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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

By a deed of absolute sale Ramachandra Aiyar sold certain lands to the 3rd defendant, purporting to act for himself and as guardian, protector and father of his minor son (the 2nd defendant). The 3rd defendant's rights are now vested in the plaintiff. The 1st and 2nd defendants were members of a joint Hindu family and the lands in question were joint family property.

At the time of sale the 3rd defendant obtained from the 1st defendant a security bond which indemnified the 3rd defendant against loss arising from any claim of the minor (2nd defendant); that bond took the form of a charge up to Rs. 8,000 on certain other lands which also formed part of the joint family property.

The plaintiff brought a suit for a general partition of the joint family property and prayed that, in partition, the suit lands should be allotted to the 1st defendant so that the plaintiff (as successor to the 3rd defendant) might obtain those lands by standing in the shoes of the 1st defendant.

The District Munsif of Negapatam held the sale to be not binding on the minor (2nd defendant), decreed a general partition, and directed that all joint properties be divided into two equal shares between the 1st and 2nd defendants, allotting the lands sold to the 3rd defendant to the 1st defendant. The Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, on appeal, reversed that decree, holding that the 2nd defendant had a prima facie right to a half share in the properties alienated and saw no paramount equity in favour of the 3rd defendant (and his vendee) to override the natural rights of the plaintiff.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. The precise question phrased in the opinion (by Wallace, J.): "Can a co-parcener whose share in one item of joint family property has been wrongly alienated by another co-parcener ... resist the delivery by the Court of that share to a bona fide purchaser of it from the alienating co-parcener, in the practical working out of the equity of that purchaser to have decreed to him, in his general partition suit brought for that purpose, the property purchased by him bona fide for value ... ?"
  2. Whether the equitable principle allowing a purchaser to enforce his purchase by a general partition (and to be allotted the item purchased if that can be done without prejudice) applies when the alienor purported to sell on behalf of himself and his infant son (i.e., whether the seller's representation as guardian affects the rule).
  3. Whether the purchaser must be taken to have known, from the statement of consideration, that the managing member (the 1st defendant) had no right to sell the property (i.e., whether the form and terms of consideration show lack of necessity or improper alienation).
  4. Whether the taking of a security bond by the purchaser (a precautionary indemnity by charge on other joint property) is evidence that the purchaser knew of the seller's lack of title and whether that bond prevents the application of equitable principles in favour of the purchaser.
  5. The effect of competing suits and authorities (including the Full Bench decision in Iburamsa Rowthan v. Theruvenkatasami Naick and the Privy Council decision in Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachhpal) on whether the alienee's right to obtain the property by means of a general partition should depend on which party sues first and the nature of the relief sought.

Arguments of the Parties

Contentions Raised by Counsel (as recorded in the opinion)

  • It was contended (by Mr. Venkatarama Sastri) that the law in Madras, as stated by a Full Bench in Iburamsa Rowthan v. Theruvenkatasami Naick, established that where family property has been alienated by one co-parcener, the other co-parceners may, without a general partition suit, either claim the whole property from the alienee or claim back their share of that property proportionate to what would be due on a partition of that specific property.
  • It was further contended that the equitable principle (allowing the purchaser's equity to be enforced by general partition) does not apply where the alienor purported not to sell the property as his own but purported to sell on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other co-parcener (his infant son).
  • It was argued that the purchaser must have known from the form of the consideration that the 1st defendant had no right to sell the property as managing member because the consideration showed that the sale could not have been for necessities; the Subordinate Judge stated there was no necessity for the alienation to bind the minor's interest.
  • It was also argued that the taking of the security bond by the purchaser was evidence that the purchaser knew the 1st defendant had no right to alienate, and that the existence of such security prevented the application of the equitable principles in the purchaser's favour.

The opinion reports these contentions but does not consistently attribute each to a named party beyond the reference to Mr. Venkatarama Sastri.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ayyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya States the equitable principle that a purchaser from one member of a joint family who had no right to sell can enforce the purchase only by a partition of the entire family property; if in partition the property sold can be wholly allotted to the vendor's share, the purchaser is entitled to the whole property he bought. The Chief Justice relies on this principle and applies it to support restoring the District Munsif's decree (i.e., to permit the purchaser's equity to be satisfied by allotment in a general partition).
Manjaya Mudali v. Shanmuga Mudali Same equitable principle as above: purchaser from a co-parcener who wrongfully alienated joint property may enforce purchase by partition of the whole family property and be allotted the property if equitable considerations permit. Both the Chief Justice and Wallace, J. cite it among authorities establishing the purchaser's equitable right enforceable via general partition, and apply that principle to the facts.
Iburamsa Rowthan v. Theruvenkatasami Naick (Full Bench) Described as holding that when family property is alienated by one co-parcener, other co-parceners may, without general partition, claim the whole property from the alienee or claim back their share in the property proportionate to their entitlement (an extension of the principle that the alienee should be decreed what he purchased). The Court recognises this Full Bench decision as binding in Second Appeal but interprets it as not intending to dissent from the equitable principle and as not deciding that the alienee's right must depend on which party sues first. Wallace, J. further notes that Iburamsa deals with equities between two alienees and does not address the present question of a purchaser seeking a general partition to enforce his equity against non-alienating co-parceners.
Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachhpal (Privy Council) Authority that an alienee (in that case an adopted son) might insist that he stands in the shoes of the adoptive father and be entitled, in that suit, to obtain a partition in which he could get the share which would come to the father, so as to give effect to rights claimed through the father. The Chief Justice and Wallace, J. invoke this decision to show (a) there is no conflict between the equitable principle and other remedies, and (b) that the alienee may, in a suit for general partition, have his equity enforced (Privy Council decision supports the alienee's right to enforce his claim by general partition in appropriate circumstances).
Chinna Sanyasi v. Suriya Subramanya Chettyar v. Padmanabha Chettyar Cited for the proposition that when a specific item of joint family property has been alienated by another co-parcener, a non-alienating co-parcener can sue for recovery of his share in the item alienated. Wallace, J. cites this to describe the non-alienating co-parcener's right to sue for recovery of his share as one of the established principles to be balanced against the alienee's equitable claim.
Vadivelam Pillai v. Natesam Pillai Explains that so long as the alienee refrains from filing his suit for general partition, the claims of the non-alienating co-parceners will be enforced against him on equitable terms; the alienee's interest remains vested but not separated until he sues to carve it out. Wallace, J. cites this to support the proposition that once the alienee sues for general partition and obtains a decree, his equity to obtain the specific property purchased will prevail unless substantial injustice would result to co-parceners.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains a two-judge analysis: the Chief Justice (leading judgment) and the concurring judgment of Wallace, J. Both judges reason from established equitable principles about alienations by a co-parcener of joint family property and the remedies available to the alienee and to the non-alienating co-parceners.

Chief Justice — analysis and outcome

  • The Chief Justice sets out the equitable principle (citing Ayyagari Venkataramayya and Manjaya Mudali): a purchaser from a co-parcener who had no right to sell can enforce the purchase only by seeking partition of the entire family property; if, in that partition and having regard to interests of other sharers, debts and equitable allocation, the property sold can be wholly allotted to the vendor's share, the purchaser is entitled to the whole property he bought.
  • He agrees with the District Munsif's application of that principle and disagrees with the Subordinate Judge's refusal to see a paramount equity in favour of the purchaser's vendee. The Chief Justice sees no natural right of the plaintiff (i.e., no overriding prejudice) that would be defeated by giving effect to the purchaser's equity.
  • On the Full Bench decision Iburamsa Rowthan v. Theruvenkatasami Naick, the Chief Justice explains that while binding, it was not intended to reject the above equitable principle nor to make the alienee's right depend on which party sued first. He notes the existence of a contemporaneous suit by the son for partition of the specific property and explains that the Privy Council decision in Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachhpal shows that, even if the son had sued first, the alienee could apply for general partition to work out his equity.
  • The Chief Justice rejects the contention that the rule should not apply where the alienor purported to sell for himself and the infant son, saying he cannot appreciate any distinction: if the alienor had sold in his own name the principle would apply; selling on behalf of the infant does not reduce the purchaser's interest.
  • He examines the form of consideration (cash paid and balance secured by hypothecation of purchaser's property) and is not satisfied that this necessarily indicated to the purchaser that the sale could not have been a proper family alienation; even if it did, the purchaser should still be able to obtain the vendor's interest by partition under the equitable principle.
  • Regarding the security bond taken by the purchaser, the Chief Justice treats it as a prudent precaution and not as decisive evidence that the purchaser knew of the seller's lack of right; he notes that if resort to the security would place the minor son in a better position, the Court might take that into account, but here the security property is also joint property and there is no suggestion the son would benefit thereby.
  • On these bases the Chief Justice concludes the appeal must be allowed and that the District Munsif's decree should be restored with respect to the A schedule property; he also orders costs in favour of the plaintiff for the Subordinate Judge and this appeal.

Wallace, J. — analysis and formal legal exposition

  • Wallace, J. frames the main legal question exactly as set out above (see Legal Issues Presented) and then summarises the "well settled principles of law" relevant to the situation:
    1. Ordinarily no co-parcener can sue for partial partition of his share in any single item of joint family property.
    2. Where a specific item of joint family property has been alienated by another co-parcener, a non-alienating co-parcener can sue for recovery of his share in that item (citing Chinna Sanyasi ...).
    3. Where the alienee has been given possession, the whole joint family may sue to recover possession (citing Ramkishore Kedarnath ...).
  • He then balances these rights against the alienee's right to enforce his purchase by a general partition suit so that the purchaser may, if possible without prejudice, be decreed the property purchased (citing Manjaya Mudali and Ayyagari Venkataramayya).
  • Wallace, J. reasons that a decree obtained by a non-alienating co-parcener in a suit for recovery of his share in the alienated item does not convert that recovered share into an individualized, specific-property right as against the co-parceners; rather, it prevents the property passing out of the joint family pool, but does not itself sever that share into a separate item for the non-alienating co-parcener's exclusive retention against fellow co-parceners.
  • Consequently, when an alienee sues for general partition to work out his equity, a non-alienating co-parcener who has previously obtained a decree for his share is not ordinarily in a superior position to retain that share against the alienee than a co-parcener who has not obtained such a decree. Such a co-parcener must show specific prejudice or substantial injustice in order to resist the alienee's equitable claim to be allotted the property he purchased.
  • Wallace, J. distinguishes Iburamsa Rowthan as dealing with equities between two alienees and not as authority preventing the enforcement of an alienee's equity by general partition against a non-alienating co-parcener who would not suffer substantial injustice.
  • He also notes (citing Vadivelam Pillai v. Natesam Pillai) that, until the alienee sues, his interest remains vested but not segregated; once he sues and obtains a decree for general partition, his equity to obtain the specific property will prevail unless substantial injustice is shown. Wallace, J. agrees that no substantial injustice was proved in this case.
  • Wallace, J. concurs in the result proposed by the Chief Justice and records that the appeal is allowed.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED; THE DECREE OF THE DISTRICT MUNSIF IS RESTORED SO FAR AS THE A SCHEDULE PROPERTY IS CONCERNED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The plaintiff (vendee, successor to the 3rd defendant) succeeds in the appeal and will obtain relief in accordance with the District Munsif's decree as to the A schedule property (i.e., the purchaser's equity is to be enforced by allotment in the general partition).
  • The plaintiff is awarded the costs of the appeal in the Subordinate Judge's Court and of this appeal.

Broader implications: The Court applies and reaffirms established equitable principles governing purchases from co-parceners of joint family property — specifically that a bona fide purchaser can enforce his purchase by seeking a general partition and, if the sold property can be allotted to the vendor's share without substantial injustice to other coparceners, the purchaser may be decreed the property he purchased. The opinion does not announce a new rule of law beyond applying these established principles to the facts of the case.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or arguments not contained in that text.

    Davud Beevi Ammal v. P.R. Radhakrishna Aiyar

    The Chief Justice. — By a deed of absolute sale one Ramachandra Aiyar sold certain lands to the 3rd defendant purporting to act for himself and as the guardian, protector and father of his minor son, the 2nd defendant. The rights of the 3rd defendant are now vested in the plaintiff. The 1st and 2nd defendants are members of a joint Hindu family and the lands in question were their joint property. At the time of the sale the 3rd defendant obtained from the 1st defendant a security bond by which the 1st defendant gave him an indemnity against the loss that might arise by any claim of the minor 2nd defendant. That bond took the form of a charge to an extent of Rs. 8,000 on certain other lands which it appears also formed part of the joint family property. This suit is brought for a general partition of the joint family property and it is prayed that, in that partition, the suit lands shall be allotted to the 1st defendant, so that, whether he was entitled to alienate them or not, the plaintiff may get them as standing in the shoes of the 1st defendant.

    The District Munsif of Negapatam, Mr. R. V. Krishna Aiyar held that the sale was not binding on the 2nd defendant. He decreed a general partition and directed that all the joint properties should be divided into two equal shares between the 1st and 2nd defendants and that, in effecting such partition, the lands sold to the 3rd defendant should be allotted to the 1st defendant, and adjourned the suit to appoint a Commissioner to effect the partition. Without the appointment of a Commissioner the 1st and 2nd defendants divided the property filing lists of properties which they had agreed to take, in those lists allotting to the 1st defendant the properties sold to the 3rd defendant. It was not contended that this division of property would work any injustice to the 2nd defendant, and indeed, by the agreement between the 1st and 2nd defendants as to the division, it is clear that it was admitted that this was not the case. The District Munsif in his judgment has stated quite clearly the principle to be applied. On the case coming before the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, he reversed the decree stating that the 2nd defendant had a prima facie right to a half share in the specific properties alienated and that there was no reason for depriving him of that natural right in giving effect to the equity in favour of the 3rd defendant and he saw no paramount equity to be enforced in favour of the 3rd defendant or his vendee so as to override the natural rights of the plaintiff operating to his prejudice.

    The principle of equity to be applied in such cases is well established and will be found clearly stated in the judgment of Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., in his very learned judgment in Ayyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya and in Manjaya Mudali v. Shanmuga Mudali and it is that a purchaser from one member of a joint family which that member has no right to sell, it being the joint property, can enforce the sale only by a partition of the entire family property; and if, in such partition, the property sold, can, with due regard to the interests of the other sharers, to the debts due by the family and to an equitable allocation of the various items of family property to the shares of the several coparceners, be wholly allotted to the vendor's share, the purchaser will be entitled to the whole property which the vendor professed to convey to him. In my judgment, the learned District Munsif puts this case from the right point of view and I should content myself with saying that I have nothing to add to his excellent judgment, which is clear and well reasoned judgment, and that I do not agree with the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, because I do not appreciate what natural right of the plaintiff operating to his prejudice are overridden by the District Munsif's decree. But Mr. Venkatarama Sastri has contended that it is now established as far as Madras is concerned that, where family property has been alienated by one co-parcener, the others may without any general partition either claim the whole property from the alienee or may claim back their share of that property, such share being the proportion to which they would have been entitled on a partition of that specific property, and for this proposition we are referred to the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Iburamsa Rowthan v. Theruvenkatasami Naick. That case is, of course, binding on us sitting in Second Appeal, but I do not think that it was intended by that Court in any way to dissent from the principle of equity stated above and so well established. Nor do I think that it was meant that whether the alienee in such cases could get the property was to depend on whether a suit was first brought by him for a partition of the whole joint property or by the other coparceners for a partition of a part. We are informed that there was pending, at the time of the hearing of this suit, another suit by the son claiming partition of the particular property and award to him of a half; so that if by chance that suit had been heard first and the principle in Iburamsa Rowthan v. Theruvenkatasawmi Naick had been applied, assuming it to be consistent with the equitable principle, that would otherwise apply, the son would have got half of the property in question and the plaintiff one half whereas by applying the equitable principled would have got the whole of what had been sold. That there is no such conflict, I think, is clear from the decision of the Privy Council, in Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachhpal. There the suit was brought by members of a joint Hindu family to set aside an alienation by their father to an adopted son whose adoption was alleged to be invalid. Their Lordships in sending back the case pointed out that the adopted son might be entitled insist that he stood in the shoes of the adoptive father and be entitled in that suit to obtain a partition in which he could get the share which would come to the father so as to give effect to any rights which the adopted son might be entitled claiming through the father. In my view, this is authority for the proposition that if this suit had been a suit by the son for a share of the alienated property, it would be open to the Court on the application of the alienee to decree a general partition in which the principle of equity should be applied.

    It is further contended that this principle has no application where the alienor purports not to sell the property as his own but purports to sell it on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other co-parcener, his infant son. I am unable to appreciate this distinction, for it is clear that, if he had sold in his own name, then the principle would apply, and I do not appreciate how the fact that he purported to sell both for himself and for his infant son in any way reduces the interest purchased by the alienee.

    It was further contended that the purchaser must have known from the statement of the consideration that the 1st defendant had no right to sell the property as managing member because the consideration showed that the sale could not have been for necessities. The Subordinate Judge states that there was no necessity for the alienation so as to bind the minor's interest in the property. On an examination of the consideration, a considerable amount was paid in cash, but a large balance was secured by a hypothecation bond of some property of the purchaser. I am not satisfied that this fact must necessarily have shown to the purchaser that the sale could not be a proper alienation in the interests of the joint family; nor do I see, even if it were so, why I should deprive the purchaser of his rights against the alienor to obtain the alienor's interest by partition the equitable principle which has been applied here.

    It was also argued that the taking of the security bond was evidence that the purchaser knew that the 1st defendant had no right to alienate, and also that its existence prevented the application of the equitable principles. It is a wise precaution when purchasing from a managing member to take security against possible claims of other co-parceners and I do not think that any such significance is to be attached to the taking of this bond. If, however, the security, if resorted to by the purchaser, would result in the son being in a better position, it may be that the Court, in applying the equitable principle, might take that into consideration. But that is not the case here as the property given as security is also joint property; and there is no evidence, nor has it been suggested that the son would in any way benefit by that security property being allotted to the father and given to the plaintiff.

    For these reasons, this appeal must be allowed and the decree of the District Munsif must be restored so far as A schedule property is concerned. The plaintiff must have costs of the appeal in the Court of the Subordinate Judge and of this appeal.

    Wallace, J.—I agree. On the important question of law raised in this appeal, I should like to say a few words.

    1. The point for decision in this case is:—Can a co-parcener whose share in one item of joint family property has been wrongly alienated by another co-parcener who nevertheless had the power of alienating it, resist the delivery by the Court of that share to a bona fide purchaser of it from the alienating co-parcener, in the practical working out of the equity of that purchaser to have decreed to him, in his general partition suit brought for that purpose, the property purchased by him bona fide for value, apart from any consideration of the question whether any real unfairness or injustice would be done to the non-alienating co-parceners by granting the alienee the decree he seeks for?

    2. The main and well settled principles of law necessary for consideration here as laid down in this Presidency are (a) that ordinarily no co-parcener can sue for partial partition of his share in any single item of joint family property; (b) that when a specific item of joint family property has been alienated by another co-parcener, a non-alienating co-parcener can sue for recovery of his share in the item alienated; see Chinna Sanyasi v. Suriya Subramanya Chettyar v. Padmanabha Chettyar or (c) where the alienee has been given possession of such a specific item, the whole joint family may sue to recover possession. See Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainaryanna Ramrachhpal(3). As against these rights of co-parceners against the alienee from a co-parcener has to be set the right of such alienee to enforce by general partition suit his rights of purchase in and possession of the specific item purchased if that can be done without prejudice to the co-parcener who were not parties to the alienation Manjaya Mudali v. Shanmuga(4) and Ayyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya(5). This right will prevail against right (c) set out above, vide the Privy Council decision in Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachhpal. The present question is whether it also prevails against right (b). Now while it is not necessary for the non-alienating co-parcener to institute a suit for general partition in order to recover his share in the item alienated by another co-parcener, and while he may sue for partial partition of his share in that item only, I do not find any authority for holding that, when he has so recovered that share, it is, as against his fellow co-parceners his specific-property, or that the effect of his suit is to cause that recovered share to cease to be the joint family property which it was before the suit. No more after the suit, then before it, can the recovering co-parcener predicate that he has himself a particular share in that item of the joint family property. He has, in my view, merely recovered that share for the joint family or rather, prevented it passing as a specific item out of the joint family pool, prevented that hitherto undivided share of his crystallising into a specific divided item, and so separating itself from the general pool. His decree does not have the effect of dividing the alienated item by metes and bounds between himself and other non-alienating co-parceners. But of course the alienor co-parcener has lost his claim to share in that item at a general family partition. In my view the decree obtained in such a suit by a non-alienating co-parcener, while it is an exception to the general rule that no co-parcener can sue for partial partition, does not go further and form any exception to the rule that no co-parcener can, as against his co-parceners, predicate that he is entitled to hold and retain against them a particular share in any particular joint family property. By the very frame of the suit the decree in it is a decree for partial partition as against the alienee, but not as against his co-parceners, and its object is to ascertain by partition the particular property which the purchaser may retain and to separate that from the joint family property. The decree in it will no doubt bind the alienee to this extent that he cannot contend that the non-alienating co-parcener's share must be available for recovery by him. It does not preclude him from claiming that in working out his equity, it may be available, though no doubt the existence of the decree may in certain cases raise a strong equity in favour of the non-alienating co-parcener retaining the share he had taken so much trouble to recover.

    3. It follows then that, when an alienee from a co-parcener files his suit for general partition in order to work out the equity in his favour as purchaser, a non-alienating co-parcener who has obtained a decree for his share of that item, is not ordinarily in any superior position to retain that share against the alienee than a non-alienating co-parcener who has not obtained such a decree, and cannot without proof of specific prejudice to himself, set up against the alienee a claim to a particular share in the item alienated since that share has fallen back into the general family pool, or rather, has really never left it. In working out the equities it follows that the ordinary rule will apply viz., that the alienee will be decreed the possession of the specific property purchased by him, if that can be done, without substantial injustice to the co-parcener and no co-parcener has a right to insist, in the absence of proof of such injustice, on his being given on division a share in the alienated item.

    4. None of the ruling quoted in support of respondent seem to me to affect this result. That in Iburamsa Rowthan v. Theruvenkatasami Naick deals with the equities between two alienees, each form a separate co-parcener, in which case it was held that equity could not insist on the 2nd alienee suing for general partition but would permit him to sue for the partition of his share, corresponding to his alienor's share, in the property conveyed to the 1st alienee. This was merely an extension of the principle that the alienee shall so far as possible be decreed what he purchased. This ruling did not consider the question what the effect of a suit by one of the alienees for general partition for the purpose of working out his equity would be, and it is certainly no authority for the proposition that such an equity cannot be enforced against a non-alienating co-parcener who has recovered by suit his share in the property alienated, when no substantial injustice would be done to him.

    5. So long as the alienee refrains from filing his suit for general partition, i.e, from insisting on the working out of his own equity, the claims of the non-alienating coparceners, will be enforced against him, on equitable terms; see Vadivelam Pillai v. Natesam Pillai. The principle, as I understand it, is that until he so sues, his interest in the property is only vested and not separate, “a legal estate” not yet reduced into possession and which may never be reduced into possession. But when he has sued to carve out and reduce to possession that vested interest and has obtained a decree, then his equity to get for himself the specific property in which he purchased an interest will prevail, if no substantial injustice will be thereby caused to the co-parceners, and can be resisted by any co-parcener on no other ground than that it will do him a substantial injustice. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that in this case no substantial injustice has been proved to be likely to follow the allotment to the purchaser of the property purchased by him.

    6. I have nothing to add on the other parts of the case and agree that the appellant must be allowed on the terms, proposed by the learned Chief Justice.

    C.KAppeal allowed..

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    Davud Beevi Ammal v. P.R. Radhakrishna Aiyar
    (Nov 24, 1922)