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  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two persons interested in a charity instituted under a settlement deed dated 4 February 1911 by Marimuthu Pillai brought a suit seeking:

  • Removal of the first defendant who purported to be trustee at the time of institution of the suit;
  • Framing of a scheme in respect of the charity;
  • Declaration that certain alienations by the first defendant in favour of the fourth and seventh defendants were invalid and not binding on the trust; and
  • Appointment of a fit and proper person as trustee in place of the first defendant.

The suit was instituted after obtaining the sanction of the Advocate-General under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned District Judge of East Tanjore substantially decreed the suit as prayed for. The sixth and seventh defendants appealed; the sixth defendant is a purchaser from the fourth defendant of the property originally alienated by the first defendant.

The operative settlement deed (4 February 1911) provided that property acquired by Marimuthu Pillai was to be used to conduct a seven-day water-shed ("thannir pandal dhwnam") charity during the Masi Makham festival of Sri Souriraja Perumal at Tirukannapuram, feeding 100 persons on the festival day, and that remaining income (after charity expenses and excluding government kist) was to be used for maintenance of three named persons (two sons Subramaniam, Natesan, and his wife Thillai Ammal). Management was entrusted to his eldest son-in-law, N. Govindaswami Pillai, and thereafter to Govindaswami's nominee. Subsequent events in the record include:

  • Releases by the two sons in 1921 and 1927 (consideration Rs. 100 each) releasing their rights to Govindaswami;
  • Govindaswami executed a will on 28 December 1932 treating the property as his subject to an obligation to conduct the charity and appointing his son Murugayya Pillai (the first defendant) as trustee; Govindaswami died in 1933;
  • The first defendant sold two acres 61 cents on 20 October 1934 to the fourth defendant (who later sold to the sixth defendant on 25 June 1939); the first defendant sold other properties to the seventh defendant by deed dated 25 January 1941.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. How is the settlement deed of 4 February 1911 to be construed: was the property itself dedicated to the religious charity or did the charity take only a charge on the property (i.e., a limited charge for necessary expenses) leaving the property or surplus to the settlor's heirs?
  2. What is the legal status of N. Govindaswami Pillai under the deed — merely a manager with no proprietary title, or a trustee with authority and duties recognized by law?
  3. Whether alienations by the first defendant (as trustee) of trust property were valid and binding on the charity, or whether they could be declared invalid as contrary to his trust office?
  4. Whether a British Indian court (specifically the District Court of East Tanjore) had jurisdiction to entertain the suit given that part of the festival ritual involved movement of the deity to a location in French India.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The deed created only a charge on the property sufficient to carry out the charitable objects; the property itself was not dedicated to the charity.
  • The legal heirs of the settlor were entitled to the property subject to the obligation to conduct the charity.
  • N. Govindaswami Pillai was merely a manager with no legal title to the property and did not occupy the position of trustee.
  • No British Indian court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit because the charity had to be performed in part at a place situated in French India (reliance on Bilasrai Joharmal v. Shinarain Sarupachand).

Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • Taking the terms of the deed together with surrounding circumstances, the entire property was dedicated to the charity, subject only to an obligation that surplus income, if any, be used for maintenance of the three named relatives.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Harnarain v. Surja Kunwari (1921) L.R. 48 I.L. 143 : I.L.R. 43 All. 291 (P.C.) There is no fixed or absolute rule to construe the effect of a will or settlement; the correct approach is a conspectus of the entire provisions of the instrument. The court relied on this principle to justify examining the deed as a whole and its surrounding circumstances before deciding whether the property was dedicated to the charity or only charged.
Ashutosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterji (1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 182 : I.L.R. 5 Cal. 438 (P.C.) Illustrative of cases where gifts or bequests were made in favour of heirs or family members or a residuary legatee—courts have held such instruments did not dedicate the entire property to charity. The court distinguished these authorities on the basis that those deeds contained express gifts to heirs or residuary legatees, whereas the present deed omitted words indicating a gift to heirs or descendants.
Sonatun Bysack v. Sreemutty Juggutsoondaree Dossee (1859) 8 M.I.A. 66 Another authority where a bequest in favour of heirs/members of family was operative; used as context on how instruments with such provisions are construed. Distinguished by the court for the same reason as Ashutosh Dutt — the present deed did not create a gift to heirs or a residuary legatee.
Thiruvengadamudayanaiya v. Narassimhaswamiaiya (1941) 1 M.L.J. 488 Case cited among those where family or heir-beneficiaries were favoured by express provisions in the instrument. Distinguished; the court emphasized the absence in the present deed of language conferring benefits on heirs or descendants.
Bilasrai Joharmal v. Shinarain Sarupachand (1944) 1 M.L.J. 466 : L.R. 71 I.A. 47 (P.C.) Addressed limits of jurisdiction where the charity and its administration were situate in foreign territory; held it would be inappropriate for the High Court of Bombay to interpose authority over a trust administered wholly in foreign territory. The court distinguished the case on facts: in the present case the property and temple are in British India (even if a ritual temporarily occurs in French territory), and the suit seeks to protect trust property within British jurisdiction; therefore Bilasrai Joharmal did not bar the District Court's jurisdiction here.
In re Duncan : In re Taylor's Trusts (1867) 2 Ch. Ap. 356 Shows that authority (e.g., Charity Commissioners) can extend to charities endowed in England or Wales even where revenues are applied abroad; the foundation/institution may be considered to take effect where property or application forms part of the endowment. The principle was cited to support the conclusion that when the property and the charitable application are parts of the endowment in the same jurisdiction, local courts may properly entertain proceedings to protect trust property; applied to support British Indian jurisdiction over property and temple located in British India.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the matter by construing the settlement deed in its entirety and examining surrounding circumstances, relying on the settled principle that there is no fixed rule and the instrument must be read as a whole.

Key steps in the court's analysis:

  1. Identified the dominant intention in the preamble: the settlor's declared objective was dedication of property to a religious charity for attainment of salvation. The court found no expressed or necessarily implied intention to confer general benefit on heirs.
  2. Placed significance on the omission of words that would indicate a gift to heirs or descendants ("and their heirs", "from generation to generation"), observing that the three named relatives were described as personae designatae rather than as generic members of a family or residuary beneficiaries.
  3. Noted specific provisions and factual indicators that opposed a family legacy: although two sons were named, they were not given management rights or the duty to perform obsequies; management and obsequies were entrusted to Govindaswami (son-in-law), and succession of management was to his nominee rather than to any heirs of the settlor.
  4. Considered whether the charity was incapable of expansion (a point often decisive where surplus exists). The court concluded the charity was not incapable of expansion because:
    • The deed prescribed feeding 100 persons but did not fix a sum for that feeding or for the water-shed charity;
    • Expenses were not rigidly fixed; therefore it could not be said the settlor unalterably fixed part of the income thereby creating a guaranteed surplus;
    • Evidence indicated no likelihood of a large surplus: contemporaneous releases by the sons recited insufficient funds; accounting estimates produced low net income numbers (approximate net income and expense figures are set out in the record).
  5. On the basis of the above, the court concluded that the charity (and not the heirs generally) was the true beneficiary; Govindaswami should be treated as a trustee of the charity, with the limited obligation to apply any surplus income (if any) for the maintenance of the three specified relatives only. If those relatives died or ceased to exist, the trustee had no obligation to divert income away from the charitable object.
  6. Applied the legal consequence that a trustee holding trust property cannot validly alienate the trust property unless the alienation is justified on recognized grounds (e.g., necessity), which was not asserted. Consequently, the sales by the first defendant (as trustee) to the fourth and seventh defendants were declared not binding on the charity by the learned District Judge and affirmed by the court.
  7. On jurisdiction, the court examined the contention that part performance of the charitable ritual occurred in French India. The deed did not specify a foreign situs; the temple and the property were in British India. The court distinguished Bilasrai Joharmal on its facts (where the charity and its administration were effectively foreign) and observed authorities permitting jurisdiction where property or the charitable institution is located in the forum jurisdiction. The court therefore held the District Court of East Tanjore had jurisdiction to entertain the suit to protect property and trust rights within its territory.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed. The court affirmed the District Judge's substantive decree: the property was held for the charitable purpose and not as a residuary beneficial proprietary estate for the settlor's heirs; Govindaswami Pillai was to be treated as trustee; the alienations made by the first defendant in favour of the fourth and seventh defendants were not binding on the charity.

Consequences and implications:

  • The two alienations made by the first defendant were declared invalid as against the charity and thus the purchasers (through those alienations) cannot assert title that defeats the charitable trust as declared by the court.
  • Govindaswami (and his successors as appointed under the instrument) are to be regarded as trustees of the charitable trust, with a defined obligation to apply any surplus to the three specified relatives only; absent those relatives, income must be applied to the charitable object.
  • The District Court of East Tanjore was held to have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit given that the property and temple are within British India, notwithstanding that part of a festival ritual occurs in neighbouring French territory.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the plaintiffs (respondents 1 and 2). The opinion does not purport to establish any novel legal doctrine beyond applying established principles of construction of trusts and jurisdictional principles to the facts; the decision primarily determines rights and obligations between the parties in this case.

This summary is confined strictly to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion.

    Jainambukanni Ammal And Another v. Ruthrapathy Pillai And Others

    1. This appeal arises out of a suit filed by two persons interested in a certain charity to be conducted on the occasion of the Masi Makham festival of Sri Souriraja Perumal at Tirukannapuram as provided in a deed of settlement executed by one Marimuthu Pillai on 4th February, 1911, for the removal of the lirst defendant who purported to be the trustee at the time of the institution of the suit, for the framing of a scheme in respect of the charity and to declare certain alienations made by the first defendant in favour of the. fourth and the seventh defendants invalid and not binding on the trust and to appoint a fit and proper person as trustee in place of the first defendant. The suit was filed after obtaining the sanction of the Advocate-General under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned District Judge of East Tanjore has substantially decreed the suit as prayed for and the sixth and seventh defendants appeal, the sixth defendant: being a purchaser from the fourth defendant of the property alienated to him.

    2. Marimuthu Pillai executed on the 4th February, 1911, a settlement deed on the construction of which depends the determination of the main question arising in this appeal. The document runs as follows:

    I have made the following arrangement, in respect of the property specified hereunder which was acquired by me out of my own earnings and which has been in my enjoyment with miras for the salvation of my soul. Out of the funds of the aforesaid property, thannir pandal dhwmam, i.e., water-shed charity shall be conducted for seven days on the occasion of the Masi Makham festival of Sri Souriraja Perumal at Thirukannapuram. During that Makham festival day, 100 persons shall be fed and the charity conducted. Out of the income derived from the aforesaid land, excluding the Government kist, etc., expenses in connection with the charity the remaining income shall be utilised for the maintenance of my sons who have come from the east, viz., (1) Subramaniam, (2) Natesan and (3) my wife, Thillai Ammal. The aforesaid charity and the aforesaid property shall be managed by my eldest son-in-law, N. Govindaswami Pillai. After the said Govindaswami Pillai the aforesaid charity and the said family shall be managed by his nominee. The aforesaid Govindaswami Pillai shall perform obsequies, etc., to me, as well as to my wife.

    3. The contention of the appellants is that under this document the charity is only entitled to a charge for an amount necessary to carry out the objects mentioned in the deed and that the property itself was not dedicated for the benefit of the charity. The appellants also contend that in any event the legal heirs of the settlor are entitled to the property under the document subject no doubt to an obligation to have the charity conducted as provided therein. The status of Govindaswami Pillai was not made clear by the learned advocate for the appellants, but as we understand him, Govindaswami Pillai was only a manager with no legal title to the property and he did not occupy even the position of a trustee. The contention of the contesting respondents (plaintiffs) is that taking all the terms of the deed into consideration together with the surrounding circumstances, the entire property was dedicated to the charity subject only to an obligation on the part of the manager to utilise the surplus income, if any, for the maintenance of three named individuals who were also related to the settlor.

    4. In such cases the only rule which appears to be established from the decided cases is that there cannot be any fixed and absolute rule to construe the effect of any particular document. In Harnarain v. Surja Kunwari (1921) L.R. 48 I.L 143 : I.L.R. 43 All. 291 (P.C.), Lord Shaw in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee said:

    The question whether the idol itself shall be considered the true beneficiary, subject to a charge in favour of the heirs or specified relatives of the testator for their upkeep, or that, on the other hand, these heirs shall be considered the true beneficiaries of the property subject to a charge for the upkeep, worship and expenses of the idol, is a question which can only be settled by a conspectus of the entire provisions of the will.

    Having regard to these observations, it is necessary to deal with the provisions of the deed before referring to some of the decided cases cited on behalf of the appellants before us.

    6. The dominant intention of the settlor which appears from the Preamble to the deed was clearly to dedicate property to a religious charity for the attainment of salvation. There is no intention either expressed on the face of the document or which could be necessarily implied, to confer any benefit on his heirs in general It is significant that even in the clause which provided for the maintenance of the three relatives the words "and their heirs" or "and their descendant or the words "from generation to generation" are absent.

    7. Reading the document as a whole, it is impossible for us to discover any gift of the surplus income or the property either to the sons or to the members of his family generally; nor do we find any expressed intention to make a resuduary gift in favour of them. The three individuals are mentioned as personae designate rather than as members of his family. The next important circumstance designatae from the face of the document is that though he mentions two persons as his sons who have come from the east, he totally disregards them. They have no right even to manage the charity and the property. Even the obsequies to be performed for himself and for his wife are directed to be performed not by the sons, as would in the ordinary course be expected from a Hindu but they are directed to be Performed by the son-in-law Govindaswami Pillai. After the death of Govindaswami Pillai, the person to manage the charity and the family is to be a person nominated by Govindaswami Pillai and not any of his heirs or descendant. These circumstances clearly distinguish this case from the rulings relied on by the advocate for the appellants in Ashutosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterji (1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 182 : I.L.R. 5 Cal. 438 (P.C.), Sonatun Bysack v. Sreemutty Juggutsoondaree Dossee (1859) 8 M.I.A. 66 and Thiruvengadamudayanaiya v. Narassimhaswamiaiya (1941) 1 M.L.J. 488. In all these casesthere was a gift or a bequest in favour of the heirs or the members of the family or in favour of a residuary legatee. Such a provision is significantly absent from the deed which we have to construe in this case and we attach great importance to the omission of words indicating a gift to any member of the family or to the heirs of the settlor generally.

    8. In most of the decided cases, importance has been attached to the fact that chanty provided by a particular document was not capable of expansion and in such cases when the income of the property in question far exceeded the requirements of the charity as fixed in and by the deed itself, it has been held that the charity will not be entitled to the surplus. Whether in such a case the donees under the document would take the surplus or the surplus would fall into the residue does not directly arise in this case. But we are clearly of opinion that the charity specified in the document in this case is not a charity which is incapable of expansion.Though hundred persons are directed to be fed, the amount to be expended is not fixed, nor the nature of the feeding. Likewise no amount is fixed for the to be incurred for the water-shed charity. In these circumstances it is not possible to say that any part of the income has been unalterably feed by the settlor for the expenses of the charity with the result that there is bound to be a surplus disposed of or undisposed of by the document. Moreover, from the evidence on record it does not appear that at the time of the settlement deed or even subseauently there was the likelihood of a large surplus. In 1921 one of the sons Subramaniam executed a deed, Ex. P-2 releasing all his rights under the deed to Govindaswami Pillai, the son-in-law, in consideration of a sum of Rs. 100. It is recited in that deed that " the funds out of the property were not sufficient to meet the Similar recitals are to be found in another release deed executed by the other son Natesa on :18th AprilI 1927, Ex. P-2-a. In this instance also the release was for of Rs 100. Even at the present tune it is probable that very much would not be left after providing for the kist for the legitimate expensesof the Thark V. The evidence is, about a 100 kalams would be the melwaram which at the normal rate of Rs 1-4-0 would come to Rs. 125 for the year. Deducting the sum of Rs 80 payable as kist, the net income would be about Rs. 45. The estimate of P.W.1 and P.W.2 that for the conduct of the charity, a sum of at least Rs 60 woulf be acquired does not appear to be extrvagant.

    9. Taking all the circumstances into cosideration, we are clearly of opionin that the charity itself is the true befeficiary and Govindaswami Pillai should be considered to be a trustee of the charity and the only obligation of the trustee for the time being, was to utilise the surplus income, if any trustee, of the three specified relatives of the settlor maintioned in the deed. On the death of the three specified relatives or their effacement otherwise, there would be no obligation on the trustee to utilise any part of the income of the property for any object other than the charitable object maintioned in the document.

    10. Govindswami pillai after obtaining the release deeds above mentioned from the two sons of the two sons of the settlor executed a will, Ex. P-3, On the 28th December, 1932. Therein he treats the property as absolutely his own, subject to an obligation to conduct the charity and makes provision for payment of maintenance to members of his family and appoints his son Murugayya Pillai, the first defedant to be trustee of the charity after him. Govindaswami Pillai died sometime in 1933 and the first defendant became the trustee in accordance with the will. He sold on 20th October, 1934, two acres, sixty one cents, out of the property covered by the settlement deed for a sum of Rs. 500 to his sister the fourth defendant. She in turn conveyed the property purchased by her to the sixth defendant by a sale deed dated 25th June, 1939. The first defendant sold the rest of the properties seventh defendant by a sale deed, dated 25th January 1941. It follows from what we have held that the first defendeant as trustee was not entitled to alienate the properties which belonged to the trust, as the alienations were not sought to be supported on the ground of necessity. The learned District Judge was right in declaring these two alienations not binding on the charity.

    11. The learned advocate for the appellants next contended that no Court in British India would have jurisdiction to entertain this suit, because the charity in question had to be performed at a place which was situated in French India. The deed of settlement itself does not mention the place where the charity has to be conducted. The temple of Sri Souriraja Perumal is at Tirukkannapuram which is admittedly in British India. But it appears from evidence that on Masi Makham festical day, the deity is taken to the beach in Tirumalairajapatnam which is in French territory. The recent decision of the Judicial Commitee in Bilasrai Joharmal v. Shinarain Sarupachand (1944) 1 M.L.J. 466 : L.R. 71 I.A. 47 (P.C.) is relied on in support of this contention. The facts of that case were peculiar and are totally different from the facts of the present case. In the case before the Judicial Committee, the public charity which had to be conducted was a hospital at a town in Jaipur State The plaint in that case prayed for the removal of the defendants from their office as trustee and for the appointment of new trustees and the sole ground of complaint was that the defendants had without authority changed the name of the hospital It was held thatit would be inconvenient if not intolerable, that the High Court of Bombay should interpose their authority upon the questions arising in the course of administering a trust which was solely situate in a foreign territory. Their Lordships point out that the plaintiffs should be left to pursue their remedy from the Courts of the country in which the hospital is carried on and whose poor are the beneficiaries of the charity. But they also point out that the question with which they had to deal that case was not a case relation to any step to safeguard trust funds which lay within the jurisdiction of the British Indian Court or to protect and preserve such funds. At page 469 their Lordships say:

    The case is not one of founding a charity abroad, or settling a scheme for a charity to be cnducted abroad, not of preserving the property of foreign charity, nor of assisting a foreign charity or a foreign Court to collect or administer funds within the jurisdiction.

    It has been held in England--see In re Duncan : In re Taylor's Trusts (1867) 2 Ch. Ap. 356--that the authority of the Charity Commissioners extends to charities endowed in England or Wales, although the revenues are applied abroad. In that case the properties (certain freehold and leasehold estates) were situate in England the object of the trust being the promotion of Christian education in the Island of Jamaica. Turner, L.J., says at page 360:

    The foundation and institution of the charity ought, I think, generally speaking, to be considered as taking effect in England or Wales, within the meaning of the Act, if the application of the charity be there and the endowment abroad, or the endowment be there and the application abroad, both the property and the application of it being, in effect, parts of the endowment and institution.

    In the present case, the property is in British India and the temple itself is situate in British India. No relief in respect of this property can be obtained except from a British Indian Court and we do not see any reason to hold that the District Court of East Tanjore within whose jurisdiction the temple and the properties are situate had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit.

    12. The appellants have failed on both the points raised before us and the appeal is dismissed with costs of the plaintiffs (respondents i and 2).

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    Jainambukanni Ammal And Another v. Ruthrapathy Pillai And Others
    (Nov 7, 1945)