Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

A.A.O No. 501 of 1939.

Advocates

Messrs. K. Rajah Ayyar, V. Seshadri, P.J Kuppanna Rao and V.C Viraraghavan for the Appellants.
Messrs. R. Kesava Aiyangar and R. Ramamurti Ayyar for the Respondents.

Judges

Leach, C.J
Gentle
Krishnaswami Ayyangar, JJ.

Acts

S. 26 of the Queen's Remembrancer's Act, 1859, the Barons
Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (Act IV of 1938)
S. 28 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act
S. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act
S. 6 of the County Courts Act, 1875
S. 19 of the Madras Act IV of 1938
S. 19 of Madras Act IV of 1938
Agriculturists Relief Act,
LAND ACQUISITION ACT

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the dismissal of an application under S. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (Act IV of 1938). The order under appeal was originally passed on 5 August 1939. At the time the order was made there was no statutory right of appeal unless it could be characterised as falling under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The appellant therefore filed a civil revision petition against the order.

On 27 October 1939 the Provincial Government issued a notification under S. 28 of the Act adding a new Rule 8, which purported to make certain orders under the Act (including orders under S. 19) appealable "as if" they related to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree within the meaning of S. 47 CPC. After that publication the appellant filed the present appeal on 2 November 1939 and withdrew the civil revision petition, which was dismissed.

The respondent objected that no appeal lay (including contention that the new rule was not retrospective and could not divest the respondent's "final" order) and alternatively that the newly promulgated R. 8 was ultra vires the Provincial Government's rule-making power under S. 28(c). The appellant contended that the rule benefited any aggrieved party and that R. 8 was intra vires, or at least declaratory of the true character of the specified orders as falling within S. 47 CPC.

Because these questions were considered important, the court referred three specific questions to a Full Bench and constituted the Full Bench to decide them.

Legal Issues Presented

Where a statutory rule giving a right of appeal is promulgated after a final order has been passed, will an appeal lie under that rule against that order?
Is Rule 8 of the rules framed under Madras Act IV of 1938 ultra vires?
Is the decision in Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. U.T. Syed Sahib correct in holding that an order under S. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (Act IV of 1938) is not appealable as falling under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

A preliminary objection: no appeal lies against the order passed on 5 August 1939 because on that date no right of appeal existed unless it fell under S. 47 CPC.
The new Rule 8 promulgated on 27 October 1939 is not retrospective; the order was final when passed and a subsequently created right of appeal cannot take away the respondent's vested right in that final order. (The respondent relied on Chidambaram Chettiar v. Muthukumaraswami Chettiar.)
Alternatively, Rule 8 is ultra vires the Provincial Government's powers because it purports to create a new remedy (a right of appeal) and therefore exceeds the power in S. 28(c) to make rules "for removing any difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of this Act."
The respondent cited the Privy Council's decision in The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving and Full Bench decisions in Daivanayaka Reddiyar v. Renukambal and Vasudeva Samiar, In re, in support of these contentions.

Appellant's Arguments

The right of appeal under the new rule should enure to the benefit of any party aggrieved by an order, provided the appeal is not barred by limitation at the date the rule was promulgated.
Rule 8 is intra vires. It should be read as declaring that the specified orders are of the nature that they fall within S. 47 CPC, rather than as creating a new right of appeal.
If it is held that Rule 8 does not create a right of appeal, a conflict between two Bench decisions (specifically Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. U.T. Syed Sahib and others) will need to be resolved to determine whether orders under S. 19 are appealable apart from the rules.
The appellant referred to a passage in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (8th ed.) based on the case of The Alexander as supportive of the appellant's interpretive approach.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Attorney-General v. Sillem	The creation of a new right of appeal requires legislative authority; rule-making bodies cannot properly create new appellate rights.	The court relied on this case to support the principle that the Provincial Government could not, by rules alone, create a new right of appeal; this principle underpinned the conclusion that R. 8 was ultra vires.
Cousins v. Lombard Deposit Bank	If a statute intends to allow an appeal on certain questions (here, questions of fact from inferior courts), clear language is required; rights of appeal are not to be lightly implied.	Used to illustrate the settled principle that a right of appeal must be conferred by express enactment and cannot be implied from general rule-making powers.
Sandbank Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire Railway Co.	A right of appeal cannot be implied "in the nature of things"; appellate jurisdiction must be given by express enactment.	Cited to reinforce the rule against implying appellate jurisdiction from general provisions; supported the court's narrow reading of S. 28.
Minakshi Naidu v. Subrahmanya Sastri (Privy Council)	The High Court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the Act gave no right of appeal; such a right must be given by statute or equivalent.	Affirmed the court's approach that rights of appeal cannot be assumed and must be traceable to statutory authority.
Rangoon Batatoung Co. Ltd. v. The Collector, Rangoon (Privy Council)	The right of appeal could not be implied; absence of statutory provision for appeal meant none existed.	Cited to show the Privy Council's stance that appellate rights are not to be implied—supporting the conclusion that S. 28 does not authorize conferring appeals by rule.
The Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Irving (Privy Council)	Referenced in the context of limits on implying appellate jurisdiction or rights.	Placed before the court by the respondent in support of the contention that an appeal cannot be created by subordinate rule-making power; cited as part of the authorities showing that rule-makers cannot confer new appellate rights.
Daivanayaka Reddiyar v. Renukambal and Vasudeva Samiar, In re (Full Bench)	Referenced by the respondent in support of the main contention (that appeals could not be created by rule or similar point).	Relied upon by the respondent as supporting authority; the court noted it among the authorities but did not elaborate further in this opinion.
The Alexander	Cited (via Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes) as an authority relevant to retrospective effect and interpretation concerning creation of rights.	The appellant referred to Maxwell's passage based on The Alexander; the court noted the appellant's reference but did not decide the underlying retrospective issue on merits because the matter was referred.
In re Subbarayudu	Held that an order under S. 19 made when no execution proceedings are pending is not appealable (i.e., not a matter under S. 47 CPC).	Noted as one side of the conflicting local decisions; the Full Bench considered this decision in the context of the third question.
Jami Venkatappadu v. Kannepalli Ramamurthi	Statement (by two judges) that S. 19 petitions must be deemed to raise questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree and so fall within S. 47 CPC.	Identified as a conflicting view; the Full Bench treated the observation as not persuasive when contrary decisions and reasoning exist, and preferred the Pakkiri view.
Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. U.T. Syed Sahib	Held that orders under S. 19 are not appealable under S. 47 CPC; pendency of execution proceedings does not convert an S. 19 application into execution proceedings.	The Full Bench preferred and approved this decision on the third question, holding that the Pakkiri view was correct as to S. 19 not being a proceeding in execution for purposes of S. 47 CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the three referred questions but first addressed Question 2 (whether Rule 8 was ultra vires), observing that if Rule 8 were ultra vires there would be no need to decide Question 1 (about retrospectivity).

Key steps in the court's reasoning:

Examination of the statutory rule-making power: The court set out S. 28 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (which permits the Provincial Government to make rules to carry into effect the Act, prescribe forms/fees, and "for removing any difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of this Act").
Characterisation of the effect of Rule 8: The Provincial Government, by its notification of 27 October 1939, added Rule 8 providing that certain orders under the Act (including S. 19 orders) shall be appealable "as if" they related to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree within the meaning of S. 47 CPC. The court characterised this as the creation of a right of appeal by rule.
Application of established principle: The court reviewed authorities (Attorney-General v. Sillem, Cousins v. Lombard Deposit Bank, Sandbank Charity Trustees, Minakshi Naidu, Rangoon Batatoung) establishing the governing legal principle that appellate jurisdiction is not to be assumed or implied and that the creation of a new right of appeal ordinarily requires explicit legislative authority.
Narrow reading of S. 28: The court held that Sub‑section (1) (power to make rules for carrying into effect the purposes of the Act) and clause (c) of Sub‑section (2) (power to make rules for removing any difficulty in giving effect to the Act) do not reasonably support the conclusion that the Provincial Government may, by rule, constitute an appellate jurisdiction or create new substantive rights of appeal. Making rules to carry the Act into effect is different in kind from adding an appellate remedy not contained in the Act; creating an appellate tribunal or conferring appellate jurisdiction would be "to read something which is not there" and ignore well-settled principle.
Conclusion on Question 2: The court concluded that Rule 8 was ultra vires the Provincial Government's rule‑making power under S. 28.
Consequences for Question 1: Because Rule 8 was held ultra vires, the court did not need to decide whether a rule promulgated after an order could be operative retrospectively to create a right of appeal against that order.
Analysis for Question 3 (appealability under S. 47 CPC): The court reviewed conflicting decisions about the nature of proceedings under S. 19 and whether they were proceedings "relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree" within S. 47 CPC. The court analysed the function of S. 19 proceedings: they are proceedings under the Agriculturists Relief Act to apply its provisions to existing decrees (either amending a decree or entering satisfaction), and are independent in nature rather than being part of execution proceedings under the CPC.
Preference for Pakkiri decision: On this analysis, the court found the reasoning in Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. Syed Sahib (that S. 19 proceedings are not proceedings in execution and therefore not within S. 47 CPC) preferable to the contrary views. The court therefore held that the decision in Pakkiri was right on the point addressed (limited to applicability of S. 47 CPC to S. 19 matters).
Limitation of the court's pronouncements: The court explicitly disclaimed any opinion on the subsidiary statement in Pakkiri to the effect that an appeal would lie from a new decree where a decree has been scaled down — noting that issue was not before the court. The court also left questions relating to S. 20 for future consideration when they arise.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

Rule 8 as promulgated on 27 October 1939 is ultra vires the Provincial Government's rule‑making powers under S. 28 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act and therefore cannot validly create a right of appeal from the orders specified by that rule.
The decision in Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. U.T. Syed Sahib is correct insofar as it holds that an order under S. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act is not appealable as a matter "relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree" within the meaning of S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Implications and direct effects:

Because R. 8 is ultra vires, the purported right of appeal created thereby is not available; appeals cannot validly be founded on that rule.
Proceedings under S. 19 are to be regarded as independent proceedings under the Agriculturists Relief Act and not as execution proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of S. 47. Accordingly, S. 47 does not, by itself, render S. 19 orders appealable.
The court did not decide whether an appeal lies from a new decree resulting from scaling down under S. 19; nor did it decide matters concerning S. 20 — these questions remain open for future adjudication.
The costs of the reference were ordered to be costs in the cause.

This summary is confined strictly to the matters stated in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

Delivered by Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ. — N.R.R.

Show full summary ...

A.S Nagappa Chettiar And Another v. Annapoorni Achi Alias Karuppayi Achi And Another

(Delivered by Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ.)

This appeal is preferred against the dismissal of an application under S. 19 of Madras Act IV of 1938 and a preliminary objection has been taken that no appeal lies. The order under appeal was passed on 5th August 1939. On this date there was no right of appeal against the order, unless it could be said to be one falling under S. 47, Civil Procedure Code. The appellant therefore filed a civil revision petition against the order. On 27th October 1939 a notification was issued in the Fort Saint George Gazette under S. 28 of the Act promulgating a new R. 8 which prescribes that

“Appeals shall lie from any of the following orders passed by a Court under the Act, namely,………(b) an order under S. 19 amending or refusing to amend a decree or entering or refusing to enter satisfaction in respect of a decree;………as if the order related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908”.

After the publication of this rule, the appellant on 2nd November, 1939 filed the present appeal, and his pending civil revision petition was withdrawn and dismissed. It is contended for the respondent that the new R. 8 is not retrospective [vide Chidambaram Chettiar v. Muthukumaraswami Chettiar(1)], that the order when passed was final, and that the subsequent creation of a right of appeal cannot take away the vested right of the respondent in that final order. Alternatively it is contended that the new rule is ultra vires, as it purports to create a new remedy and goes beyond the power given in S. 28(c) to make rules “for removing any difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of this Act.”

The appellant contends that the right of appeal under the rule enures to the benefit of any party aggrieved by an order, an appeal against which was not barred by limitation on the date of the promulgation of the rule. He also contends that the new rule is intra vires and that it should be read not so much as creating a new right of appeal as declaring the nature of the specified orders to be such as to fall within S. 47 Civil Procedure Code so as automatically to attract to them the right of appeal given under the ordinary law. It is also suggested that if it be held that there is no right of appeal under the rules, it will be necessary to resolve the conflict between two Bench decisions [Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. U.T. Syed Sahib(3)] and to decide whether or not the order is appealable apart from the rules.

We are of opinion that these contentions raise questions of such importance that it is desirable to refer them to a Full Bench. That being so, we do not wish to express any opinion on the merits of those contentions. The respondent has quoted the decision of the Privy Council, in The Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Irving and also the Full Bench decisions in Daivanayaka Reddiyar v. Renukambal and Vasudeva Samiar, In re in support of his main contention. The appellant has referred us to a passage at page 199 of Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (8th Edition) which is based on the case of The Alexander(4).

We refer the following questions to a Full Bench:

(1) Where a statutory rule giving a right of appeal is promulgated after a final order has been passed, will an appeal lie under that rule against that order?

(2) Is rule 8 of the rules framed under Madras Act IV of 1938 ultra vires? If so,

(3) Is the decision in Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. U.T Syed Sahib(5) right in holding that an order under S. 19 of Madras Act IV of 1938 is not appealable as falling under S. 47, Civil Procedure Code?

OPINION

Three questions arising out of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (Act IV of 1938) have been referred for decision by a Full Bench and this Bench has been constituted for the purpose. The questions read as follows:

“(1) Where a statutory rule giving a right of appeal is promulgated after a final order has been passed, will an appeal lie under that rule against that order?

(2) Is rule 8 of the rules framed under Madras Act IV of 1938 ultra vires? If so,

(3) Is the decision in Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. U.T Syed Sahib right in holding that an order under S. 19 of the Madras Act IV of 1938 is not appealable as falling under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure?”

It will be convenient to take the second question first, because if it is answered in the affirmative the first question will not call for an answer.

The Act itself does not directly provide for an appeal against an order passed in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by the Act, but the Provincial Government has assumed that S. 28, which confers upon it power to make rules under the Act, is sufficiently widely drawn to enable it to provide for appeals. S. 28 reads as follows:

“(1) The Provincial Government may make rules for carrying into effect the purposes of this Act.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the Provincial Government may make rules—

(a) in regard to any matter which is required to be prescribed by this Act;

(b) prescribing the form of, and the fees to be paid in respect of, applications under this Act; and

(3) All the rules made under this section shall be consistent with the provisions of this Act. They shall be published in the Official Gazette and upon such publication shall have effect as if enacted in this Act.”

Relying on Sub-S. (1) and Cl. (c) of Sub-S. (2) of S. 28, the Provincial Government, by a notification dated the 27th October, 1939, added the following rule to those already framed:—

“8. Appeals shall lie from any of the following orders passed by a Court under the Act, namely:—

(a) an order under S. 18(1) amending or refusing to amend a decree;

(b) an order under S. 19 amending or refusing to amend a decree or entering or refusing to enter satisfaction in respect of a decree;

(d) an order under S. 22 directing or refusing to direct the refund of any sum realized in execution of a decree;

(e) an order under S. 23 setting aside or refusing to set aside any sale or foreclosure of immovable property; and

(f) an order under S. 24 directing or refusing to direct the repayment of any purchase money realized in execution of a decree;

as if the order related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”

Before discussing the nature of the provisions to be found in sub-S. (1) and Cl. (c) of sub-S. (2) of S. 28 it will be advantageous to refer to certain of the cases in which the governing principle that an appeal does not lie as of right, but must be conferred by express enactment, has been applied. The first of the cases which I have in mind is that of the Attorney-General v. Sillem. By S. 26 of the Queen's Remembrancer's Act, 1859, the Barons of the Court of Exchequer were given authority to make rules with regard to the process, practice, and mode of pleading in revenue cases in their Court. By virtue of this section the Barons of the Exchequer made rules in which they purported to grant an appeal to the Exchequer Chamber and to the House of Lords. It was held by the House of Lords that the section did not authorize them to do this. Lord Westbury, L.C, in the course of his judgment in that case, said:—

“The creation of a new right of appeal is plainly an act which requires legislative authority. The Court from which the appeal is given, and the Court to which it is given, must both be bound, and that must be the act of some higher power………………………………………………………………In making the order now in question, the Barons of the Court of Exchequer have assumed that a discretionary power to exercise this legislative authority or not, and thereby to confer or to withhold, this important benefit of new rights of appeal, has been given to them by the S. 26 of the Act of 1859. If the Legislature has done this, it has done a thing which is very irregular, and which antecedently would seem to be very improbable.

It is not reasonable to suppose that in matters affecting the taxation of the subject, the Legislature would abdicate its own functions and delegate to the Barons of the Exchequer the power of determining at their pleasure whether, in certain cases, there should or should not be a right of appeal as between the subject and the Crown.”

In Cousins v. Lombard Deposit Bank the question was whether the Court of Appeal from Inferior Courts was empowered by S. 6 of the County Courts Act, 1875 to hear an appeal from a decision of a County Court upon a question of fact arising in a suit brought within its jurisdiction as a Court of common law. Grove, J. observed that if the Legislature had intended to allow an appeal on such a question, clear language would have been employed. In Sandbank Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire Railway Co. Bramwell, L.J in considering the question whether the Court had jurisdiction over the Master's taxation on a motion to review, answered it in the negative. He said that an appeal did not exist in the nature of things and a right to appeal from any decision of any tribunal must be given by express enactment. The Privy Council has also considered this question. In Minakshi Naidu v. Subrahmanya Sastri the Judicial Committee was called upon to say whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order of a District Judge made by him in a proceeding under the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, appointing a member to fill a vacancy in a Committee. The Act gave no right of appeal. It was held that neither the Act, nor the general law, gave any right of appeal. In the course of the judgment it was observed:—

“In approaching the consideration of this question, their Lordships cannot assume that there is a right of appeal in every matter which comes under the consideration of a Judge; such a right must be given by statute, or by some authority equivalent to a statute.”

In Rangoon Batatoung Co. Ltd. v. The Collector Rangoon the Privy Council dealt with the question whether there was an appeal to His Majesty in Council from a decision of the Chief Court of Lower Burma on a reference to that Court by the Collector of Rangoon in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. It was held that there was no such right. Delivering the judgment of the Board Lord Macnaghten referred to the observations of Bramwell, L.J in Sandbank Charity Trustees v. The North Staffordshire Railway Co. and said that the right of appeal could not be implied.”

In view of these observations it is manifest that what we have to consider is whether there is anything in S. 28 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act which can reasonably be read as conferring authority on the Provincial Government to make rules providing for appeals from orders passed under the Act. Only Sub-S. (1) and Cl. (c) of Sub-S. (2) are relied upon in support of the contention that R. 8 is intra vires the powers of the Provincial Government. Sub-S. (1) merely says that the Provincial Government may make rules for carrying into effect the purposes of this Act. In making a rule providing for appeals the Provincial Government is not making a rule for carrying into effect the purposes of the Act. It is adding something to the Act. The object of the Act is to grant relief to agriculturists by providing machinery for the scaling down of their debts. The Court of first instance decides whether a case falls within or without the Act. If a case falls within the Act the Court must scale down the debt in accordance with the directions embodied in the Act. An order of the Court must be taken to be a correct order unless it is shown to be wrong by an appellate tribunal which has power to entertain an appeal. Cl. (c) of Sub-S. (2) does not carry the matter any further. By providing for an appeal the Provincial Government is not removing any difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. The Courts of first instance are there for the purpose and, as I indicated, their orders must be assumed to be correct. To read either into Sub-S. (1) or into Cl. (c) of Sub-S. (2) a power for the Provincial Government to constitute an appellate tribunal would be to read something which is not there, and incidentally be ignoring a well settled principled. Therefore, the answer I would give to the second question is that R. 8 is ultra vires the power of the Provincial Government. As my learned brothers agree in this answer it is not necessary to discuss the first question.

The third question has arisen as the result of a conflict in the decisions of this Court. In In re Subbarayudu, Burn and Stodart, JJ. held that an order passed on an application filed under S. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act while no proceedings in execution are pending is not appealable. In the opinion of the learned Judges it could not be considered to be a question under S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, in the absence of execution proceedings. S. 19 provides that where before the commencement of the Act, a Court has passed a decree for the re-payment of debt, it shall, on the application of a judgment-debtor who is an agriculturist or in respect of a Hindu joint family debt on the application of any member of the family, whether or not he is the judgment-debtor, or on the application of the decree-holder, apply the provisions of the Act to the decree and shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, amend the decree or enter satisfaction as the case may be. In Jami Venkatappadu v. Kannepalli Ramamurthi, JJ. without giving any reasons, stated that they had no doubt that petitions filed under S. 19 must be deemed to be petitions which raise questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree and therefore come within the matters covered by S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. Syed Sahib Burn and Lakshmana Rao, JJ. had to consider the effect of the decision in In re Subbarayudu the argument being that if at the time when an order is made under S. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act there is pending an execution petition, the order would be appealable as one falling under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judges directly negatived this contention. They held that the pendency of execution proceedings did not make an application under S. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act a matter relating to the execution of the decree in any sense. The learned Judges regarded the observation of Pandrang Row and Abdur Rahman, JJ. in Jami Venkatappadu v. Kannepalli Ramamurthi as being merely an obiter dictum which it was.

I have no hesitation in preferring the view expressed in Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. Syed Sahib on this question to that expressed in Jami Venkatappadu v. Kannepalli Ramamurthi dealing with applications under S. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act the Court is not acting in execution. Its function is to apply the provisions of the Act to decrees against persons who are entitled to relief under the Act. If relief is applied for and the Court considers that the applicant is entitled to have the provisions of the Act applied, the Court must apply them. If the scaling down does not wipe out the decretal amount then an amended decree is passed, which can only be enforced in execution proceedings separately instituted under the Code of Civil Procedure. If the scaling down wipes out the decretal amount the Court cannot pass an amended decree. It must then declare that the decree has been satisfied. But here again, the entering up of satisfaction is not in execution proceedings, but in proceedings under the Agriculturists Relief Act, which are of an independent nature. Unless proceedings under S. 19 can be regarded as proceedings in execution—and I think I have said sufficient to indicate that in my opinion they are not—S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure can have no application. It follows that in my judgment the answer to the third question is that the decision in Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. Syed Sahib in holding that an order under S. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act is not appealable under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is right. In giving this answer I do not intend, however, to express any opinion on the statement to be found at the end of the judgment in that case to the effect that if the decree is scaled down, an appeal will lie from the new decree. This statement was no doubt made on the opinion of this Court previously expressed that an appeal will lie from an order amending a decree. That question is not before us and therefore in holding that Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar v. Syed Sahib was rightly decided the answer is confined merely to the applicability of S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I may also add that in answering the third question the Court is only concerned with cases falling within S. 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act and not with applications under S. 20. The consideration of the position with regard to S. 20 must be left until the question arises.

I would make the costs of this reference costs in the cause.

N.R.R

A.S Nagappa Chettiar And Another v. Annapoorni Achi Alias Karuppayi Achi And Another

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

Appellant's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

A.S Nagappa Chettiar And Another v. Annapoorni Achi Alias Karuppayi Achi And Another

Comments