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Case Number

Referred Trial No. 68 of 1931.

Advocates

Mr. K. S. Jayarama Ayyar for Mr. V. L. Ethiraj and Mr. N. Somasundaram for the Accused.
Mr. N. S. Mani for The Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Crown.

Judges

Jackson
Cornish, JJ.

Acts

Sect. 162, Criminal Procedure Code, and the kindred Sect. 25 Indian Evidence Act
provision in Sect. 27 Indian Evidence Act
Indian Evidence Act, Sects. 17, 18
Sect. 27 Indian Evidence Act,
18, Indian Evidence Act

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion (Jackson, J.; Cornish, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The accused had been sentenced to death for the murder of a boy, G. Ramanatham, the offence being punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The available facts are few and summarized in the judgment (referred to as paragraph 38). The boy disappeared by 6 P.M.; he was last seen alive at about 5 P.M. that evening. He was found murdered the next morning and stripped of his ornaments. Witness testimony placed the boy entering a shed with the accused. The following day the accused took the police to the place where the jewels (ornaments) were buried. A nine‑year‑old girl (P.W.4) allegedly identified circumstances of enticement into the shed but the trial court found her evidence unreliable. At trial, the accused denied showing the jewels to the police.

A long statement, tendered as Exhibit K, had been made at the time of discovery to certain neighbours in the presence of the Sub‑Inspector (a signatory), making it a statement "made to a police officer in the course of his investigation." The central procedural dispute concerned the admissibility of Exhibit K in the accused's defence under Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a statement made by the accused to a police officer during the course of investigation (Exhibit K) may be used by the accused in his defence, or whether Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, forbids its use even when it assists the accused.
Whether the evidence available—principally the accused's leading police to the buried jewels and the rejected testimony of the child witness—was sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC, or only for a lesser offence (Section 201 IPC: causing disappearance of evidence).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)

Mr. Jayarama Ayyar, appearing for the accused, argued that Exhibit K (the statement made in the presence of the Sub‑Inspector) materially assisted the accused's defence and should be placed on the record and admitted in evidence.
The appellant's position, as reported, relied upon authorities (notably Azimaddy v. Emperor and other High Court decisions) that, it was argued, permit the use of statements made by an accused to police so long as they are not confessions, and that the accused should not be deprived of the right to show an early explanation to the police.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Azimaddy v. Emperor	Held (Calcutta) that a statement made by an accused to a police officer may be proved against him and (presumably a fortiori) for him, provided it is not a confession; supports the view that Section 162 does not necessarily bar use of accused's statements to police.	The court considered Azimaddy closely and noted its reasoning (including Rankin, C.J.'s approach). Jackson, J. treated it as persuasive authority but not binding in the face of the plain language of Section 162; ultimately the court did not follow Azimaddy's approach to allow Exhibit K.
King‑Emperor v. Maung Tha Din	Duckworth J. expressed the opinion that Sections 160, 161 and 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code refer to witnesses and not to an accused person (thereby excluding accused persons from the Section 162 prohibition).	The court recorded this opinion but emphasized that judicial preference for such a reading cannot override the plain statutory language. The case was examined but not treated as dispositive.
Jagwa Dhanuk v. King‑Emperor	Held that Section 162 does not apply to accused persons, partly because otherwise Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act would be repealed and because the court would be deprived of valuable material for testing the truth.	The court cited the reasoning but rejected the view that judicial dislike of the statutory consequences justifies departing from the plain meaning of Section 162.
King‑Emperor v. Maung Tha Bin	Observation by Heald J. that intention and language may not coincide (i.e., statutory language can be plain even if its effects are odd).	The court used the observation to support the proposition that courts must follow statutory language even if it leads to anomalous results; the point was invoked in interpreting Section 162.
Thimmappa v. Thimmappa	Full Bench and High Courts had opinions on the relationship between Section 27, Indian Evidence Act, and Section 162, CrPC; previously discussed in the judgment (some obiter conforming).	The court noted that Thimmappa had conformed obiter to the opinion that Section 27 is unaffected by Section 162, but Jackson, J. found this alignment not binding and reiterated that the plain statutory prohibition of Section 162 must be applied.
Rannun v. The Crown	Authority approved by Azimaddy that Section 162 does not apply to accused persons.	The court acknowledged the authority but analysed it as based on judicial distaste for the statutory effect rather than on a strict reading of Section 162; the court did not find it persuasive enough to admit Exhibit K.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis centers on two intertwined strands: the admissibility of Exhibit K (a written statement made in the presence of a police officer) and the sufficiency of the remaining admissible evidence to sustain a conviction for murder.

On admissibility, Jackson, J. reasoned as follows:

Exhibit K was made to neighbours in the presence of the Sub‑Inspector, who was a signatory; consequently it is plainly a statement made to a police officer "in the course of his investigation."
Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, provides that "no statement by any person to a police officer" shall be used at any inquiry or trial except in the limited manner the section permits. The court emphasized the plain and wide language of "any person."
The court examined contrary authorities (including Azimaddy and decisions that treated Section 162 as not applying to accused persons) but concluded there was "no binding authority" to treat admissions made to the police as outside Section 162. The court rejected attempts to reconstruct legislative intent in a way that would render Section 162 ineffective.
Jackson, J. stressed that the judicial role is to interpret statutory language, not to adjust it because of perceived absurdity; while acknowledging the provision may create anomalies (e.g., potentially excluding evidence valuable to justice), the judge felt bound by the statutory text and the legislative choice to deprive courts of such material except as the statute allows.
Accordingly, Exhibit K is statutorily inadmissible and "cannot be used."

On sufficiency of evidence for murder:

The court rejected the testimony of the nine‑year‑old girl (P.W.4) as unreliable and possibly imaginative; therefore her evidence that the boy was enticed into the shed was not accepted.
With the girl's evidence rejected and Exhibit K excluded, the only uncontested fact proved beyond doubt was that the accused led the police to the buried jewels the next day. The court recognized a presumption of guilt can arise from an accused showing knowledge of the hidden property, but that knowledge alone does not necessarily prove murder.
The court concluded that, in the absence of corroborative admissible evidence, it would be unsafe to convict the accused of murder (an offence punishable by death). The accused might have known where the jewels were hidden without having committed the murder.
Given these evidentiary limitations, the court considered it safer and legally appropriate to convict the accused of a lesser offence—causing the disappearance of evidence (Section 201 IPC)—for which the available facts were sufficient.

Cornish, J. agreed substantially with this reasoning. On the procedural point he explicitly stated that the question of using Exhibit K is governed solely by Section 162, CrPC; even if the accused wishes to rely on it, Section 162 bars its use. Cornish, J. noted that while Section 162 is a procedural rule preventing the production of police statements at trial, it does not prevent the accused from presenting his defence orally or calling witnesses to the same effect; only the recorded police statement itself (Exhibit K) could not be produced for corroboration.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

- The court held that Exhibit K — a statement made to a police officer in the course of investigation — is inadmissible under Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code and therefore could not be used by the accused in his defence.
- The court further held that the admissible evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC. The accused was accordingly acquitted of the charge under Section 302, Indian Penal Code and instead convicted under Section 201, Indian Penal Code (causing disappearance of evidence). The accused was sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment for the Section 201 conviction.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The prior conviction (and death sentence) for murder was set aside insofar as the accused was acquitted of Section 302 and convicted of the lesser offence under Section 201, with a seven‑year R.I. sentence imposed.
Evidentiary and procedural implication: The decision underscores a strict, textual application of Section 162, CrPC — recorded statements to police are, as a matter of statute, excluded from trial use except in the limited ways the section permits. The court recognized the statutory rule may produce anomalies, but declined to depart from the statute's plain language on grounds of necessity or perceived injustice.
Precedential note: The court discussed and distinguished contrary authorities but did not announce a novel legal principle beyond its application of Section 162 to the facts; it applied existing statutory language and addressed earlier case law without purporting to overrule a specific binding precedent. The judgment therefore applies the statutory exclusion in the present case rather than establishing a broad new exception.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the material and propositions contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce facts or inferences not present in the source text.

Show full summary ...

Sheik Kalesha, In Re.

Jackson, J. — The accused has been sentenced to death for murdering a boy G. Ramanatham, the offence punishable under Sect. 302 Indian Penal Code.

The facts which are very few are summarized in paragraph 38 of the judgment. The boy disappeared by 6 P.M Next morning he was found murdered and stripped of his ornaments. He was last seen alive at 5 P.M, that evening. Then he was seen going into a shed with Accused. Next day Accused took the police to where the jewels were buried.

The fact that he went into the shed is not proved beyond suspicion. A little girl aged 9, P. W. 4, who was taking a morbid interest in the case, for she not only went to see the corpse but identified it, says that she saw the boy enticed into the shed by the offer of a doll which later she changes to the offer of a pomegranate. If she is speaking plain truth and not drawing upon her imagination she should know if it was a doll or a pomegranate; and it is quite possible that she is telling the Court not what she saw, but what she thinks she must have seen; a common and dangerous type of witness in criminal trials.

So the only fact proved beyond all doubt is that the Accused took the police to where the jewels were hidden next day, and if he cannot explain his knowledge, a presumption of guilt lies against him. At the trial he denied that he had ever shown the jewels to the police. And here there arises a point of much interest and difficulty. At the time of the discovery of the jewels the accused made a long statement to certain neighbours Ex. K. The Sub-Inspector was present and is one of the signatories, so that it is undoubtedly a statement made to a police officer in the course of his investigation.

This is one of those items of evidence which the Legislature has laid down shall not be used by Courts of Law, except in the special manner provided in Sect. 162, Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Jayarama Ayyar who appears for the accused says that it is a document which materially assists his client's defence, and wishes to bring it upon the record. Is this prevented by Sect. 162?

This question has been considered in Calcutta where it is held, Azimaddy v. Emperor , that a statement made by an accused to a police officer may be proved against him and (presumably a fortiori for him) provided that it is not a confession. This decision is based on various lines of thought.

In King-Emperor v. Maung Tha Din , Duckworth J., expressed the opinion that Sects. 160, 161 and 162 only refer to witnesses and not to an accused person. The Chief Justice apparently held the same view though he preferred to base his judgment on other grounds. He refers to the authority of Jagwa Dhanuk v. King-Emperor* , where it is also held that Sect. 162 does not apply to accused persons, partly because otherwise the special provision in Sect. 27 Indian Evidence Act would be repealed, and partly because the Court would be deprived of valuable material for testing the truth of the case.

This latter reason has little force because the whole object of Sect. 162, Criminal Procedure Code, and the kindred Sect. 25 Indian Evidence Act is to deprive the Court of material. If anything in the statutes depriving the Courts of what otherwise might prove to be valuable material is to be treated as a dead letter, Sect. 25 and Sect. 162 might both be ignored. With all respect it seems useless for the Courts to try to reconstruct the statutes on such lines of logic and common sense which might have commended themselves to the Legislature. The Court's sole function is to interpret the language which the legislature has employed. As pointed out by Heald J., King-Emperor v. Maung Tha Bin very probably the intention and the language do not coincide, but the Courts are only concerned with the language. Rankin, C.J, in Azimaddy v. Emperor accepts this position and interprets “any person” in Sect. 162 as meaning guivis ex populo. But it is not very clear why “any one you like out of the people” is a phrase which excludes an accused person. His Lordship proceeds (page 258) that it would require express and compelling language to deprive an accused of what is so often the mainstay of a good defence, the right to show that immediately he was challenged he gave an explanation. But this is to restate the problem. Is the language of Sect. 162 express and compelling, or what is there about its language to justify the view that it is not express or compelling? “No statement by any person to a police officer shall be used,” is surely as express and compelling language as could be found, and the difficulty lies not in its plain interpretation, so much as in the fact that its plain interpretation leads to absurdity. But then as I ventured to point out in Thimmappa v. Thimmappa the whole provision involves absurdity. It must be borne in mind that Criminal Procedure is not devised on behalf of the prosecution, or on behalf of the accused, but on behalf of justice; and anything that derogates from the proper claims of justice is inherently absurd. It is just as absurd to prevent the prosecution from exhibiting a confession, as to prevent the accused from exhibiting an admission; and if the statute were to be overridden to admit admissions merely to prevent absurdity, it might equally well be overridden to admit confessions. So this line of thought that language must be compelling, is not perhaps very helpful.

Then there is another line in Azimaddy v. Emperor strongly relied upon by Mr. Jayarama Ayyar that in as much as it has now been held by all the High Courts and by a Full Bench of our Court in Thimmappa v. Thimmappa that the special provision in Sect. 27 Indian Evidence Act admitting a confession to the police which leads to a discovery is not repealed by the general provision in Sect. 162 forbidding the proof of all statements to the police, therefore the provision in the Indian Evidence Act, Sects. 17, 18 that a statement which suggests an inference made by a party to the proceeding can be proved, is not repealed by the provision in Sect, 162 that statements made to the police cannot be proved. Generalia specialibus non derogant. But unfortunately the application of this maxim, so useful when Sect. 27 Indian Evidence Act was considered leads in precisely the opposite direction when Sects. 17 and 18, Indian Evidence Act are considered along with Sect. 162, Criminal Procedure Code. Because now the generalia are embodied in Sects. 17 and 18, which lay down generally that all admissions can be proved, while the specialia are embodied in Sect. 162 which provides that even though all admissions can be proved statements made by any person to a police officer cannot be used. To sum up: There is no binding authority upon us that an admission to the police is not governed by Sect. 162, and therefore is admissible. Thimmappa v. Thimmappa has only conformed obiter with the opinion that Sect. 27, Indian Evidence Act is unaffected by Sect. 162 Criminal Procedure Code. There is however authority that Sect. 162 does not apply to accused persons. Rannun v. The Crown approved by Azimaddy v. Emperor . When that authority is analysed it is found to be based not so much on the plain reading of Sect. 162, as upon a dislike of what that plain reading involves. Speaking for myself I find no difficulty in the reading, because the language seems to be perfectly plain; and I cannot see that any good object is served by the judiciary attempting to readjust the artificial barriers which the legislature chooses to lay down that any statement recorded by a police officer in the course of his investigation is worthless, save as provided by Sect. 27 Indian Evidence Act, the Court must treat it as statutorily worthless, though judicially it may amount to evidence of the greatest value.

Ex. K is statement made by a person to a police officer in the course of his investigation and therefore it cannot be used. I would add that this case adds an anomaly which I overlooked in my list in Thimmappa v. Thimmappa . Here there is an accused who runs grave danger of being hanged because judicially good evidence has been arbitrarily ruled out by the legislature.

The Court is confronted then by the fact that accused discovered the jewels to the police and offers no better explanation than that the story of the discovery is a lie. Can we in the absence of all other evidence, for the evidence of the little girl is now rejected, convict him of murder on that circumstance alone? We think not. He may have known where the jewels were hid, without necessarily having committed the murder; and we think it safer to convict him only of the minor offence of causing evidence to disappear under Sect. 201, Indian Penal Code, accused is sentenced to 7 years R. I.: he is acquitted of the charge under Sect. 302, Indian Penal Code.

Cornish, J. —I agree that the evidence for the prosecution is not sufficiently free from doubt to support the conviction of murder, but that the appellant should be convicted of an offence under Sect. 201, Indian Penal Code. With regard to the question whether the appellant is entitled to use in his defence his statement to the police recorded in Ex. K, it appears to me that the question being solely one of procedure, it must be governed by Sect. 162, Criminal Procedure Code. If he wishes to rely on Ex. K, or some part of it, then I think that Sect. 162 is in his way.

The view in Azimaddy v. Emperor approving of decisions in the Patna, Lahore and Rangoon High Courts, was that Sect. 162 did not apply to accused persons. With all respect, I do not think that the language of the section sanctions this differentiation. Sect. 162 is explicit. Firstly, it provides that no statement made by “any person”—and these words are wide enough to comprehend a person who subsequently becomes the accused—to a police officer in the course of an investigation shall, if reduced into writing be signed by the person making the statement. Next it provides that no such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, shall be used for “any purpose” at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation where the statement was made. The words “any purpose” must include purpose of prosecution or defence. Then comes the exception permitting the accused to obtain a copy of the statement, if it has been reduced into writing, and, if it is duly proved, to use it to contradict the witness who made the statement and who has been called to give evidence for the prosecution.

In Azimaddy v. Emperor Rankin C. J., expressed his unwillingness to hold, in the absence of express and compelling language that the section was intended to deprive an accused of the right of showing that he put forward his explanation to the police at the earliest opportunity. But could the language of Sect. 162 be more compelling than it is? Personally, I do not see that the rule puts an accused at a disadvantage. As already observed, the rule is one of procedure. It is aimed at preventing a statement made by the accused to the police at an investigation —and some police officer must be the repository of the statement whether it has or has not been reduced to writing—being produced by the police at the trial except for the limited purpose permitted by the section. But it does not prevent the accused from proving his defence aliunde. His mouth is not sealed at the trial in respect of anything said by him at the police investigation. It is open to the accused, as was pointed out by my learned brother in the course of the arguments, when making his defence to repeat in Court what he has already said to the police at the investigation, and to call witnesses to support his statement. But he cannot call for his statement made at the investigation for the purpose of corroborating or implementing his defence at the trial. In my opinion neither Ex. K nor any extract from his recorded statement was available to the appellant.

N. R. R.

Sheik Kalesha, In Re.

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion (Jackson, J.; Cornish, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Sheik Kalesha, In Re.

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