Plaintiff is the appellant in this appeal. In execution of a money decree obtained by the plaintiff against Subbiah Pillai in O.S No. 650 of 1910, the plaintiff attached the suit properties in October 1913. Subsequently the plaintiff himself purchased the property in Court auction on 9th March 1914. The sale was confirmed on 9th April 1914 and the plaintiff got delivery of property in enforcement of the sale certificate on 2nd December 1914. The sale to the plaintiff was subject to a hypothecation In favour of Periya Ravutha Goundar for Rs. 200 over the suit property.
Periya Ravutha Gounder filed a suit (O. S. No. 537 of 1913) on 19th November, 1913, to recover money due on his hypothecation bond, making Subbiah Pillai party defendant. The present plaintiff, however, was not made a party to that suit. The defendant after obtaining the preliminary and final decrees in Suit No. 537 of 1913, himself purchased the properties in Court auction on 27th March, 1916.
On the allegation that the defendant got into possession of the properties by trespass in May 1916, the plaintiff filed the present suit on 2nd February 1917 against Periya Ravutha Goundar for redemption of the defendant's mortgage for Rs. 200 dated 11th August, 1905, mentioned above. The defendant pleaded that he was the owner of the properties and that the plaintiff was not entitled to redeem.
The Court of first instance decreed redemption by the plaintiff on payment Rs. 830-8-5 to the defendant.
The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the lower Appellate Court on the ground that the amount that he was directed to pay for redemption was too large and that he was entitled to redeem on payment of a smaller amount. At the hearing of the appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to any right of redemption at all, and consequently not only dismissed the plaintiff's appeal but reversed the decree of the first Court in plaintiff's favour and dismissed his suit in toto.
Two questions of law have been raised in the appeal to the High Court, one relating to the plaintiff's right to redeem and the other whether the lower Appellate Court had jurisdiction in an appeal preferred by the plaintiff, not only to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal but further to reverse the decree passed in plaintiff's favour by the first Court, even though the respondent had not preferred any memorandum of objections or an independent appeal questioning the decree of the first Court.
To appreciate the first question it is necessary to state that the first Court relying on the decision reported in Venkata Seetharamayya v. Venkataramayya decided that a money decree-holder who had attached the mortgage properties ought to have been made a party to the suit subsequently filed by the mortgagee to recover money due on the mortgage and that such attaching decree-holder was entitled to redeem the mortgage. It would appear that a later decision of the High Court dissenting from the view taken in Venkata Seetharamayya v. Venkataramayya was reported in the Law Reports [Chamiyappa Thamgan v. Rama Ayyar ] shortly before the appeal was heard by the lower Appellate Court. Consequently according to the later ruling of the High Court, the plaintiff could not claim any right of redemption and consequently his suit for redemption ought to have been dismissed.
But the defendant had not preferred any independent appeal nor filed any memorandum of objections in the plaintiff's appeal questioning that portion of the decree passed by the District Munsif upholding the plaintiff's right to redeem. The lower Appellate Court however was of opinion that under O. 41, R. 33, Civil Procedure Code, the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to reverse even that portion of the first Court's decree though it had not been appealed against; and having regard to the circumstances of the case, it held that a case was made out for the exercise by it of the jurisdiction conferred by O. 41, R. 33, Civil Procedure Code. Accordingly the Appellate Court not only dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, but proceeded further and reversed the first Court's decree and dismissed the plaintiff's suit altogether.
It was argued before us that there is a conflict between the decision in Venkata Seetharamayya v. Venkataramayya and the decision in Chamiyappa Tharagan v. Rama Ayyar on the question whether the right of redemption subsists in the plaintiff in such cases.
On the question of the power of the Appellate Court to interfere even with the portion of the decree not appealed against even if it thought that decision erroneous, in the absence of an Appeal or memorandum of objections, various cases were quoted before us. The question relates to a matter of practice as regards jurisdiction and powers of Appellate Courts. It is essentially necessary and expedient that the law on such a point should be definitely and authoritatively laid down.
Having regard to the two questions of law aforesaid arising in the case, and for the reasons mentioned already, we think that this appeal should be decided by a Full Bench and we accordingly refer the whole case for the decision of a Full Bench.
This Letters Patent Appeal coming on for hearing on Thursday 9th Feb., 1928, in pursuance of the above said order of reference to a Full Bench and the case having stood over for consideration till Wednesday, the 2nd day of May 1928, the Court (the then C.J, Beasley and Madhavan Nair, JJ.) delivered the following
JUDGMENT
Madhavan Nair, J. — The plaintiff is the appellant in the Letters Patent Appeal. He obtained a money decree against Subbiah Pillai and one of his sons in O. S. No. 650 of 1910 on the file of the District Munsif's Court of Madura. In execution of that decree he attached the suit property in October 1913. Subsequently he himself purchased it in Court auction on 9th March, 1914. The plaintiff's purchase of the property was subject to a hypothecation in favour of the defendant for Rs. 200 dated 11th August 1905. The sale was confirmed on 9th April 1914 and in the enforcement of the sale certificate he obtained the delivery of the property on the 2nd December 1914. In the meanwhile, the defendant filed a suit (O.S No. 537 of 1913) on his hypothecation on 19th November 1913 and got a decree on 18th December, 1913. To this suit the present plaintiff was not made a party. In execution of his decree, the defendant purchased the property on 27th March, 1916. Alleging that the defendant is in unlawful possession of the land the plaintiff filed the present suit against him for the redemption of his mortgage for Rs. 200. The defendant pleaded that he was the owner of the property and that the plaintiff was not entitled to redeem. The first issue in the case was “whether the plaintiff has the right to redeem”. When the case came on for trial, the defendant conceded this point in favour of the plaintiff as under the ruling in Venkata Seetharamayya v. Venkataramayya an attaching creditor has a right to redeem. The District Munsif passed a decree for redemption in favour of the plaintiff on payment of Rs. 830-8-5 to the defendant.
The plaintiff then preferred an appeal to the lower Appellate Court on the ground that the sum he was ordered to pay was too large and that he should have been allowed to redeem on payment of a smaller amount. At the hearing of the appeal the defendant's Vakil contended that the Plaintiff's suit for redemption itself was not maintainable; and he represented that it was in view of the decision in Venkata Seetharamayya v. Venkataramayya that an attaching creditor has a right to redeem, that he conceded before the lower Court the Plaintiff's right to redeem but that the decision in Chamiyappa Tharagan v. Rama Ayyar has now negatived such a right on the part of the attaching creditor. In the circumstances, the learned Subordinate Judge allowed the defendant to raise the contention under O. 41, R.33, Civil Procedure Code; and though there was no cross-appeal or memorandum of objections by him, he upheld his contention” and hot only dismissed the plaintiff's appeal but reversed the decree of the first Court in plaintiff's favour and dismissed his suit in toto.
Against the above decree of the lower Appellate Court the plaintiff preferred Second Appeal No. 88 of 1922, and urged before Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the plaintiff had no right to redeem and that he had no jurisdiction under O. 41, R. 33, Civil Procedure Code, to allow the respondent to raise this new plea. The learned Judge overruled both arguments and dismissed the Second Appeal. The present Letters Patent Appeal is against the judgment and decree of the learned Judge.
The same arguments have been addressed to us. It is first contended that the learned Judge erred in holding that the lower Appellate Court had jurisdiction to dismiss the plaintiff's suit under O. 41, R. 33, Civil Procedure Code, when the respondent had filed neither an appeal nor a memorandum of cross-objections challenging the decree for redemption passed by the District Munsif and the provision of this rule should be read as subject to R. 22 of the said Order, the Court Fees Act and the limitation Act etc. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon the true scope and meaning of O. 41, R. 33, as illustrated by the decisions in Rangam Lal v. Jhandu Gangadhar v. Banabashi Abjal Majhi v. Intu Bepari (3) Raualinqam Chettiar v. Subrahmanya Chettiar, (4) and Chockalingam Chetty v. Seethai Achi, (5).
O. 41, R. 33, reads as follows:—
“The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to hare been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection.
Illustration.
A claims a sum of money as due to him from X or Y, and in a suit against both obtains a decree against X. X appeals and A and Y are respondents. The Appellate Court decides in favour of X. It has power to pass a decree against Y.
The rule has been newly introduced in the Code of 1908. Its object is clearly to enable the Court to do compelete justice between the parties. Its terms are very wide and in a proper case it gives the Appellate Court ample discretion to pass any decree or make any order to prevent ends of justice from being defeated. By the very terms of the order, involving as it does an exercise of judicial discretion, the question whether the Appellate Court should exercise the powers conferred by them in a particular case would no doubt depend upon the special facts and circumstances of that case. The illustration to the rule is a type of one class of cases, which calls for the exercise of the powers conferred by R. 33; but it does not by any means exhaust the class of cases in which the powers of the Appellate Court under this rule may be invoked. Having regard to the wide language of the rule it is inexpedient to lay down any hard and fast rule regarding the true scope of this provision. In a proper case the Courts should not hesitate to use the powers conferred upon it by this rule. The basis for the rule may be found in O. 58, R. 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court in England. The Attorney-General v. Simpson is an instance of another class of cases justifying action under this rule. In that case, an action was brought by the Attorney-General on behalf of the public for two reliefs: (1) for a declaration that the public were entitled to the right of passage along a river including the locks without the payment of tolls; and (2) that the defendant was under an obligation to maintain the locks in an efficient state by repair. In the first Court a decree was passed declaring that the public were entitled to use the locks without payment of tolls but it was also declared that the defendant was under no obligation to repair the locks. The defendant preferred an appeal against this decree. The plaintiff did not file either a cross-appeal or a memorandum of objections. The Court of Appeal found that the public were not entitled to use the locks-without payment of tolls to the defendant; at the same time the Court expressed the opinion that the defendant was under an obligation to repair the locks, and passed a decree to that effect. The learned Judges pointed out that under O. 58, R. 4, they were entitled to make this declaration notwithstanding the fact that there was no appeal by the plaintiff “against so much of the judgment which declared that the defendant was not bound to repair and maintain the works.”
In none of the cases brought to our notice has it been laid down that in an appeal preferred by the Plaintiff against a portion of the decree, the Appellate Court has no jurisdiction in the absence of a cross appeal or cross objection to dismiss the whole suit and that the utmost that the Appellate Court is competent to do in to dismiss the appeal. No doubt, learned Judges have remarked that the provision embodied in this rule should be used with care and caution; but that does not mean that the Appellate Court has no jurisdiction under it to dismiss the plaintiff's; suit in toto. The Court is not bound to interfere in every case in which it has the power to do so; it is in this connection that the question of judicial discretion comes in. There may no doubt be cases where no excuse or justification could be found for a party not having preferred an appeal or a memorandum of objections, in which cases justice may not require the exercise of powers under O. 41, R. 33, and the Appellate Court will be well advised in not exercising such powers. The decision in Bangam Lal v. Jhandu , does not support the extreme contention urged by the appellant. In that case, the plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant for rent of a holding and obtained a decree for a portion of his claim. The plaintiff then appealed with respect to the portion of his claim dismissed by the first Court. The defendant submitted to the order in so far as it was against him and neither filed a cross-appeal nor took objections under O. 41, R. 22, Civil Procedure Code. The District Judge remitted certain issues to the first Court and on return of the findings dismissed the entire suit of the plaintiff holding that he had power to do so under O. 41, R. 33, even though the defendant had not appealed against that part of the decree which was against him. On appeal by the plaintiff, the learned Judges held that it was not competent to the Appellate Court acting under O. 41, R. 33, to interfere with the decree obtained by the plaintiff in so far as it had not been challenged by the defendant. The true purport of that decision is explained in Jawahar Bano v. Shujaat Husain Beg in these words: “The Full Bench in that case held, that, although the words of O. 41, R. 33, were very wide and the Judge, strictly speaking, had jurisdiction to pass the decree which he had made (the italics are ours), still, there was not a proper exercise of jurisdiction by him in that case. It was pointed out that in a case where there is no sufficient reason for a respondent neglecting either to appeal or to file objections, the Court will hesitate before allowing him to object at the hearing of the appeal.” Distinguishing the case in Bangam Lal v. Jhandu , with these remarks, the learned Judge upheld in Jawahar Bano v. Shiyast Hussain Beg , the exercise of power by the appellate Court under O. 41, R. 23, Civil Procedure Code. In that case, a decree was passed for varying amounts against three defendants, of whom two only appealed, the third not being made a party to the appeal. It was held that it was competent to the Appellate Court to modify the decree in favour of the defendant who had not appealed by decreeing the whole sum due to the plaintiffs against the defendants who had. The decisions in Gangadhar v. Banabasi , and Abjal Majhi v. Intu Bepari , also, do not in our opinion support the extreme contention urged by the appellant. The learned Judges while pointing out that “ordinarily the power contained in R. 33 should be limited to those case where, as the result of the appellate Court's interference with the decree in favour of the appellant, further interference is required in order to adjust the rights of the parties in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience”, do not deny the appellate Court's jurisdiction to interfere in a proper case. Jenkins, O. J., says in Gangadhar v. Banabashi, : “There is no doubt that the words of that rule are widely expressed, but they must be applied with discretion.” And later on, the learned Judge adds: “No hard and fast rule can be laid down.” A similar opinion is expressed by Mookerjee, J., in Abjal Majhi v. Intu Bepari . It would thus appear that the statement of the learned Judges in Ramalingam Chettiar v. Subrahmanya Chettiar , that the two Calcutta decisions just now mentioned laid down that the exercise of the rules should be limited to cases where the Court has interfered in favour of the appellants and further interference is required to adjust the rights of parties, is not—with all deference to the learned Judges—quite accurate. There is no warrant for limiting the very wide terms of the rule only to this class of cases, though ordinarily it may be that it is in those cages occasions arise for exercising powers under the rule. The decision in Debendra Narain Singh… v. Narendra Narain Singh…. recognises the extensive jurisdiction of the Court under R. 33 or Order 41, Civil Procedure Code. The latest decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jogendra Kishore Roy v. Nasimuddin Sardar shows unmistakably the view of that Court on this matter. The facts of that case are thus summarised in the head note:
“In a Suit for the rent of a holding the first Court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for a proportionate amount of the rent payable in respect of the land included in the plaint, on the ground that the holding covered more lands than were included in the plaint. There was no appeal or cross-objection by the defendant, but on an appeal by the plaintiff the Appellate Court held that having regard to the manner in which the suit had been framed, the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief and accordingly dismissed the entire suit of the plaintiff.”
The High Court held “that having regard to the very wide powers given to an Appellate Court under O. 41, R. 33, Civil Procedure Code, the decision of the Appellate Court dismissing the whole of the Plaintiff's suit, in the absence of a cross-appeal or cross-objection by the defendant, was not without jurisdiction,” The following observation appearing in the judgment gives a complete reply to the arguments urged by the appellant before us. “There can be no doubt that the wording of R. 33 is very general and in this respect gives very wide powers to the Court of Appeal. But the learned Vakil for the appellant, however, urges in reply that R. 33 is controlled by R. 22 and that the wide powers given by R. 33 can only be exercised in case the whole matter is brought into controversy before the Appellate Court by a cross-appeal or a cross-objection filed under R. 22. I am not satisfied that this is a correct view of the scope of R. 33.” Our own Court has not dealt with this question except in the decision reported in Ramalingam Chettiar v. A.L.S.P.P.L Subramanya Chettiar , already referred to. In Gopala Tyengar v. Mammachi Reddiar , the learned Judges, “to be consistent” gave relief to a defendant though he had not appealed or joined in the memorandum of objections filed by some of the respondents. The Privy Council in Chockalingam Chetty v. Seethai Achi observes that under O. 41, R. 33, Civil Procedure Code, the Appellate Court is empowered, in a proper case, to add a defendant as respondent to the appeal for the purpose of passing a decree against him though their Lordships “saw no sufficient reason for interfering with the refusal of the Appellate Court to do so” in that instance. On the whole, we are satisfied that in a proper case the lower Appellate Court has jurisdiction to exercise its powers in favour of the respondent by dismissing the Plaintiff's case in toto though the respondent did not prefer a cross-appeal or memorandum of objections challenging the decree passed by the first Court.
As already stated whether interference was justified or not would depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. In the case before us, the Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that at the time when the appeal was filed the law that prevailed in Madras with regard to the Plaintiff's right to redeem was what was laid down in Venkata Seetharamayya v. Venkataramayya and that therefore the respondent could not take exception to the District Munsif's decree by preferring an appeal or cross-appeal. But by the time the appeal came on for hearing before him, the report of a decision of this Court refusing to follow Venkata Seetharamayya v. Venkataramayya appeared in Chamiyappa Tharagan v. Rama Ayyar . Relying on this decision respondent raised the question before the lower Appellate Court. In these circumstances the Subordinate Judge held that there was sufficient excuse or justification for the respondent not having preferred an appeal or a memorandum of objections. With this view Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., also agreed. If therefore the Subordinate Judge's decision that the case in Chamiyappa Tharagan v. Rama Ayyar , really has overruled the decision in Venkata Seetharamayya v. Venkataramayya is correct, then we cannot say that he was wrong in exercising his discretion under O. 41, R. 33, and dismissing the plaintiff's suit in toto, though the respondent had not filed an appeal or a memorandum of cross-objections. The question for decision in this Letters Parent Appeal therefore reduces itself to this: Has the plaintiff-appellant in this case no right to redeem in view of the decision in Chamiyappa Tharagan v. Rama Ayyar . As already indicated this question was decided against him both by the lower Appellate Court and by the learned Judge whose decision is now under appeal.
The case will be posted for further hearing on this point.
Sir Murray Coutts-Trotter, C. J.—I agree.
Beasley, J.—I agree.
This Letters Patent Appeal again coming on for hearing on Tuesday, and Wednesday, the 15th and 16th days of April 1930, and this day, the Court delivered the following
JUDGMENT
Ananthakrishna Ayyar, J. — This Letters Patent Appeal raised two important questions of law, one turning on the construction to be placed upon O. 41, R. 33, Civil Procedure Code, and the other on Sect. 91 of the Transfer of Property Act read with O. 34, R. 1, Civil Procedure Code.
The first question has been answered in favour of the respondents and against the appellant by a Full Bench of this Court at an earlier stage of this Letters Patent Appeal.
The only other question that remains for decision is whether the plaintiff, on the facts stated in the order of Reference, is entitled to redeem the 1st defendant's mortgage. The plaintiff was a money decree-holder against the judgment-debtor, the mortgagor, and in execution of his money decree he attached the mortgaged properties. Pending the attachment, the 1st defendant, the mortgagee, filed a suit to recover the money due upon his mortgage but he failed to make the plaintiff who was then the attaching decree-holder a party to his suit on the mortgage. In course of time the plaintiff became purchaser in Court auction in, execution of his money decree and obtained possession. The mortgagee, the plaintiff in the other suit, also became purchaser in execution of the decree passed on the foot of his mortgage. The question that arises in the present suit is whether the plaintiff, the attaching decree-holder who subsequently became also the auction-purchaser in execution of the money decree, has got the right to redeem the mortgage on the ground that Sect. 91 (f) of the Transfer of Property Act gives him such a right to redeem since he was not made a party to the mortgage suit.
The first point that arises for consideration in this connection is as to the exact scope of the expressions appearing in Sect. 91 (a) and (b) of the Transfer of Property Act, namely, “a person having any interest in or charge upon the property” and “any person having any interest in or charge upon the right to redeem the property” read along with O. 34, R. 1, Civil Procedure Code, “all persons having an interest either in the mortgage-security or in the right of redemption.” I am clear that the cases contemplated, by Sect. 91 (a) and (b) exhaust the class of cases contemplated by O. 34, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, and that it is only persons interested in the mortgage security or in the equity of redemption that have necessarily to be made parties to a suit under O. 34, R. 1, Civil Procedure Code. This is the view that has been taken in Chamiyappa Tharagan v. Rama Ayyar and in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan . It is also clear that attachment in execution of a money decree does not itself create any interest in or a charge over the properties which are the subject-matter of the attachment. This has been decided by the Privy Council in Motilal v. Karrabuldin and is not open to question. Having regard to the construction placed on Sect. 91 (a) and (b) of the Transfer of Property Act, and to the view taken regarding the scope of O. 34,. R. 1, Civil Procedure Code, it seems to me that it could not be said that a person in the position of the plaintiff, namely, an attaching decree-holder in execution of a money decree against the mortgagor is a necessary party to a suit under O.34, Civil Procedure Code. The question then arises whether the plaintiff, simply because under Cl. (f) of Sect. 91 he is given a right to redeem, as an attaching decreeholder, is entitled in the circumstances that have happened in this case to claim redemption. It has been held by Oldfield, J., in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan , that any rights he might have qua attaching decree-holder are not available to him when the properties have been sold in execution through Court; and that view has been accepted by two learned Judges of this Court, Sir John Wallis, C.J, and Seshagiri Ayyar, J., in Chamiyappa Tharagan v. Rama Ayyar . It was argued that, if under Cl. (f) an attaching decree-holder has been given a right to redeem, then whatever might be the exact category under which the right could be placed, not having been a party to the mortgagee's suit his rights could not vanish. The answer to this is furnished in the judgment of Oldfield, J., and the other learned Judge in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan . The Legislature evidently saw the impropriety of retaining Cl. (f) of Sect. 91, after the Privy Council made it clear that an attachment as such does not create any title to or interest or charge on, the properties attached in favour of the attaching decree-holder, and has accordingly omitted Cls. (f) and (q) from the section in the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929. The case is not consequently of any general importance and could not arise under the present law; and I am not prepared in the circumstances to reconsider the point decided by the three learned Judges of this Court in 43 and 44, Madras whose observations I have already referred to, and I respectfully follow their opinion on this point. It follows that this contention raised by the learned Advocate for the appellant should fail. The Letters Patent Appeal should, for these reasons, be dismissed. But having regard to the fact that the lower Appellate Court exercised the rather extraordinary jurisdiction that Courts have under O. 41, R. 33, Civil Procedure Code and granted a decree in favour of the respondents though the respondents had not preferred an appeal to it, and for that reason directed that they should have no costs of the litigation, I think that this Letters Patent Appeal should in the Circumstances be dismissed, without costs.
The Chief Justice.—I agree and have nothing further to add.
Curgenven, J.—I agree.
N. R. R.Appeal dismissed.