Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sect. 134 (4) of the Companies Act,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sect. 134 (4) of the Companies Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Five accused were charged in relation to the National Live Stock Registration Bank, Ltd., Madras: accused Nos. 1 to 4 were directors of the Bank and accused No. 5 was the company itself. Three charges were brought against them under the Companies Act: (1) Section 134(4) (failure to file the balance sheet), (2) Section 32(4) (defects in the list of members and summary), and (3) Section 87(2) (failure to notify changes among directors). All accused were found guilty of the first two offences; the third accused was acquitted of the third offence. Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 were convicted and fined; the 3rd accused is deceased. Criminal revision petitions were filed: Crl. R. C. No. 641 of 1931 by accused Nos. 1 and 2, and Crl. R. C. No. 648 by accused Nos. 4 and 5 (the Bank).

Relevant events and filings included: the balance-sheet for the year ending 31 July 1928 (Ex. Y) was passed on 26 December 1929 and filed on 16 January 1930; the next balance-sheet (for 31 July 1929) had not been filed. The Registrar sent a series of reminders (Ex. Z dated 9 January 1930; Ex. O dated 29 May 1930; Ex. Q dated 14 July 1930; Ex. S dated 19 August 1930). The Bank replied to some reminders promising to send the balance-sheet (e.g., Ex. Z(1) dated 18 January 1930; Ex. P dated 5 June 1930). The Bank filed a list of members and summary as Ex. J on 11 February 1930.

At trial before the Presidency Magistrate the accused were convicted on the first two charges and some were convicted on the third; objections and legal points were raised on appeal (including challenge to the correctness of the Magistrate's interpretation of Articles of Association, the application of various sections of the Companies Act, the sufficiency and character of the returns, the effect of rescinding Director resolutions, the mandatory character of filing time mentioned in Form No. 26, institutional competence of the complaint, misjoinder of parties, and the locus standi of the liquidator representing the Bank in revision).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the accused were guilty under Section 134(4) of the Companies Act for non-filing of the balance-sheet when the Registrar called for it (i.e., whether the Registrar's call was premature because the annual general meeting was not yet due).
  2. Whether the accused were guilty under Section 32(4) for filing a list of members and summary (Ex. J) that contained numerical discrepancies and omissions (including alleged failure to note transfers and forfeitures).
  3. Whether the accused (or the company) were guilty under Section 87(2) for failing to file notice of change among directors within the period referred to in Form No. 26 (the 30-day note in the form).
  4. Whether misjoinder of parties (notably trying the 3rd accused on a charge he was not chargeable with) vitiated the trial.
  5. Whether the complaint was properly instituted when it was signed by the Registrar's clerk without proof of authorization by the Registrar.
  6. Whether the liquidator representing the Bank had locus standi to present the revision petition (i.e., whether he had authority to act as the Bank's liquidator).

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's Arguments

  • The annual general meeting (AGM) was not due until 26 December 1930 (15 months after the last AGM held 26 December 1929), hence the Registrar's call for the balance-sheet was premature and the balance-sheet was not yet due to be filed when the Registrar demanded it.
  • The Articles of Association (Art. 151) do not require that a general meeting be held within four months after the balance-sheet is prepared; rather, Art. 151 entitles shareholders to a balance-sheet made up to within four months before a meeting — it does not conversely mandate calling the meeting within four months of making up accounts.
  • The alleged numerical discrepancies in Ex. J were arithmetical errors or could be corrected in subsequent returns and the prior returns relied upon by the prosecution had not been proved to be correct.
  • The forfeiture resolution by directors (17 December 1929) had been cancelled at a general meeting on 29 December 1929 and therefore the omission of the forfeiture in Ex. J was not a default.
  • The accused relied on argument and evidence that books had been taken away preventing proper preparation of accounts (as a possible defence to a charge under other sections), and generally denied wilful or knowing authorisation of defaults necessary to convict under the relevant sections.
  • In respect of the revision by the Bank, the liquidator who presented the petition failed to prove his status and authority; there was no proof that one liquidator could appoint another in his place.

Respondent's (Prosecution's) Arguments

  • It was argued for the respondent that the accused might have committed an offence under Section 131(4) and that that section should be read along with Section 134 — an argument implying the Registrar's call and the filing requirement could be supported by construing the sections together.
  • The lower court relied on its interpretation of Art. 151 of the Articles of Association and relevant authorities to support conviction on the first charge (this reflects the prosecution's position as accepted by the lower court).
  • It was contested that the complaint might still be competent even though signed by the Registrar's clerk; authorities were cited on the point.
  • The prosecution relied upon the returns and the Registrar's view that discrepancies existed in Ex. J (the list and summary) as supporting the charge under Section 32(4).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dabendra Nath Das Gupta v. Registrar of Joint Stock Companies Authority holding that a director cannot plead omission to call the annual general meeting (required by Sect. 76) in answer to a charge under Sect. 134 where there was an omission to call the annual general meeting. The Court held this case inapplicable to the present facts because in that case there was an omission to call the AGM, whereas here the defence was that the AGM was not due when the Registrar called for the balance-sheet.
In re Briton Medical and General Life Association Held that forwarding to the Registrar a list of members and summary that on their face purport to satisfy the Act is insufficient unless they are in accordance with the facts; the Court may go into the truth of the returns. The lower court's reliance on this case was noted, but the appellate Court emphasised that here the prior returns relied upon had not been proved, and there was no evidence the differences were deliberate; thus the cited case did not require conviction on the present record.
Sundar Das v. The Crown Authority for the proposition that an officer of a company cannot be convicted under the relevant section unless it is found that he knowingly and wilfully authorised or permitted the default. The Court applied this principle to conclude that, on the evidence before it, the alleged discrepancies appeared to be mere arithmetic mistakes and there was no proof of knowing and wilful authorisation, defeating conviction under Sect. 32(4).
Glossop v. Glossop Authority referred to in relation to the effective date of resignation of a director (i.e., resignation takes effect from the date of the resignation letter). The Court noted the rule (resignation takes effect from the letter's date) in considering the effect of the 3rd accused's resignation, but the Court's ultimate view on the charge rested on another precedent about the mandatory character of the Form 26 time limit.
Kamud Chandra Nandi v. Emperor Decided that the provision in the footnote to Form No. 26 (Appendix A of the Act) requiring notice of change among directors to be given within 30 days is not mandatory and that no offence is committed by a company by not filing such notice within that period. The Court followed this decision, holding that the 30-day note in Form 26 is not mandatory and therefore failure to file within that period does not constitute an offence under Sect. 87(1)/(2) on the present facts.
Emperor… v. Shib Das Marwari… Authority relevant to the competence of complaints signed by a clerk (discussion on being chary of admitting such complaints but possible competency). The Court cited the cases on both sides of the question and did not express a final view; it found it unnecessary to decide definitively whether the complaint was invalid merely because signed by the Registrar's clerk.
Upendranath Bishwas v. Emperor Authority that Section 233 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to summons cases (relevant to misjoinder and vitiation of trial). The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that misjoinder of parties had vitiated the trial in the present case.
Subrahmania Ayyar v. King-Emperor Privy Council authority on misjoinder of charges vitiating trial; well-known precedent on the subject. The Court cited this Privy Council case to reinforce the point that misjoinder could vitiate the trial; the Court held that misjoinder of parties in the present trial had indeed vitiated it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each charge and the attendant factual matrix in turn and analysed the legal effect of the statutory provisions and the evidence adduced at trial.

Charge under Section 134(4) — Non-filing of the balance-sheet

The Court began from Section 134(1) (which requires that after a balance-sheet is laid before the company at the general meeting, a copy signed by the manager or secretary shall be filed with the Registrar at the same time as the copy of the annual list and summary prepared under Sect. 32). The appellate analysis noted (and set out) the factual chronology: the balance-sheet for year ending 31 July 1928 (Ex. Y) had been passed at the general meeting on 26 December 1929 and filed 16 January 1930; the next balance-sheet (31 July 1929) had not been filed when the Registrar began sending reminders in January 1930 and thereafter.

The accused's defence was that the AGM was not due until 26 December 1930 (15 months from the last AGM), and that the Registrar's call for the balance-sheet was premature. The Registrar's clerk himself testified that the next general meeting could be held within 15 months and that for the purpose of holding the general meeting there was time till 31 December 1930. The Presidency Magistrate had sought to counter this by invoking Sect. 131(1) (requiring accounts to be prepared at intervals not more than 15 months) and Article 151 of the Articles of Association (which the Magistrate interpreted as requiring a general meeting within four months of making up the balance-sheet).

The appellate Court rejected the Magistrate's reasoning on Article 151: the Court interpreted Art. 151 as entitling shareholders to a balance-sheet made up to within four months before the meeting, but it does not require that a meeting be called within four months from the date when balance-sheets were made up. The Court emphasised that the Articles have no statutory force to expand statutory obligations and that the lower-court case Dabendra Nath Das Gupta (which involved an omission to call an AGM) did not apply because here the defence was that the AGM was not yet due.

The Court rejected the respondent's submission that Sect. 131(4) must be read with Sect. 134 and held that the charge under Sect. 134(4) could be met by showing that the balance-sheet was not yet due to be filed. On the evidence here (including the Registrar's own clerk's evidence about timing) the accused had effectively met the charge and no conviction could stand under the first count.

Charge under Section 32(4) — List of members and summary (Ex. J)

The Bank filed Ex. J dated 11 February 1930. The trial court found numerical discrepancies between Ex. J and earlier returns: (1) preferential shares allotted in cash were recorded as 25,8474½ in column 2 but allegedly should be 26,126½; (2) ordinary shares allotted for cash recorded as 7,294 but allegedly should be 7,310; and (3) transfers and forfeited shares for the year were not noted.

The appellate Court analysed the record and observed that the trial court seemed to proceed on an assumption that the previous returns were correct. But the earlier returns had not been placed in evidence as exhibits and there was no proof they were accurate. The Court noted that the Registrar's conduct (as shown by the reminders and steps taken) did not indicate he regarded the matter as deliberate misrepresentation but rather as matters that could be corrected. The Court concluded that the discrepancies might well be mere arithmetical errors and that without proof of the correctness of the earlier returns or proof of deliberate misrepresentation the charge could not be sustained.

With regard to the failure to note forfeiture, the Court examined the directors' resolution forfeiting shares on 17 December 1929 and the directors' (or shareholders') cancellation of that resolution at the general meeting on 29 December 1929. The Court held there was nothing in the Articles to show that the general power of shareholders to cancel a directors' decision was absent or that such cancellation was ultra vires. Consequently, the omission in Ex. J to reflect a forfeiture that had already been cancelled was not a default. The Court further relied on the principle from Sundar Das v. The Crown that an officer cannot be convicted under this section absent a finding that he knowingly and wilfully authorised or permitted the default.

Charge under Section 87(2) — Notice of change among Directors

The 3rd accused sent his resignation on 29 May 1930; at a directors' meeting on 29 October 1930 his resignation was withdrawn while the 4th accused's resignation was accepted. Form No. 26 contains a footnote stating that notice of change should be given within 30 days from the date of occurrence. The trial court relied on Glossop v. Glossop to treat resignation as taking effect from the date of the letter.

The appellate Court followed the decision in Kamud Chandra Nandi v. Emperor, which held that the 30-day provision in the footnote to Form No. 26 is not mandatory and that failure to file within that specified period does not itself constitute an offence. The Court therefore held that on this point no conviction could be sustained and thought the time stated in the form should be made more specific by legislation rather than read as mandatory in the present context.

Other Procedural Objections — Complaint and Misjoinder; Locus of Liquidator

The Court noted two additional objections raised by the petitioners. First, the complaint was signed by the Registrar's clerk and there was no proof of the Registrar's authorisation; authorities were cited on both sides and the Court found it unnecessary to determine the point in this judgment.

Second, the Court found that misjoinder of parties had occurred: the 3rd accused was not properly chargeable under the third charge but was tried jointly with others on all charges. The Court relied on Upendranath Bishwas v. Emperor and the Privy Council case Subrahmania Ayyar v. King-Emperor to conclude that misjoinder had vitiated the trial.

Finally, regarding Crl. R. C. No. 648 (brought by the 4th accused and the Bank as represented by its liquidator T. A. Doss), the Court found that the liquidator failed to prove his status and authority to act (he could not show that one liquidator had the power to appoint another in his place as he claimed), and therefore the liquidator had no locus standi; accordingly that petition was also allowed on the basis that the grounds were the same as those taken by the other accused.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The convictions on all three offences were set aside and the accused were acquitted.

Consequences and immediate practical effects:

  • The convictions against accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 were quashed.
  • Fines imposed at trial were ordered to be refunded.
  • The Court held that (a) the defence that the balance-sheet was not yet due could defeat a charge under Section 134(4) where supported by the evidence; (b) numerical discrepancies in a list/summary require proof that earlier returns were correct or proof of wilful misrepresentation before an officer can be convicted under Section 32(4); and (c) the 30-day note in Form No. 26 is not mandatory (Kamud Chandra Nandi v. Emperor was followed) so failure to file within that period did not constitute an offence in the present circumstances.
  • The Court found misjoinder of parties, which vitiated the trial (citing Upendranath Bishwas and Subrahmania Ayyar), and also found that the liquidator representing the Bank in one petition had not proved his authority and therefore had no locus standi.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond following existing authorities cited (for example, it expressly followed Kamud Chandra Nandi v. Emperor on the Form 26 point). The decision's direct effect is to set aside the convictions in this specific case and order refunds of fines; the Court did not state that it was creating a new rule of general application beyond the analysis reflected above.

N. R. R. — Convictions set aside.

    V.K. Lakshmana Mudaliar, In Re.

    There were five accused in this case of whom accused 1 to 4 were the Directors of a certain company called National Live Stock Registration Bank, Ltd. Madras, and the 5th accused was the company itself. There were three charges against them: the first under Sect. 134 (4) of the Companies Act, the second under Sect. 32 (4) and the third under Sect. 87 (2). All the accused were found guilty of the first two offences. The 3rd accused was acquited of the third offence. Accused 1, 2, 4 and 5 were convicted and various fines imposed. 3rd accused is since dead. Crl. R. C. No. 641 of 1931 has been put in by accused 1 and 2 and Crl. R. C. No. 648 by accused 4 and 5.

    Taking the first charge under Sect. 134 (4), Sect. 134 (1) says:

    “After the balance sheet has been laid before the company at the general meeting a copy thereof signed by the manager or secretary of the company shall be filed with the Registrar at the same time as the copy of the annual list of members and summary prepared in accordance with the requirements of Sect. 32.”

    The first balance-sheet Ex. Y prepared for the year ending 31st July, 1928 was passed at a general meeting of the company held on 26th December, 1929 and filed with the Registrar on 16th January, 1930. The next annual balance sheet of the company representing the state of the bank on 31st July, 1929, has not as yet been filed. On 9th January, 1930 the Registrar sent a reminder (Ex. Z) to the bank to expedite the balance-sheet. The managing Director of the Bank replied by Ex. Z (1) dated 18th January, 1930, acknowledging receipt of Ex. Z and promising to send the balance sheet. A further reminder Ex. O was sent on 29th May, 1930 to which Ex. P dated 5th June, 1930 is the Bank's reply promising to send the balance sheet. A still further reminder Ex. Q dated 14th July, 1930 and another Ex. S on 19th August, 1930 were sent. The contention of the accused is that as the last general meeting was held on 26th December, 1929, there was time to convene the next general meeting till 26th December 1930, and therefore the call for the balance sheet by the Registrar wag premature. It is in the evidence of the Registrar's clerk himself that the last general meeting was held on 26th December, 1929 and the next general meeting should be held within 15 months and that for the purpose of the general meeting there was time till 31st December 1930. The learned Presidency Magistrate got over this plea by saying that under Sect, 131 (1) of the Act the Bank should have its balance sheet prepared at intervals of not more than fifteen months and the latest date up to which the balance sheet should have been prepared is therefore up to the period ending 31st October 1929 and that under Art. 151 of the Articles of Association such a balance sheet should have been put before the general meeting within not more than four months, and hence there should have been a general meeting not later than 28th February 1930. Apart from the fact that the Articles of Association have no statutory force, this is not what Art. 151 says. It runs:

    “At every ordinary general meeting the Directors shall lay before the Company a profit and loss account, and a balance sheet, containing a summary of the property and assets and liability of the Company made up to a date not more than four months before the meeting, from the time when the last preceding account and balance sheet were made up.”

    The clear meaning of this Article, I think, is that the shareholders of the company are entitled to have a balance sheet made up to within four months before the meeting; but there is nothing to indicate the converse, namely, that a meeting must be called within four months from the date when balance sheets under the rules are made up. The case quoted by the lower Court, Dabendra Nath Das Gupta v. Registrar of Joint Stock Companies in which it was held that the Director of a company cannot plead, in answer to a charge under Sect. 134, his own omission to call the annual general meeting of the company required by Sect. 76 and to place before it such balance sheet has no application to the present case. In that case there was an omission to call the annual general meeting. Here the whole defence is that the annual general meeting was not due to be held and therefore had not been held at the time when the Registrar called for the balance sheet. The charge being one under Sect. 134 (1) the charge of non-filing of the balance sheet before the Registrar receives a complete reply if the accused can show that the balance sheet was not due to be filed before the Registrar. It is altogether immaterial whether they had or had not prepared the balance sheet.

    It was attempted to be argued for the respondent that the accused had committed an offence under Sect. 131 (4) and that that section must be read along with Sect. 134. That is to my mind a quite untenable argument. The accused might have had quite a good defence against a charge under this head and in fact it is suggested that the books had all been taken away and therefore they could not make up the accounts. However that may be, the charge is not under Sect. 131 (4) but under Sect. 134 (4); and to my mind it is clear that they have met this charge effectually and there can be no conviction for this offence.

    The second offence was one under Sect. 32 (4). That section requires a company to make every year a list of all persons who on the day of the first or only ordinary general meeting in the year are members of the company, or have ceased to be members of the company, together with the summary required by Sect. 32 (2). The Bank filed Ex.J dated 11th February 1930—list of members and summary. The Court found that the figures in columns 2 and 3 of items 2 and 3 did not agree with the total of the returns of allotments already filed in respect of three matters.

    “(1) In column 2 the number of preferential shares allotted in cash is noted as 25,8474½ whereas the correct figure according to the return of allotments is 26.126½.

    (2) Again in column 3, the number of ordinary shares allotted for cash is noted as 7,294 whereas it ought to be 7,310 and

    (3) The transfer of shares for the year and the number of shares forfeited had not been noted.”

    Now, it may be observed in the first place that the Court evidently proceeded on the supposition that the previous returns were correct. The previous returns have not been marked as exhibits. There is no evidence that the previous returns were correct. Also there is no evidence that the difference in figures is not merely an arithmetical error in counting. Evidently from the steps which the Registrar took he did not regard the matter as one of deliberate misrepresentation. The whole charge obviously fails in any case unless there is evidence that the previous return is correct because otherwise one must arrive at the conclusion that if there is any mistake in one year it cannot be corrected in the next. As I have said, the original return has not been marked as an exhibit and there is no proof that it is correct. The case quoted by the lower Court, In re Briton Medical and General Life Association , has no application. What was held in that case was that the forwarding to the Registrar of a list of members and summary which upon the face of them purport to satisfy the requirements of the Act is not a sufficient compliance with that section unless such list and summary are in accordance with the facts and the Court can go into this. Finally it is clear that an officer of a company cannot be convicted under this section unless it is found that he knowingly and wilfully authorised or permitted the default. Vide Sundar Das v. The Crown . For all that appears here as regards the first two charges as I have said, they are purely arithmetical mistakes in addition.

    As regards the question of reporting the transfer of the shares in the year, there was a resolution on 17th December 1929 of the Directors forfeiting certain shares, and this no doubt does not appear in Ex. J. The contention of the accused is that that resolution was cancelled at a general meeting held on 29th December 1929, whereas Ex. J was not submitted till 11th February 1930. The learned Presidncy Magistrate says that according to Art. 41 of the Articles of Association of the Company shares may be forfeited by a resolution of the Directors. But there is nothing in the Articles to show that the general power of the share-holders at a public meeting to cancel a decision of the Directors is not possessed by this company or that the cancellation on 29th December 1929 was ultra vires. Therefore the failure to note the forfeiture of the shares in Ex. J, which forfeiture had by that time been cancelled, is not a default. This second charge must therefore also fail and the accused must be acquitted of it.

    The third offence was under Sect. 87 (2). Sect. 87 (1) requires that every company shall keep at its registered office a register containing the names and addresses and the occupations of its Directors and file with the Registrar a copy thereof and from time to time file with the Registrar notice of any change among its Directors or Managers. On 29th May 1930 the 3rd accused sent in his resignation of his directorship of the Bank. But at a meeting of the Directors held on 29th October 1930 that resignation was withdrawn and the resignation of the 4th accused was accepted. The lower Court has dropped the resignation of the 4th accused and only deals with the resignation of the 3rd accused. In Form 26 it is stated that the notice of change should be given within 30 days from the date of occurrence. The resignation of the 3rd accused no doubt took effect from the date of the resignation letter. Vide Glossop v. Glossop , quoted by the lower Court. But it has been held in Kamud Chandra Nandi v. Emperor that the provision in foot-note of Form No. 26, Appendix A of the Act, requiring a notice of the change among Directors to be given within 30 days from the date of occurrence is not mandatory and that no offence is committed by a company by not filing such notice. If there had not been this decision on this point, it might certainly be argued with a good deal of force that as Sect. 87(1) contains only such a vague expression as ‘from time to time the particular period prescribed in the form was meant to supplement it and was mandatory. However, I see no reason for not following this decision and there is none other on the point. It seems to me in the light of this decision that the tima mentioned in Sect. 87 (1) should be made more specific.

    I find that the conviction on none of the three offences can stand. It is not therefore necessary to deal at great length with the two other objections raised. One is that the complaint was not properly instituted, the complaint being only signed by the Registrar's clerk and there is nothing to show that the Registrar authorised it. In this connection Emperor… v. Shib Das Marwari…. were quoted for the petitioners. The first case seems to be distinctly against them, for though it was said that the Court should be chary of admitting such complaints it was held that the complaint was competent. The second case is a decision in the petitioners' favour. I do not think it is necessary to express an opinion on this point.

    The other point is that there has been misjoinder of parties. That I think is clear. The 3rd accused was obviously not chargeable under the third charge but he was tried jointly with the other accused on all the charges. It has been held in Upendranath Bishwas v. Emperor that Sect. 233 Criminal Procedure Code applies to summons cases, and as regards misjoinder of charges vitiating trial, may be mentioned the well-known Privy Council case in Subrahmania Ayyar v. King-Emperor . I would therefore hold that in any case the misjoinder of parties had vitiated the trial.

    In the light of the above it is hardly necessary to deal with Crl. R. C. No. 648 put in by the 4th accused and the Bank, 5th accused, represented by its liquidator T. A. Doss. With regard to this I may say that this liquidator has failed to prove his status. In the Fort St. George Gazette dated 13th January 1931, three liquidators were appointed and he says that two of these resigned and the third appointed petitioner in his place. But he failed to show me any authority for one liquidator appointing another in his place. I consider therefore that he has no locus standi. As the grounds taken by the 4th accused are the same as those taken by the other accused this petition must also be allowed.

    In the result the convictions are Set aside and the accused acquitted. The fines will be refunded.

    N. R. R.Covictions set aside.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    V.K. Lakshmana Mudaliar, In Re.
    (Mar 3, 1932)