1. The present writ petition has been filed by the landlord against the judgment of the II Additional District Judge, Kanpur, dt. 21-5-1984, allowing the revision preferred by the tenant-respondents 1 to 10 under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.

2. The dispute is regarding premises No. 17/3-V. The, Mall, Kanpur. The aforesaid respondents are the, tenants thereof. The tenancy is for residential-cum-non-residential purposes. In 1972, the landlord moved an application under S. 21 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act No. XIII of 1972) for release of residential and commercial accommodation. A compromise was arrived at in between, the petitioner and the tenant on 10-10-1973. In pursuance of the said compromise, the respondents surrendered land measuring nearly 700 square yards. In the compromise, amongst others, what was agreed was:

“(i) they will not make any material alterations in portion in their occupation except with the permission in writing of the landlords.

(ii) after the expiry of the said period of 10 years the landlords will be free to develop the site of the tenanted accommodation of the apposite parties facing Mall Road and construct a building thereon.”

3. On 11th Oct., 1973, a letter was written by the tenants to the landlord seeking to incorporate, in the compromise which had been omitted from being mentioned in it. Para 4 of this letter, is reproduced below:—

“(a) Re-erection of our factory sheds and other requisites of the factory in the land remaining in our tenancy of per plan.

(b) Two rooms with or without latrine/bathroom in the back portion of our residential accommodation, not of permanent nature.

(c) A siding room adjoining to the main building on the open land between Khaprail shed and the main building”.

4. What may be noted here is that the respondents were permitted to construct two rooms in the back portion of the residential accommodation (not of permanent nature).

5. The tenant-respondents, however, made default in payment of rent for the period 1-10-1974 to 31-3-1978. The petitioner gave notice in April, 1978 and thereafter, filed Suit No. 804 of 1978 for eviction against the respondents on the ground of default in payment of rent, unauthorised sub-tenancy on a portion and raising of construction without his permission.

6. On 21-12-1979, the suit was decreed by the Judge, Small Causes. The revision preferred by the respondents was also dismissed on 17-9-1980. The respondents, thereafter, filed Writ No. 9995 of 1980, Smt. Gulab Devi v. VII Additional District Judge, Kanpur, in the High Court. The writ petition was allowed on 10-9-1981 and the suit was remands to the Judge Small Causes for a fresh trial. The observations were:

“(1) The authorities below have committed a manifest error of law in deciding the plea about the sub-tenancy on the basis of the provisions contained in S. 12(1)(b) and Explanation (1) to S. 25(2) of the Act and not on the basis of the evidence produced by the parties, as was necessary to decide an issue of, sub-tenancy under S. 7(3) of the old Act and their orders on this point cannot, therefore, be sustained.

(2) Finding of the trial court, affirmed in revision on 17-9-1980, it was held, deserved to be quashed and the issue whether the tenants had raised construction in violation of S. 20(2)(c) of the Act 13 of 1972 gone into afresh.”

7. After remand, the trial court recorded additional evidence including the statement of the Advocate Commissioner, who had been to the spot on May 31, 1978 and also disposed of objection to his report. The trial court held that:

“(i) the tenant had raised construction of permanent nature in the building without the landlord's permission and the constructions raised were such which diminished the value and utility of the building let out to the respondents.

(ii) that Gaya Prasad, Govind Prasad, Ram Narain and Chhote Lal were tenants admitted by the tenant to various portions of the tenant in contravention of S. 7(3) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act without permission of the landlord.

(iii) the petitioner was the sole landlord being the Karta of the joint Hindu family and their having been partition through registered award dt. Jan. 18, 1977.”

8. Aggrieved, the respondents preferred revision which was allowed by the Additional District Judge by his judgment dt. May 21, 1984. Amongst others, the Additional District Judge held that:

(i) that the petitioner was entitled to sue for eviction being the Karta of the joint Hindu family and there having been the partition as claimed by him;

(ii) there was no subletting and as such no Contravention of S. 7(3) of U.P Act No. 3 of 1947. There was no violation of S. 20(2)(c) on the part of tenant-respondents.”

9. Challenging the aforesaid judgment of the Additional District Judge, the landlord has filed the present writ petition.

10. The points convassed by the petitioner's learned counsel against the judgment were:

(i) The Additional District Judge deciding the revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act transgressed the limits of revisional jurisdiction by entering into appraisal of evidence;

(ii) findings of fact have been interfered with, on its own view of evidence, the opinion has been substituted in law of the Judge Small Causes;

(iii) finding on S. 20(2)(c) of U.P Act No. XIII of 1972 is manifestly erroneous being based on its wrong interpretation and assumption of facts against the petitioner landlord which did not exist on record; and

(iv) the finding of the Additional District Judge that the respondents did not sublet the various portions of the tenement let out to him, to Govind Prasad, Gaya Prasad and Chhote Lal is against S. 7(3) of U.P Act No. 3 of 1947.

11. The point of S. 20(2)(c) may be taken up first.

12. S. 20(2) provides for various grounds for the eviction of tenant from the building after the determination of his tenancy. Cl. (c) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 runs as under:—

“that the tenant has, without the permission in writing of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction or structural alteration in the building as is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it.”

13. The landlord was required under law; to establish:

(i) the tenant has made some construction;

(ii) the construction has been made in the building;

(iii) this has been done without the landlord's written permission;

(iv) the construction is such as is likely to diminish its value or likely to diminish its utility or to disfigure it.”

14. At the out-set, it may be noted that there is a marked difference in between the languages employed in S. 3(1)(c) of the old Act and that used in S. 20(2)(c) of the present Act.

15. The letter dt. 11-10-1973, which granted permission to the respondents with regard to making of construction, has already been reproduced. To recapitulate what was permitted was:

(a) reconstruction of factory sheds and other requisites of the factory in the land under tenancy;

(b) two rooms with or without latrine/bathroom in the back portion of residential accommodation not of permanent nature;

(c) the said room adjoining the main building on the open lawn between the Khaprail-shed and the main building.

16. Two things may be noted immediately for deciding the controversy raised in this writ petition about material alterations. The first is that the tenancy of the respondents could be terminated after the expiry of the period of ten years from the date of entering into the compromise for enabling the landlord-petitioner, to develop the site of the tenanted accommodation of the opposite party facing Mall Road. The second is that the constructions which were permitted to be made could not be of a permanent nature. The intention Obviously was that the construction of two rooms mentioned in cl. (b) of para 4 would be of a temporary nature What the respondents however, did was that he constructed eight rooms which had been reported by the Commissioner and shown in his map (Ex. 26/1) as A1, B1, C1, D1 and by letters E1, F1, G1 and II.

17. Amba Sahai, who reported on behalf of the respondents, showed in his map (Ex. A-5-1) the said eight rooms constructed by the respondents.

18. The learned Judge Small Causes held after appraisal of evidence that “whatever, they have constructed is construction of permanent nature.” The Judge Small Causes also took into consideration the statement of Engineer Amba Sahai (D.W 1) examined by the respondents. His reading of the statement was that all the eight rooms which had been admitted by Engineer Amba Sahai, were pucca rooms fitted with electricity, ceiling fans and coolers. The revisional court does not disagree so far as the construction of eight rooms by the respondents is concerned. For finding that S. 20(2)(c) did not apply, the view of the learned Additional District Judge was that as the constructions had been made on the open land in the tenancy of the respondents and the rooms were not attached to the main building in their tenancy, therefore the respondents did not make them liable to eviction and therefore, S. 20(2)(c) was not attracted.

19. The open land was part of me tenant let out to the respondents. The prohibition to make construction under S. 20(2)(c) is not confined to the building but also to the open land which may form part of the tenancy. The learned Additional District Judge has misconstrued S. 20(2)(c) by holding that if the respondents would have made some constructions in the constructed portion let out to them, only then S. 20(2)(c) could apply. This is patently erroneous interpretation.

20. The next question that requires consideration is whether the learned Additional District Judge is right in holding that the construction of eight rooms was temporary in nature and on that account S. 20(2)(c) could not be attracted. The Judge, Small Causes held on the evidence that the constructions were of a permanent nature. The Additional District Judge, however, took a different view only on account of the fact that there were no slabs on these rooms. He held:

“In subsequent agreement Ex. 22, the tenants were permitted to make rooms but not of permanent nature. The report of the Commissioner and other evidence on record clearly indicates that there is no slab on these rooms. On the other hand, some of the rooms have been roofed from Allahabadi tiles.”

21. The view of the learned Additional District Judge is manifestly erroneous simply because that there were no slabs on the roofs and instead Allahabadi tiles had been used for that purpose. The constructions on that account could not be held to be of a temporary nature. In Allahabad most of the bungalows in the civil lines are roofed by Allahabadi tiles. The learned Judge appears to have incorrectly thought that merely because the tiles had been used for roofing, the constructions were temporary. A tile is a flat or curved piece of fired clay, stone, concrete, or other material used specially for roofs. Some people still perfect to have roofing done by slabs. So far as Allahabadi tiles are concerned, they are generally curved pieces of fired clay. It, therefore appears that the finding of the Additional District Judge that the use of Allahabadi tiles oyer the eight rooms for roofing purpose made it a kachcha construction is erroneous. The finding of the Judge Small Causes that all the eight rooms built by the respondents were pucca is based on the report of the Commissioner, his statement and the statements of other witnesses. He took into account the statement of Engineer Amba Sahai (D.W I) also. The relevant portion of the Commissioner's report produced from the side of the petitioner is extracted below.:—

[Matter in Hindi omitted — Ed.]

22. In my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge has committed an error in holding that the roofing by tiles were conclusive to determine that the constructions were not permanent. Roofing was one of the many things which has to be taken into account. It was not conclusive and determinative. The Judge, Small Causes found the constructions as permanent by taking into account the relevant facts in its totality. This was not done by the Additional District Judge.

23. What would have been considered a building of the nature as it was in the instant case by the public in general is also a relevant factor.

24. The Additional District Judge should have taken this fact also into account while coming to the conclusion about the nature of the constructions.

25. The trial court, in the instant case upon consideration of the entire evidence, reached the finding that the respondents had raised eight rooms on the vacant land forming part of the tenanted building and this was without the landlord's permission. The Addl. District Judge has no power under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to reappraise the evidence and to record finding different than that of the Judge. Small Causes on the ground on which it had been done in the instant case. That apart, it has been shown above that the judgment of the Judge, Small Causes was erroneously reversed by the Additional District Judge by holding that the constructions made by the respondents were not of a permanent nature. The constructions, in my opinion, were of a permanent nature and as such, one of the qualifications required for attracting S. 20(2)(c) had been established.

26. The relevant portion of the letter dt. 11-10-1973 has been quoted by me above. The permission did not travel beyond what is stated in that letter. The reasoning which appealed to Additional District Judge, however, was:

“……it is difficult to say that the entire constructions are without written consent of the landlord. Neither exhibit 21 nor in exhibit 22 there is mention that if the tenants raised construction in excess of the agreement, they will render themselves liable to eviction.”

27. The learned Judge overlooked that the permission relied on for the respondents was limited and specific. It was neither general nor covering any construction other than that referred to in the permission. Whatever construction falls outside the purview of that permission is hit by S. 20(2)(c).

28. S. 20(2)(c) is materially different than what was provided for by S. 7(1)(c) of the old Act. Under the old Act, a landlord without the permission of the District Magistrate could bring a suit for eviction against a tenant, where he had either caused or permitted to be caused “any material alteration” in the building or any such alteration which was likely to diminish the value of the accommodation. This question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in appeal of Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Others v. Bishun Das, AIR 1967 SC 643, which had been preferred against the judgment of the High Court. The High Court held that the material alteration should be such as was likely to substantially diminish the value of the accommodation. This was overruled by the Supreme Court. It held that the two conditions were intended not to exist simultaneously but were in the alternative. The legislature brought about changes in S. 20(2)(c).

29. A landlord must, in order to succeed in a suit for eviction, satisfy:

(i) absence of written permission of the landlord;

(ii) tenant has made any construction or structural alteration in the building;

(iii) such construction or structural alteration is likely to dimmish its value or utility or to disfigure it.

30. If any one of the three grounds mentioned in S. 20(2)(c), namely, (i) diminishing the value of the accommodation; (ii) diminishing its utility; and (iii) disfiguring, is established, the landlord may succeed in getting a decree for eviction of the tenant. It is of course essential in every case that the tenant made the construction or structural alteration in the building without the permission. This view has been taken in Shabbit Ahmad v. I.A.D.J Saharanpur, (1983) 1 All Rent Cas 145 : 1983 (UP) RCC 170. In Udaibhan Gupta v. Hari Shanker, (1985) 2 All Rent Cas 20, Hon. N.N Mithal, J. also held that it was not essential that diminution in value, utility or disfiguring it, all must be present together for the purpose of proving the ground for eviction of a tenant stated in S. 20(2)(c).

31. It may be pointed out first that the use of word “likely” in S. 20(2)(c) before “to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it” is very material. The constructions made should have the probability of diminishing the value or utility of the balding or disfiguring the same. The dictionary meaning of the word “likely” in Websters Dictionary, in the context in which it has been used is “in all probabilities”. Therefore, in the case where it is established by a landlord that the constructions made by a tenant without permission is in all probabilities likely to diminish the utility of the building or disfiguring it, S. 20(2)(c) will apply. The instant case was brought within the four corners of S. 20(2)(c) by the landlord on two grounds. The first ground is that it has diminished the value of the constructions and also its utility as well as it has disfigured the accommodation let out to the respondents. The making of eight rooms by the respondents on the vacant land could not lead anybody to a conclusion other than this that it has disfigured the bungalow let out to the respondents. The eight rooms changed the figure or appearance of the building let out to the respondents.

32. There can be no doubt that the vacant land had value different for a landlord than lone over which constructions stand. Such a landlord or owner of the land situated on the Mall which is the fastest area in Kanpur could derive much profits by selling it after demarcation or making construction thereon which could not be possible if the land would have remained vacant. The making of constructions by the respondents has definitely reduced the value of the building let out to them. It is not correct to say that the permanent pucca constructions made by the respondents could since be demolished, S. 20(2)(c) Would not apply to the present case. What was required to be seen is whether the permanent constructions made by the respondents had materially altered the building which resulted in diminishing or disfiguring the same. Instead of doing so, the learned Additional District Judge got involved into irrelevant considerations. In Om Prakash v. Amar Singh, (1987) 1 All Rent Cas 185 : (1987 All LJ 184), the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the words “materially altered” with reference to S. 14 of the U.P Cantonment Rent Control Act, 1954, and held that:

“The meaning given to words show that the expression ‘materially altered’ means “substantial change in the character, form and the structure of the building without destroying its identity.” It means that the, nature and character of change or alteration of the building must be of essential and important nature.

33. For determining the question, therefore, the court below should have entrusted itself in the nature or character of the constructions and found whether they had materially altered the building resulting in diminishing its value or utility or disfiguring the same. This was not considered by the learned Additional District Judge. The law settled is that the learned Additional Judge must have taken into account all relevant considerations, eschewing all irrelevant considerations. This had not been done in arriving at the finding.

34. The construction-impugned in the present case covers what was vacant land attached to the building under tenancy. Vacant land has thus been covered by pucca construction at the instance of the respondents without there being the permission of the landlord in this respect. The trial court could not be said to have acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in being of opinion that this was likely to diminish the value or utility of the premises. The consideration had to be had in this respect from the point of view of the landlord and not the convenience of the respondents-tenants alone. Vacant land has its own utility in a premises and dependent on the situation et cetera.

35. In Murlidhar v. V.A.D.J, (1984) 1 All Rent Cas 207 : (1984 All LJ NOC 18), relied upon by the Additional District Judge, the facts were different. That was a case of alleged disfigurement and the finding was that if the constructions raised by the tenant in a particular case enhanced the value and increased its utility, it was difficult to agree that the same amounted to disfiguring it. That is not the fact in the instant case. The construction of eight rooms on the vacant land definitely disfigured the building let out to the respondents. It could and did not increase its utility also. I am also of the opinion that law should take pragmatic view of the matter and response to the purpose for which it was made. It is well settled that the purpose of law provides a good guide to the interpretation of a statute.

36. Looking to the purpose in the instant case, I find that the Act was passed to regulate eviction. Under the regulatory provision curtailing the power of the landlord to evict tenant, it could not be the object that the tenant could make any alteration in the building let out to them to suit their purpose without caring for its consequences. The Act was passed with a view to restrict the increase of the rent and to meet the various problems arising from house shortage by restricting the right of the landlords to evict the tenant. One view has been that the Rent Control Acts have done much more harm than good by perpetuating shortage, encouraging immovability, fostering dilapidation of housing structure, eroding production incentives and land distorting land use pattern. This is only one view about the Rent Control Acts. This controversy has no relevance so far as the present problem arising in this writ petition is concerned.

37. In Jagat Ram Sethi v. D.D Jain, (1972) 2 SCC 613 : AIR 1972 SC 1727, the Supreme Court while upholding the decision of the Allahabad High Court filed for eviction of the tenant had an occasion to consider whether any action on the part of the landlord entitled the tenant to resist the suit on the ground of estoppel where the same had been made without permission. The Supreme Court negatived the argument of estoppel raised on behalf of the tenant as against the landlord. There is no duty on a landlord to protest against invasion of his right by the tenant when the latter is making unauthorised and illegal constructions. As in such a case there will be no delusion which a landlord could be said to be encouraging or fostering by his silence and inaction.

38. Next comes the question of subletting. The petitioner's case was that the defendants had sublet separate portions of the disputed premises to Govind Prasad, Ram Narain, Gaya Prasad and Chhote Lal and they had been in its exclusive and separate possession over-different portions. Hari Saran Pande, Advocate Commissioner showed the portions of the disputed house in possession of different persons in different colours, Govind Prasad was the brother-in-law of defendant No. 7. The defendants admitted that Govind Prasad lived in a portion of the disputed premises. But what was pleaded was that he was not a sub-tenant but living in the separate portion as a relation. The Judge Small Causes held after consideration of evidence that Govind Prasad was not a member of the family and that he had been in exclusive possession of a portion of the building and he was held to be a sub-tenant.

39. With regard to Gaya Prasad, Ram Narain and Chhote Lal also, the finding of the Judge Small Causes was to the same effect, which is reproduced below:—

“From the discussion of evidence, noted above, it is proved that Govind Prasad, Ram Narain, Gaya Prasad and Chhotey Lal have been living in different portions of the disputed premises and have been in exclusive possession. Admittedly, they are not members of the defendants' family. This shows that they are nothing but sub-tenants in possession of different portions of the disputed premises.”

40. In revision, the finding of the Judge Small Causes was reversed.

41. Challenging the judgment of the revisional court, the argument advanced in this petition was that in doing so, the limits of S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act had been transgressed. The Additional District Judge entered into reassessment and reappraisal of evidence. Finding of fact had been interfered with by the learned Additional District Judge and his own opinion had been substituted on that of the trial court.

42. Sri S.N Verma, the learned counsel for the respondents, urged that possession of Govind Prasad was that of a licensee and the Judge Small Causes acted erroneously in holding. It to be that of a sub-tenant. He was, according to Sri Verma, a relation of defendant No. 7. The Judge Small Causes incorrectly held by considering inadmissible evidence against the respondents in arriving at the finding that his possession was that of a sub-tenant. Counsel urged that there was no evidence of the payment of rent by Govind, Prasad to the respondents. To the same effect was the position of other tenants. In the absence of payment of rent, no finding of subletting could be given. Sri Murlidhar who appeared for some of the respondents, also made arguments to the same effect. Further he referred to the compromise entered into in between the petitioner and the defendants in 1973 and urged that Govind Prasad had been accepted by the petitioner to be living in the portion in his occupation as a licensee. He contended that acceptance of rent from the respondents by the petitioner for the period subsequent to the compromise amounted to estoppel and that disentitle the petitioner to get relief of eviction against the respondents on that ground.

43. The distinction between licence for exclusive possession and licence to use is a well settled one. There is a demise where a right is granted (as to) the exclave possession of lands or ten tents. A grant of such exclusive possession is a lease. No exclusive possession is given in case of licence.

44. With regard to the possession of Ram Narain and Gaya Prasad, the first ground of the respondents was that they were not living in the houses and the second taken tip for the relationship was that they had been allowed to use the premises as servants and as such, they had acquired no interest therein.

45. I have heard counsel for the parties and I am of the opinion that as the learned Additional District Judge did not have the power under S. 25 of the Provincial Smalt. Cause Courts Act to record a finding of his own by reappraising the evidence led by the parties, the judgment rendered by him on this controversy is liable to be set aside.

46. In Hansraj v. Puran Lal, 1981 All LJ 35, this Court held that:

“Under S. 25, the High Court has limited jurisdiction to find whether the judgment given by the J.S.C.C is in accordance with law. Where the J.S.C.C after considering the evidence comes to a Finding that the defendant was a defaulter of rent, it being a finding of fact, the High Court cannot reappraise evidence and arrive at a finding different from that of the court below.

47. In Hari Shanker v. Girdharilal, AIR 1963 SC 698, the Supreme-Court laid down that the decision if given according to law would not be interfered with except on certain, error of law. This was followed in M.A Naicker v. Seth Manghra, (1969) 1 SCC 688 : AIR 1969 SC 1344 (para 7). Relying on these and other authorities, a Division Bench, of this Court laid down the law in this respect in Laxmi Kishore v. H.P Shukla, 1979 All WC 746. It was held that the Court exercising revisional power under S. 25 does not possess jurisdiction to determine issues of fact itself by entering into the evidence and assessing it. The revisional court has no jurisdiction it was pointed, to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine a issue of fact for itself. It cannot enter into the evidence assessed and determine an issue of fact. Interference may not be justified in the absence of error of law, vide Laxmi Prasad v. 2nd Addl. Dist. Judge, (1983) 1 All Rent Cas 182 (See also Jaikali Devi v. Addl. District Judge, (1984) 2 All Rent Cas 442.

48. In order that the revisional court could be justified to interfere, it had to be made out that the court of fact has, in substance, based its findings on no evidence or its finding is perverse or it erroneously ignores the vital plea or material evidence which affects the result. There has to be a manifest error of law. In other words the finding of the trial court has to be shown to suffer from illegality, vide Janardan Pande v. 1st A.D.J Nainital, (1983) 1 All Rent Cas 640. To the same effect is the view taken in Isamuddin v. Judge, Small Causes, 1986 All CJ 143 : (1986 All LJ 495), pointing that in considering whether the revisional court has transgressed the limits set for it, it would have to be seen whether the lower court took into account material extraneous to the record. In Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Anguri Devi, (1984) 1 All Rent Cas 679 : (1984 All LJ 379), also, the Supreme Court ruled out an attempt on the part of the revisional authority to reassess evidence though it may take into consideration the evidence, if any, which had not been looked into by the trial court.

49. There is no dispute in the present case that there was no permission in writing of the landlord and the District Magistrate to the respondents to sublet any part of the building in question of the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, held that the relationship of landlord was fairly made out as between the respondents on the one hand and sub-tenants on the other. The trial Court in arriving at this finding referred to exclusive possession preferring the circumstances including that the exclusive possession of those sub-tenants and arrived at the conclusion that their possesion was in law of payment of rent. In respect of Gaya Prasad and Ram Narain, two of the alleged subtenants, the revisional court, however, held:

“It can also be said that the weight of evidence does not entitle an interference that these persons were necessarily sub-tenants.”

50. This clearly amounts to reappraisal and reassessment of evidence. This is exactly what the revision court could not do. Even if the inference drawn from proved facts were erroneous, the learned Additional District Judge was prohibited from reversing the judgment of the Judge Small Causes as he had no jurisdiction to do so under S. 25.

51. In regard to Govind Prasad, the finding reached by the trial court, upon considerning the entire relevant evidence, was that he had been in exclusive possession over specific portion towards the east. The eastern portion was separated with a passage in between, Govind Prasad had been residing in that portion with his family. He has had a separate mess ever since, 1950. He held a ration card in his name and his name appears also in the voters' list. He carries on independent occupation of notary. In support of all these, there is the admission of Govind Prasad, the witnesses examined including for the respondents and the statement of the advocate Commissioner. True if is that Govind Prasad is brother-in-law of one of the respondents, but this, taken in the light of all other related facts, does not make out that his exclusive possession was due to this relationship. The trial Court was not unjustified in referring as well in this context to Govind Prasad's contention that he did not visit the respondents at the portion in occupation of the latter. In Laxmi Narain v. 1st A.D Judge, (1984) 1 All Rent Cas 170, referred by the revisional court, it would deserve to be noticed there was no evidence of exclusive possession on the part of the alleged sub-tenant and this constitutes an important distinguishing feature so far as this case is concerned. There also the court emphasised that when the finding is essential of fact and where it is based on appraisal of evidence and does not suffer from manifest error of law, it is not open to interfere. The revisional court has observed in the present case. There is no dispute that Govind Prasad is in exclusive possession of a portion. It says, however, that there is no evidence as to the payment of rent to the respondents and hence the conclusion reached by the trial court could not be sustained. This is clearly perverse and contrary to the settled view of law that despite the absence of direct evidence to prove the contract of sub-tenancy or of payment of rent, there may be on Record circumstances or material reasonably suggesting inference that the relationship is of landlord and tenant. There did exist enough reasonable matter before the trial court enabling it to reach the finding. Which it did and the revisional court had no justification to make its own appraisal.

52. Before the revisional court, it appears to have been argued also that Gaya Prasad and Ram Narain had let the premises in or about 1974. The petitioner landlord refuted this. But even if that is true, the position under the law is not changed. The expression relevant as appearing in S. 7(3) of the old Act read With S. 20(2)(c) of the new Act is “has sublet”. This was also the language of S. 13(1) of the Bombay Act, 1947, which came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in Gajanan v. S.H Patel, (1975) 2 SCC 668 : AIR 1975 SC 2156, it was laid down that the language is that if the tenant has sublet, the protection ceases. It could not be contended that the sub-letting must continue at the date of the suit for passing the decree far eviction. The liability of the tenant to eviction arises once the fact. Of unlawful subletting is proved.

53. Therefore, on the ground of subletting, the judgment of the court below cannot be sustained.

54. Dealing with the scope of interpretation of S. 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, the Supreme Court in Helper Girdhar bhai v. Saived Mohammad Mirasaheb Kadri, (1987) 3 SCC 538 : AIR 1987 SC 1782, said that it is in the same language as is S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The Supreme Court held:

“We must, however guard ourselves against permitting in the guise of version substitution of one view where two view are possible and the court of Small Causes has taken a particular view. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction to substitute its own view with that of the courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant Judged by that standard, we are of the opinion that the High Court in this case had exceeded its jurisdiction.”

55. In the instant case, on the evidence fed by the parties one of the possible views that Govind Prasad was a sub-tenant despite his relationship with respondent No. 7. This, view was not perverse and, as such, the Additional District Judge was not justified in reversing the finding of the Judge Small Causes by taking a contrary view. The same is the position with regard to other tenants and sub-tenants. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the Additional District Judge dated 21-5-1984 is set aside and that of the Judge Small Cause is restored. The respondents, would have four months' time for removal of the constructions and to vacate the premises. There shall be no order as to costs.

56. Petition allowed.