The facts are fully given in the judgment of Seshagiri Ayyar, J.
This Letters Patent Appeal coming on for hearing in the first instance, the Court made the following
Before disposing of this appeal it is desirable that we should have a finding whether the second defendant, when he obtained assignment of the decree in question, knew that decree had been satisfied. The finding will be submitted on the evidence on record within the first week after recess of the High Court, and the parties will be allowed to file objections to the said finding within ten days after notice of the return of the same shall have been posted up in this Court.
In compliance with the above order, the District Judge of Madura submitted the following
Finding
“My finding is that second defendant knew the decree had been satisfied.”
T.R Venkatarama Sastri for the appellant.—There is no cause of action against the second defendant, the assignee. Though it is found by both the lower Courts that he knew that the decree was satisfied, yet as there is a prior order of the Court that the decree was not satisfied, he is entitled to execute. section 49 of the Civil Procedure Code does not affect the question. The assignee was not a party to the judgment-debtor's contract with the assignor, the decree-holder. It has been held that section 244, Civil Procedure Code, bars a suit for a, refund or for an injunction against executing the decree [Bairagulu v. Bapanna]. A second execution is therefore maintainable. The cause of action arises not on the date of the second execution but on the date on which the original decree-holder failed to enter satisfaction. The only equities affecting a transferee are stated in section 49, Civil Procedure Code, and Order XXI, rule 16. Civil Procedure Code. That section relates to equities in the course of execution Moreover, as the Court cannot take notice of an uncertified payment, such payment is not one of the equities that can be set up in bar of execution under section 49 or Order XXI, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code [Sinnu Pandaram v. Santhoji Row(2)]. A suit to annul the effect of a second execution cannot lie but a suit for damages against the decree-holder will lie, for breach of contract to certify [Jaikaran Bharti…(Plaintiff); v. Raghunath Singh…(Defendant).*(3)]. Moreover, the suit is barred by limitation. The original satisfaction was in March 1906. The date of recognition of assignment was February 1908. The recovery of decree amount was in July 1909. This suit was filed in October 1910. The suit, not having been filed within three years of the first payment, is barred by limitation. Dorasinga Tevar v. Arunachalam Chetti, Gopala Aiyar v. Ramaswamy Sastrigal and Marappa Chetti v. Shanmugappa Chetti.
K. Jagannatha Ayyar (or respondent—[Court:—We do not want to hear you on the question of limitation.] I have a right of suit against the second defendant also. My cause of action is the actual recovery of money in execution a second time. The decree-holder may put in several applications for execution but he may not actually execute or recover. There is no period of limitation for the decree-holder reporting the satisfaction. The transferee who is the representative of the decree-holder is liable if he executes after satisfaction; Goono Monee Dossia v. Pran Kishore Dossee(4) and section 49, Civil Procedure Code. Reference was made to Monmohan Karmokar v. Dwarak Nath Karmokar(5) affect also his assignee.
Abdur Rahim, J.:— I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff-respondent had no cause of action against the second defendant in the suit. The first defendant obtained a decree against one Antonia Pillai whose executor is the present plaintiff.
The decree amount was paid out of Court by the judgment-debtor. The payment however was not certified as required by the law by the decree-holder whose duty it was to do so in the first instance, nor did the judgment-debtor inform the Court of the satisfaction as he was entitled to do in default by the decree-holder. The decree was afterwards assigned to the second defendant. A question was raised in the execution of the decree as to whether it had been adjusted, and, if so, whether the adjustment could be recognized. The executing Court held that in the absence of a certificate or record of satisfaction as required by Order XXI, rule 2, it remained an executable decree and it also found that adjustment had not been proved. The second defendant then proceeded to realise the decree amount by execution. The plaintiff, as executor of the judgment-debtor, thereafter instituted this suit claiming damages against the first and second defendants to the extent of the amount, which the second defendant had realised in execution. It has been well settled, and it can hardly be disputed, that so far as the first defendant, the original decree-holder, was concerned, the plaintiff had a good cause of action. This was so laid down as far back as Viraraghava Reddi v. Subbakka by a Full Bench of this Court and that is also the view of the other High Courts. In that case, it was held that such a suit would lie as for breach of a promise on the part of the decree-holder either not to execute the decree or to enter satisfaction. It was also held that the judgment-debtor could frame his claim against the decree-holder thus in default for damages on the basis of fraud or negligence in not certifying adjustment.
But the question whether there is a cause of action against the assignee of a decree which had been adjusted but the adjustment of which was not certified to the Court, is bare of authority. It cannot be said that there was any sort of contractual relation between the second defendant, the assignee in the case, and the plaintiff and the mere fact that the second defendant, as found knew that the decree had been satisfied will not make him guilty in law, either of fraud or of negligence inasmuch as he was under no obligation to certify adjustment, the decree amount having been received by the original decree-holder before assignment. The executing Court was right in holding that it was bound to treat the decree as still subsisting and to allow it to be executed, by virtue of Order XXI, rule 2, clause (3) which enacts that “a payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid, shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree.” The decree, therefore, on the date of its assignment being one which, according to law, the second defendant could enforce, the only way in which the case of the plaintiff could be put is to base it on section 49, which enacts that “every transferee of a decree shall hold the same subject to the equities, if any, which the judgment-debtor might have enforced against the original decree-holder.” It is argued that we must hold that the decree was in this case subject to an equity which bound the assignee who had knowledge of the adjustment before he obtained the assignment. In the first place section 49 relates to the stage of execution, that is to say, under it, it is the Court executing the decree that has to consider whether it was held subject to any equities which the judgment-debtor could enforce against the original decree-holder. Now the cause of action in a case lite this as laid down in Viraraghava Reddi v. Subbakka is breach of a promise or contract and I am not aware of any general principles according to which the existence of such a contract or promise would create an equity which would be enforceable against the transferee. In the case of sales of immovable property, no doubt, it is well established that the transferee is bound by a contract to convey the property in favour of another person of which he had knowledge. But that rule, so far as I am aware, has not been extended either to the disposition of movable properties or of money decrees. We have been referred to a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Goono Monee Dossia v. Pran Kishore Dossee where the cause of action against the original decree-holder who executed the decree in spite of adjustment out of Court is put on the ground that after such adjustment he held the decree in trust for the judgment-debtor. But I do not think that section 49 of the Coda of Civil Procedure or the corresponding provision of the old Code ever contemplated such an inferential trust. The Full Bench of this Court in Viraraghava Reddi v. Subbakka does not base it on any such ground, and if I may say so with respect, the right way to regard the cause of action as laid down in that case is either breach of a promise or of a statutory duty to certify adjustment to Court. The second defendant, as I have pointed out, could not be said to have committed any breach of promise or having been guilty of violating any statutory duty. We have been also referred to another decision of the Calcutta High Court in Monmohan Karmokar v. Dwarak Nath Karmokar, But I do not think that the point decided there throws much light on the principles applicable to this case. There the question arose in execution between the assignee of a decree who held it as benamidar of the judgment-debtor and other creditors of the judgment-debtor, and having regard to the conclusion of the learned Judges that in those circumstances there was no executable decree, any observations regarding the liability of assignees of decree generally cannot in my opinion be of much help in the present case. Here there was undoubtedly an executable and subsisting decree and that decree was executed according to law. I hold therefore that there was no cause of action against the second defendant. I may mention that we had called for a finding as to whether the second defendant, at the time he obtained the assignment, had knowledge of the adjustment out of Court. The finding is that he had such knowledge, but as I have already stated, that fact cannot make any difference as to his liability in the present suit.
The result is that the Appeal must be allowed and the suit as against the second defendant dismissed with costs throughout.
Oldfield, J.:— I am not prepared to accept all the considerations adduced by my learned brethren. But I can give my reasons shortly for agreeing with the conclusion that there is no cause of action against the second defendant; and that is sufficient to justify concurrence in the decision that the suit must be dismissed.
The main question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover, not only from the first defendant who has once recovered the decree amount, that is not disputed, but also from the second defendant who has recovered it again by execution. I agree with my learned brethren for the reasons given by them that the claim must be regarded as for damages for injury caused by first defendant's failure to certify satisfaction, as he ought to have done after recovering the decree amount. Then the only ground, on which second defendant can be held liable, is that he in some way subjected himself to first defendant's liability by taking an assignment from him. There is only one basis put forward for this contention, namely, the terms of section 49 of the Civil Procedure Code. But no authority has been cited to show that the section is intended to cover such cases as the present. Whether the fact that it occurs in the chapter relating to execution is a reason against the construction of it, I do not wish to decide. It is at all events not necessary in the present connexion to hold that it is final; for there is another clear reason for the same conclusion.
The section provides that the transferee of a decree shall hold the same subject to the equities, which the judgment-debtor might have enforced against the original decree-holder. It seems to me that the section is not intended to mean any more than it says explicitly. It is only intended to make provision regarding the terms on which the decree is to be held; and it is not the contention of the plaintiff in this case, and could not be, that the second defendant's holding of the decree in any way arose from or is connected with the first defendant's wrongful conduct or was ever conditional on his paying compensation for it. In fact, the claim against the second defendant is entirely independent of his holding the decree in that way. In these circumstances, I agree with the order proposed by Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim.
Seshagiri Ayyar, J.:— I agree with the judgment of Abdur Rahim, J., just pronounced.
In O.S No. 316 of 1905 the first defendant obtained a decree against the plaintiff. Subsequent to the decree, it was arranged that the plaintiff should pay off the debts due from the first defendant to third parties and that he should enter up satisfaction of the decree obtained by him against the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case is that he did perform the agreement, but that the first defendant fraudulently failed to enter up satisfaction. An application was made for execution by the first defendant which was opposed by the plaintiff. But it was allowed on two grounds: (1) that as no satisfaction was entered, the decree can be executed and (2) that the arrangement between the parties was not carried out by the plaintiff. After this order permitting execution, the first defendant transferred the decree to the second defendant. He executed it and recovered the money from the plaintiff. This was on the 7th September 1908. Thereupon the present suit was instituted by the plaintiff for damages for wrongfully executing the decree in contravention of the original arrangement. The Courts below have found that the plaintiff did perform his part of the contract and gave a decree for damages against both the defendants. The second defendant, appealed to this Court in Second Appeal No. 389 of 1916. The two learned Judges who beard the appeal differed in opinion. Sadasiva Ayyar, J., was for reversing the decree as against the second defendant, but Phillips, J., was for confirming the decree against him. Hence this Letters Patent Appeal.
Although I did not dissent from the opinion of my learned colleagues that a finding should be called for on the question whether the second defendant was aware that, at the time the decree was transferred to him, the plaintiff had performed his part of the contract, in my opinion, there is no cause of action at all against the second defendant. There is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the second defendant. The suit for damages is for the breach of the contract. That is well settled. See Viraraghava Reddi v. Subbakka and In the matter of Medal Kaliani Anni. What gives the aggrieved party a right of action is the failure to carry out the terms of the contract to enter up satisfaction. It is true that the measure of damages in such a suit is ordinarily the amount recovered by the wrongdoer. But that is not because the plaintiff is entitled to follow the amount recovered in whosoever's hands it may be found, but because the Courts for the sake of convenience have enunciated the rule that the injury must be estimated as the actual loss sustained by the aggrieved party. In all the four High Courts in this country it has been held that where there is a wrongful sale of property in violation of the agreement to enter up satisfaction, the property purchased at the execution sale cannot be recovered by the injured party but that he is only entitled to damages. Yellappa v. Ramachandra, Rewa Mahton v. Ram Kishen Singh, Jaikaran Bharti v. Ragunath Singh, and Krishnaswami Ayyangar v. Ranga Ayyangar(6), all enunciate this principle. Now the ground on which these decisions proceed is that the execution proceedings are not invalid by themselves, although they had been taken in violation of the agreement, because under the Civil Procedure Code, so long as the decree is allowed to be outstanding without satisfaction having been entered in respect of it, it is an enforceable decree. Parties deriving benefit thereunder should not be deprived of their right because of a pre-existing arrangement between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder. That being the provision of law, all the four High Courts have held that the right of the judgment-debtor who has been deprived of property is to sue the decree-holder for damages caused by the deprivation, and not the purchaser for the restoration of the property taken from him. I think the principle of these decisions is applicable to the present case. The second defendant obtained execution in a proceeding, which was held to be subsistent and enforceable. The fact that it is not land but money that he recovered ought to make no difference in the application of the rule of law. Therefore I am unable to hold that the second defendant is bound to return the money which he recovered in execution against the plaintiff.
But it was suggested that the knowledge of the second defendant that, at the time he obtained a transfer of the decree, the plaintiff had performed his part of the contract entered into with the first defendant would make a difference in the case. Now there are some recognized principles on this subject. For example, we have section 27 of the Specific Relief Act which enables a party with whom a contract of sale has been entered into to sue for specific performance not only against the person who agreed to sell the property to him but also against the person who, has purchased that property with knowledge of the agreement to sell. The principle of this section is borrowed from the well-known rule in equity that “equity regards that as done which ought to have been done.” From this maxim, the rule has been deduced “that from the time of the contract for the sale of the land, the vendor, as to the land, becomes a trustee for the vendee; and the vendee, as to the purchase money a trustee for the vendor who has a lien upon the land therefor. And every one coming in by subsequent and representative title, and every subsequent purchaser from either with notice, becomes subject to the same equities as the party would be to whom be succeeds, or from whom he purchased”. It is doubtful whether this principle is applicable to contracts relating to money or movable property. For the sake of argument, I shall assume that it covers such cases also. What follows? The person with whom the contract not to execute the decree has been entered into can proceed to recover the amount wrongfully levied from him not only from the promisor, but also from the party who has benefited by the breach. This assumes that the proceeding is wrongful and void ab initio. But where legally the decree is executable, it is not open to argument that the party who recovered under such a decree is compellable to refund what be has recovered. Moreover, the four cases from the four High Courts to which I drew attention already show that the principle underlying section 27 of the Specific Relief Act has no application to such cases. In my opinion when once it is conceded that the aggrieved party is not entitled to recover land or other property sold in execution contrary to the terms agreed upon between the judgment-debtor and the decree holder, it is impossible to suggest any ground of liability on the part of a third party deriving benefit under the decree. This conclusion derives further support from decisions like Bairagulu v. Bapanna where it was held that no injunction will lie to prevent a party from executing a decree. The obvious reason is that the decree is legal and enforceable and the right of action to the aggrieved party arises on the breach of the agreement and not upon the fact that the decree has been executed. The decision in Monmohan Karmokar v. Dwarak Nath Karmokar has been very much misunderstood. It is a case of a judgment-debtor obtaining an assignment of decree nominally after it had been satisfied. The question related to the equities enforceable in execution against the assignee. The observations about similar equities being available in suits are pure obiter. They really have no bearing on the present case. However, if that judgment lays down the proposition contended for by the respondent's vakil. I am unable to agree with it. As regards Goono Monee Dossia v. Pran Kishore Dossee., the question was between the original parties to the decree and no question of assignment was considered. With all respect I am unable to accept the proposition that the decree-holder is a trustee for the judgment-debtor. As regards section 49 of the Civil Procedure Code on which reliance was placed; it is enough to point out that section deals only with equities in the course of execution: for example, there may be cross-decrees or a question of set off in respect of costs. In such matters, the transferee decree-holder is bound by the equities subsisting between his assignor and the judgment-debtor. Vide Sinnu Pandaran v. Santhoji Row. That has no application to the cases of suits for damages. I therefore agree with Sadasiva Ayyar, J., that there is do cause of action against the second defendant. This being my view it is unnecessary to consider the question of limitation.
As I have, held that there is no cause of action against the second defendant, I would reverse the decrees of the Courts below, and dismiss the suit against the second defendant with costs throughout.
N.R