Murlidher Rao, J.:— Conflicting decisions on the interpretation of Section 20, Contempt of Courts Act and its effect on Article 215 of the Constitution of India, have given rise to the following question:—
Whether the period of one year prescribed in Section 20, Contempt of Courts Act is applicable to contempt proceedings under Article 215 of the Constitution, in respect of Contempt of High Court?
2. In High Court of Karnataka v. Y.K Subbanna (Contempt of Court Case - Criminal - 8/84)1 a Bench consisting of DRVJ and KBNJ framed the following questions for consideration:—
“(1) Whether the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the Act is attracted to case of contempt of the High Court which is a Court of Record initiated under Article 215 of the Constitution?
(2) What are the material dates for purposes of Section 20 of the Act?”
3. It was held that the period of limitation prescribed in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act applies to proceedings initiated by the High Court for contempt of itself. Consequently it was held that the limitation of one year would commence from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. This was reiteration of the view expressed in Venkataramanappa v. D.K Naikar.2
4. In Kanakaraj Mehta v. Shivakumar - CCC (Civil) No. 35 of 1989,3 Bench consisting of Mr. M. Rama Jois, J. and Mr. M. Ramakrishna, J. held that the period of one year in Section 20 applies to proceedings for contempt of subordinate Courts in which the High Court exercises power under the Contempt of Courts Act and would not apply to cases under Article 215 of the Constitution of India in contempt proceedings against itself.
5. In all the above cases the ‘contempt’ complained of was that of this Court; hence the question which needs examinations is whether the power of this Court to initiate proceedings for contempt against itself is controlled by Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act reads thus:
“20. Limitation for action for contempt:—No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”
6. In the first of these cases namely, Venkataramanappa v. D.K Naikar, as rightly pointed out in Kanakaraj Mehta's case, contention relying on Article 215, Constitution of India, with reference to Section 20, Contempt of Courts Act was neither raised nor considered. But it was nevertheless held that contempt proceedings arising out of proceedings in this Court initiated after one year, from the alleged date of commission, could not be entertained. The opinion of the Bench in Kanakaraj Mehta's case finds support from similar observations in an order of learned singla Judge of Calcutta High Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Ramnivas.4
7. Before considering the amplitude of this provision, as a cautious approach, it is necessary to state that a ruling of this Court or the Supreme Court is an authority for what it decides. It is the ratio of the decision which assumes the character of precedent. A reference to certain statutory provisions in the course of discussion becomes inevitable to understand the scope, ambit, application of several matters which the legislation intends to enact. The various chapters in a Statute are intended to deal with several topics and allied situations in tackling the problems for which the Act is enacted. It is axiomatic that no provision is redundant. Therefore if the legislature bearing in mind the several aspects and the object makes provisions in several Sections, the Courts are required to find out the scope and the area of operation of each Section. In this endeavour reference to a provision, which in the given context becomes necessary would not mean that the referred provision has a bearing on the question in issue. Before concluding that the provision so referred has a bearing on the issue debated, it may become necessary to scrutinize the Section and its applicability to the subject dealt with by the other statutory provisions. To infer that because the provision is referred it has a bearing or relevance to the question posed for consideration would be fallacious. In the light of this discussion, the reasoning adopted in High Court of Karnataka v. Y.K Subbanna with reference to Baradakanta Mishra's Case5 and Purushottamadas Goyal6 cannot commend acceptance. The observation of the Bench reads thus:
“The reference to Section 20 even though the question of limitation did not arise for consideration in the case is a pointer to the conclusion that the Apex Court has taken the view that Section 20 is applicable to cases of contempts of the High Courts also.”
(Emphasis added)
Again in para 87 it is observed thus:
“It is clear from the facts in the case as well the observations, excerpted above, that the Supreme Court has expressly referred to Section 20 in connection with the powers of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution. The observations of the Supreme Court in the two cases cited supra, in our opinion, show that Section 20 would be attracted even in respect of proceedings for contempt initiated for contempt of the High Court.”
(Emphasis added)
8. Having cleared this ground, let me advert to entry 41 of List III which reads:
“Contempt of Court but not including contempt of the Supreme Court.”
9. The learned Judges of the Bench in Y.K Subbanna's case (supra) held that the power to legislate in respect of “Contempt of Court” includes the initiation of proceeding by all Courts including High Court. Sustenance for this view is derived from the words “excluding the matters pertaining to contempt of Supreme Court”. While these words exclude the matters pertaining to contempt of Supreme Court, they do not enlarge the interpretation of the words “Contempt of Court” to hold that the legislature can make a law to confer jurisdiction on the High Court in respect of contempt of itself, as if such power had not existed earlier.
10. Existence of powers of the High Court in this regard is well established by the Judgment of Supreme Court in the following cases:—
In Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P . AIR 1964 SC 1625. it is observed thus:
“….The High Court's powers for punishment of contempt have been preserved by the Constitution and they are also inherent in a Court of Record. The learned Judges were perhaps in error in describing it as contempt in facie curiae. That is contempt of a different sort. This was contempt by disobedience of an order of the High Court which is sometimes a civil contempt punishable under the Code of Civil Procedure and sometimes a criminal contempt punishable by imprisonment….”
Again in R.L Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu . 1972 1 SCC 651, it was observed thus:
“…so far as contempt of the High Court itself is concerned, as distinguished from that of a Court subordinate to it, the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, and so no Act of a legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority…”
11. Therefore it is clear that even without the Contempt of Courts Act, the High Court possesses power to take action regarding the contempt of itself.
12. Next question is, whether this power could be curtailed, abridged or restricted by legislation under the above Entry. The period of one year prescribed in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act as the optimum period makes the power non-exercisable after that period. It follows that the Highest Court, in the State becomes powerless to take any action for contempt of itself by technical rule of limitation, notwithstanding the fact that it derives its power, as a Court of record and from the Constitution. Its power, in the given context could only be abridged or deprived by express provision in the Constitution itself.
13. As observed by Supreme Court in R.L Kapur's case (supra) the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 215 to punish for contempt of itself is a special one, not arising or derived from the Contempt of Courts Act.
14. Dealing with this question, a learned Judge of Calcutta High Court observed thus in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Ramnivas Poddar (supra).
“…I accept the submissions of Mr. Somnath Chatterjee and hold that 1971 Act cannot define, limit or regulate the High Court's power under Article 215 to punish for contempt of itself summarily. Sections 15 and 20 are ultra vires Article 215. Section 15 however, can co-exist with the summary powers of the High Courts only as an alternative or additional procedure so far as Article 215 is concerned and non-compliances thereof will not affect High Court's power to punish. 1971 Act also can co-exist as laying down the law for contempt of Courts subordinate to High Courts.”
15. We respectfully agree except that we are not called upon to decide the vires of Sections 15 and 20, on that question we express no opinion. Therefore our conclusion is that the period of one year in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is applicable only in respect of contempt of subordinate Courts. It has no application in cases of contempt of High Court; the power conferred under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is absolute and unfettered. It may be that in a given case Court may decline to take action due to delay but that is in exercise of its jurisdiction and ‘just’ discretion.
16. For the foregoing, while approving the decision in Kanakaraj Mehta v. Shivakumar, the decisions in
1. High Court of Karnataka v. Y.K Subbanna (ILR 1989 KAR 3572) and
2. Venkataramanappa v. D.K Naikar (AIR 1978 Karnataka 57 : 1978 (1) KLJ 65)
are overruled. Ordered accordingly.