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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A suit for partition of a joint Hindu family was instituted on behalf of a minor member. The minor plaintiff died after the suit was instituted but before the written statement had been filed. The respondent (the minor's mother) applied in the First Court to be brought on record and for permission to continue the suit as the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff. The First Court refused that application, holding that no cause of action survived. On appeal, the District Judge set aside the First Court's order and held that the respondent was entitled to continue the suit as the plaintiff's legal representative.

The defendants (in the suit) contended that on the minor's death, any rights he had in the family property passed to the other coparceners because there had been no partition. A procedural question whether an appeal lay to the District Judge from the order of the First Court was discussed, but the respondent's counsel did not press that objection and the court did not decide that procedural point.

The central substantive question for decision was whether the filing of the plaint (by or on behalf of the minor) effected severance of the joint Hindu family status.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the filing of the plaint (instituting a partition suit) amounted to a severance of the joint Hindu family status.
  2. Whether, on the death of a minor plaintiff who had been the subject of a partition suit instituted on his behalf, the minor's rights survive to the other members of the family in the absence of an effective severance (i.e., whether no cause of action survived such that the representative cannot continue the suit).
  3. The procedural question whether an appeal lay to the District Judge from the First Court's order was discussed in the opinion but was not decided by the Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • When the minor died, any rights he had in the family property passed to the other members of the joint family because there had been no partition.
  • Consequently, no cause of action survived the minor such as to permit continuation of the suit by his legal representative.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent sought to be brought on record and to continue the suit as the deceased minor's legal representative.
  • The learned pleader for the respondent argued that the plaint sets out facts and circumstances which, if proved, would justify a decree for partition; therefore, at the stage of determining the application to continue the suit, there should be a presumption that a good cause of action exists and that severance was effected by institution of the suit.

Other Counsel's Submissions

  • Mr. A. Krishnaswami Aiyar (appearing in the proceedings) urged that it would be a hardship and cause inconvenience if the decision to effect severance in respect of a minor could be left to any person who chooses to act as next friend for the minor; he argued against allowing third parties effectively to decide the family's joint/separate status on behalf of a minor.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj (Privy Council) That a member of a joint Hindu family can effect division of his status by a clear and unequivocal expression of intention without concurrence of other coparceners. The Court treated this as settled law supporting the general principle that a member may choose severance by a clear act or expression of intention.
Sundararajam v. Arunachelam Chetty (Full Bench) The Full Bench held that filing a plaint is an unambiguous manifestation of intention to sever joint status. The Court acknowledged the Full Bench ruling but observed that the Full Bench's plaintiff had been a minor and that the specific question whether a plaint filed on behalf of a minor effects severance had not been raised before the Full Bench. The Court therefore considered whether the Full Bench rule should apply to minors.
Bachoo Hurkisondas v. Mankorebai (Privy Council) In suits instituted on behalf of a minor, the Court has discretion whether to decree partition; if partition would not be for the minor's benefit, the suit may be dismissed. The Court relied on this authority to hold that the law vests discretion in the Court, not in a lay next friend, to decide whether partition should be decreed in a suit brought on behalf of a minor.
Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi Affirms the position (in this presidency) that in suits on behalf of minors the Court has discretion to decide whether partition should be granted in the minor's interest. The Court treated this case as confirming that local practice follows the Privy Council rule and applied that principle to reject the proposition that filing a plaint by a next friend necessarily effects severance for a minor.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by accepting the general principle (as established in Girja Bai and the Full Bench decision in Sundararajam) that an adult member of a joint Hindu family may effect severance of his status by a clear and unequivocal expression of his intention and that the filing of a plaint has been treated as such an expression.

The Court then examined whether that principle should be applied where the suit is instituted on behalf of a minor. It reasoned that the power to choose between remaining joint and seeking a division presupposes that the person exercising that choice is capable of exercising discretion. A minor—at least one who is not of an age to have discretion—cannot be treated as possessing that discretion in law.

The Court noted established authority (Bachoo Hurkisondas and Kamakshi Ammal) that, in suits instituted on behalf of minors, the court has discretion to decide whether granting partition would be for the minor's benefit; if not, the court may refuse partition. From that premise the Court inferred that the decision whether to effect severance on behalf of a minor should not rest on the unilateral act of any private person who files a suit as next friend. Allowing anyone to effect severance for a minor would cause hardship and complications and would be an inappropriate delegation of the discretionary protective function that the law gives to the Court in respect of minors.

The Court rejected the argument that, because the plaint (if facts alleged are taken at face value) might establish a good cause of action, it must be treated as having already effected severance. The Court explained that severance is caused by the exercise of the option conferred by law on a competent member; in the case of a minor that option is not his to exercise in the same sense, and the Court must determine whether separation is in his interest.

Consequently, the Court held that the mere institution of a partition suit on behalf of a minor by a next friend does not automatically effect severance of the joint Hindu family status. The Court therefore considered that the District Judge's order (which had allowed the respondent to continue the suit as legal representative on the basis that severance had been effected) was not correct.

Procedural question about the proper remedy (whether appeal lay to the District Judge or whether recourse should have been by second appeal or revision) was discussed but intentionally left undecided by the Court because the respondent's counsel did not press the objection.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court set aside the order of the District Judge and dismissed the respondent's petition (i.e., the application to be brought on record and to continue the suit as legal representative of the deceased minor plaintiff). The civil revision was treated as a second appeal; the Court set aside the District Judge's order with costs here and in the Court below. The decree will not be drawn up until the learned pleader for the appellants pays Court-fee within a week.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the respondent's application to continue the partition suit as legal representative was dismissed and the District Judge's order in her favour was set aside; therefore she may not continue the suit on that footing as a result of this order.
  • The Court applied existing authorities (Privy Council and Full Bench decisions) to clarify that the protection afforded to minors in partition suits vests a discretion in the Court to decide whether partition would be for the minor's benefit; it declined to treat the filing of a plaint by a next friend as an automatic severance for a minor.
  • No new precedent enlarging the rights of persons acting on behalf of minors was created; the decision reinforces that the Court's discretion governs partition claims made on behalf of minors and prevents private individuals from unilaterally effecting severance for minors by instituting suits.

    Chelimi Chetti And Others v. Subbanna Petitioner .

    1. This matter arises in connection with a suit instituted on behalf of a minor member of a joint Hindu family for partition. The minor plaintiff died after the institution of the suit but before the written statement was filed. The respondent before us, who is the mother of the plaintiff, applied to the First Court to be brought on record and for permission to continue the suit as legal representative of the deceased plaintiff. That Court held that no cause of action survived and refused the application of the respondent. On appeal however the District Judge set aside the order of the First Court holding that the respondent was entitled to continue the suit as legal representative of the plaintiff. The contention before us on behalf of the defendants in the suit is that when the minor died whatever rights he had in the family property survived to the other members of the family as there was no partition. A rather interesting question was discussed before us as to whether an appeal lay to the District Judge from the order of the Court of the first instance but the learned vakil for the respondent did not mean to persist in the objection as to whether the proper remedy for the defendants in this Court was by way of second appeal or by way of moving us in revision. We need not therefore decide any such question.

    2. On the merits the question that requires our decision is whether by the filing of the plaint severance was effected by the joint status of the family.

    3. This is an important point but there is no authority expressly dealing with it. It is now settled law especially after the recent Privy Council decision in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj(1) and the Full Bench decision of this Court in Sundararajam v. Arunachelam Chetty(2), that it is open to a member of a joint Hindu family to effect a division of his status by a clear and unequivocal expression of his intention without the necessity of any concurrence on the part of the other coparceners. The last case laid down that the filing of the plaint is such an unambiguous manifestation of intention within the meaning of the ruling of the Privy Council. It is curious, as has been pointed to us by the learned vakil for the respondent, that in the Full Bench case the plaintiff who instituted the suit was a minor. Apparently however no question such as this was raised before the Full Bench for decision. There can be no doubt that what the Privy Council decided and what the Courts have followed is that it depends upon the discretion of a member of a joint Hindu family whether he is to continue the joint status or whether there should be a separation. That prima facie implies that the member who exercises such discretion must be of an age capable of exercising discretion in law. That will not be the case with a minor at least if he is of an age when discretion cannot be imputed to him. In the case of a suit instituted on behalf of a minor member of a Hindu family for partition it has been laid down that it depends upon the discretion of the Court whether to make a decree for partition or not, that is to say, the Court has to consider in such cases whether a decree for partition would be for the benefit of the minor.

    4. If it is satisfied that it is not for the benefit of the minor to give a decree for partition, the Court will dismiss the suit. This is laid down by the Privy Council in Bachoo Hurkisondas v. Mankorebai(3), approving the decision of the Bombay High Court on this point. This has also been the law in this presidency as stated in Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi(4) and that position has not been contested before us. If it is left to the discretion of the Court to say in a suit instituted on behalf of a minor whether there should be a division of the family or not, it seems to us prima facie to follow that the matter does not depend on the choice or option of any person who chooses to act on behalf of a minor member of a Hindu family. Any person is at liberty to institute a suit on behalf of a minor as the next friend and it was forcibly urged upon us by Mr. A. Krishnaswami Aiyar that it would lead to great hardship and inconvenience if it were left to the discretion of any person who chooses to file a suit on behalf of a minor to decide whether the family of which the minor is a member shall continue joint or become separate. The institution of a suit, so far as it expresses the intention of a member of the family to divide depends on principle on the same basis as any other expression of intention of a competent member of the family. If we are to hold that the filing of a plaint on behalf of a minor ipso facto constitutes a severance of the family status, then logically one would be driven to hold also that a notice given by such a person on behalf of the minor to the other members of the family of the intention to divide would also effect a severance of the joint status. This seems to us to be a position which we would not like to uphold without authority and no authority has been cited to us in support of it. It was strongly argued by the learned pleader for the respondent that as the plaint states facts and circumstances which if proved would be good justification for the Court decreeing partition therefore at this stage we must proceed on the basis that there was a good cause of action and there was thus a severance of status effected by the institution of the suit. This clearly does not amount to anything more than this, that it is open to a person who chooses to act on behalf of a minor member of a Hindu family to exercise the discretion on his behalf to effect a severance. What causes the severance of a joint Hindu family is not the existence of certain facts which would justify any member to ask for partition but it is the exercise of the option which the law lodges in a member of a joint family to say whether he shall continue to remain joint or whether he shall ask for a division. In the case of an adult he has not got to give any reasons why he asks for partition but he has simply to say that he wants partition and the Court is bound to give him a decision. In the case of a minor the law gives the Court the power to say whether there should be a division or not and we think that it will lead to considerable complications and difficulties if we are to say that other persons also have got the discretion to create a division in the family purporting to act on behalf of a minor. It is urged that there might be cases in which it would be desirable that partition should be effected in the best interests of the minor and as soon as possible. In such cases those who are interested on behalf of the minor are entitled to institute a suit but having regard to the decisions in Bachoo Harkisondas v. Mankorebai and Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi, it must be left to the Court to decide whether there should be a partition or not.

    5. We treat this civil revision petition as a second appeal and set aside the order of the District Judge with costs here and in the Court below. The respondent's petition will stand dismissed. This decree will not be drawn up until the learned pleader for the appellants pays Court-fee within a week.

    S.N/R.K

    6. Order set aside.

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    Comments

    Chelimi Chetti And Others v. Subbanna Petitioner .
    (Aug 29, 1917)