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  • Sect. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • appeal.Rule 89 of O. 21
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  • Sect. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • appeal.Rule 89 of O. 21

    Bodapati Adenna v. Bodapati Chinna Ramayya

    The question for our decision in this civil miscellaneous second appeal (with which has been filed a civil revision petition) is whether a lessee, subject to whose lease immovable property has been sold in Court auction, can apply under O. 21, R. 89 of the Civil Procedure Code to have the sale set aside. The District Munsif dismissed the application but it was allowed by the Subordinate Judge on appeal.

    Rule 89 of O. 21 runs as follows:

    “Where immovable property has been sold in execation of a de see, any person, either owning such property or holding an interest therein by virtue of a title acquired before such sale, may apply to have the sale set aside”

    upon complying with certain conditions. The argument addressed to us is twofold.

    (A) That a lease obtained before a sale is not an ‘interest’ held in the property by virtue of a “title acquired” before such sale; and (B) that the property sold excluded the lessee's right and therefore that the lessee cannot be said to have an interest in that property,

    (a) According to Sect. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lessee is a transferee of a right to enjoy the property leased, and there is enough authority [See Secretary of State for India v. Karuna Kanta Chowdhry and Mohipal Sing v. Lalji Sing] for the position that a lease amounts to a transfer of interest in the property, and, if there was a transfer of interest, there was, as the rule also requires, a “title acquired.” In Potti Nayaker v. Suppammal, Venkatasubba Rao, J., went so far as to express the view that even a trespasser has an interest which would allow him to come under this rule a view which was dissented from by the other learned Judge who composed the Bench, Oldfield, J. It is unnecessary for us to offer an opinion upon this point, and we mention the case rather because the view is expressed in it that a lessee may apply, an opinion also to be found in the judgment of Ameer Ali, J., in the Calcutta Full Bench case, Paresh Nath Singha v. Nabogopal Chattopadhya. We can see no good reason why, if a mortgagee has an interest which enables him to apply, a lessee should not equally have an interest. (b) The argument under this second head virtually amounts to this, that the rule does not bear what appears to be its plain meaning and that in the term “interest” is comprised only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor which is sold and not any other interest subject to which the sale takes place. The corresponding provision in the Code of 1882, Sect. 310 (A), has the words “any person whose immovable property has been sold,” and it can hardly be questioned that the language in the present rule is of a wider scope. Nevertheless it was held by the Full Bench in Paresh Nath Singha v. Nabogopal Chattopadhya, that under the old wording a mortgagee, was a person who could apply, although no doubt, that decision proceeded on the footing that the auction purchaser would be in a position to annul the mortgage. Although it is not expressly so stated, the judgments of the learned judges who composed the majority in that case do give some ground for the inference that the application could be made because the mortgagees was a right which might be affected by the sale. But that decision is not upon the language of the rule as it now stands, and we cannot avoid the conclusion that Mookerjee, J., when in Dulhin Mathura Koer v. Bhangsidhari Singh, he construed the rule as relating to only to a person whose interest would be “affected”, in the strictly legal sense of that word, by the sale, read into it something which it does not contain and which might have been clearly expressed if it had been intended so to restrict it. Whatever may have been the reason for amending the phraseology, we think that, as the rule stands the word “property” must mean the tangible property sold, whether or not persons other than the judgment debtor have any interest in it, and that it does not mean merely the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor alone. This is clearly the meaning which must be given to the word “property” in Rr. 62 and 91 of O. 21, and it is the meaning which Krishnan, J., attached to it in Kandaswami Asari v. Swaminatha Stapathi. Any more restricted meaning would apparently limit resort to the rule to the judgment-debtor or to one of several joint judgment-debtors or in the very unusual case of a mortgagee-decree-holder applying to have the sale under his own decree set aside. Its application to the case of a sale free of a prior mortgage could hardly arise as under R. 12 of O. 34. The consent of the prior mortgagee is necessary to that course. We think accordingly that there are no sufficient grounds to limit the application of the rule in the manner suggested but rather that its purpose is to include among those who can apply such persons as mortgagees and lessees of the property, who may be concerned to avoid a transfer of the judgment-debtor's title although their own interest may not be “affected” using that word in its strictly legal sense. Accordingly we confirm the order of the Subordinate Judge and dismiss the civil miscellaneous second appeal and the civil revision petition the latter with costs.

    N. R. R.Appeal and Petition dismissed.

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    Bodapati Adenna v. Bodapati Chinna Ramayya
    (Aug 11, 1927)