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  • P.V Rajamannar and C. Sanjeeva Rao for appellant.—In making the adoption the senior widow was influenced by a corrupt motive, namely, to spite the junior widow. In The Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sethupathy, (The Ramnad case) the Privy Council held that an adoption to be valid must not have been made by the widow from corrupt motive. In Sri Virada Pratapa Raghunada Deo v. Sri Brozo Kishoro Patta Deo (The Berhampur case) the Privy Council held that adoption should not be made capriciously by the widow. In Vellanki Venkata Krishna Rao v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi (The Guntur case) the Privy Council held that nice questions of the motive of the widow in making the adoption should not be introduced into the question. The widow should not make the adoption to defeat the rights of this person or that. The presumption is in favour of validity unless the contrary is shown. In Sri Krishnayya Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur Garu(4), which is an appeal to the Privy Council from Krishnayya Rao v. Raja of Pittapur(5), the Privy Council doubted whether the motive of the widow was relevant, but left the matter open. In Vijaysingji v. Shivsangji(6) the Privy Council did not deal with the question of motive. In Ramachandra v. Mulji Nanabhai(7) a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the motive of the widow in making the adoption is irrelevant in considering whether an adoption is valid or not. In Bombay a widow can make an adoption unless prohibited by her husband. That is why in Bombay her motive in making an adoption is immaterial. In Kandaswami Goundar v. Chinnammal(8) Madhavan Nair and Jackson, JJ. held that an adoption made by the widow to spite her daughters was invalid. To the same effect is the decision in Murahari Brahma Sastri v. Sumitramma(9). In Annapurnamma v. Appayya Sastri there is an obiter dictum that improper motive of a widow in making an adoption will vitiate the adoption. In Hari Ramayya v. Venkatachalapati Varadachariar, J. observed that the motive of the consenting sapinda may be a material consideration but not the motive of the widow making the adoption.
  • Advocate-General (Sir A. Krishnaswami Ayyar) with B.V Subramanyam for first respondent was not called upon.
  • Second respondent was not represented.
Judges
  • Sir Lionel Leach, C.J
  • Krishnaswami Ayyangar
  • Chandrasekhara Ayyar, JJ.
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  • P.V Rajamannar and C. Sanjeeva Rao for appellant.—In making the adoption the senior widow was influenced by a corrupt motive, namely, to spite the junior widow. In The Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sethupathy, (The Ramnad case) the Privy Council held that an adoption to be valid must not have been made by the widow from corrupt motive. In Sri Virada Pratapa Raghunada Deo v. Sri Brozo Kishoro Patta Deo (The Berhampur case) the Privy Council held that adoption should not be made capriciously by the widow. In Vellanki Venkata Krishna Rao v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi (The Guntur case) the Privy Council held that nice questions of the motive of the widow in making the adoption should not be introduced into the question. The widow should not make the adoption to defeat the rights of this person or that. The presumption is in favour of validity unless the contrary is shown. In Sri Krishnayya Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur Garu(4), which is an appeal to the Privy Council from Krishnayya Rao v. Raja of Pittapur(5), the Privy Council doubted whether the motive of the widow was relevant, but left the matter open. In Vijaysingji v. Shivsangji(6) the Privy Council did not deal with the question of motive. In Ramachandra v. Mulji Nanabhai(7) a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the motive of the widow in making the adoption is irrelevant in considering whether an adoption is valid or not. In Bombay a widow can make an adoption unless prohibited by her husband. That is why in Bombay her motive in making an adoption is immaterial. In Kandaswami Goundar v. Chinnammal(8) Madhavan Nair and Jackson, JJ. held that an adoption made by the widow to spite her daughters was invalid. To the same effect is the decision in Murahari Brahma Sastri v. Sumitramma(9). In Annapurnamma v. Appayya Sastri there is an obiter dictum that improper motive of a widow in making an adoption will vitiate the adoption. In Hari Ramayya v. Venkatachalapati Varadachariar, J. observed that the motive of the consenting sapinda may be a material consideration but not the motive of the widow making the adoption.
  • Advocate-General (Sir A. Krishnaswami Ayyar) with B.V Subramanyam for first respondent was not called upon.
  • Second respondent was not represented.
Judges
  • Sir Lionel Leach, C.J
  • Krishnaswami Ayyangar
  • Chandrasekhara Ayyar, JJ.
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Sir Lionel Leach, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

On 8 June 1931 Kandulapati Gopalam died leaving two widows: the second respondent (senior widow) and the appellant. On 20 October 1931 the second respondent purported to adopt the first respondent; it was not suggested that any necessary formalities were ignored. On 17 December 1935 the first respondent filed suit in the District Judge's Court of West Godavari (later transferred to the Subordinate Judge of Ellore) to recover possession of Gopalam's estate.

The first respondent alleged that Gopalam had, by will, given authority to the second respondent to adopt a son, and alternatively that the adoption was valid because the nearest sapinda had given his consent. The appellant denied execution of the will and disputed the validity of the nearest sapinda's consent. The will was not produced. The Subordinate Judge found that the first respondent had been validly adopted because the second respondent had in fact received the consent of the nearest sapinda; this factual finding as to the sapinda's consent is not disputed on appeal.

For the purposes of the appeal the court accepted that the second respondent was not actuated by any religious motive and that her object in making the adoption was to prevent the estate falling into the hands of the appellant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the adoption by a Hindu widow of a son to her deceased husband is invalid when the widow is actuated not by a sense of religious duty but by an improper or "corrupt" motive.
  2. Whether the consent of the nearest sapinda is vitiated (and therefore not a lawful authority for adoption) where that sapinda gave consent under the impression that the deceased had by will authorized the widow to adopt (this contention was not seriously pressed).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • A Hindu widow's adoption is invalid if she is prompted by a corrupt or improper motive (for example, to defeat the claims of a junior widow).
  • The consent of the nearest sapinda cannot be regarded as lawful here because (it was contended) he gave it under the mistaken impression that the deceased had by will authorized the adoption.

First Respondent's Arguments

  • The motive of the widow in making the adoption is not a relevant factor when valid authority to adopt exists (in particular, when the consent of the nearest sapinda has been obtained).
  • Evidence showed that the nearest sapinda gave his consent independently of any authority received from the deceased; his testimony was believed by the Subordinate Judge and is not challenged on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sethupathy (the "Ramnad" case) Held that a widow who has not received authority from her husband may adopt with the consent of his kinsmen, but contained a passage suggesting the act must be done bona fide and not from a corrupt motive. The court considered the passage relied upon by the appellant but treated subsequent authority as limiting the weight to be attached to inquiries into the widow's motive.
Vellanki Venkata Krishna Rao v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Warned against introducing "nice questions" about the widow's particular motives; required proof of assent by sapindas sufficient to infer the adoption was not capricious or corrupt but a family council decision on expediency. Quoted for the principle that evidence required is of assent by sapindas (kinsmen) rather than direct proof of the widow's motives; used to downplay motive inquiry.
Sri Krishnayya Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur Garu The Privy Council expressed doubt whether the motive of the adopting widow is relevant where the consent of the sapindas has been obtained; the Board did not decide the point finally in that case. The Court relied on this doubt and subsequent Privy Council authority to hold the widow's motive irrelevant when valid authority (sapinda consent) exists.
Kandaswami Goundar v. Chinnammal Madhavan Nair and Jackson Applied the dictum in the Ramnad case; held that if the consent of the sapinda was given with the object of benefiting himself or the widow adopted to defeat the interest of a sapinda and not to promote spiritual welfare, the adoption was invalid. The court expressly held that this earlier decision on the relevance of the widow's motive should be overruled.
Kalaga Annapurnamma v. Kalaga Appayya Sastri (Full Bench) Observed that consent of the nearest sapinda would be sufficient "if the circumstances showed that the adoption was made by the widow in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty". (Noted as obiter in that case.) The court stated that the observations of that Full Bench should not be given effect to insofar as they suggest motive must be examined; they are treated as not authoritative on this point.
Murdhari Brahma Sastri v. Sumitramma Discussed the widow's motive and (the Court felt) was bound by the Ramnad observations, though one judge indicated he might have decided differently if not bound. The present Court concluded that the decision on motive in that case should be overruled.
Hari Ramayya v. Venkatachalapati Considered the Privy Council judgment in Sri Krishnayya Rao; the learned judges of this Court appeared to regard Sri Krishnayya as deciding that only the sapinda's motive requires canvass, but the present opinion says that goes too far. Referred to as an instance where the previous Court arguably misread the Privy Council, supporting the present Court's corrective analysis.
Ramchandra v. Mulji Nanabhai (Bombay Full Bench) Held that in the Bombay Presidency discussion of the widow's motive was irrelevant because there a widow could adopt without any consent and the adoption resulted in religious benefit to the deceased. Used to illustrate that where the widow has power to adopt without consent, motive is irrelevant; supports the present Court's view on irrelevance of motive when authority exists.
Amarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh Emphasized the importance of the spiritual significance of the act of adoption. Relied upon to reinforce the principle that adoption confers spiritual benefit and that motive of the widow does not affect that spiritual result where valid authority exists.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the central issue as whether a widow's improper motive renders an adoption invalid where she has obtained whatever authority is necessary to adopt (in the Madras Presidency, typically the consent of the nearest sapindas or authority by will).

Step-by-step analysis as presented in the opinion:

  1. The court accepted the factual finding that the nearest sapinda had given his consent and that formalities were observed; the appellant did not dispute the sapinda's consent on appeal and the sapinda's testimony that his consent was independent was believed below.
  2. The court examined and quoted the passage from the Ramnad case relied on by the appellant, which suggested that adoption should be done "in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty and neither capriciously nor from a corrupt motive."
  3. The court then turned to later authority which had interpreted or limited the Ramnad observations. In Vellanki Venkata Krishna Rao the Privy Council cautioned against making "nice questions" of the widow's motive and emphasized that proof of assent by sapindas sufficient to support an inference of bona fides was what was required.
  4. The court noted the accumulation of decisions emphasizing the importance of the consent of the nearest sapindas and observed that in Sri Krishnayya Rao the Privy Council expressly doubted whether the widow's motive is relevant when sapinda consent has been obtained (though they did not finally decide the point in that case).
  5. The court also referred to the Bombay Full Bench decision in Ramchandra v. Mulji Nanabhai, which held motive irrelevant in the Bombay Presidency where widows could adopt without consent, demonstrating an approach that motive is not a necessary inquiry where the power to adopt exists.
  6. Taking into account the Privy Council's emphasis on the spiritual character of adoption (as in Amarendra Mansingh) and the particular position in the Madras Presidency — that a widow can adopt only with authority (will or sapinda consent) — the court reasoned that motive is irrelevant. The court explained that the spiritual benefit conferred on the deceased is unaffected by the widow's spiteful or improper motives, and that the requirement of authority makes it unnecessary and unjustified to inquire into motive.
  7. The court analogized to English law: where a power exists the law does not inquire into the motive for exercising it, and it saw no justification for applying a different rule to the Madras law of adoption where authority had been validly obtained.
  8. On this basis the court concluded that the widow's motive could be ignored when she had received valid authority to adopt (here, the consent of the nearest sapinda), and therefore the adoption must be regarded as valid.
  9. Finally, applying that legal conclusion to the facts, the court held that the second respondent's adoption of the first respondent was valid notwithstanding the second respondent's alleged improper motive to defeat the appellant.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the adoption is held to be valid because the widow had received valid authority (consent of the nearest sapinda). The court awarded costs in favour of the first respondent.

Implications explicitly stated in the opinion:

  • The Court held that when a widow has received valid authority to adopt (e.g., consent of the nearest sapinda), her motive in doing so can be ignored.
  • The opinion expressly states that earlier decisions to the contrary — Kandaswami Goundar v. Chinnammal and Murdhari Brahma Sastri v. Sumitramma — on the question of motive should be overruled.
  • The Court also stated that the observations of the Full Bench in Kalaga Annapurnamma v. Kalaga Appayya Sastri regarding the necessity of showing the widow's bona fide religious motive should not be given effect to.
  • Thus, the direct effect on the parties is that the first respondent's adoption is valid and the appellant's challenge fails; the Court has also altered the applicable law by overruling certain earlier decisions that made the widow's motive relevant where authority had been obtained.

G.R. (signature/initials as appearing in the original opinion)

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    Kandulapati Kanakaratnam v. Kandulapati Narasimha Rao

    Sir Lionel Leach, C.J:— The question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether the adoption by a Hindu widow of a son to her deceased husband is invalid when the widow is actuated, not by a sense of religious duty, but by an improper motive.

    On 8th June 1931 one Kandulapati Gopalam died leaving two widows, the second respondent and the appellant. The second respondent was the senior widow. On 20th October 1931 the second respondent purported to adopt the first respondent and it is not suggested that any of the necessary formalities were ignored. On 17th December 1935 the first respondent filed in the Court of the District Judge of West Godavari the suit out of which this appeal arises to recover possession of Gopalam's estate. The suit was subsequently transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Ellore. The first respondent alleged that Gopalam had by will given authority to the second respondent to adopt a son. He also alleged that, irrespective of the will, the adoption was valid as the nearest sapinda had given his consent. The appellant denied that the will had been executed by the testator and disputed the validity of the consent of the nearest sapinda. The will was not produced, but the Subordinate Judge held that the first respondent had been validly adopted because the second respondent had in fact received the consent of the nearest sapinda, and this is not now disputed. It may be taken for the purposes of the appeal that in adopting the first respondent the second respondent was not actuated by any religious motive and that her object was to prevent the estate falling into the hands of the appellant.

    Two arguments have been advanced on behalf of the appellant. In the first place it is said that a Hindu widow cannot make a valid adoption when she has been prompted by a corrupt motive. In the second place it is said that here the consent of the nearest sapinda cannot be regarded as being a lawful consent because he gave it under the impression that Gopalam had by will directed the second respondent to adopt a son to him. The second contention was not seriously pressed and calls for little comment. The nearest sapinda was Kandulapati Bullivenkayya, the elder brother of Gopalam. He gave evidence and stated that his consent was given independently of any authority received from Gopalam. His statement was believed by the Subordinate Judge and we see no justification for disbelieving it.

    The appellant mainly relies on a passage in the judgment of the Privy Council in The Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sethupathy, which is usually referred to as the Ramnad case. It was there held that according to the law prevalent in the Madras Presidency a Hindu widow who has not received authority from her husband may nevertheless adopt a son to him if she has received the consent of his kinsmen. Subsequent decisions make it clear that by kinsmen is meant the nearest sapindas. The passage relied upon by the appellant reads as follows:—

    “It is not easy to lay down an inflexible rule for the case in which no father-in-law is in existence. Every case must depend upon the circumstances of the family. All that can be said is that there should be such evidence of the assent of kinsmen as suffices to show that the act is done by the widow in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty and neither capriciously nor from a corrupt motive.”

    We will assume that where a senior widow adopts a son in order to prevent her husband's estate falling into the hands of a junior widow her motive is “corrupt” in the sense that it is improper.

    On behalf of the first respondent it is contended that the widow's motive in making the adoption is not really a factor and that weight should not be attached to the words “and neither capriciously nor from a corrupt motive” which appear in the judgment in the Ramnad case. For reasons which we shall state we consider that there is great force in this contention.

    The judgment in the Ramnad case was delivered in 1868. In 1876 the Privy Council had occasion to consider their observations in that case in Vellanki Venkata Krishna Rao v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi and, in delivering the judgment of the Board, Sir James Colvile observed:

    “Their Lordships think it would be very dangerous to introduce into the consideration of these cases of adoption nice questions as to the particular motives operating on the mind of the widow, and that all which this committee in the former case intended to lay down was, that there should be such proof of assent on the part of the sapindas as should be sufficient to support the inference that the adoption was made by the widow not from capricious or corrupt motives, or in order to defeat the interest of this or that sapinda, but upon a fair consideration, by what may be called a family council, of the expediency of substituting an heir by adoption to the deceased husband.”

    Here the weight is attached to the consent of the nearest sapindas. Their consent is the important factor and this has been emphasized in numerous decisions given by the Judicial Committee since. In quoting from the judgment in the Ramnad case Sir James Colvile pointed out that the evidence which was required was evidence of the assent of the kinsmen and not evidence of the widow's motives. In 1935 the Privy Council expressly left open the question whether the widow's motive could be disregarded when the consent of the nearest sapinda had been obtained, but in doing so their Lordships did express doubt whether her motive is relevant. This occurred when the Board delivered judgment in Sri Krishnayya Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur Garu. In that case their Lordships observed:

    “The last objection urged by the respondent is based on the motives of the first defendant. She is said not to have made the adoption for the benefit of her husband or upon religious grounds, but merely in order to get hold of a substantial part of the property. Their Lordships doubt if, where the consent of the sapindas has been obtained, the motive of the adopting widow is relevant. They do not, however, consider it necessary to decide this question in the present case, as assuming it to be so, they think that there is no ground for imputing a corrupt motive to the lady.”

    At this stage it will be convenient to refer to three decisions of this Court on which the appellant also relies. In Kandaswami Goundar v. Chinnammal Madhavan Nair and Jackson, JJ. applied the dictum in the Ramnad case and held that, if the consent of the sapinda was given with the object of benefiting himself or the facts showed that the widow was making the adoption to defeat the interest of a sapinda and not to promote the spiritual welfare of her husband, the adoption was invalid. In Kalaga Annapurnamma v. Kalaga Appayya Sastri, a Full Bench (Coutts Trotter, C.J, Madhavan Nair and Jackson, JJ.) said that the consent of the son who is the nearest sapinda would be sufficient

    “if the circumstances showed that the adoption was made by the widow in the proper and bona fide performance of a religious duty and the real motive which actuated her was the conferment of spiritual benefit on her husband.”

    It was not necessary to say this for the purpose of deciding the question which was raised in the case, and Mr. Rajamannar, on behalf of the appellant, has very properly conceded that these observations must be regarded merely as obiter. The question of the widow's motive was also discussed in Murdhari Brahma Sastri v. Sumitramma where Madhavan Nair and Jackson, JJ. again felt themselves bound by the observations of the Judicial Committee in the Ramnad case, although Jackson, J. indicated in his judgment that, if he were not bound by what had gone before, he might have decided otherwise. These three decisions were, of course, all given before the judgment of the Privy Council in Sri Krishnayya Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur Garu. That judgment was, however, considered by this Court (Cornish and Varadachariar, JJ.) in Hari Ramayya v. Venkatachalapati. The learned Judges apparently regarded the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Sri Krishnayya Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur Garu as actually deciding that the only person whose motive requires to be canvassed is the sapinda and not the widow, but the passage which we have just quoted from the judgment of the Board shows that this is going too far.

    The question was fully debated by the Bombay High Court in Ramchandra v. Mulji Nanabhai which was decided by a Full Bench of five Judges. The Court held, one Judge dissenting, that in the Bombay Presidency any discussion of the widow's motive in making an adoption was irrelevant, because a widow in the Bombay Presidency had the power to adopt without any consent and the adoption resulted in religious benefit to her deceased husband.

    As the result of the judgment of the Privy Council in Sri Krishnayya Rao v. Surya Rao Bahadur Garu the Court can now decide the question untrammelled by the observations in the Ramnad case on which the appellant so much relies. In Amarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh the Privy Council emphasized the importance of the spiritual significance of the act of adoption. In the Madras Presidency a widow cannot adopt unless she has received direct authority from her husband, either before his death or at his death by will, or the consent of the nearest sapindas, unless such consent is improperly withheld, in which case she can go to the next-nearest sapindas. Bearing in mind that the adoption confers spiritual benefit on the deceased husband and that in the Madras Presidency a widow can only adopt when she has received authority to do so, it seems to us that her motive is entirely irrelevant. However spiteful her action may be towards others the benefit conferred upon her deceased husband by her action is in no way affected, and the fact that she cannot act without authority makes the position all the more clear. The English law does not inquire into the motive for the exercise of a power when the power exists and we can see no justification for applying a different rule here. Consequently we hold that, when a widow has received valid authority to adopt, her motive in doing so can be ignored. It follows that we consider that the decisions in Kandaswami Goundar v. Chinnammal and Murahari Brahma Sastri v. Sumitramma on this question should be overruled and that the observations of the Full Bench in Kalaga Annapurnamma v. Kalaga Appayya Sastri, to which we have referred, should not be given effect to.

    In the present case the widow received authority from the nearest sapinda and consequently her adoption of the first respondent should be regarded as valid notwithstanding that her object was to defeat the appellant. We dismiss the appeal with costs in favour of the first respondent.

    G.R

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    Comments

    Kandulapati Kanakaratnam v. Kandulapati Narasimha Rao
    (Aug 28, 1941)