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Case Number

Appeal No. 229 of 1937

Advocates

K.E Rajagopalachari for respondent.
K.V Sesha Ayyangar and R. Desikan for appellant.

Judges

Sir Lionel Leach, C.J
Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.

Acts

Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. By Section 588(24) of that Code corresponding to Order 43, Rule 1(s) of the present Code,
Code of Civil Procedure, and the Hindu Religious Endowments Act;
provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926,
Section 62 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926,
Section 63(4) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act,
provisions of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Section 503 of the Code of 1882, (now Order 40, Rule 1
Section 588, Clause (24) (now Order 43, Rule 1, Clause
Act. As Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926,
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act
Sub-section (1) of Section 105.
Sub-section (1) of Section 63
Sub-section (4) of Section 63,

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1933, twenty worshippers of the Sri Alagiananibirayar temple (Tinnevelly District) applied to the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board requesting an inquiry to determine whether the Board should frame a scheme for administration of the temple and its endowments. The Board held an inquiry and decided it was not necessary to frame a scheme. The applicants then sued in the District Court (District Judge of Tinnevelly) seeking a decree that the Court settle such a scheme. The trustee (respondent) defended the suit, principally contending that the Court had no power to frame a scheme. A preliminary issue on that question was tried and answered by the District Judge in favour of the plaintiffs. The respondent applied to this Court in revision; Venkataramana Rao, J., concluded that the District Judge erred and dismissed the suit in revision. On communication of that order, the District Judge entered a formal decree dismissing the suit with costs. The plaintiffs appealed from that decree. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the revisional order of Venkataramana Rao, J., was final and therefore barred the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the revisional order of Venkataramana Rao, J., dismissing the suit was final and therefore precluded an appeal from the District Judge's decree (i.e., the question of appealability/finality of the revision order).
Whether, under the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (particularly Section 62 and Section 63, including Sub-section (4) of Section 63), a person aggrieved by the Board's refusal to frame a scheme may maintain a suit in a Civil Court which can result in the Court framing a scheme (i.e., whether the Court has power to frame a scheme when the Board has declined to do so).
Whether Section 65 or any residuary judicial power permits the Civil Court to frame a scheme in the absence of a scheme first framed by the Board.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Sub-section (4) of Section 63 permits "the trustee or any person having interest" to institute a suit in the Court to modify or set aside an order of the Board; therefore, if the Court sets aside the Board's refusal to frame a scheme, the Court must have power to frame a scheme itself.
Section 65 was relied upon as conferring power on the Court to frame a scheme ("any scheme of administration which has been settled by a Court under Section 63" — argued to support court's power).
There is an argument that, apart from the Act, there remains a residuary power in the Court to frame a scheme (a fallback contention).
Case law relied upon in support of a broad construction included Venkatasami v. Stridevamma and Reasut Hossain v. Hadjee Abdullah (these were cited to support the proposition that a negative order refusing relief under a statutory provision may itself be regarded as an order under the section, thus giving rise to remedial powers on appeal or in court).

Respondent's Arguments

Main contention: the Court has no power to frame a scheme (i.e., the District Court had no jurisdiction to make such an order).
Preliminary contention: the revisional order of Venkataramana Rao, J., was final, so the appeal from the District Judge's decree did not lie. To support this, the respondent's counsel cited authorities including Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari, Mubarak Hussain v. Bihari, and Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari (1883) L.R. 11 I.A. 37 : I.L.R. 6 All. 269 (P.C.)	Cited by respondent’s counsel to support finality of certain revisional orders.	The Chief Justice held this and similar authorities were not in point because the case was governed by Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure; these authorities were therefore not examined further in the judgment.
Mubarak Hussain v. Bihari (1884) I.L.R. 16 All. 306	Cited by respondent’s counsel as supporting finality of revisional orders.	Treated as not in point for the reasons given in respect of Section 105; the Court did not rely on this authority.
Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal (1921) 40 M.L.J. 423 : L.R. 48 I.A. 187 : I.L.R. 48 Cal. 499 (P.C.)	Cited by respondent’s counsel in support of finality/limits of revisional orders and appealability.	The Court indicated these authorities were not applicable because Section 105 of the Code governs the present matter; they were therefore not followed.
Venkatasami v. Stridevamma (1886) I.L.R. 10 Mad. 179 (Full Bench)	Held that an order rejecting an application for the appointment of a receiver was an order under the relevant statutory provision and thus appealable; the Full Bench concluded that a negative order was still an order under the section.	The Court explained that Venkatasami relied on very different statutory context (Code provisions) and that its reasoning did not apply to the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. The Court distinguished it because here the Board, not the Court, has the initial duty to frame schemes.
Reasut Hossain v. Hadjee Abdullah (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 221 : I.L.R. 2 Cal. 131 (P.C.)	Authority relied upon in Venkatasami; concerned appealability/character of orders under a statutory provision governing receivership.	The Court noted that the Full Bench in Venkatasami based part of its reasoning on Reasut Hossain, but again distinguished the present statutory setting and did not adopt that line of reasoning for the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Preliminary procedural point (appealability): The Court examined whether the revisional order of Venkataramana Rao, J., was final and therefore barred an appeal. Section 115 (power of revision) permits the revisional court to make an order appropriate to the application; the Court observed that the order of Venkataramana Rao, J., dismissing the suit was not appropriate because, having decided the District Judge erred on the preliminary issue, the revisional court should have set aside that ruling and directed the District Judge to proceed in accordance with law rather than dismissing the suit itself. Consequently, the revisional order was interlocutory in character.

The Court then relied on Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-section (1) of Section 105 permits the High Court to set aside an erroneous order affecting the decision of the case when considering an appeal from a decree. The Court held that the revisional order did affect the decision of the case because, as a result of the revisional order, the District Judge was compelled to dismiss the suit; therefore the order fell within Section 105(1) and could be examined in the appeal from the decree. The Chief Justice observed that to accept the respondent's contention would allow an interlocutory revisional order to finally dispose of the suit with no appeal to the High Court or to the Privy Council; statutory provisions (Letters Patent and Section 3 of the Code) precluded appeal to the Privy Council from a one-judge order, and thus Section 105 was the proper vehicle for review of the revisional order's correctness when it affected the decree.

Substantive statutory interpretation (power to frame a scheme): The Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926. Section 62 confers upon the Board a discretionary power to hold an inquiry when it has reason to believe there has been mismanagement or when at least twenty persons having interest apply requesting inquiry; the Board cannot be compelled to hold an inquiry, and if it decides an inquiry is unnecessary, applicants have no further recourse to compel the Board (a concession acknowledged in the opinion).

The decisive provision was Sub-section (4) of Section 63, but the Court read Sub-section (4) together with Sub-section (1) (first part) and Sub-section (3). The opening part of Section 63(1) authorizes the Board, after inquiry and consultation, to "by order settle a scheme of administration" where certain conditions are met. Section 63(3) allows the Board to modify or cancel a scheme; Section 63(4) requires publication of every order of the Board under that section and gives trustees/people having interest six months from publication to institute a suit to modify or set aside "such order."

The appellants argued that the right to sue under Section 63(4) implicitly included a right to have the Court frame a scheme if the Court set aside the Board's refusal. The Court rejected this on the plain reading: the phrase "such order" necessarily refers to orders of the kind described earlier in the same sub-section — namely, orders settling, modifying or cancelling schemes — and does not include an order where the Board declines to frame a scheme. The Court emphasized that the Act vests the Board with the initial power to frame a scheme; the Court's role, as provided by the Act, is to modify or cancel schemes once framed. Thus, setting aside an order (e.g., cancelling) does not give the Court power to take the Board's place and itself frame the initial scheme.

The Court specifically distinguished the appellant's reliance on Venkatasami v. Stridevamma and Reasut Hossain, explaining that those cases arose under different statutory contexts (Code provisions governing receivership) and that the reasoning there — which treated negative orders as orders under the section — did not apply to the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act given its different purpose and structure. The Court observed that it would be futile to set aside a Board discretion to decline framing a scheme if the Court had no power to compel the Board to frame one; therefore the Legislature could not have intended Section 63(4) to apply to an order of refusal.

On Section 65, the Court addressed the appellant's contention that the phrase "any scheme of administration which has been settled by a Court under Section 63" should be read to allow the Court to settle schemes in any circumstances. The Court rejected this, construing Section 65 as permitting the Court to modify or cancel a scheme already framed (i.e., initially settled by the Board and subsequently deemed or settled under the Act), not as conferring power to originate a scheme where the Board has refused to do so.

Finally, the Court rejected the submission of residuary jurisdiction in the Civil Court to frame schemes, noting that Section 92 of the old Code (which formerly provided for court-framed schemes and required Advocate-General's sanction) had been superseded for these matters by the 1926 Act and that the Act had placed the initial duty of scheme framing with the Board. Thus there remained no residual judicial power to frame schemes outside the statutory scheme provided by the Act.

Krishnaswami Aiyangar, J., concurred with the Chief Justice and added reasoning: the language in Section 63(4) ("such publication" and "such order") refers to orders of the kind previously described in the section (i.e., orders settling/modifying/cancelling schemes). He agreed the Full Bench decision in Venkatasami was not binding in the different statutory context of the Endowments Act. He highlighted two further reasons: (1) the Code and the Endowments Act are not in pari materia and the policy and object of the Endowments Act — to vest supervision and control in a specialized Board — make a different construction appropriate; (2) the Court should avoid a construction that would afford an ineffective remedy (i.e., enabling the Court to set aside a Board refusal but leaving the Board free to maintain the refusal, thereby producing no real relief).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The Court held that the revisional order in question was interlocutory in character and that, on the merits, the Civil Court has no power under the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, to frame a scheme when the Board has refused to do so; the Board has the initial duty to frame schemes and the Court's powers (under Sections 63 and 65) are limited to modifying or cancelling schemes already framed by the Board. APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: the District Judge's decree dismissing the suit is affirmed; the plaintiffs cannot obtain from the Civil Court an order compelling the Court itself to frame an administration scheme for the temple when the Board has refused to frame one.
Statutory clarification: the opinion construes Sections 62, 63 (including Sub-section (4)) and 65 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 to mean that the Board has the initial power to frame schemes and that judicial power is confined to modifying or cancelling schemes once enacted; courts do not possess residuary authority to originate such schemes under the Act.
Remedial consequence emphasized by the Court: where the statute vests an initial discretion in an expert administrative Board, a court should require more explicit statutory language before holding that it may substitute its own scheme-making power for that of the Board.

This summary is strictly based on the text of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in that opinion.

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T.S. Pichu Ayyangar v. Perarulala Ramanuja Jeer Swamigal

1. In 1933 an application was made by 20 worshippers of the Sri Alagiananibirayar temple in the Tinnevelly District to the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board for an order directing an inquiry to be held into the question whether the Board should frame a scheme for the administration of the temple and its endowments. The Board held an inquiry and as the result of the investigation decided that it was not necessary to frame a scheme. The applicants then filed a suit in the Court of the District Judge of Tinnevelly with the object of obtaining the settlement of a scheme under a decree of the Court. The suit was defended by the trustee, who is the respondent in this appeal. It is unnecessary to set out all the objections to the suit. It is sufficient to say that the main objection was that the Court had no power to frame a scheme. On this question a preliminary issue was framed and was answered by the District Judge in favour of the plaintiffs. Thereupon the respondent applied to this Court to reverse the order in exercise of its revisional powers. The application was heard by Venkataramana Rao, J., who decided that the District Judge had erred in holding that the suit lay. In addition to allowing the petition the learned Judge dismissed the suit. On the order being communicated to him the District Judge passed a formal decree dismissing the suit with costs. The appeal is from that decree. Before proceeding to discuss the merits of the appeal it is necessary to dispose of a preliminary objection raised by the respondent, who says that the order of Venkataramana Rao, J., was final and therefore the appeal does not lie.

2. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which confers upon the Court its power of revision states that if the Subordinate Court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. The section only contemplates an order which is appropriate to the application; and the order of Venkataramana Rao, J., dismissing the suit was not appropriate. Having decided that the District Judge had erred on the preliminary issue he should have set aside his ruling and directed the District Judge to dispose of the suit in accordance with law and not to have dismissed the suit himself. The order of Venkataramana Rao, J., was an interlocutory order and the preliminary objection must be decided on this footing.

3. In support of his contention that the decision of Venkataramana Rao, J., is final the learned Advocate for the respondent has quoted Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari (1883) L.R. 11 I.A. 37 : I.L.R. 6 All. 269 (P.C.), Mubarak Hussain v, Bihari (1884) I.L.R. 16 All. 306 and Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal (1921) 40 M.L.J. 423 : L.R. 48 I.A. 187 : I.L.R. 48 Cal. 499 (P.C.), but as the present case is clearly governed by Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure they are not in point and I do not propose to pause to examine them. That section says:

(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any, order made by a Court in exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand made after the commencement of this Code from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness.

4. Authority is given here to the Court to set aside an erroneous order affecting the decision of a case, unless it be an order of remand from which an appeal lies and no appeal is filed Sub-section (2) appeared in the Code for the first time in 1908. Now the order of Venkataramana Rao, J., certainly affected the decision of the case, As the result of the order, the District Judge was left with no other course open to him but to dismiss the suit. Therefore the order is one which directly falls within Sub-section (1) of Section 105. If the argument of the learned advocate for the respondent were to be accepted it would mean that this suit would be decided by an interlocutory order and there would be no appeal either to this Court or to the Privy Council. The order of Venkataramana Rao, J., was not appealable. The Letters Patent of this Court expressly provide that an order passed in revision shall not be subject to an appeal and Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that no appeal shall lie to His Majesty in Council from the decree or order of one Judge of a High Court. Therefore the order of Venkataramana Rao, J., does not fall with in the purview of section 109 of the code which provides for appeal to His Majesty in Council from a final order or a decree of a High Court. The present appeal is from the decree, and as the order affected the decision of the Court when passing decree it is clearly open to this Court by virtue of Section 105 to consider its correctness.

5. I will now turn to the merits of the appeal. Section 62 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, says that when the Board has reason to believe that the trustee of a math or excepted temple has been mismanaging the endowments or has been spending or alienating them for improper purposes, or when not less than twenty persons having interest make an application to the Board stating that in the interests of the proper administration of the endowments a scheme of administration should be settled, the Board may hold an inquiry. The Board cannot be compelled to hold an inquiry. If it decides that an inquiry is not necessary, the applicants can carry the matter no further. So much is conceded by the learned Advocate for the appellant. The decision of the appeal depends upon the interpretation to be placed on Sub-section (4) of Section 63, but the sub-section must be read in conjunction with the first part of Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3). The first part of Sub-section (1) of Section 63 reads as follows:

If after making the inquiry referred to in Section 62 the Board is satisfied that the trustee concerned has mismanaged the endowments of such math or temple or has spent or alienated them for improper purposes, or that, in the interests of the proper administration of such endowments, a scheme of administration should be settled, the Board may, after consulting, in the prescribed manner the trustee and the persons having interest, by order settle a scheme of administration for the endowments connected with such math or temple.

6. Sub-section (3) and (4) are in these words:

(3) The Board may at any time by order and in the manner provided in Sub-section (1) modify or cancel a scheme settled under that sub-section.

(4) Every order of the Board under this sub-section shall be published in the prescribed manner.

The trustee or any person having interest may within six months of the date of such publication institute a suit in the Court to modify or set aside such order.

7. For the appellant it is said that inasmuch as Sub-section (4) gives a person having interest in an endowment to institute a suit in the Court to modify or set aside an order under this section the power must include a power to the Court to frame a scheme, if the Court sets aside an order of the Board refusing to do so. It is also said that the Court has power to frame a scheme by reason of Section 65 to which I shall refer later. It is further said that apart from the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, there is power in the Court to frame a scheme.

8. I agree with Venkataramana Rao, J. that Section 63 does not give authority to the Court to frame a scheme in the event of the Board refusing to do so. The only orders which the section refers to are: (1) An order settling a scheme; (2) an order modifying a scheme, and (3) an order cancelling a scheme. I consider that the words "institute a suit in the Court to modify, or set aside such order" are intended only to refer to an order settling a scheme or modifying or cancelling one.

9. Mr. Sesha Ayyangar on behalf of the appellant has referred us to Venkatasami v. Stridevamma (1886) I.L.R. 10 Mad. 179 (F.B.) and Reasut Hossain v. Hadjee Abdullah (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 221 : I.L.R. 2 Cal. 131 (P.C.). In Venkatasami v. Stridevamma (1886) I.L.R. 10 Mad. 179 (F.B.) a Full Bench of this Court held that an order rejecting an application for the appointment of a receiver was an order passed under Section 503 of the Code of 1882, (now Order 40, Rule 1 and was therefore appealable under Section 588, Clause (24) (now Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (s)) An appeal was given from an order appointing a receiver, but nothing was said with regard to an appeal from an order refusing to appoint a receiver. The Court considered that as there was an appeal from an order appointing a receiver it followed that there must be an appeal from a negative order. This meant that on appeal the Court could appoint a received, if an appointment had been improperly refused by the Court below. Mr. Sesha Ayyangar says that in as much as the Court has the power to set aside an order of the Board to frame a scheme under Section 63 it can set aside the order refusing to settle a scheme and if it does so this must imply a power to frame a scheme. This does not follow. The Act may vest in the Board the power to frame a scheme and in the Court only the power to modify or cancel it, and' this is my reading of the Act. The Board must in the first instance frame a scheme. The Court can modify or cancel it, but it cannot take initial action. Therefore it is not a question of the Court having power to do something and refusing to do it, as in Venkatasami v. Stridevamma (1886) I.L.R. 10 Mad. 179 (F.B.) and that makes all the difference. The decision in that case was based on Reasut Hossain v. Hadjee Abdullah (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 221 : I.L.R. 2 Cal. 131 (P.C.) the second case quoted by Mr. Sesha Ayyangar.

10. If Sub-section (4) were to be held to apply to the Order of the Board in this case, what would be the result? The Court would have to set aside the order, but it could not pass any further order, because the power to frame a scheme is in the Board. Venkataramana Rao, J. put the position here very aptly in these words:

So when the Board declines to frame a scheme there is no use in the Court setting at naught that discretion because there is no power in the Court to compel the Board to frame that scheme. Unless the Court has got that power it would be futile to set aside such an order.

In my opinion the Legislature never intended Sub-section (4) to have application except to orders of the Board framing schemes or modifying or cancelling them.

11. This brings me to the second contention of the appellant. Section 65 says that "any scheme of administration which has been settled by a Court under Section 63", or which under Section 75 is deemed to be a scheme settled under the Act may, at any time, for sufficient cause be modified or cancelled by the Court in a suit instituted by the Board or the trustee or any person having interest but not otherwise. Mr. Sesha Ayyangar says that the words "any scheme of administration which has been settled by the Court under Section 63" must be read as meaning that the Court is given power to settle a scheme in any circumstances. I cannot read Section 65 in this way. The Court has power to settle a scheme, but it must be a scheme which has first been framed by the Board. Section 65 is merely intended to give the Court power, after a scheme has been framed, to modify or cancel it at any time.

12. I am also unable to accept the argument that there is a residuary power in the Court to frame a scheme. The first Act relating to the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments was passed in 1923. Before then a scheme for the management of a temple could only be framed in accordance with the provisions of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the suit required the sanction of the Advocate-General to its institution. It is common ground that since 1923, Section 92 has ceased to apply and that the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board has taken the place of the Advocate-General. The scheme of the first Act was to place in the Board power of supervision of Hindu temples and maths in this Province and in proper cases the control of the management, and this is the scheme of the present Act. As Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure has now been replaced by the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, so far as Hindu Religious Endowments of this Province are concerned that Act alone can be looked at for ascertaining what the powers of the Court are. There can be no residuary powers because the former powers are taken away by the present Act. The only section which has application here is Section 63, and, as I have indicated, this section in my judgment gives no power at all to the Court to frame a scheme when the Board has refused to do so. I consider that Venkataramana Rao, J., correctly interpreted the Act in his order of revision and consequently I hold that the appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs.

Krishnaswami Aiyangar, J.

13. I agree with my Lord, the Chief Justice on both the points dealt with in the judgment just now delivered. On the second point, which turns on the true construction of the last sentence in Section 63(4) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, I desire to add a few words of my own. That clause runs as follows:

The trustee or any person having interest, may within six months of the date of such publication institute a suit in the Court, to modify or set aside such order.

14. The words "such publication" and "such order" fin this clause have reference obviously to the kind of order mentioned just previously, in the earlier portion of the same still-section which directs the publication of "every order of the Board under this section" in the prescribed manner. The order with which we are here concerned is no doubt an order of the Board, but is it also one under this section so as to give to the appellants a right to institute a suit to modify or set it aside? I was at first impressed by the argument that the point is covered by the decision of the Full Bench in Venkatasami v. Stridevamma (1886) I.L.R. 10 Mad. 179 (F.B.), but on further consideration, I think that that view cannot be sustained. The above decision was rendered no doubt on similar words but occurring in a different enactment, namely, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. By Section 588(24) of that Code corresponding to Order 43, Rule 1(s) of the present Code, an appeal was allowed against, amongst others, orders under Section 503. Section 503 contained the various provisions relating to the appointment of a receiver, his rights and duties etc., but said nothing about the dismissal of an application made under the section, a feature which is common to both the old and the new Codes. The argument was advanced that an appeal was permitted only in respect of an affirmative order, that is to say, orders granting the application, and none against an order refusing it. The contention was negatived, the Court holding that even an order rejecting the application was an order passed under the section and was therefore appealable under Section 588(24). The result was that, in the view of the Full Bench, an order under the section, comprehended both classes of orders positive as well as negative. Here then, it is said, we have a construction of the words orders under a section, and the question is, are we free to adopt a different construction in respect of what is practically the same language in the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act?

15. Two reasons in particular have operated on my mind in persuading me to assent to the opinion expressed in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice. In the first place, it is to be observed that there is nothing in common between the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Hindu Religious Endowments Act; or to say the same thing in other words, the two statutes fore not in pari materia. Further the judgment of the Full Bench appears to have proceeded on considerations, which have little or no application to an Act like the one with which we are concerned. Parker, J., felt compelled to place a reasonable Construction on the Act, and pointed out that the opposite construction could not have been intended by the Legislature. Brandt, J., laid stress on principles and expediency, and held that the view of the Full Bench was more consonant with the general principles of the Code and the rules of construction. But it cannot be said that there is anything in the general principles of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act, which as pointed out by my Lord, can be said to lend support to the construction accepted in the case cited. The purpose and scope of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act are quite different and leave no room for doubt that it was the intention of the Legislature to vest the supervision and control of religious institutions in a Board composed of men specially qualified by their knowledge and equipment to discharge the duty entrusted to them by the Act. It is therefore right to say that in a statute of this kind, we should require language more explicit than we have, to give a right of suit against the decisions of a body composed presumably of persons having expert knowledge in the special field of Hindu Religion and charities.

16. Secondly, and this in my view is a more powerful argument against the appellant, the Court should be slow to adopt a construction which is not likely to afford a real and effective remedy to the complaining party. The initial duty of framing a scheme, rests with the Board and with the Board only, and all that the Court can do, assuming it has the power, is to modify or set aside its order of refusal, arid not to compel it to frame a scheme. There is nothing in Sections 63, 64 and 65, to warrant our holding that the Court by its decree can itself frame a scheme in the suit. To imply such a power in the Court from the opening words of Section 65 namely, "Any scheme of administration which has been settled by a Court under Section 63" is to place an unreasonable construction on these words, and cannot be permitted. Is the Court then to be placed in a position in which it is merely to set aside the order and still leave it open to the Board to refuse to frame a scheme, in other words to stultify itself? I think not.

17. I therefore feel, that whatever might be the meaning of the words in question in some other enactment or in some other context, it is not correct to construe Section 63 as conferring a right of suit against a refusal to frame a scheme under the section.

T.S. Pichu Ayyangar v. Perarulala Ramanuja Jeer Swamigal

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondent's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

T.S. Pichu Ayyangar v. Perarulala Ramanuja Jeer Swamigal

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