Bailey and Romford Urban Council. In the present case, no costs could have been awarded to the accused, under the Cattle Trespass Act; and probably, if the claim for costs were one of the items of the claim for damages, it may be open to argument that there was probable damage to property within the dictum of Lord Holt. But, in the present case, although the claim for such costs was in the plaint, it was advisedly given up in appeal. It is not, therefore, necessary to consider this question f urther.
The only other ground on which the action may be sustained is that the plaintiff's reputation suffered by the complaint, under Sect. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act. It certainly looks as if it would be straining the language too far to say that an injury to a man's reputation has been done by accusing him of having improperly and maliciously impounded the cattle of the complainant. A great deal will depend upon the position in life of the man who has been thus accused, and upon the motive and status in life of the accuser I am not prepared to hold that an accusation of this kind is covered by the head of “damage to reputation”, Mr. Justice Mookerjee in C.H Crowdy v. L. O'Reilly seems inclined to give an extended application to the principle.
The District Munsif in paragraph 14 of his judgment says that there has been enmity between the plaintiff and the defendant for some years. It may be that the prosecution was started with intent to harm the reputation of the plaintiff. The Munsif has, however, held that there was no malice or want of probable and reasonable cause for the complaint by the defendant. The District Judge has expressed no opinion on the facts; but the evidence has been placed before us and on reading them, (see Sect. 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure) I see no reason to differ from the conclusion of the District Munsif. I would, therefore, dismiss the second appeal with costs.
Napier, J.—I agree with my learned brother that this appeal should be dismissed and I entirely concur with him as to the principles governing suits for maliciously setting the law in motion. (Vide my judgment in Ramasami Aiyar v. Govinda Pillai. But I would go rather further than he does in applying those principles to a suit for maliciously proceeding under Sect. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act. The Court of Appeal in England has in Quartz Hill Mining Co. v. Eyre and Wiffen v. Bailey and Ramford Urban Council accepted the proposition that where it is based on damage to a person's reputation it must be something serious, the words of Holt, C.J, in Savile v. Roberts being “as if the matter whereof he is accused be scandalous” and Bo wen, L.J, in the Quartz Hill mining Company's case at page 692 draws an analogy between such cases and spoken slander giving as examples charges that a ‘man has been guilty of an indictable offence which is criminal and scandalous in its character and involves the loss of liberty of fair fame. Accepting this explanation as to what is meant by damage to fair fame, I cannot regard a charge of illegal distraint of cattle as coming within the mischief of the principle.
C. K.Appeal dismissed.