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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order XIV; Rule 2 and Order XV, Rule 3 (1). Order XIV, Rule 2
  • Section 10 of the Code of Civil Precedence. Mr. T. Rule
  • Section (sic)15 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rule 303 : Sar. P. C. J. 819 (P. C.).
  • 1. C. Rule Ps. Non. 859
  • Order XV, Rule. 3 (i),
  • C. Rule P.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order XIV; Rule 2 and Order XV, Rule 3 (1). Order XIV, Rule 2
  • Section 10 of the Code of Civil Precedence. Mr. T. Rule
  • Section (sic)15 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Rule 303 : Sar. P. C. J. 819 (P. C.).
  • 1. C. Rule Ps. Non. 859
  • Order XV, Rule. 3 (i),
  • C. Rule P.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two civil revision petitions challenge interlocutory orders of the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram dated 12th November 1921 and 29th November 1921 concerning the framing and trial of preliminary issues in Original Suit No. 56 of 1920 and related proceedings. The substantive dispute in Original Suit No. 56 of 1920 is a claim by a son (plaintiff) against his father (defendant) for recovery of land which the father held under a "deed of indenture" dated 11th May 1905. That indenture arose out of contentions regarding adoption and alleged reversionary rights of a third person, Tirunarayana Pillai. A related Suit No. 8 of 1917, instituted in 1906 by the father against Tirunarayana, seeks among other reliefs to set aside the indenture on the ground of fraud. The Subordinate Judge directed that Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 9 (preliminary issues dealing with estoppel, possession and prescription) be tried first and posted the suit for preliminary argument; these interlocutory directions are the subject of the present revisions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction/power to order the trial of certain issues as preliminary issues under Order XIV, Rule 2 and Order XV, Rule 3(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the High Court should interfere by revision with the Subordinate Judge's interlocutory order — i.e., the standard for interference (perversity, want of jurisdiction, or likelihood of causing irreparable injury).
  3. Whether the selection of Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 9 as preliminary issues would cause irreparable injury or prejudice to the defendant so as to justify revision.
  4. Whether Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (bar of previously instituted suit between the same parties or under the same title) prevents the trial of this suit until Suit No. 8 of 1917 is determined.
  5. Whether an amendment of plaint (adding an issue of prescriptive title) was rightly allowed under Order VI, Rule 17 (raised in C. Rule P. No. 489 of 1921).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff argued that Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 9 were preliminary and ought to be tried first; the plaintiff's Vakil stated he could substantiate his case on those issues from the pleadings without further evidence.
  • In respect of the amendment (second petition), the plaintiff sought to add a prescriptive-title plea based on possession by a defendant benami for the plaintiff; the plaintiff's counsel contended Issue No. 3 is involved in Issue No. 9 so that if plaintiff fails on No. 3, No. 9 will fall.

Defendant's Arguments

  • Mr. Ramachandra Iyer, for the defendant, complained that Issues Nos. 1 and 5 (which he regarded as equally preliminary) were omitted from the list of preliminary issues and that the selection of Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 9 would seriously prejudice the defendant.
  • The defendant contended that the order was irregular because it was made on a suggestion by Mr. Venkatarama Sastri without hearing the defendant's Vakil; he further argued that determination of Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 9 would cause irreparable injury (including multiple appeals and expense) and that Issue No. 1 (involving alleged invalidity of adoption and the indenture) should have been included as preliminary.
  • The defendant relied on Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to contend that the present suit should be stayed until Suit No. 8 of 1917 (between the defendant and Tirunarayana Pillai) was determined, because certain issues overlap.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Yatindre Nath v. Bari Charan (26 Ind. Cas. 954 : 20 C. L. J. 426) Held that an application to try certain issues first made long after the date for first hearing fell outside Order XV, Rule 3. The court considered this authority but declined to accept a strict limitation to first hearings only; the judge observed no reason to confine the application of trying issues first to the original first hearing date where there had been no actual first hearing.
Kuarmani singha v. Wasif Ali (28 Ind. Cas. 818 : 19 C. W. N. 1193) Laid down that Order XIV, Rule 2 may be applied even when settlement of issues of fact have not been postponed. Cited in support of the proposition that Order XIV, Rule 2 can have application beyond the strict context suggested by Yatindre Nath; the court treated it as authority for a wider application of preliminary issues procedure.
Muitnsami Iyear in Nieam of Hyderabad (9 M. 256 : 3 Ind. Dec. (n. s.) 575) Expressed an older view against interference with interlocutory orders. Used to show divergent opinions in authorities; court noted older views against interference but did not treat them as absolute bar to revision.
Ohinnu v. Sambanda Moorthi (23 Ind. Cas. 522 : 15 M. L. T. 839) Recognized exception for wanton abuse of the court's powers as ground for interference with interlocutory orders. Cited as part of authorities indicating High Court may interfere in exceptional cases such as wanton abuse of power.
Sitaramaya v. Ramappaya (39 Ind. Cas. 106 : 5 L. W. 207) Held the Court can interfere if manifest injustice would otherwise be done; interference is permissible where question is one of jurisdiction. Cited to support the proposition that interference in interlocutory orders is possible when jurisdictional error or manifest injustice exists.
V nkat-ch -lam pattar v. parasu Pattar (1914) M. W. N. 614 : 16 M., L. T. 156 Held that there might be interference for perversity (conscious deviation from rules of law or procedure). Referred to as authority that perversity can justify revision of interlocutory orders; used in the court's consideration of whether the impugned order was perverse.
Latish India Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for Ind. (8 Ind. Cas. 107 : 12 C. h. J. 505 ...) (Cited among cases dealing with High Court's jurisdiction to correct interlocutory orders). Included in a series of cases summarized by the court as evidence that High Court can set matters right where interlocutory orders are without jurisdiction or cause irreparable injury.
Amjad Ali v. Ali Hussain (6 Ind. Cas. 574 ...) (One of series of cases where Mookerjee, J. participated addressing revision/interference with interlocutory orders). Summarized alongside other cases as supporting High Court's competence to correct interlocutory orders under specified circumstances.
Khirode Chandra Ghoshal v. Saroda (7 Ind. Cas. 436) (Included in series affirming the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with interlocutory orders when necessary in interests of justice). Used as part of the court's survey of authorities permitting interference in exceptional matters.
Charu Chandra Dutt v. sarat Chandra singh (8 Ind. Cas. 87) (Included in series on High Court intervention in interlocutory orders). Summarized similarly as supportive of High Court's jurisdiction in appropriate cases.
Vuppuluri Atchayya v. Sri Seetharamachandra (18 Ind. Cas. 555 : 39 M. 195 ...) Held High Court could interfere under Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure where an Appellate Court had erroneously exercised jurisdiction regarding the Munsif's jurisdiction. Court noted this authority but doubted its applicability to the present facts; it was discussed to illustrate circumstances in which revision was permitted.
Buddhoo Lal v. Mewa Ram (63 Ind. Cas. 15) Majority held that where one of several issues had been decided and there was a remedy by appeal, no revision lay as there was no case within Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Cited to highlight limits on revision when an appellate remedy exists; the court used this to consider whether separate remedy by appeal precluded revision.
Kumar Chandra Kishore Roy v. Basat Ali (Calcutta High Court decision cited for proposition that Court cannot by Charter Act powers interfere where no appeal or revision under Section 115 lies to High Court). Referenced as authority limiting the exercise of revisionary powers where statutory appeal/revision channels are absent.
Ventala Verrarazu v. Kuruvella Subbarayudu (64 Ind. Cas. 493 : 41 M. L. J. 378) Expressed the opinion that the High Court will not interfere in revision where the party has a separate remedy. Cited by the court in support of the position that existence of alternate remedies (e.g., appeal) weighs against interference by revision except in exceptional cases.
Ramakrishna Pillai v. Bulakrishna Aiyar (62 Ind. Cas. 712 ...) Discussed in relation to propriety of counsel appearing in two related suits and overlapping questions of validity of the indenture. Used as an example of a prior decision dealing with related procedural questions; the court noted it did not decide the applicability of Section 10 in that case.
Wahid-un nissa Bibi v. Zamin Ali Shah (55 Ind. Cas. 89) Held that where the widow was claiming in both suits on the same title, the Court below did right in staying one of the suits (application of Section 10 principles). Referred to by the defendant in support of invoking Section 10; the court held the present materials did not permit a finding that Section 10 applied.
Sivaprasad Ram v. Trincomdas (27 Ind. Cas. 917) Explained that jurisdiction under Section 10 is limited to stopping a suit if the statutory circumstances exist; criticized proceeding without finding whether parties litigated under the same title. Relied upon to show the proper scope and limits of Section 10; the court found the materials before it did not establish the Section 10 bar.
Sultanate Jahan Begam v Sundar Lal (58 Ind. Cas 90) Held that an application under Section 10 is not a case for revision under Section 115. Noted by the court while considering the defendant's Section 10 argument and limits of revision jurisdiction.
Penumalri Vasantarayadu v. Reddi Suhbamma (22 Ind. Cas. 39) Held that the Court would not interfere with an order refusing amendment, as the plaintiff could attack the order on appeal if adversely affected. Cited in connection with the separate revision petition challenging amendment of the plaint; the court relied on this principle in declining to interfere by revision.
Vasudeva Padhi Khadanga Gatu v. Mayani Dev in Bakshi Mahapatrulu Guru (24 M. 387 ...) Remarked that prescriptive title need not be expressly pleaded as it is evidence of a party's title. Used by the court to note that prescriptive title may be treated as evidence rather than a distinct pleading requirement, supporting the court's view that allowing the amendment was within discretion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the statutory provisions governing preliminary issues: Order XIV, Rule 2 (power to try issues of law first when the court thinks certain issues of law can dispose of the case or part of it) and Order XV, Rule 3(1) (determination of issues of law at first hearing if no further argument or evidence is required).

The court reviewed a range of authorities showing divergent views on whether preliminary issues can be ordered for separate or prior trial after the original first hearing date. It treated the authorities collectively and concluded that:

  • Interference with interlocutory orders by a revisional court is not categorically excluded but must be exercised with extreme caution; the general rule is against such interference.
  • Intervention is justified where the interlocutory order is perverse, made without jurisdiction, or is likely to cause irreparable injury to a litigant.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court addressed the defendant's specific objections in turn:

  1. On the alleged failure to hear the defendant's Vakil: the court examined the affidavit and contemporaneous notes and concluded that the defendant's counsel did argue the point; therefore there was no illegality or irregularity in making the order on that ground.
  2. On alleged irreparable injury from trying Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 9 first: the court analyzed the content of those issues and the defendant's position (including that Issue No. 1 concerning invalidity of adoption could be dispositive). The court noted that the defendant would have a right of appeal from decisions adverse to him and that the possibility of inconvenience and expense from multiple appeals did not demonstrate irreparable injury. The court declined to assume the decision on the preliminary issues would be adverse to the defendant and found no basis to characterize the Subordinate Judge's order as perverse or causing irreparable loss.
  3. On Section 10: the court considered whether Suit No. 8 of 1917 (between defendant and Tirunarayana) and the present suit were suits between the same parties or parties under whom they claim under the same title. The court found the materials did not establish that Section 10 applied and relied on authorities explaining the limited scope of Section 10. Consequently, Section 10 did not bar trial of the present suit.
  4. On the amendment of the plaint (C. Rule P. No. 489 of 1921): the court observed that amendment lies within the discretion of the trial court under Order VI, Rule 17. The court cited authorities that an order refusing amendment is ordinarily attacked on appeal and that prescriptive title need not always be separately pleaded. Given the absence of any showing that the amendment changed the character of the suit or caused material injustice to the defendant, the court found no ground for revision.

Weighing the authorities and the facts, the court concluded that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to make the orders complained of, and that the defendant had not shown perversity, want of jurisdiction, or irreparable injury justifying the High Court's interference by revision.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The civil revision petitions challenging the interlocutory orders (selection/trial of preliminary issues) are dismissed with costs.
  • The separate civil revision petition against amendment of the plaint (C. Rule P. No. 489 of 1921) is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the Subordinate Judge's orders (ordering Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 9 as preliminary and allowing the plaint amendment) stand and the trial court may proceed accordingly.
  • The High Court reaffirmed the limited and exceptional nature of its power to interfere with interlocutory orders in revision — interference is appropriate only in cases of perversity, lack of jurisdiction, or likely irreparable injury. The court emphasized that inconvenience and expense, or the mere possibility of multiple appeals, do not establish irreparable injury sufficient for revision.
  • The court found no basis on the materials before it to apply Section 10 to stay the suit pending determination of Suit No. 8 of 1917; accordingly, the bar in Section 10 was not held to apply here.
  • The allowance of amendments to pleadings (Order VI, Rule 17) remains a discretionary matter for the trial court, and refusal or allowance of such amendments is ordinarily a matter for appeal rather than revision unless special circumstances exist.
  • No new broad precedent was set beyond the court's application of the established principles limiting interference with interlocutory orders; the decision affirms existing lines of authority as summarized in the reasons above.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion. Where the opinion did not supply detailed party labels or complete citations, the summary follows the language and references as they appear in the opinion.

    S. Ramakrishna Pillai v. Krishnaswami Pillai

    1. C. Rule Ps. Non. 859 and 850 of 1921.

    2. These civil revision petitions relate to two orders passed by the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram, dated, respectively, 12th November 1921 and 29th November 1921 whith run as follows:

    It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 9 being preliminary Issues should be tried first. The case was being posted along with Original Suit No. 8 of 1917 on the belief that the parties in this suit wilt agree to the evidence recorded in Original Snit No. 8 of 1917 being treated as evidence in this suit also. But the learned Vakil for the plaintiff in this snit urges that on the pleadings without any farther evidence being let in he is prepared to substantiate his case as against the defendant on Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 9 and I cannot say that he had no right so to contend.

    The suit is posted for argument on Issues Nor. 3, 4 and 9 to 1st December.

    Note:---The plaintiffs Vakil states that he does not give up thereby the other issues and 2, "This is opposed by plaintiff. The suit is posted for preliminary argument to 1st December after consideration. I see no reason to reconsider my order already passed. Rejected.

    3. The suit in which they were parsed is Original Suit No. 56 of 1920 and is brought by the plaintiff, a son, against his father, far the recovery of certain land which had come to the latter under a se-called "deed of indenture" dated 11th May 1905. This deed was made between one Tirnnarayana Pillai and the present petitioner and recites that Tirnnarayana had become entitled to certain properties as reversionary heir of one Venkatakrishna Pillai on the death of the latter's mother in 1905 : that plaintiff (here in) contended that the mother of Venkatakrishna Pillai had adopted him, which adoption was admittedly not valid as no authority had been given by the sapindas. The father took possession of the properties given by the indenture on behalf of his son. In 1906 the father discovered that Tirunarayana was not an heir of the deceased Venkatakrishna Pillai at all and he thereupon in stinted a Suit No. 8 of 1917 for, inter alia, setting aside the deed of indenture as having been executed by him owing to the fraud of Tirunarayana This suit has been partly heard but according to the note of the Subordinate Judge it has been adjourned from time to time along with the present suit and on 4th October 1921 an order was passed adjourning Original Suit No. 5 of 920 to 1st November 192 for arguments and orders whether this is to go with Original suit No. 8 of 1917 or to bewared separately. Toe order was passed on 12th November 1921 and is one of those now sought to be revised There has been a very full argument before me on both sides and the complaint of the defendant (father) in the shit is that not only was the order irregularly made but the action of the Subordinate Judge in directing Issues Non. 3, 4 and 9 to be tried as preliminary issues will seriously prejudice im. the issues in question are as follows:

    3. Whether the defendant is entitled to rely upon any such possession even after the deed of indenture dated. (sic)h May 1(sic)05 and whether the defendant is not estopped from setting up such possession in his own right as against the plaintiff?

    4. Whether the defendant is estopped from setting up a title to the properties in himself by reason of the indenture?

    9. Whether the plaintiff has a squired a title by prescription by the properties having been held by his guardian on his behalf for over 12 years?"

    4. Mr. Ramachandra Iyer for defendant complains that Issues Nos. 1 and 5 have been omitted, these being in character quite as preliminary as there selected by the Subordinate Judge.

    5. The power to order trial on preliminary issues is contained in Order XIV; Rule 2 and Order XV, Rule 3 (1). Order XIV, Rule 2 clearly applies when on settlement of issues the Court thinks there are issues of law upon which the case or some part thereof may be disposed of, then those issues are to be tried first and settlement of issues of fact may be postponed.

    6. 0. XV, Rule 3 (1) applies after issues bave been framed and allows the Court to determine issues of law, if satisfied that no further argument or evidence than the parties can at once adduce is required upon such of the issues as may be sufficient for the decision of the suit. If, however, the finding on those is not sufficient for decision, the Court shall postpone further hearing of the suit, Mr. T. Rule Ramachandra Iyer argues that the former rule is prior to issues, the latter applies to the first hearing only and when that day is passed, the Court has no power to select issues of law for determination as preliminary issues. Reliance is placed on a judgment of Mr. Justice Mookerjee in Yatindre Nath v. Bari Charan 26 Ind. Cas. 954 : 20 C. L. J. 426., which held that an application to try certain issues first whith was made long after the date for first hearing took it out of the application of Order XV, Rule 3. As against this there was the ruling in Kuarmani singha v. Wasif Ali 28 Ind. Cas. 818 : 19 C. W. N. 1193. which lays down that 0. XIV, Rule 2 may be applied also when the settlement of issues of fast have not been postponed. I may add that, in my opinion, there is no reason that I can see to confine the application to try certain issues as questions of law to the date of first hearing, and especially to insist on that rule in the case of adjourned hearings, for it is common ground that only issues have been settled in this suit and the orders now sought to be revised made and there has been no actual first hearing to far. The question really is, 26 Ind. Cas. 954 : 20 C. L. J. 426., Can I interfere 55 Ind. Cas. 89 : 42 A. 2(sic) 18 A. L. J. 145. If I can, ought I to do so under the circumstaaces of the present case? An to 26 Ind. Cas. 954 : 20 C. L. J. 426., the older view here is expressed by Muitnsami Iyear, J. in Nieam of Hyderabad, In 9 M. 256 : 3 Ind. Dec. (n. s.)575. and was against interference with interlocutory orders. Sea also Ohinnu v. Sambanda Moorthi 23 Ind. Cas. 522 : 15 M. L. T. 839. which, however, excepted a wanton abuse of the powers of the Court. In Y tandra Nath v. Hari Charan ((sic)) it was said that Court could interfere in very exceptional cases. In Sitaramaya v. Ramappaya 39 Ind. Cas. 106 : 5 L. W. 207. it was held that the Court can interfere if manifest injustice would otherwise he done; the question being one of jurisdiction, and the fact that there is a final appeal would not prevent interference. Here, as pointed out by Mr. Venkatarama Sastri, the question was the addition of a party and the matter was actually one of jurisdiction. In V nkat-ch -lam pattar v. parasu Pattar 26 Ind. Cas. (sic) (1914) M. W. N. 614 : 16 M., L. T. 156. it was held that there might be interference for perversity, i e., conscious deviation from rules of law or procedure. Latish India Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for Ind. a 8 Ind. Cas. 107 : 12 C. h. J. 505 : 15 C. W. N. 87 : 38 C. 230. Amjad Ali v. Ali Hussain 6 Ind. Cas. 574 : 12 C. h. J. 519 : 15 C. W. N. 353. Khirode Chandra Ghoshal v. Saroda (sic) 7 Ind. Cas. 436 : 12 C. L. J. 525. Charu Chandra Dutt v. sarat Chandra singh 8 Ind. Cas. 87 : 12 C. L. J. 537., are a series of cases to all of which Mookerjee, J., was a party. The first of these cases lays down that the High Court is competent to set matters right when an interlocutory order has been made without jurisdiction or under such circumstances as are likely to cause irreparable injury to one of the litigants. In the second case the same test of irreparable injury in applied. In the third and fourth cases the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the interlocutory order is affirmed, if such interference is necessary in the interests of justice. In Vuppuluri Atchayya v. Sri Seetharamachandra 18 Ind. Cas. 555 : 39 M. 195 : 13 M. L. T. 60 : 24 M. L. J. 112 the Munsif had returned a plaint on the ground that a Civil Court had no jurisdiction. On appeal the Subordinate Judge restored the suit to the Munsif's file. Held in revision by the majority, that the High Court could interfere under Section (sic)15 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the Appellate Court had erroneously decided in the exercise of its jurisdiction as an Appellate Court that Munsif had or had not jurisdiction. I doubt if this has any application to the facts of the present case. Wall is, C. J., based his decision on the third part of Section 115 while Sundara Iyer, J., based his on the first In Buddhoo Lal v. Mewa Ram 63 Ind. Cas. 15 : 43 A. 561 : 19 A. L. J. 558. the majority of the Fall Bench held that where one of several issues in a suit had been decided and there was a remedy by appeal no revision lay ac there was no cane within Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in Kumar Chandra Kishore Roy v. Basat Ali (18) the majority of the Calcutta High Court held that the Court cannot, by exercising its powers under section (sic) of the Charter Act interfere with a decision of a Subordinate Court from which no appeal or revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure lies to High Court.

    7. I hare purposely refrained from citing all the cases that were quoted before me but I have attempted to make a selection which will give a fair view of the somewhat divergent opinions that have been expressed by the various High Courts.

    8. It seems to me, as a fair result of these opinions, impossible to say that in no case whatever will the Court interfere with an interlocutory order, but that that interference must be exercised with extreme diligence, the general rule being against such interference. The latter may be justified when the order sought to be revised is in fact perverse or irreparable injury will be caused unless the revision h allowed. I, therefore, proceed to the second point.

    9. The first objection is that the order was made without hearing the Vakil for the defendant on a suggestion by Mr. T. Rule Venkatarama Sastri to the lower Court. Under Order XV, Rule. 3 (i), the satisfaction of the Court can only be prima facie, otherwise there would be no scope for sub-Rule (2). It appears, however, from the affidavit of the defendant that his Vakil did argue the question and I cannot say that the order is illegal or irregular on that ground. The next and much more serious argument is that defendant will suffer irreparable injury by the determination of Issues Nos. 3, 4 and 9 as preliminary issues. The contention of petitioner is that Issue 23 Ind. Cas. 522 : 15 M. L. T. 839. which is admittedly a question of mixed law and fait---being estoppel by conduct---will conclude the case one way or other, also that Issue No. 1 should bave been included. This issue involves the question of invalidity of Tirunarayana's adoption which he had set up as entitling him as a reversioner to the property and also the invalidity of the deed of indenture. Issues Nos. 3 and 4, both flow from the indenture. The defendant put forward prior to the indenture a claim of adoption on behalf of the plaintiff by the mother of Venkata Krishna Pillai in order to make him a nearer agnate than Tirunarayana whose alleged adoption was to Venkatakrishna Pillai himself. The adoption of plaintiff is disclaimed in the indenture by his guardian (defendant) and the argument is to be that defendant cannot be heard to cay that be bas a prior and better title in himself. It is also to be argued that defendant by his execution of the deed of indenture is estopped. Defendant will admittedly have a right of appeal, however the decision on these preliminary issues goss. His complaint is that he will be put to inconvenience and expense by possibly having to file several appeals. But this is anticipating that the decision of the Court will be against him on those preliminary issues, or one or more of them. I do not think that I am warranted in making such assumption at the present time. I have in Ventala Verrarazu v. Kuruvella Subbarayudu 64 Ind. Cas. 493 : 41 M. L. J. 378 : (1921) M. W. N. 507. expressed the opinion that this Court will not interfere in revision where the party has a separate remedy. Can I say that the Court below acted perversely or in a way to cause irreparable loss to defendant P The issues selected are very material to the case; and I cannot find that, becanse it would suit the defendant better to have Issues Nos. 1 and 5 decided before the others, the order in perverse or is likely to cause injury which cannot be largely remedied by costs if he succeeds. There is no fear that his issues will not be eventually tried if the decision of the others is not sufficient to dispose of the case If the Subordinate Judge comes to that opinion the defendant has the right of appeal, The Subordinate Judge certainly had, in my view, and for the reasons giver, jurisdiction to make the order be did, and the fact that it may possibly result in inconvenience and expense to defendant is not a ground to interfere in revision. I cannot say there is any injury to defendant in the actual selection of those issues as preliminary and as I have said, it seems to me I cannot anticipate the possible consequences of a decision on them adverse to him. I therefore, think that on this point defendant's petitions fail.

    10. The next point argued is, that Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a bar to the trial of this suit till No. 8 of 1917 is determined. It is said that Issues Nos. 1, 3 and 5 in that suit involve the determination of Issue No. 1 in the present suit. That suit as stated between the present defendant as plaintiff and Tirunarayana Pillai. It is, therefore, not between the same parties as the present suit. Section 10 speaks of a previously instituted suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title; no argument has been addressed to me to show that the present suit and No. 8 of 1917 would fall under the litter words of the clause, but I am referred to a judgment of Spencer and Ramesam, JJ, in Civil Revision Petition No 687 of 1920 Ramakrishna Pillai v. Bulakrishna Aiyar 62 Ind. Cas. 712 : 13 L. W. 541 : 41 M. L. J. 601 (1921) M. W. N. 646. which dealt with the propriety of certain Vakils appearing for the defend, ant in this suit, they having already acted for him in No. 8 of 1917 where he is the plaintiff. It is there said that in both suits questions arise as to the validity of the indenture and its binding character on defendant and also of estoppel. No doubt, soma of the questions in the two suits are the same but the learned Judges had not to deal with the applicability of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Precedence. Mr. T. Rule Ramachandra Iyer relies on Wahid-un nissa Bibi v. Zamin Ali Shah 55 Ind. Cas. 89 : 42 A. 2(sic) 18 A. L. J. 145. and Sivaprasad Ram v. Trincomdas 27 Ind. Cas. 917 : 42 C. 926. In the former case it was held that the widow was claiming in both suits on the same title and that the Court below had done right in staying one of the suits. In Sultanate Jahan Begam v Sundar Lal 58 Ind. Cas 90 42 A. 409 : 18 A. L. J, 431. it was held that an application under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a case and that no revision would lie under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Sivaprasad Sam v. Tricondas 27 Ind. Cas. 917 : 42 C. 926. the jurisdiction under Section 10 is limited to stopping a suit if the circumstances mentioned in the section are found to exist. On the materials before me I clearly cannot so find here. In that ease the Judge (page 931*) had come to no finding as to whether the parties were litigating under the same title but proceeded to decide the question of ret judicata which was clearly materially irregular. Under these circumstances, I cannot say that Section 10 applies here, and I must find this point against the defendant and these civil revision petitions must be dismissed with costs.

    C. Rule P. No. 489 of 1921.

    11. This is a revision petition against the amendment of plaint and consequent settlement of an additional Issue No. 9 on 7th April 1921. The amendment is as to prescriptive title based on possession of defendant benami for plaintiff. It appears to me that Issue No. 3, is involved in Issue No. 9. If plaintiff is wrong on No. 3, 9 will go. In Penumalri Vasantarayadu v. Reddi Suhbamma 22 Ind. Cas. 39 : 14 M. L. T. 588 : (1914) M. W. N. 98. it was held that the Court would Dot interfere with an order refusing amendment, as the plaintiff could attack the order on appeal if the decision was against Lim. In Vasudeva Padhi Khadanga Gatu v. Mayani Dev in Bakshi Mahapatrulu Guru 24 M. 387 at p 388 : 5 C. W. N. 545 : 28 I. A. 81 : 3 Bom. L. Rule 303 : Sar. P. C. J. 819 (P. C.). it was remarked that prescriptive title need not be expressly pleaded as it is only evidence of a party's title.

    12. The amendment was within the discretion of the Court (O. VI, Rule 17), and for the reasons stated above I am unable to say that this amendment id a matter which I should deal with in revision. It has not been argued that the amendment changes the character of the suit or would involve any material injustice to the defendant. This civil revision petition must, therefore, be dismissed with costs.

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    S. Ramakrishna Pillai v. Krishnaswami Pillai
    (Dec 20, 1921)