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Case Summary — Appeal concerning Malicious Prosecution (Delivered by The Chief Justice)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants appealed from a decree of the original side of this Court that had awarded the respondent damages for malicious prosecution. The first appellant carried on business in edible oils in Bombay and opened a Madras branch in January 1933, which the respondent was placed in charge of. The respondent's services were dispensed with at the end of August 1933. On 22 October 1933 the second appellant became manager of the Madras branch.

On 31 October 1933 the second appellant met Subramaniam Chetty and a broker named Murthi. On Murthi's representation, the second appellant sold 75 cases of edible oil to Subramaniam Chetty on credit (payment in three days). The purchaser did not pay and never paid. By inquiries the second appellant discovered that the goods had been moved to a godown rented by the respondent and Murthi. On 10 November 1933 the second appellant, in the name of the first appellant, wrote to the Law College Police Station alleging collusion and requesting the police to apprehend and book the parties.

The police arrested Subramaniam Chetty, Murthi and the respondent on 11 November 1933, charging them with cheating under Ss. 415 and 420, Indian Penal Code. Magisterial proceedings continued until 10 July 1934 when the three accused were discharged. On 9 May 1935 the respondent filed the suit for malicious prosecution from which this appeal arises.

At trial before Gentle J., the learned judge found for the respondent, holding that the respondent had proved malicious prosecution and awarded Rs. 1,500 as damages. The Chief Justice delivered the judgment on appeal allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was an absence of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution, having regard only to the facts known to the complainant at the time the complaint was presented.
  2. Whether the complainant (the second appellant) acted with malice—meaning malice in fact (malus animus) or a wrongful motive—so as to sustain an action for malicious prosecution.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hicks v. Faulkner Hawkins J.'s statement that the malice required in malicious prosecution is "malice in fact" (malus animus), that absence of reasonable ground may be evidence of malice but is a question for the jury, and that want of reasonable cause is for the judge to determine. The Court relied on this articulation to explain the distinction between judge's role (deciding reasonable and probable cause) and the jury's role (deciding whether absence of reasonable cause indicates malice). The passage guided the Court's approach to whether malice could be inferred here.
Bromage v. Prosser Cited (per Bayley J.) for the idea of "malice in law" which may be assumed from intentional doing of a wrongful act; used in the quoted passage to contrast malice in law with malice in fact. The Court referenced this authority within the quoted passage from Hicks v. Faulkner to underline the distinction between malice in law and malice in fact; it forms part of the background legal exposition on malice.
Mitchell v. Jenkins Cited in the quoted passage (per Lord Westbury) as part of authorities related to the principles described by Hawkins J.; the opinion itself does not elaborate the rule from this case. The Court quoted the passage that lists this case; no specific separate application or detailed rule from Mitchell v. Jenkins is set out beyond its inclusion in the cited authority.
Turner v. Ambler Cited in the quoted passage (per Lord Westbury); the opinion does not state a distinct rule drawn from this authority beyond its mention in the passage. The Court included this citation within the broader quotation used to explain malice standards. No independent application beyond that citation is described in the opinion.
Lister v. Perryman Cited in the quoted passage (per Lord Westbury); the opinion itself does not specify a separate rule drawn from this case beyond its mention in the passage. The case is referenced within the Hawkins J. quotation relied upon to set out the legal approach to malice; the opinion does not record a distinct application of this authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the two essential elements of malicious prosecution as set out in the trial: (1) absence of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution, and (2) malice on the part of the person who launched the proceedings. The opinion follows the rule that, when deciding absence of reasonable and probable cause, the Court may only have regard to the facts known at the time the complaint was presented.

On the first element (reasonable and probable cause), the Chief Justice concurred with the learned trial judge that the facts known to the complainant did not constitute sufficient ground for proceeding against the respondent. The relevant facts known at the time were limited: the goods had been removed to a godown rented by the respondent and Murthi and had disappeared; the other transactions the respondent later asserted (resales, purchase price differences, disposal of cases) were not known to the appellants at the time of the complaint. The Court therefore found an absence of reasonable and probable cause.

On the second element (malice), the Chief Justice disagreed with the trial judge's inference of malice. The trial judge had found the second appellant acted with a wrong motive—hoping that arresting the respondent would appease his employer—and therefore acted maliciously. The Chief Justice reviewed the legal standard for malice, quoting Hawkins J. in Hicks v. Faulkner to show that malice to be proved in such an action is malice in fact and that absence of reasonable cause may be evidence of malice but does not necessarily establish it. Whether malice should be inferred depends on the circumstances; an inference of malice is appropriate where the defendant acted recklessly or from an improper motive.

Applying those principles to the facts, the Chief Justice concluded that the evidence did not justify an inference of malice. The record indicated the second appellant honestly believed his employer had been defrauded: payment had not been made within the agreed three days, inquiries showed the goods had been taken to the godown rented by the respondent and Murthi, and the goods were thereafter untraceable. The second appellant was a layman; the Court considered that, in those circumstances, forming the honest conclusion that the respondent was implicated in fraud was understandable. Because malice in fact was not proved, the respondent had failed to establish both required elements of malicious prosecution.

The Court therefore held that absence of reasonable and probable cause (which the respondent had proved) did not suffice because malice (the other element) had not been established on the facts.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The appeal was allowed and the respondent's suit for malicious prosecution was dismissed. The Court ordered costs in favour of the appellants both at the appellate stage and at trial.

Consequences: The direct effect is that the decree awarding the respondent Rs. 1,500 for malicious prosecution was set aside and the respondent's suit was dismissed with costs. The opinion does not purport to establish any new legal principle beyond applying existing authority on the distinction between want of reasonable cause and malice; no broader precedent beyond the application of existing authorities (as cited) is discussed in the opinion.

    Abubucker Ebrahim And Another v. Maganlal K. Javeri

    (Delivered by The Chief Justice).

    The appellants appeal from a decree passed by the original side of this Court awarding the respondent damages for malicious prosecution. The first appellant carries on business in edible oils in Bombay and has a branch office in Madras. The Madras branch was opened in the month of January 1933 and the respondent was placed in charge of it. At the end of August 1933 the respondent's services were dispensed with and on the 22nd October 1933 the second appellant became the manager of the Madras branch. On the 31st October 1933 the second appellant received a visit from one Subramaniam Chetty and a broker named Murthi. It is common ground that Murthi had acted as the broker in transactions with the first appellant's Madras branch during the period the respondent was in charge of it. Murthi represented to the second appellant that Subramaniam Chetty was a big merchant carrying on business in Mambalam, Madras, and on the strength of his recommendation the second appellant agreed to sell to Subramaniam Chetty 75 cases of edible oils at the price of Rs. 14-8-0 per case, payment to be made in three days time. The contract having been entered into the goods were delivered to Subramaniam Chetty. He did not pay for them on the day arranged and has never paid for them. On the 5th November, 1933 the second appellant met Murthi and told him that Subramaniam Chetty had defaulted. Murthi then said that Subramaniam would be coming to pay the amount in the course of that day or the next. Subramaniam Chetty did not appear that day or the next day and the second appellant was unable to trace his whereabouts, but as the result of inquiries he ascertained that the respondent was doing business in vegetable oils and that the cases which had been sold to Subramaniam Chetty had been removed to a small godown in Thathamuthiappan street, Madras, which had been rented by the respondent and Murthi. As default had been made in payment, the second appellant grew anxious and it is his case that he asked Murthi to accompany him to Mambalam to show him where Subramaniam Chetty lived. Murthi put him off by various pretexts and he never found Subramaniam Chetty. On the 10th November, 1933, the second appellant in the name of the first appellant wrote a letter to the officer in charge of the Law College Police Station, Madras, setting out substantially these facts. The letter concluded with the following paragraph:—

    “Under these circumstances, we are obliged to infer and believe that all these three persons have colluded together with the sole object of defrauding us of the cost of the goods and thus cheat us from the very beginning. Now we find on further enquiry that the said godown is empty, the said 75 cases having been despatched to some destination. As the parties have done a criminal act we request you to apprehend and book them for the offence committed and also make enquiries both at Salt Cottaurs, Madras Beach and Egmore Stations, as to the stations to which the cases have been despatched and stop delivery of the same.”

    On receipt of this letter the police searched for Subramaniam Chetty, Murthi, and the respondent, and on the 11th November arrested them, charging them with cheating under Ss. 415 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The magisterial proceedings continued until the 10th July, 1934, when the three accused were discharged. On the 9th May 1935, ten months later, the respondent filed the suit out of which this appeal arises. The case was tried by Gentle J., who held that the respondent had proved his case and was entitled to the sum of Rs. 1,500 as damages.

    In the course of his evidence the respondent stated that he had bought the 75 cases from Subramaniam Chetty at the price of Rs. 14-10-0 per case, two annas more than Subramanian had paid. He also stated that he had re-sold 50 of the cases at Rs. 13-8-0 per case on the 4th November 1933 and the balance, except two cases, at the price of Rs. 14-6-0. He alleged that the goods were sold minus their cases and that he was able to dispose of the cases at twelve annas each. This statement rests entirely on his own evidence, which is not of a convincing nature. The transactions which the respondent had entered into in respect of these goods were not known to the appellants when the letters of complaint were written to the police. All that was known was that the goods had been removed immediately to the godown which the respondent and Murthi had rented and that the goods had dissappeared. It also transpired during the course of the suit that this godown had only been rented by the respondent and Murthi on the 1st November 1933, the day after the sale to Subramaniam Chetty.

    In order to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff has to prove:— (1) absence of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution and (2) malice on the part of the person who launched the proceedings. In deciding whether there is absence of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution the Court can only have regard to the facts known at the time of the presentation of the complaint. The learned Judge held that the fact that the goods had been removed to the godown rented by the respondent and Murthi and had been disposed of from there did not constitute sufficient reason for proceeding against the respondent. Consequently he found that the respondent had proved that there was absence of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. Dealing with the question of malice the learned Judge said:

    “The plaintiff in addition must, as I have pointed out earlier, also show there was malice. This does not mean ill-will, spite or hatred but a wrong motive. The second defendant having failed to receive payment and being unable to find the purchaser of his master's goods, was disturbed. He obviously thought his conduct would incur his employer's displeasure and when it was ascertained that the goods which had been sold were delivered at the plaintiff's godown, his only thought was to be able to have the plaintiff together with others in the custody of the police in the hope that perhaps this would appease his employer. Not having made any enquiry at all and recklessly making the charge he did he could not have bona fide come to the conclusion that there was reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. If he had not the information bona fide to come to that conclusion, in my view, it shows that he was guilty of malice.”

    I concur in the finding of the learned Judge that the respondent did prove want of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. Knowledge that the goods had been removed to a godown rented by the respondent and Murthi and had disappeared was not sufficient to justify the complaint against the respondent. But I am unable to concur in the finding of the learned Judge that the respondent has established malice and I do not accept the conclusion that the second appellant was actuated in his complaint against the respondent by the thought that if he preferred the complaint and got him arrested it would appease his employer. Malice may be implied when there is absence of reasonable and probable cause, but it does not necessarily follow from the fact that proceedings have been launched without reasonable and probable cause that the person launching them did in fact act maliciously. Whether malice should be implied will be dependent on the circumstances. It would be a proper inference if it is shown that the defendant acted recklessly. The position is stated in the well known judgment of Hawkins J. in Hicks v. Faulkner (1) in which Huddleston, B. concurred. Hawkins J. said:—

    “The malice necessary to be established is not even malice in law such as may be assumed from the intentional doing of a wrongful act (See Bromage v. Prosser (2) per Bayley J.), but malice in fact—malus animus—indicating that the party was actuated either by spite or ill-will towards an individual, or by indirect or improper motives, though these may be wholly unconnected with any uncharitable feeling towards anybody. In order to arrive at a conclusion on the question, the jury are to take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, and to form their own opinion upon them uninfluenced by any opinion of the Judge unless that opinion accords with their own view. If among the circumstances it appears to the jury that there was no reasonable ground for the prosecution, they may—though by no means bound to do so—well think that it must have been dictated by some sinister motive on the part of the person who instituted it. Absence of reasonable cause, to be evidence of malice, must be absence of such cause in the opinion of the jury themselves and I do not think they could be properly told to consider the opinion of the Judge upon that point if it differed from their own—as it possibly might, and in some cases probably would—as evidence for their consideration in determining whether there was malice or not. In no case, however, will their finding relieve the Judge of the duty of determining for himself the question of reasonable cause as an essential element in the case. Want of reasonable cause is for the Judge alone to determine, upon the facts found, for the jury; as evidence of malice it is a question wholly for the jury, who, even if they should think there was want of probable cause, might nevertheless think that the defendant acted honestly and without ill-will or any other motive or desire than to do what he bona fide believed to be right in the interest of justice in which case they ought not, in my opinion, to find the existence of malice; Mitchell v. Jenkins , Turner v. Ambler , Lister v. Perryman (3) per Lord Westbury.”

    What the Court has to decide is whether the facts here justify the inference that the respondent was actuated by malice in the sense here indicated. It is not disputed that if the second appellant were actuated by malice, his employer, the first appellant would also be liable.

    I am of opinion that the evidence on the record does not justify the Court holding that malice on the part of the second appellant has been proved. I go further. In my opinion the evidence points to the conclusion that the second appellant honestly thought that his employer had been defrauded. The goods were sold on the 31st October 1933 on the condition that the money would be paid within three days. It was not then paid and in spite of what Murthi had said in interval it had not been paid by the 10th November when the letter of complaint was written. The second appellant had traced the goods to a godown which the broker and the respondent had rented and from there they had disappeared. The second appellant is not a lawyer but a layman and I can understand that in the circumstances mentioned he formed the honest conclusion that the respondent was implicated in a fraud. The question is not whether a fraud had been committed but whether the second appellant believed that it had. I consider that there is indication that he honestly held that opinion. The respondent not having proved malice and the fact that he had shown the absence of reasonable and probable cause does not help him. He must succeed on both points and having failed on one, his suit must be dismissed.

    The appeal will be allowed and the suit dismissed with costs in favour of the appellants both here and below.

    Appeal allowed.

    N.R.R

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    Abubucker Ebrahim And Another v. Maganlal K. Javeri
    (Aug 16, 1939)