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  • provisions of S. 79 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act
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  • provisions of S. 79 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application for a writ calling for the records in M.A. No. 4 of 1935 and the connected proceedings in M.A. No. 9 of 1935 before the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, and to quash the order passed by the Board in M.A. No. 9 of 1935 (order dated 15th May, 1935). The operative part of the Board's order declared that certain petitioners (Appalwar Pakshiraja Iyengar and others) were entitled to the 9th theertham and 9th place in the distribution of honours at Sri Athinathar Alwar temple (Alwarthirunagiri), directed the trustee to observe that order in supersession of the Board's Order No. 277 dated 12th May, 1927, and stated that the order would not affect the Board's Order No. 277 regarding distribution of special honour during the Vaikasi festival.

Procedural history: an original order of the Board dated 12th May, 1927 was the subject of an application to review; a Full Board of three Commissioners dismissed that application; an application was then made to review the dismissal by the Full Board, and the present order of 15th May, 1935 arises from that subsequent review. The present petition in this Court seeks to quash the Board's 15th May, 1935 order (and its annexure).

Relevant factual detail: Sri Emberumanar Jeer (the petitioner in this Court) had filed a memorandum before the Board expressly stating he had "no objection whatever" to the applicants being given the 9th place and theertham. The principal objection in this Court related not to the consented-to placement of those petitioners but to the annexure to the Board's 15th May, 1935 order — especially paragraph 9 of the annexure which directed that the distribution of theertham and honours should follow the order in the case reported as Sadagopachariar v. Srinivasachariar and, in general terms, purported to supersede the directions in the 1927 order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a writ of certiorari will lie to quash the Board's order (including its annexure) purporting to determine the order of distribution of theertham and temple honours.
  2. Whether the action of two Commissioners in reviewing and modifying an order earlier passed by three Commissioners (the Full Board)—and the procedure followed by those two Commissioners in granting the review without what is alleged to be a full hearing—was beyond jurisdiction (i.e., whether that procedure vitiates the Board's order).
  3. Whether the annexure to the Board's order (particularly paragraph 9 referencing Sadagopachariar v. Srinivasachariar) is to be treated as part of the Board's order and binding on the trustee (the court noted that the extent to which the annexure prevails when it goes beyond the formal order had not been fully argued).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Emberumanar Jeer / petition in this Court) Arguments

  • The petition attacks the annexure (especially paragraph 9) to the Board's 15th May, 1935 order and contends that the annexure goes beyond what was agreed to and that two Commissioners had no right to review an order passed by three Commissioners.
  • It was argued that the procedure adopted by the Board (two Commissioners granting the review and passing orders without giving the parties a full hearing on the disputed points) was without jurisdiction.
  • Implicitly, the petition asks the Court to entertain certiorari to quash the Board's order (including the annexure) as being beyond the Board's powers or jurisdiction in that procedure.

Respondents' / Board's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondents (or those opposing the writ) relied on the proposition that the Board's act was administrative in nature and therefore not amenable to a writ of certiorari; in other words, that no certiorari would lie in the present case.
  • Conversely, that contention was met by the opposing contention that the Board's order was a judicial act determining questions affecting rights and so fell within the rule (from Rex v. Electricity Commissioners and Rex v. London County Council) permitting judicial review where a body with duty to act judicially acts in excess of legal authority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rex v. Electricity Commissioners Articulated the rule (quoted via Halsbury) that where a body having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights and a duty to act judicially acts in excess of its authority, it is subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench (i.e., judicial review by certiorari). The court considered whether the Board's decision fell within that rule (i.e., whether it determined legal rights and thereby was a judicial act). The court concluded the Board's order did not determine legal rights and so the Rex rule did not make certiorari available in this case.
Rex v. London County Council Adopted and followed the same rule as in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (principle on judicial bodies acting beyond authority and subject to certiorari). The court treated this case as confirming the rule and again asked whether the Board's order involved determination of legal rights; finding it did not, the court held certiorari was not available under that principle.
Sadagopachariar v. Srinivasachariar Referred to as a prior decision establishing an order for distribution of theertham and honours; paragraph 9 of the annexure to the Board's order directed the trustee to follow the order laid down in this case. The court noted that the Board's annexure relied on that decision to prescribe a general direction for distribution. The court observed that such a general direction (as in paragraph 9) went beyond what had been consented to by Emberumanar Jeer, but the court did not decide the full legal effect of the annexure vis-à-vis the formal order.
Striman Sadagopa v. Kristna Tatachariyar Used for the proposition (via Scotland C.J.'s observations) that duties to perform certain religious observances according to ritual or conventional practice are, absent express legal recognition, imperfect moral obligations and not civil rights cognizable by civil courts. The court relied on these observations to reinforce the conclusion that claims to mere honours or precedence in religious observances (such as theertham and honours) are not legal rights enforceable in civil courts, and therefore the Board's decision about distribution was not a judgment affecting enforceable legal rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first addressing a preliminary question: whether a writ of certiorari would lie to quash the Board's order. The analysis followed these steps:

  1. The court accepted as settled the general rule that certiorari does not lie in respect of purely administrative acts, and that certiorari will lie where a body with legal authority to determine questions affecting rights and with a duty to act judicially acts in excess of its authority (the rule stated in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners and applied in Rex v. London County Council).
  2. The decisive inquiry, therefore, was whether the Board's order (including the annexure, assuming it to be part of the order for present purposes) determined "questions affecting the rights of subjects" and hence constituted a "judicial act" within that rule.
  3. The court examined the subject-matter of the Board's decision: the order of distribution of theertham and related temple honours. It held that these honours and the order of precedence are not legal rights enforceable in civil courts but are matters of internal management of the temple and of ritual/ceremonial practice.
  4. The court relied on the authority of Striman Sadagopa v. Kristna Tatachariyar (Scotland C.J.'s observations) to support the proposition that duties to perform religious observances according to ritual are imperfect moral obligations, not civil obligations cognizable by civil courts. Thus, claims to mere honours or precedence are not civil rights.
  5. The court addressed S.79 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (quoted in the opinion) and interpreted it as a saving clause that preserves existing usages, rights, honours, emoluments and perquisites but does not convert non-legal claims into enforceable legal rights. In short, S.79 neither creates nor extinguishes such rights; it does not make a non-legal honour into a legal right.
  6. The court concluded that because the Board's decision dealt only with internal management (the order of distribution of theertham and honours) and did not declare or deprive any person of a legal right, the decision was not the kind of judicial determination of rights that would attract certiorari. The mere use of judicial forms or procedures by the Board did not change the essential administrative character of the subject-matter.
  7. Having sustained the preliminary objection (that certiorari would not lie), the court found it unnecessary to decide the separate question whether two Commissioners could review an order passed by three Commissioners or whether the procedure adopted was otherwise illegal. The court also noted that parts of the order had been consented to by Emberumanar Jeer and that to the extent the order fixed the petitioners' place by consent it was not open to the petitioner to have that quashed.

The court did assume, for argument's sake, that the annexure formed part of the order but expressly stated that it should not be taken as an opinion that the annexure is in fact part and parcel of the formal order. The question of the legal effect of the annexure when it goes beyond the formal order had not been fully argued and was not decided.

Holding and Implications

PETITION DISMISSED

Direct effects on the parties:

  • The petition was dismissed on the ground that a writ of certiorari will not lie in respect of the Board's order concerning the distribution of theertham and honours, the subject-matter being non-justiciable as rights enforceable in civil courts.
  • Costs were awarded to the Board (1st respondent) and to respondents 3 and 7 (these two respondents share one set of costs). The advocate's fee was fixed at Rs. 100.

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down any new principle extending judicial review; it applies established distinctions between administrative/internal management decisions (not subject to certiorari) and judicial determinations of legal rights (subject to certiorari). The court expressly did not adjudicate the separate procedural objection about the competence of two Commissioners to review an order of three Commissioners, nor did it finally decide the legal status of the annexure when it goes beyond the formal order.

N.R.R — Petition dismissed.

    Sri Emberumanar Jeer Swamigal Petitioner v. The Board Of Commissioners For Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras And Others S

    This is an application for the issue of a writ calling for the records in M.A No. 4 of 1935 and the connected proceedings in M.A No. 9 of 1935 with the orders passed thereon by the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, and to quash the order passed by the Board in M.A No. 9 of 1935. The order in question runs as follows:

    “The petitioners (Appalwar Pakshiraja Iyengar and others) are entitled to 9th theertham and 9th place in the distribution of honours as claimed by them in Sri Athinathar Alwar temple, Alwarthirunagiri, Tiruchendur taluk, Tinnevelly District.

    2. The trustee of Sri Athinathar Alwar temple, Alwarthirunagiri, Tiruchendur taluk Tinnevelly District is hereby directed to observe the order of distribution of theertham as stated above in supersession of the directions given in the Board's Order No. 277 dated 12th May, 1927.

    3. This order shall not in any way affect the Board's Order No. 277 dated 12th May, 1927 regarding distribution of special honour during Vaikasi festival.”

    This order was passed on review of the previous order which itself was passed on an application for reviewing the order of the Board dated 12th May 1927. On that application for reviewing the order of 1927 three Commissioners constituting what is called a Full Board passed on order dismissing it and declining to review the order passed in 1927. Thereupon an application was made for a review of the order dismissing that application and it was on such an application for review that the present order dated 15th May, 1935, was passed and it is this order that is sought to be quashed in these proceedings. It would appear that Sri Emberumanar Jeer, the petitioner in this Court, had no objection to the 9th theertham and 9th place being given to the petitioner before the Board. The memorandum filed by him before the Board was as follows:

    “Without prejudice to any of the contentions of Sri Emberumanar Jeer either before this Board or elsewhere this respondent has no objection whatever to the applicants or petitioners herein being given the 9th place and theertham claimed by them and to their names being included in the list attached as an annexure to the Board's Order dated 12th May, 1927 in C.A No. 206 of 1927.”

    The order of the Board dated 12th May 1935, purports to do nothing more as would be seen from the order which has been extracted in full above. Even in this Court the petitioner's advocate did not object to the petitioners before the Board being given the 9th theertham and the 9th place. Apparently the objection of the petitioner is to the annexure to the order in question which purports to give the reasons for the order itself, and in particular to paragraph 9 of that annexure in which the Board held that the order for distribution of theertham and honours should be the one that was laid down in the case reported in Sadagopachariar v. Srinivasachariar(1). The Board in that paragraph directed the trustee to follow that order in supersession of the directions given in the order of 1927. This general direction regarding distribution of theertham and other honours certainly went beyond what had been agreed to by the Emberumanar Jeer (5th respondent before the Board). But as will be seen from the order itself nothing was said therein about the distribution of theertham and honours to other persons, that is to say, persons other than the petitioners before the Board whose place was fixed by consent. So far, therefore, as the order goes it was by consent and it is hardly open to the petitioner herein to move this Court to quash an order which was passed with his consent. This consideration, however, does not apply to what is contained in the annexure and to what goes beyond what was agreed to. To what extent the annexure prevails when it goes beyond the formal order itself is not a question that has been argued before me though the argument was carried on for a very long time. It has been assumed that the annexure is part of the order and must be deemed to contain directions to the trustee. I shall therefore proceed on the same assumption though it should not be taken that in my opinion the annexure is part and parcel of the order itself. The objection taken to the order or rather to the annexure is that two Commissioners had no right to review the previous order passed by three Commissioners even assuming that there was power of review and that the procedure followed by the Board of two Commissioners in granting the review and passing orders thereon without giving the parties a full hearing on the points in dispute must be deemed to have been passed without jurisdiction. It would be necessary to consider these objections to the order only if it is found that a writ of certiorari will lie in a case of this kind. It has been very strongly contended that no such writ would lie in the present case and this preliminary objection to the application must be decided before the merits can be gone into.

    In the first place, it is well settled, and there is really no dispute about it, that a writ of certiorari does not lie in respect of administrative acts. What is contended is that the present order is not an administrative act but a judicial act and that it falls within the rule laid down by Atkin, L.J, in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, which has been adopted and followed in Rex v. London County Council(2). That rule runs more or less as follows (I am quoting from Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 9 p. 855):

    “Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench division exercised in the writ.”

    The real question for decision in this case is whether the order of the Board including therein the annexure to it determines questions affecting the rights of subjects, and whether such determination was a judicial act. What was determined by the Board was the order of distribution of theertham and honours connected with theertham. This matter cannot in my opinion be regarded as a determination of any rights of subjects. The rights of subjects referred to in the rule are rights which can be legally enforced and not mere honours or precedence claimed or recognised as a matter of courtesy or usage. It is not seriously disputed that the right to obtain the theertham or honours in a particular order of precedence is not a civil right which can be enforced or declared in a civil Court. The following observations in Striman Sadagopa v. Kristna Tatachariyar(3) appear to me to bear on this question. That was also a case in which certain honours were claimed by the Matathipathi of a certain Mutt as against the trustees or wardens of a certain temple at Conjeevaram. Scotland C.J observed as follows:—

    “The duty of individuals to submit to and perform certain religious observances in accordance with the ritual or conventional practice of their race or sect is, in the absence of express legal recognition and provision, an imperfect obligation of a moral and not a civil nature. Of such obligations the present civil Courts cannot take cognizance.”

    Indeed the rule that civil Courts cannot take cognizance of claims to mere honours or privileges of the nature referred to above has been unquestioned for many years and every attempt to evade that rule has met with failure. There can be no doubt therefore that the Board dealt with a subject-matter which was not within the cognizance of the civil Courts. I do not think the mere fact that the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments pronounced a decision about these honours or privileges has changed their essential nature. The distribution of theertham and other honours in temples is a matter of internal management which is left to the trustee or manager subject to such supervision as may be vested by law either in the temple committee or the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments. It is not pretended that any particular person like the petitioner could enforce a claim to get theertham or other honours in a particular order of precedence by filing a suit against the trustee or any one else. It is a matter of administration of the temple including therein the proper performance of ceremonies in the temple. Such a claim is not based on any legal right. The provisions of S. 79 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act do not in my opinion change the position. That section merely provides that nothing in the Act shall affect any established usage of a Mutt or temple or the rights, honours, emoluments and perquisites to which any person may by custom or otherwise be entitled in such Mutt or temple. The section does not enlarge such rights, honours, emoluments or perquisites, nor does it take away any of such which existed before the Act became law. In other words, what was not a right has not become a right by reason of S. 79. S. 79 is merely a saving clause which does not add to or take away existing rights or remedies. It seems to me therefore what was decided by the Board relates not to any rights of subjects but deals only with the question of order of precedence in the distribution of theertham and other honours, a subject which cannot be agitated in the ordinary civil Courts and regarding which no one can be said to possess any legal right in the sense of a right which can be enforced with the assistance of the State. It may be that in coming to their decision the Commissioners observed certain judicial forms. The subject-matter of their decision is however not altered by the procedure observed. There is nothing incongruous in an administrative act being preceded by a judicial mode of enquiry. Instances are not wanting of even acts of Courts properly so called after hearing the parties or taking evidence being deemed to be administrative acts. It is enough to give as an instance the determination of the terms of a proclamation of sale by the executing Court which has been held to be not a judicial act but as an administrative or ministerial one. What matters is not the form or procedure followed but the subject-matter of the decision. If that subject-matter includes the rights of parties and if the decision is one which is intended by law to be arrived at in a judicial manner, i.e, after hearing evidence and the parties, a writ of certiorari will certainly lie. But the mere fact that parties were heard or evidence was taken would not convert what is not a decision about rights of subjects into such a decision. The order of the Board is in my opinion nothing more than a direction to the trustee to distribute the theertham and other honours in a particular order of precedence. That is not a direction which determines the legal rights of any one. It cannot be said that such a decision has declared any one's legal right or deprived any one of any legal right which he had. It is merely an order dealing with the internal management of the temple and does not decide the legal rights of any subject. In this view of the case it is clear that a writ of certiorari will not lie for it is conceded that it would not lie in the case of an administrative act and it has not been contended that the Board had no jurisdiction to control the discretion of the trustee in the matter of distribution of theertham and other honours. The preliminary objection is a sound one, and the application must fail on that ground and it is not necessary to go into the question whether the procedure adopted by the Board in reviewing its previous order was wrong or whether two Commissioners were entitled to review or modify an order passed by three of them.

    The petition is dismissed with costs of the Board (1st respondent) and also costs of respondents 3 and 7, these two respondents having only one set of costs. Advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 100.

    N.R.RPetition dismissed.

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    Sri Emberumanar Jeer... v. The Board Of Commiss...
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