This Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal arises out of an application to enforce the terms of a security bond given by 2nd respondent in the course of an interlocutory proceeding in the suit. The suit itself was for a permanent injunction by the plaintiff against the 1st defendant restraining him from interfering with his possession of the property. Immediately after filing the said suit he filed an application for a temporary injunction requesting the Court to restrain the 1st defendant from interfering with his possession during the pendency of the suit and when the application came on for hearing the parties seem to have entered into an agreement in and by which the 1st defendant was to be in possession of the land in dispute during the pendency of the suit and he should, in case the plaintiff's title to the property is declared, pay him the profits of the said land. It was also stipulated among other terms that for the fulfilment of this obligation the 1st defendant must also furnish security. A joint memo embodying the terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties was filed in Court and the Court approved of it and took a security bond from the 2nd respondent in the appeal. The security bond clearly recites the agreement, the obligation entered into by the 1st defendant and that the 2nd respondent has agreed to stand security for the fulfilment of that obligation and that in case the plaintiff succeeds the amount mentioned in the bond can be recovered in execution, “treating this as part of such decree and by executing such decree”. The result of the suit was there was a decree in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff accordingly filed an application to recover the amount which the 1st defendant and the 2nd respondent agreed to pay as aforesaid. The learned District Munsif allowed the application, but the learned District Judge disallowed it on the ground that the said suit itself being one for a permanent injunction the Court had no jurisdiction to give a relief in regard to mesne profits subsequent to the suit. It seems to me that this view of the learned District Judge is entirely wrong. He has misunderstood the nature and scope of the order passed on the application for temporary injunction and has not correctly appreciated the effect of the security bond given by the parties as a result of the agreement arrived at between them at the stage when the parties sought interlocutory relief by way of temporary injunction. It cannot be doubted that the plaintiff was entitled to ask for the relief by way of a temporary injunction restraining the 1st defendant from interfering with the possession during the progress of the suit. It was open to the parties at that stage to agree to any terms as they deemed fit to agree or it was open to the Court to pass such order as it might deem fit to give proper relief to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The result of the proceedings was that by agreement the 1st defendant was put in possession of the property he being accountable for the produce thereof in case the plaintiff succeeded in the suit. The Court had general jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. It was perfectly competent to the parties to come to the said understanding and for the Court to give effect to it. As stated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sadasiva Pillai…Plaintiff; v. Ramalinga Pillai…Defendant., the security bonds under such circumstances must be considered “as proceedings in Court importing a certain liability to be enforced in the suit against the defendant to that suit.” Having undertaken this obligation it would not be open to the 1st defendant or the 2nd respondent to resile from it and allege that the proceedings were entirely irregular and that the Court had no jurisdiction to enforce the terms which they had undertaken to fulfil. As observed by their Lordships in the same case, if the Court had general jurisdiction over the subject-matter, though the exercise of that jurisdiction by the particular proceeding may have been irregular, upon the ordinary principles of estoppel the 1st defendant or the 2nd respondent cannot be heard to say that he cannot fulfil the obligation which he solemnly undertook to the Court. There is thus jurisdiction in the Court to enforce that obligation. I therefore reverse the decree of the learned District Judge and restore the decree of the District Munsif with costs.
(Leave refused).
N.R.RDecree reversed.