(This Second Appeal coming on for hearing before Madhavan Nair and Stodart, JJ. on 15th September 1938, the Court made the following):
Before disposing of this case, we would ask the lower Appellate Court to submit specific findings on the following two questions:
1. Is the plaint land ryoti land within the plaintiff's zamindari?
2. Is it part of the Inam of the defendants?
The parties are at liberty to adduce fresh evidence if necessary. The findings will be submitted within two months from the date of this order. The parties are at liberty to file their objections to the findings within ten days after notice of the receipt of the findings shall have been posted on the Notice Board of the High Court.
(This Second Appeal again coming on for final hearing after the return of the findings, the Court delivered the following):
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by Stodart, J.)
This Second Appeal arises out of a suit for rent under S. 77 of the Estates Land Act by the zamindar of Bodo Khenidi. The suit proceeded on the footing that the land for which rent was claimed was S. No. 532 of Godogovindpur, a village in the plaintiff's zamindari. The defendants are (1) a goldsmith of Godogovindpur, (2) a Brahmin describing himself as an inamdar of the neighbouring village on the west called Pattigovindpur which is outside plaintiff's zamindari and (3) a Komati of Naupada, a village in the plaintiff's zamindari. The 1st defendant filed a written statement, which was adopted by the 2nd and 3rd defendants, claiming that the field was an enfranchised pre-settlement inam land, that 1st and 3rd defendants had bought separate portions from the inamdars, and that the land formed part of Pattigovindpur village. It was also claimed that defendants had held the land for long over the statutory period without paying rent to the zamindar.
First defendant gave evidence slightly at variance with his written statement. He said that 2nd defendant had purchased the portion in his possession by the title deed Ex. II-C. This therefore was a new case, namely, that 2nd defendant held the land by purchase, not by inheritance.
First defendant also said that the suit land was surrounded on all sides by inam lands of Pattigovindpur.
The defendants produced title deeds Ex. II series. Ex. II-C, dated 10th August 1913 is alleged to be the title deed of the 2nd defendant showing that he purchased a certain plot of land called Podoro tope in Pattigovindpur from Nitakaro Pothi. Both vendor and purchaser are described as inamdars of Pattigovindpur. The field is described by boundaries. The description of the eastern boundary is in direct contradiction of 1st defendant's statement that the suit land is surrounded on all sides by inam lands of Pattigovindpur. For, the eastern boundary in Ex. II-C is “the jeroyati Podoro and inam Podoro of Beno Prohlado.”
Ex. II-d, dated 21st July, 1898, is the title deed of 3rd defendant. It is a sale of inam dry land in Pattigovindpur. The vendor describes himself as an inamdar of Pattigovindpur. Here too one of the boundaries contradicts the 1st defendant. The nothern boundary is “the boundary limit of Jeroyati land of Godogovindpur which is known as Budo Thotta.”
The title deeds of 3rd defendant are Ex. II dated 15th March, 1923, Ex. II-b dated 4th September, 1925 and Ex. II-a, dated 12th July 1927. In Ex. II there are three plots of land conveyed. In Ex. II-b, one, and in Ex. II-a, two plots. The eastern boundary of one of the plots in Ex. II is described as the jeroyati field of Krishna Maharana and others.
No attempt was made in the suit to identify the fields as described in those sale deeds with the field in suit. One thing is certain. From the description of the boundaries in Ex. II series the plots of land therein conveyed are not entirely surrounded by inam lands of Pattigovindpur. Some of them are bounded on one side by fields which are described as jeroyati. And the only jeroyati land in the neighbourhood is the jeroyati of the plaintiff's village of Godogovindpur.
We start therefore with two facts:
1. That the defendants' title deeds which they say refer to the suit land have not been proved to comprise the suit land;
2. That the plots of land described in those title deeds are not as stated by 1st defendant surrounded by inam lands of Pattigovindpur.
A third fact is established by the evidence led on the side of the plaintiff. It is that the suit land is jeroyati land in Godogovindpur village and entirely surrounded by land of that village.
These being the facts of the case, it is somewhat surprising to find that in the course of the various trials which this comparatively simple suit has undergone, a completely new case was set up on behalf of the defendants, namely, that although the suit land might be situated within the zamindari village of Godogovindpur and completely surrounded by lands of that village, nevertheless it belonged to the whole inam village of Pattigovindpur and had been sold by the inamdars of Pattigovindpur to defendants. Out of whose imagination this theory was evolved we cannot ascertain. We can only say that there is not a vestige of fact to support it. There is not the slightest evidence in its favour. If in fact there was a piece of the whole inam village of Pattigovindpur situated inside the limits of Godogovindpur that would be a very easy thing to prove. No attempt was made to prove it. And as we have already said the case of the defendants as set out in first defendant's evidence was quite different, namely, that the suit land was entirely surrounded by the inam lands of Pattigovindpur.
It may be conjectured that what gave this new and unexpected turn to the case was the discovery by defendants on closer inspection of their title deeds that in respect of some of the fieds comprised therein the boundaries included jeroyati fields, which, ex hypothesi, do not exist in the whole inam village of Pattigovindpur.
However that may be, the point on which this Second Appeal has come before us is one of limitation. When the suit was first tried in 1930 the Sub-Collector found (a) that defendants failed to prove that the suit land was part of Pattigovindpur and (b) that plaintiff proved that the suit land formed part of Godogovindpur, was surrounded on all sides by land belonging to Godogovindpur and was jeroyati land. On appeal, the District Judge, relying on the fact that the plaintiff had not stated in his plaint that defendants had encroached on the suit lands, held that the burden lay on the plaintiff to prove that (a) the suit land formed part of his zamindari and (b) that the defendants were in occupation as tenants. And he remanded the suit for re-trial directing that the plaint be amended and the defendants allowed to plead afresh. The remand was clearly unnecessary. Plaintiff in his original plaint had stated (a) that the defendants were in occupation, (b) that they refused to pay rent on demand. Defendants had countered with the claim that the land did not belong to plaintiff at all and that they had been in possession of it for over the statutory period. On these pleadings the parties went to trial. Defendants did not show that the land did not belong to plaintiff and plaintiff proved that it did. Defendants were left therefore with the plea of long possession. There was sufficient evidence in the case to decide this. The karnam of the village examined for the plaintiff stated that defendants had been in enjoyment of the suit lands for ten years. On defendants' side 1st defendant who was the only witness originally examined deposed the suit land had been occupied by defendants or their predecessors-in-title for over twelve years before suit. First defendant's title deeds—assuming that they refer to the suit land—date from 1923 only. The title deeds of defendants 2 and 3 date from 1898 and 1913. But there is nothing to show that these title deeds relate to the suit land. The fact of possession for more than twelve years without paying rent to the plaintiff was certainly not proved. The fact is that this land once formed part of a large tope within the limits of Godogovindpur village and this was believed to be inam, that is to say, held on rent-free tenure, but at a special survey and settlement of the estate which took place shortly before suit it was discovered that the tope was not inam but in reality jeroyati land. Hence the new demand for rent from the persons in occupation, including these defendants.
At the re-trial no new evidence was led except that of the 1st defendant's son who said merely that the suit land formed part of Pattigovindpur which has been the case of defendants from the beginning and which is demonstrably false. The Sub-Collector framed new issues of which only the first two are relevant, namely, whether the suit lands are enfranchised pre-settlement inam or jeroyati and whether the plaintiff is debarred from suing owing to adverse possession by the defendants. The Sub-Collector agreeing with his predecessor held that the land was jeroyati land. But on the second issue he made a most surprising assumption. He declared “it is in evidence that the inamdars of Pattigovindpur had enjoyed this land for a considerable portion of time as inam and then sold it as such to the defendants”. But there was no evidence at all to that effect. We have pointed out already what first defendant said in this connection. He said that he bought lands in the village of Pattigovindpur which his predecessors had been enjoying for a long time. And he said that the lands he bought were the suit lands, which is of course absurd because the suit lands are not in Pattigovindpur. He may have bought lands in Pattigovindpur which is a whole inam village and perhaps he has good title to them. But he never claimed to have bought inam lands inside the village of Godogovindpur. The karnam examined as plaintiff's 2nd witness said that he wrote Ex. II-B (1925) and Ex. II-A (1927). He did not say that these sale deeds relate to the land in suit and this was not proved otherwise. He said also that the lands in suit were sold by the villagers of Pattigovindpur. He did not say that the latter had enjoyed the suit lands as inam lands. There was thus no ground whatever for the Sub-Collector's assumption that there was evidence that “the inamdars of Pattigovindpur had enjoyed this land (i.e, the suit land) for a considerable time as inam and then sold it as such to the defendants.” The Sub-Collector was wrong in holding as he apparently did that there was evidence—much less proof—that the sale deeds produced by the defendants related to the suit land. On the contrary the Sub-Collector should have held that on the defendant's own evidence these sale deeds did not refer to the suit lands but to lands in the village of Pattigovindpur.
However that may be the Sub-Collector held that the defendants had prescribed for title against the Zamindar and dismissed the suit.
On appeal by plaintiff the learned District Judge held dismissing the appeal that there was evidence that the suit land had always been treated as part and parcel of the whole inam village of Pattigovindpur and enjoyed as such by the predecessors-in-title of defendants who conveyed it to the defendants. Here again we find the assumptions that (a) the suit land is comprised in the sale deeds of the defendants and (b) that the defendants claimed to be owners of land within the limits of Godogovindpur. We cannot read this into the evidence led for the defendants. Again the learned District Judge stated, “It is admitted that the defendants and their predecessors-in-title have been in possession of the suit land for a long number of years without paying any rent to the plaintiff.” But that is not the case. Plaintiff's witness, the Karnam, deposed that defendants had been in possession for ten years without paying rent. The learned District Judge however held that plaintiff's suit was barred and the plaintiff files this Second Appeal against that decision.
The learned District Judge did not express any opinion or record any finding as to the location of the suit land. We have explained that both at the first and the second trial the trial Court held that the suit land was within the limits of Godogovindpur. The learned District Judge held that even if it was within those limits it was impossible to resist the plea of adverse possession set up by the defendants, since for more than twelve years these defendants had asserted proprietary title in themselves adverse to the zamindar. He did not however state on what part of the evidence in the case this finding was based. We have carefully gone through the evidence in the case which is indeed of no great volume and we find not the slightest trace of an assertion of a proprietary title adverse to the zamindar. The plain fact is that this land was once part of a tope which was mistakenly thought to be an inam tope and when the inams in Godogovindpur were examined with a view to detect encroachments it was found that the suit land was not inam land. There is no evidence at all that the persons in possession of the tope set up in themselves a proprietary right in the tope adversely to the Zamindar.
As it was not clear from the learned Judge's judgment what his opinion was as to the exact location and character of the suit land we called for a finding on that point. The finding is, as found at both trials of the suit, that the land is the jeroyati land of the zamindar in the village of Godogovindpur.
On appeal three points are urged on behalf of the respondents. First that the suit land although situated inside the limits of Godogovindpur is nevertheless part of the whole inam village of Pattigovindpur. This as we have said was never pleaded much less proved. We have already said more than once that defendants claimed the suit land as lying within the village of Pattigovindpur. Then it is urged that the learned District Judge was right in his finding that the defendants had held the land adversely to the plaintiff for more than twelve years. We have already stated that there is no evidence at all of this. Lastly it is urged that having been in possession for more than twelve years without paying rent the defendants cannot now be called on to pay rent. And this is the only point of law which arises for decision in this appeal. We are not prepared to hold on the evidence that the defendants or their predecessors were in possession for over twelve years without paying rent, but assuming that they were, we think that did not prevent the zamindar from levying rent when he came to know of the occupation of the land. Jeroyati or ryoti land is land in a zamindari in which the tenant has occupancy rights as defined in the Estates Land Act (I of 1908). A ryot who has been let into possession by the landholder or whose possession is recognised by the landholder is called an occupancy ryot and has large rights the chief of which is that he cannot be evicted except on the ground that he has rendered his holding substantially unfit for agricultural purposes. See S. 151. A ryot who has not been let into possession by the landholder or who has not acquired the occupancy right by inheritance or transfer is a non-occupancy ryot. And he too has valuable rights and privileges under the Act. He may make improvements on the land without the landholder's consent, (S. 14). He is not liable to pay rent for the land in excess of the rent fixed on the land or if no rent is fixed then a fair and equitable rent decided by the Collector (S. 45). And finally he can compel the landholder to grant him a permanent right of occupancy on tendering as premium a sum equal to two and a half times the rent of the land and the landholder is debarred for twenty years thereafter from enhancing that rent. (S. 46). It is only when the provisions of Ss. 45 and 46 have not been complied with that the landholder has the right to evict a non-occupancy ryot by a suit in a Civil Court (S. 163). On the other hand the non-occupancy ryot must of course pay rent (S. 45) and the rent can be recovered from him by suit in the Collector's Court (S. 77) and he can be evicted if he fails to discharge a decree for rent within a certain time by suit filed in the Collector's Court (S. 153). But there is nothing in the Act which enables the non-occupancy ryot to prescribe for title to hold the land free of rent. And having regard to the conditions prevailing in zamindaries it would be surprising if there were any such provision. For in the majority of cases these estates are not surveyed. There is no demarcation of the holdings of the various ryots on the ground. There is no survey map by reference to which the holding can be located. The recorded area of the land in the landholder's books is not based on exact measurements nor calculated with mathematical precision. It is easy therefore for a ryot to encroach gradually on unoccupied land adjacent to his holding and the encroachment may pass unnoticed for years. It would be vexatious burden on the landholder if he were debarred from claiming rent on such encroachments as soon as he detected them.
It was somewhat faintly argued by learned Counsel for the defendants that if defendants believed that they had the full ownership of the land—which in itself is a large assumption—and enjoyed it as such for over the statutory period, that in itself is sufficient to give them a title by prescription against the zamindar. We cannot concur in this argument. Adverse possession in order to become a basis of title must be brought to the notice of the true owner. Here, if, for the sake of argument, we grant that the defendants actually were on the land for over twelve years before suit—and the evidence of that is not conclusive either—such occupation did not affect the landholder with notice of their claim to be proprietors. For in a zamindari, as it is hardly necessary to point out, the major portion of the land is in the occupation of persons who have the right to occupy it but not the whole proprietary right; who are in other words occupancy ryots or persons who hold the land in the hope of becoming occupancy ryots. If such persons wish to prescribe for a higher right in the land they must give open and unequivocal notice of their intention to the landholder. Nor does the mere non-payment of rent for a number of years amount to such notice since as we have pointed out, when a land has been encroached upon gradually and secretly the very fact of its being occupied may very well escape notice.
In the result we differ from the lower Court. We find that defendants did not prescribe for title as proprietors for the simple reason that they never asserted any such title. And we find that by non-payment of rent for more than twelve years, assuming that such is the fact, they did not prescribe for the right to enjoy the land for ever without paying rent. We allow this appeal and set aside the decrees of the Courts below. The appellant will have his costs of this appeal and of the suit throughout.
Appeal allowed.
N.R.R