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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Appeal Nos. 349 of 1924 & 47 of 1928)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued in O.S. No. 116 of 1924 before the Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga, relying upon a foreign judgment — a decree in O.S. No. 47816 of 1917 from the District Court, Colombo. On 16 December 1924 an ex parte decree was recorded in the Sivaganga suit against the 1st and 13th defendants. The 13th defendant applied to set aside that ex parte decree on 13 March 1926 and succeeded. The 2nd defendant is the contesting defendant before the Court of Appeal. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the 2nd defendant only became aware of the decree on 16 February 1926 and that his application to set aside was therefore within time.

The primary procedural focus is whether the Colombo decree (relied upon as a foreign judgment) was a decision on the merits for the purposes of Section 13(b) of the (Ceylon) Civil Procedure Code. The appeal challenges the lower court's order dismissing the plaintiff's suit as against the 2nd defendant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the foreign decree (District Court, Colombo) was a judgment "given on the merits" within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the Civil Procedure Code.
  2. Whether an ex parte decree nisi and subsequent decree absolute entered under Chapter 12 (notably Sections 85, 86, 87 and 90) of the Ceylon Civil Procedure Code constitutes a decision on the merits or is a decree for default.
  3. Whether the presence of an affidavit filed by the plaintiff (and recorded in the journal) makes the ex parte decree a decision on the merits.
  4. Whether the 2nd defendant had notice of the decree such that his application to set it aside was or was not within time (i.e., questions of service and actual notice).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The foreign judgment/decree should be treated as a judgment on the merits under Section 13(b) of the Code, and so may be relied upon in the Sivaganga suit.
  • The filing of an affidavit (the affidavit printed at page 3 of appellant's documents) at the ex parte hearing indicates evidence was placed before the Colombo Court and that the decree was founded on that evidence — i.e., is effectively a decision on the merits.
  • An application was made to permit examination of a learned barrister (Mr. Brooke Elliot) to elucidate Colombo procedure; implicitly the appellant sought to rely on expert/practical knowledge of District Court practice to show that such decrees were often decided on their merits.

Respondent's / Defendants' Arguments

  • The decree entered in Colombo was a decree for default and not a decision on the merits; therefore it does not satisfy Section 13(b) as a foreign judgment on the merits.
  • The 2nd defendant contended that he had not been served with any summons and only became aware of the decree on 16 February 1926; his application to set aside was therefore within time.
  • Evidence was put forward describing concealment by the defendant (employment in Colombo, secret return to Tondi, allegations of absconding and hostile local atmosphere) which bears on whether formal service and actual notice occurred; there was conflict of evidence between plaintiff's agent and the defendant regarding the date of the defendant's presence in the village.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Arunachalam Chettiar v. Muhammad Salihu Marakkayar Authority that a similar decision was not a decision on the merits. The Court noted this decision and treated it as supporting the view that an ex parte decree under the Ceylon Code need not be a merits decision.
Mahomed Kassim & Co. v. Seeni Pakir Bin Ahmed (Full Bench) Full Bench precedent followed in the above case, supporting that such decrees are not decisions on the merits. Referenced as earlier authority consistent with the conclusion that decrees under the relevant sections of the Ceylon Code are decrees for default.
Keymer v. Visvanatham Reddi (Privy Council) Privy Council ruling relied upon in the chain of authority that such entries were not merits decisions. Referred to by the Court as part of the line of authority supporting the conclusion that the Colombo decrees were not decisions on the merits.
Balasingham's Notes of Cases, (as cited: Vol. 6, p.17 / Vol. V, p.17) Holds that at an ex parte hearing plaintiff must give such evidence of material averments as would enable the Court to pass a decree; if no such hearing took place the decree may be vacated. The judges considered this practice note but found that even if an ex parte hearing is required, the presence of an affidavit in the record here did not demonstrate that a hearing on the merits occurred; the case was distinguished on facts (absence of any judgment or reasons).
3 New Law Reports (Ceylon) 34 (1897) Holds plaintiff must make out a prima facie case at an ex parte hearing; the Judge need be satisfied before passing decree and may grant adjournments to enable plaintiff to repair defects. Used to show that although some ex parte hearings require proof, the practice does not convert a default decree into a merits decision; the Court found the present record lacked the indicia of an adjudication on the merits (no judgment, no reasons).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded on statutory interpretation of the Ceylon Civil Procedure Code and on the documentary record (the District Court journal). The judges examined whether the entries and the presence of an affidavit in the journal demonstrate that the Colombo Court took evidence and decided the case on its merits.

Key statutory and evidentiary points relied upon by the Court:

  • Chapter 12 of the Ceylon Code (default of appearance) and specifically Section 85 (obligation to "proceed to hear the case ex parte and to pass a decree nisi" on default) was read as imposing a mandatory procedure which penalizes default and does not necessarily mean the Court adjudicated the merits.
  • Sections 86, 87 and 90 characterise the decrees as decrees "for default," provide that no appeal lies against such decrees (Sect. 87) and allow for them to be set aside by motion. The Court treated these provisions as indicating that such decrees are procedural penalties for default rather than merits decisions.
  • The mere filing or presence of a plaintiff's affidavit in the file does not establish that the Court took that affidavit as evidence on which it based a merits decision. Sections 179 and 437 of the Ceylon Code were cited as showing affidavits are evidence only when the Court, for sufficient reason, orders proof by affidavit or specifically calls for it; there was no record here that the Colombo Court ordered the affidavit to be evidence.
  • When a Court decides a matter on the evidence, Sections 184 and 187 require a judgment or statement of reasons. The absence of any judgment or statement of reasons in the Colombo record strongly indicated that no adjudication on the merits took place.
  • The journal entry (19 September 1921: "filed affidavit and moves that decree nisi be entered...") and the sequence of decree nisi followed by decree absolute after notice being affixed supported the view that the entry recorded a procedural step under the default provisions rather than a decision on the substantive merits.

The Court reviewed relevant reported Ceylon decisions (Balasingham's Notes; 3 NLR (Ceylon) 34) and concluded that while courts in Colombo may in some circumstances require proof before passing a decree nisi, the circumstances and the documentary record in the present case did not demonstrate that evidence had been taken and a merits determination made. Both judges therefore concluded that the foreign decree was not a judgment on the merits.

Odgers, J. additionally explained why the Court would not invite or accept an outside expert opinion (a member of the Ceylon Bar) to interpret the local Code for them: the judges considered it their duty to interpret the Code themselves rather than to rely on an external opinion to decide the legal question before them.

Concise statement of the analytical outcome: Interpreting the Ceylon Civil Procedure Code and examining the journal, the Court found no evidence that the Colombo Court called for or received evidence and wrote a judgment on the merits; therefore the Colombo decree was a default decree and not a decision on the merits under Section 13(b).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeals are DISMISSED. Both Odgers, J. and Wallace, J. concluded that the foreign decree from the District Court, Colombo, was not a decision on the merits but a decree for default; consequently it did not satisfy Section 13(b) as a judgment given on the merits.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The plaintiff's reliance on the Colombo decree as a foreign judgment on the merits failed; the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed with costs.
  • The Court did not decide other points pressed by the plaintiff (for example, whether the lower court erred in setting aside the ex parte decree, or whether the respondent's application to set aside was out of time) because the appeal failed on the primary point.
  • The opinion emphasises the procedural distinction under the Ceylon Code between decrees entered for default (decree nisi / decree absolute under Sects. 85–87, 90) and judgments rendered after evidence and a reasoned decision (which would attract the requirements of Sections 184, 187 and related provisions). That distinction means default decrees remain susceptible to being set aside on motion, and are not to be treated as conclusive merits judgments for purposes such as enforcement elsewhere.
  • No broader novel legal principle was laid down beyond the Court's interpretation and application of existing Code provisions and precedent: the judgment applied statutory text and existing reported rulings to conclude the Colombo entry was a default decree, not a merits adjudication.
Order: Appeal dismissed with costs.

This summary is compiled strictly from the material contained in the provided opinion. No outside facts or inferences beyond the text have been added.

    P.L.S. Firm v. M.R.M.S. Sulaiman

    Odgers, J. — These appeals, Appeal No. 349 of 1924 and Appeal No. 47 of 1928, were originally heard by myself and Curgenven, J., but owing to the latter's illness before he left the Court last year we were unable to deliver our judgments. In the meantime an informal application was made to me which is now put in the form of a petition that we should ask Mr. Brooke Elliot a member of the Ceylon Bar to either appear as an amicus curiae or as a witness to help us in the elucidation of the Ceylon procedure in this case, as contained in the Ceylon Procedure Code. We have given very careful consideration to this request and we are indebted to Mr. Brooke Elliot for so readily placing his services and knowledge at our disposal. But we consider that the only way in which Mr. Brooke Elliot could be of any real assistance would be if he were asked his opinion as to the very question that we have to decide. An expert in foreign law is called, as I understand it, to state what the law of a foreign country on a particular point is: an Advocate of the Scottish Bar is often called as a witness in the English Courts to explain the law of Scotland on any particular point that arises. But in this case, we have the law laid down for us in a particularly elaborate manner in the Ceylon Civil Procedure Code and it appears to me that it is our duty to interpret that Code as best we can and that we are not entitled to rely on any outside opinion however eminent as to the interpretation of that Code.

    The plaintiff brought O.S No. 116 of 1924 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga. On the 16th December, 1924, an ex parte decree was passed in the suit on a foreign judgment of the District Court of Colombo against defendants 1 and 13 in the suit. On the 13th March, 1926, 13th defendant applied to set aside the ex parte decree and succeeded. The 2nd defendant is now the contesting defendant before us. The learned Judge on this application held that the 2nd defendant only became aware of the decree on the 16th February, 1926, and that his application was therefore within time. We were at first inclined to go into the facts to see if the learned Judge's order could be sustained on this point; but in this case the most important question that arises is as to whether this is a decision on the merits. On the 30th May, 1917, the suit was filed. We have the journal under Sect. 105, Ceylon Civil Procedure Code, printed. It is contended that because an affidavit is apparently put in, the decision is one on the merits, although the defendant was ex parte. The suit was against 14 defendants of whom only the 1st and 13th defendants were ex parte. On the 7th July, 1921, Mr. Kondayya moved for an ex parte trial as against the 1st and 13th defendants. This was allowed and the trial fixed to the 15th July. On the 19th September, 1921, Mr. Kondayya filed an affidavit and moved that decree nisi be entered. Decree nisi was issued on the 11th November 1921. The affidavit was filed on the 15th September 1921 and sets out the fact that certain promissory notes and a cheque were dishonoured and that the defendants are jointly and severally liable in the sum of Rs. 9,500 and odd. The journal states that on the 19th September, the day fixed for the hearing the plaintiff appeared and that the 1st defendant and the 13th defendant did not appear, though they were duly served, as by the affidavit of the process-server appears. Reference must be shortly made to the provisions of the Ceylon Procedure Code. The Chapter relating to default of appearance is Chapter 12. Sect. 85 says:

    “If the defendant fails to appear on the day fixed for his appearance and answer, or if he fails to appear on the day fixed for the subsequent filing of his answer, or for the filing of the replication, or on the day fixed for the hearing of the action, and if the Court is satisfied by affidavit of the process-server stating the facts and circumstances of the service or otherwise, that the defendant has been duly served with summons, or has received due notice of the day fixed for subsequent filing of answer, or of replication or of the day fixed for the hearing of the action, as the case may be, or if the defendant shall fail to file his answer on the day fixed therefor, and if on the occasion of such default of the defendant the plaintiff appears, then the Court shall proceed to hear the case ex parte and to pass a decree nisi in favour of plaintiff in the Form No. 22 in the second schedule hereto or to the like effect, and shall thereupon issue to the defendant a notice of such decree. Such notice shall be served personally unless the Court for sufficient reason to be assigned by it, direct some other mode of service.”

    Reference may also be made to the words of Sect. 87:

    “No appeal shall lie against any decree nisi or absolute for default,” Sect. 90 says “In the case of an action where there are more defendants than one, the Court shall not be obliged to pass a decree for default against a defendant for failing to appear at a stage of the action, provided that one defendant at least appears at that stage against whom the action must proceed.”

    It is alleged that the affidavit printed at page 3 of the appellant's documents was used at the hearing ex parte and that that constitutes a decree on the merits. We have no judgment in the case and the only affidavit referred to in the order quoted above is that of the process-server. Under Sect. 85 it would seem that the Court has no option but to give a decree for the plaintiff, the defaulting defendant being left to his remedy of moving to set aside the decree nisi if he can. Ch. 12 makes no reference to affidavit evidence which is only by Sect. 179 to be allowed by the Court for sufficient reason. The affidavit relied on does not appear in the journal and it is not explained under what provision of law it has been used. It may be that it is the practice of the Colombo Courts to use affidavits of this kind before ordering the issue of the decree nisi but in the absence of any evidence on the point it seems to me that the affidavit in question cannot be relied upon to make this a decree on the merits. There is no judgment whatever.

    Another possible explanation is that this suit though begun as a regular suit, and we know that all the defendants but two originally appeared and filed answers—was after the dismissal of the suit against them converted into a summary suit and it will be remembered that in summary suits an affidavit is required.

    Another question raised in this appeal has been already referred to viz., whether these defendants had notice of this particular decree. The 2nd defendant states that he was not served with any summons and was only aware of the decree passed against him on the 16th February 1926. This becomes important in considering whether he was within time in making his application to set aside the ex parte decree. He further says he was employed in Colombo for the last two years and came to Tondi, the village in question, on the 28th of January, 1926. The agent of the plaintiff on the other hand says that this defendant came to the village of Tondi a few days prior to 28th January, 1926. The Court amins came to Tondi on the eve of his marriage, the defendant remaining in concealment. A resident of Tondi, Madar Shaik Ali, says that the marriage of this defendant was celebrated secretly, because even at the end of January he was aware of the warrants out for his arrest. There is a conflict of evidence about this matter and it is evident that the amins found themselves in an hostile atmosphere in this village and wired to the Subordinate Judge to know what they were to do as the defendant was absconding inside the house. They asked for police bundobust from Tiruvadani as the outpost of Tondi did not seem to be able or willing to help them. It is of course the law that the defendant must know exactly what decree and for what amount is being executed against him and while it is quite likely that he knew that the amins were in the village to execute this particular decree it is possible that as he was a man involved in circumstances he was not sure what particular decree it was that was sought to be executed. This question really becomes of no importance in the view that I have taken that this decree is not one on the merits.

    This is admittedly a decree for default and not a decree on the merits, Cf. Ceylon Civil Procedure Code, Sects. 703 and 705. Therefore it may be argued with reason that an affidavit is not a distinguishing mark of a regular hearing on the merits and that exactly the same materials are placed before the Court in a case of this kind as in the summary procedure. There is also the fact that there is no judgment but merely a decree in this matter which supports the view that it is not a decree on the merits. In this view I am of opinion that this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    While this judgment was under consideration, we have been referred to two reported Ceylon decisions. The first is Vol. 6 of Notes of Cases by Mr. K. Balasingam and is at page 17 of that volume. The learned Judges there held that at an ex parte hearing it was necessary for plaintiff to give such evidence of the material averments as would enable the Court to pass a decree. The Judges held there had been no hearing at all as all the plaintiff said was “I have actually sustained the damages claimed and nearly half the claim was for pain of mind and body. It was also doubtful if such damages could be recovered.” The other case is reported in 3 New Law Reports, (Ceylon), 34 and was a case of 1897. It holds that the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case and that the Judge is not bound to pass a decree till he is satisfied. He may grant an adjournment to enable plaintiff to repair the defects in his evidence and which may seem a strange proceeding to us here. The Judges refer to the old practice of allowing the defaulter defendant to appear and examine plaintiff in order to make the Court dissatisfied with the plaintiff's case. This is no longer allowed but the Court must still be satisfied that plaintiff has a case. This is reasonable. Suppose A sued B for the price of a coat and claimed Rs. 10,000 (Ten Thousand). The case is ex parte. It may well be that the Court would not be satisfied without proof of the truth of the plaintiff's claim, i.e, that the coat is worth so much. I am not satisfied that this would make it a decree on the merits. The Ceylon case cited seems peculiar as there seems to have been a judgment. We have none here and in my opinion this case has no bearing on the present.

    Wallace, J.—This appeal is against the decision of the lower Court dismissing as against the 2nd defendant the plaintiff's suit; the plaintiff appeals. The suit is based on a foreign judgment, namely the decree in O.S No. 47816 of 1917 on the file of the District Court, Colombo. It was a decree based on certain promissory notes and hundies. The plaintiff has sued upon this decree in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga to recover the sum of Rs. 15,000 now said to be due under it.

    The first and, to my mind, the most important contention is whether that foreign judgment satisfies the requirements of Sect. 13 (b) of the Civil Procedure Code; that is, is it a judgment given on the merits of the case? The Subordinate Judge has held that it was not and on full consideration I agree with him.

    The journal, which is the diary in the suit O.S No. 47816 of 1917 maintained in the District Court, Colombo, is exhibited and discloses the following facts. The present respondent was one of the several defendants there, he being No. 13. All the defendants to the suit were served and several appeared on the 12th August, 1918, the date fixed for trial, but this defendant did not. The District Court proceeded to try the case against those served, reserving the right to proceed against those absent—a procedure permitted by the Ceylon Civil Procedure Code. The trial against those present was held up till a connected case was disposed of in November 1919 and was finally dismissed on the 27th May, 1921, owing to the plaintiff having taken no steps. On the 7th July, 1921, the plaintiff appeared to ask for the case to be proceeded ex parte against those defendants who did not appear including the present respondent. After two adjournments, the case was taken up on the 19th September, 1921, and the entry in the Journal, (the meaning and the implications of which we have to consider) is:

    “Mr. C. T. Kondayya (that is, the plaintiff's proctor or Vakil) filed affidavit and moves that decree nisi be entered in terms of the prayer of the plaint against the 1st and 13th defendants.”

    and the Court entered decree nisi and on the 11th November, 1921, notice of the decree nisi having been affixed to the defendant's residence and no appearance made, a decree absolute was passed. It is on that decree absolute that the present suit is based.

    The question is whether the entry of the 19th September, 1921, imports that the case was heard and judgment given on the merits. The procedure followed is, it is conceded, that laid down for the trial of regular suits by Chap. 12 of the Ceylon Civil Procedure Code. Sect. 85 is the section particularly applicable. On the non-appearance of the defendant, the Court shall, if the plaintiff appears, “proceed to hear the case ex parte and pass a decree nisi,” Does the phrase “shall proceed to hear the case ex parte” necessarily mean that the case was decided on the merits? I am unable to hold so. Hearing a case is merely attending to a case, taking it up for further proceedings. Dates are fixed for the “hearing of an action” after the pleadings have been put in: See Sects. 84 and 85. “Hearing” appears to me nothing more than taking the case up for trial. Even a decree nisi Cannot be passed until the case is taken up for hearing and heard. That it does not necessarily imply the taking of evidence is indicated by the mandatory character of the section—“the Court shall pass a decree nisi.” That the passing of a decree for default is mandatory is clear from Sect. 90, which enacts that if all the defendants in a case do not fail to appear but some do appear, then the decree for default is not immediately obligatory on the Court. The present case is obviously governed by Sect. 90. The decree for default against those defendants who had not appeared was postponed until the trial of the case against those defendants, who had appeared, was closed. The reasonable interpretation of Sect. 85 is that the passing of a decree nisi is not a decision on the merits of the case but is a penalty for default of appearance.

    It is argued that the fact that the plaintiff's proctor is said to have filed an affidavit, which is said to be the affidavit printed on page 3 of the documents before us and appears to be a reduplication of the plaint, implies that the Court called for evidence and accepted the affidavit as evidence on which to base its decree. We are asked to infer from the fact that the affidavit was present that the Court called for it and used it as evidence, but the provisions of the Ceylon Code lend no support to this proposition. The general section relating to proof by affidavit is Sect. 179, which says that the Court may, for sufficient reasons, order that any particular fact be proved by affidavit. Sect. 437 clearly implies that, except in an action of summary procedure, affidavits which are to be evidence in a case must be called for by the Court on specific order. We are not shown anything here to indicate that the Court did so order evidence to be given by affidavit. There is nothing to show that the Court called for this affidavit or used it as evidence. There is in fact, and it is a strong point against the plaintiff, no judgment or statement of reasons for the decree, nothing to show that the Court directed any attention to the merits of the case. When the Court has taken evidence and decides on evidence it must write a judgment: See Sects. 184 and 187.

    There are other indications that a decree nisi passed under Sect. 85 and a decree absolute which follows under Sect. 86 are not decrees passed on the merits. For example, Sects. 86 and 87 speak of each of these decrees as decrees for default. Presumably this is of deliberate purpose. No appeal against either is allowed (see Sect. 87) and if the decision was on the merits, one would naturally expect an appeal to be allowed. Again Sect. 87 provides for these decrees being set aside by motion, but what the Court has then to consider is not the merits of the controversy in the suit but the merits and demerits of the defendant's failure to appear. So in the present case, the decree nisi was evidently passed not on the affidavit but on the defendant's failure to appear. It is clear that the procedure in Chapter 12 does not anywhere contemplate a decision upon the merits of the matters in issue in the suit. The form of the decree nisi No. 22 affords no hint that the merits of the matters in issue in the suit have been considered. It is a decree purely because of the default of appearance.

    The plaintiff has based an argument on the wording of the summons issued to the defendant in a regular suit procedure as contrasted with that issued in an action of summary procedure on a liquid claim. These are forms Nos. 16 and 19 respectively, found at the end of the Ceylon Civil Procedure Code. Form No. 16 says that in default of appearance “the action will be proceeded with and heard and determined in your absence.” Form No. 19 says that in default of appearance, plaintiff will be entitled to obtain a decree. But these forms must be read in conformity with the Code itself and there is no reason why we should read more into the words “hear and determine” than give the case a hearing and bring it to an end.

    I am satisfied for the above reasons that there was in the District Court, Colombo, no decision on the merits. The point is not without authority in this Court. A very similar case is reported in Arunachalam Chettiar v. Muhammad Salihu Marakkayar, where Kumaraswami Sastri and Curgenven, JJ., held that the decision was not on the merits, following the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Mahomed Kassim & Co. v. Seeni Pakir Bin Ahmed(2), and the Privy Council ruling in Keymer v. Visvanatham Reddi(3).

    As the suit fails on this point, it is unnecessary to go into the other points raised by the plaintiff, namely whether he is entitled to plead here that the lower Court was in error in setting aside the ex parte decree which he had obtained against the respondent and whether the respondent's application to set aside that ex parte decree was out of time.

    I may just briefly note here that an application was made to us by the appellant to examine, for the purpose of elucidating the procedure in the District Court of Colombo, a learned barrister of this Court who has practised there, but I really do not see how an examination of this gentleman would assist us to decide the present case. Even if he were able to say that in certain cases the District Court did adopt a procedure which involves a decision on the merits, it is incredible that he will be able to say that it was the inveterate habit of that Court to decide all such cases on the merits and that there could not be any exception to that practice, that in fact the District Court of Colombo and every District Judge in it invariably, as a matter of uniform rule, recorded decisions on the merits in all cases under Sect 85. If the appellant had wished to produce before us information which would enable us to decide in a clearer fashion what the exact procedure in the District Court of Colombo was and what the meaning of the particular sections of the Civil Procedure Code cited before us is as laid down by the Supreme Court of Ceylon, it would not have been difficult for him to produce Before us reported rulings of the Supreme Court on the points at issue in the case but no attempt has been made to do this, when the case was argued at the Bar.

    Since that argument, appellant, has by letter called our attention to two reported cases of the Supreme Court of Colombo. It is not necessary for us to post the case for further argument on these, as they do not seem to me to a rise from his point. From the case reported in Balasingham's Notes of Cases Vol. V, page 17, it appears that there must be an ex parte hearing of plaintiff's case before a decree nisi can be passed. It was held that there had been no such hearing and the decree nisi was therefore vacated. From the case reported in 3 New Law Reports 34, it appears that though a defendant appears at the ex parte hearing, he cannot plead because he is in default, In both cases, it is clear that the hearing is not a trial on the merits of the matters in controversy. As stated clearly in the latter case the defendant's objections to plaintiff's case “could not be tried until pleaded by the defendant who was wilfully in default.” The decision therefore remains a decision for default of appearance, and not on the merits, and it is clear, as I have pointed out from Sect. 87 that defendant may, at any later stage, for good reasons shown, have the decree for default set aside and the case tried on the merits. In other words, the decree nisi and the decree absolute under Sects. 85 and 86 are not decisions on the merits. I would therefore decline to interfere and dismiss the appeal with costs.

    N. R. R. Appeal dismissed.

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    P.L.S. Firm v. M.R.M.S. Sulaiman
    (Mar 26, 1929)