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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from Suit No. 81 of 1915, brought by the Plaintiffs for a declaration that 784 acres of land (formed by Government into Diara Estate No. 1503 with a revenue of Rs. 568) were part of the Plaintiffs' permanently settled estate Char Alokdia (Touzi No. 1071, present Touzi No. 174), held at a fixed revenue; the Plaintiffs sought a declaration that Government had no right to assess those lands with revenue and other reliefs. The disputed lands appear in the case map as two yellow-coloured blocks, the northern called "ka" and the southern "kha".

Procedurally, the immediate antecedent events were: an Assistant Diara Survey Superintendent concluded certain newly formed lands were not included in the settlement of Estate Alokdia (sold in 1863). The Plaintiffs objected; their objections were rejected and the matter was forwarded to the Board of Revenue, which sanctioned settlement; a temporary settlement for 12 years (1 April 1914 to 31 March 1916) was made, and the Plaintiffs accepted settlement under protest.

Background facts relevant to title: in 1844 a large char formed on the Brahmaputra and Government took possession under Regulation II of 1819; Thak Survey in 1852 and the Revenue Survey in 1854 recorded large areas appertaining to the mehal (Char Alokdia). Government made repeated temporary settlements and issued a sale notification (30 May 1863) putting the zemindari right of the mehal (Touzi No. 1071) up to sale. The mehal was purchased (initially by an agent for the Nathpur Indigo Concern) and later purchased by Gangamani Chaudhurani on 28 March 1878, who registered her name for the mehal. The General (A) Register under sections 6 and 7 of Act VII of 1876 described the estate as "Alokdia Jazira Char" (Touzi No. 174) with area and revenue figures consistent with the Revenue Survey Map.

There were several prior governmental proceedings affecting the lands: (a) 1874–75 — creation of a new estate (No. 1141) followed by the Collector's recommendation and Board's sanction removing the new estate from revenue rolls (18 December 1875); (b) 1881 — a new estate No. 10776 was constituted including portions of lands now in dispute; objections were filed and official inquiries (including by Jadu Kanongoe) and reports led to the Board sanctioning settlement of 1,036 bighas (4 April 1882) while other quantities were treated as reformation of Char Alokdia; (c) 1891–1896 — disputed plots X, Y and Z were the subject of remand and mapping; the Commissioner and later the Board of Revenue (resolution dated 6 March 1896) concluded those tracts belonged to the Appellants and that Government had no claim to them as island char.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale notification and certificate of sale dated 1863 transferred to the purchaser the entirety of the Government's zamindari rights in Touzi No. 1071 (i.e., the whole estate as shown in earlier Revenue/Thak surveys and including accretions and submerged lands), or whether only the specific area stated in the sale notification (5,508 bighas 6 cottas 4 chittaks) was conveyed.
  2. Whether lands subsequently formed (or reformed) and found to be reformation of Touzi No. 1071 could be assessed again with revenue by Government (specifically whether the disputed 784 acres in Diara Estate No. 1503 could be assessed).
  3. What legal effect should be given to the prior administrative and Board of Revenue proceedings (1874–75, 1881, 1891–1896) and the maps and registers when construing the rights that passed on the 1863 sale.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The Plaintiffs (and their predecessors) relied on the sale of Touzi No. 1071 in 1863, contending that what was sold was Touzi No. 1071 (the estate by name) and therefore all the Government's zamindari rights in that Touzi passed to the purchaser, including lands that were submerged at the time of various surveys and accretions/reformations subsequently formed.
  • The Plaintiffs pointed to documentary and administrative indicia that Government recognised the estate's area as shown in the Revenue Survey Map (e.g., registration under the Land Registration Act and entries in the General (A) Register under sections 6 and 7 of Act VII of 1876), as well as the conduct of Government officials in the Diara and Board of Revenue proceedings which, on several occasions, dealt with the Plaintiffs' predecessors on the footing of the Revenue Survey Map.
  • The Plaintiffs relied on the Board of Revenue's own resolutions and Commissioner reports (including the 1894 remand and 1896 resolution) showing the Board treated the disputed tracts as belonging to the Appellants and found Government had no claim.

Government / Defendant's Arguments

  • The Government (through its senior pleader) contended that the 1863 sale notification specified an area of 5,508 bighas 6 cottas 4 chittaks and that only that quantity of land (i.e., what physically existed at the time of sale) passed to the purchaser. On that basis, subsequent formed lands or submerged lands not in actual existence as dry land at the date of sale did not pass.
  • As to the 1881 proceedings, the Government argued that only the matter of settlement of 1,036 bighas was before the Board of Revenue and that the alleged release of 1,426 bighas was not before the Board; therefore the Plaintiffs could not rely on a larger release than was formally sanctioned.
  • The Defendant denied (in para. 7 of the written statement) that the predecessors of the Plaintiffs “became by virtue of their said auction-purchase entitled to all the right, title and interest of Government in all the lands (including the then existing as well as the submerged lands) of the Estate No. 1071,” thus asserting that submerged lands and subsequent formations were not included unless expressly conveyed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gunga Naradn Chowdhury v. Radhika Mohun Roy The certificate of sale conveying "whatever zamindari right the Government had in the mehal" passes the whole zamindari right to the purchaser; a specification of area in the sale document describing the existing area does not necessarily limit the general words conveying the zamindari rights; accretions (incremental land) are a contingent right of the zamindar and pass. The Court treated the case as closely resembling the present facts and relied on its reasoning to conclude that the sale of Touzi No. 1071 should be read as passing all the Government's zamindari rights (including accretions/reformations), and that a mere specification of area in the notification did not narrow the general description of the estate sold.
Gholam Ali Chaudhury v. The Collector of Backergunge Where a Thak (or map) relied upon for claiming larger quantity of land bears a different Touzi number or represents a different estate, that case does not support the purchaser's claim to the larger area; factual distinctions matter. The Court distinguished this authority on the facts: in Gholam Ali the Thak map showed a different Touzi number and a much larger area, whereas in the present case the Touzi number and official conduct supported the Plaintiffs' claim.
Jogubandhoo Bose v. Koomoodinee Kant Banerjee Where a purchaser did not buy the originally settled khas mehal but bought a different, reduced estate (likely with a different Touzi), that purchaser cannot claim accretions or reformations of the originally settled mehal. The Court regarded this and its follow-up case (Kristo Mohan Bysack) as distinguishable because in those cases the purchaser had not bought the original settled estate bearing the same Touzi number; thus those authorities did not support the Government's position in the present case.
Kristo Mohan Bysack v. Collector of Dacca Similar principle to Jogubandhoo Bose: where the estate purchased is not the originally settled estate bearing the same Touzi, purchaser cannot claim the original mehal's reformation rights. Followed and treated as distinguishable for the same reasons: the present purchaser (predecessor of Plaintiffs) had bought Touzi No. 1071 (the estate by name) and official records and treatment supported that.
Secretary of State for India in Council v. Narendra Nath The governing description in a sale certificate is the name of the estate; the addition of area and revenue is not sufficiently precise to defeat the force of the general description; where the estate is described by name, the sale conveys the estate as it stood at the date of sale and includes accretions (an inaccurate area may be a false demonstration). The Court cited and applied this principle: the description by estate name (Touzi No. 1071) governs and conveys the estate as it stood on the date of sale; therefore accretions and reformations that are part of that estate passed to the purchaser.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence focused on construction of the 1863 sale notification and appraisal of subsequent official conduct:

  1. Primacy of the sale description: The Court examined the sale notification and observed that it referred to Touzi No. 1071 (the estate by name) rather than purporting to create a new Touzi or to limit the sale strictly to the numeric area stated. The Court treated the estate-name description as the governing description, consistent with the authorities cited (notably Secretary of State v. Narendra Nath and Gunga Naradn).
  2. Historical evidence of Touzi's existence: The Court gave weight to documentary evidence that Touzi No. 1071 existed prior to the 1863 sale (an 1845 reference at the Collectorate) and that what was sold was Touzi No. 1071 — i.e., the estate as known and recorded.
  3. Effect of specified area in sale notification: The Court considered the Government's contention that the numeric area (5,508 bighas etc.) in the sale notification meant only that land passed. Relying on precedent, the Court explained that a specification of area on the face of a sale certificate that describes the then-existing area does not necessarily limit the broader words conveying the zamindari rights; accretions and reformations are contingent rights of the zamindar and may pass unless the sale clearly reserves them.
  4. Administrative conduct and prior proceedings: The Court carefully reviewed the administrative history (1874–75, 1881 and 1891–96 proceedings). It observed that on multiple occasions Government authorities (Collectors, Commissioners, Board of Revenue) treated the Plaintiffs' predecessors as having rights measured by the Revenue Survey Map. Specifically, the 1881 proceedings and subsequent submissions and the Board's later references (including the 1894 resolution referring to the Jadu Kanongoe map and the 1896 resolution) indicated Government recognition of lands released or treated as belonging to the Plaintiffs' predecessors.
  5. Evidence gaps and inferences limited by record: The Court noted that the Collector's letter of 26 October 1881 (which might have clarified the exact scope of the 1881 settlement) was not produced by the Defendant despite being called for. The Court therefore treated the available settlement papers and later Board statements as indicating that the release of certain quantities (e.g., 1,426 bighas) was before the Board in 1881 and that the Board in later remand proceedings understood what had been released.
  6. Distinguishing contrary authorities: The Court distinguished authorities where the purchaser had in fact bought a different, newly constituted Touzi (or where the Thak map bore a different Touzi number), explaining those cases were not analogous because in the present case the Touzi number and administrative treatment pointed to conveyance of the estate as originally known.
  7. Conclusion of law applied to facts: On construing the sale notification in the light of documentary and administrative conduct and the precedents, the Court concluded that what was sold was Touzi No. 1071 (the estate) and not merely the specific numeric area stated; accordingly, lands found to be reformations of Touzi No. 1071 could not be assessed again by Government.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court set aside the decree of the lower court and decreed the Plaintiffs' suit with costs in both Courts.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Plaintiffs (as successors to the purchaser of Touzi No. 1071) obtained a decree that the disputed lands (those found to be reformation of Touzi No. 1071) form part of their permanently settled estate and cannot be re-assessed with revenue by Government; the Plaintiffs recover with costs in both courts.
  • Scope of precedent: The opinion applies and relies on existing precedents concerning the construction of sale certificates (notably that the estate-name description governs and accretions pass unless expressly excluded). The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond the application of those precedents to the facts of this case.

Result recorded in the opinion: "The decree of the lower Court is set aside and the Plaintiffs' suit is decreed with costs in both Courts." (Signed/marked "S.C.M" in the text.)

    Kumar Sankar Roy Chowdhury v. Secretary Of State For India In Council

    This appeal arises out of a suit (Suit No. 81 of 1915) which was one for declaration that the lands in dispute, 784 acres, which Government formed into a Diara Estate No. 1503 with a revenue of Rs. 568, was part of the Plaintiffs' permanently settled estate, Char Alokdia, Touzi No. 1071 (present Touzi No. 174) held at a fixed revenue, that Government had no right to assess the lands in dispute with revenue, and for other reliefs. The disputed lands are shown in the case map in 2 blocks, the northern is called ka and the southern kha, both being coloured yellow. The proceedings which immediately led up to the institution of the present suit are the following:—

    The Assistant Diara Survey Superintendent found that certain newly formed lands were not included in the settlement of the Estate Alokdia which was sold in 1863 to the predecessor-in-title of the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs objected to the Diara proceedings, bot those objections were rejected and the proceedings were forwarded to the Board of Revenue for sanction. They were accordingly sanctioned by the Board of Revenue, and a settlement of the lands for 12 years was made from the 1st April 1914 to 31st March 1916. The Plaintiffs took settlement under protest.

    It appears that in 1844 a big char was thrown up on the bed of the river Brahmaputra. The Government took proceedings under Reg. II of 1819 and got possession of the lands. These lands constituted Char Alokdia and became the property of Government. In 1852, Thak Survey was made of those lands and it was found that 8,211 bighas appertained to the mehal. The Revenue Survey took place in 1854, in which also it was found that the same quantity of lands appertained to that mehal. The Government made temporary settlements of the mehal from time to time, and ultimately on the 30th May 1863 issued a notification in the Calcutta Gazette for sale of the mehal. The terms of the sale notification were these:—

    “Notice is hereby given that zemindary right of Government to the undermentioned khas mehal, situated in the District of Pabna, and mentioned in the statement hereunto annexed, will be put up to sale.”

    The statement of the mehal was as follows:—

    Touzl No. 1071. Name of Muhal and Pergana. Area. Jama Assessed. 1 per cent for roads. Total Sudder Jama. Island Chur Alokdia Pergaaaha Berahimpur. 5508-6-4 867-10-11 8-14-0 896-6-11

    Upset price 1,793-1-10.

    The mehal was purchased by one Mr. Trisandi on behalf of the Nathpur Indigo Concern, and the Plaintiffs' predecessor Gangamani Chaudhurani purchased the mehal from the owner of that Concern on the 28th March 1878. Gangamam alter purchasing it applied for registration of her name under the Land Registration Act. Her name was registered in respect of mehal “Jazira Char Alokdia, Touzi No. old 1071, present No. 174.”

    In the General (A) Register (under secs. 6 and 7 of Act VII of 1876) the estate is described as “Alokdia Jazira Char,” the Touzi No. is given as 174, the total area 2,726 acres 2 roods 27 poles, and the Government revenue Rs. 887-4 as. 11 pies. The area corresponds exactly with the area mentioned in the Revenue Survey Map. It is true that the entry in the general register does not affect the Government, but it shows that the Government recognized the area of the estate to be the same as stated above.

    There were three proceedings for assessment of revenue with respect to some lands of Char Alokdia before the proceedings of 1913 referred to above. In 1874-1875 certain lands were formed into a new Estate No. 1141 on the ground that those lands were newly formed char lands. At that time Mr. Graham, the predecessor-in-interest of the Plaintiffs, was the I owner of Char Alokdia. He objected that the Government had no right to create a new estate in respect of the lands which had already formed part of Char Alokdia. The Collector Mr. Rees recommended the cancellation of the new estate on the ground that the Revenue Survey and other maps showed that the new estate was really reformation of the lands of Char Alokdia. The Board accepted the recommendation of the Collector, and on the 18th December 1875 they sanctioned the removal of the estate Char Alokdia from the revenue roll. The second proceedings were held in 1881. In that year the Government again made a new estate of certain lands of Char Alokdia and certain other lands. This new estate was numbered 10776, and a large portion of the lands now in dispute was included in that estate. Gangamani (who was then the owner of Estate Char Alokdia) on the 10th July 1880 filed a petition objecting to the inclusion in the new estate of lands which according to the Revenue Survey appertained to her estate Char Alokdia. Thereupon one Jadu Kanongoe was directed to compare the “Survey Map of Char Alokdia whose lands are alleged to have been measured and included in the Jazira Char No. 10776 which is under settlement.” He submitted his report on the 24th February 1881 that only 1,036 bighas and odd fell outside the Revenue Survey area and should be brought under settlement. The Deputy Collector found on the Kanongoe's report and upon his own enquiry that 1,926 bighas of land of Alokdia had reformed on the original site and was measured in the new mehal and recommended that as the land was reformation on original site, might be kharijed. The settlement papers were accordingly submitted by the Collector to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division and he in his turn submitted the “settlement papers of Government Estate No. 10776 Island Char on the river Jumna received from the Collector of Dacca with his letter No. 1032, dated 26th October 1881” to the Board of Revenue on the 20th March 1882. He recommended the settlement of 1,036 bighas 11 cottas 17 drones only, and the Board sanctioned the settlement accordingly by its order, dated the 4th April 1882 and directed the original papers to be returned. The effect of this settlement of 1,036 bighas of land will be considered later.

    Lastly, there were proceedings in 1891 relating to lands within the Revenue Survey but which were sought to be again assessed with revenue. The matter came up to the Board of Revenue and was remanded by an order, dated the 26th April 1894. There were three plots in dispute in that case, namely, plots X, Y and Z, X was claimed by the Plaintiffs as part of Alokdia according to the Map of 1863; Y as part of another mouzah, and plot Z was claimed as being included in the Revenue Survey Map of 1854 of Alokdia. The remand order of the Board of Revenue, dated the 26th April 1894 directed certain Maps to be plotted on the Amin's Map. In para. 2 of the directions it was stated: “The Maps of Alokdia of 1851 and 1863. As to the latter it is to be remarked that the Collector admits the claim, and the question is whether the Appellant is entitled to hold in addition the lands covered by the former.” The maps were accordingly plotted and the Commissioner of the Dacca Division reported that the Plaintiffs were entitled to hold the lands included in the Revenue Survey Map of 1854 in addition to the lands included in the Map of 1863; and that plot X, the south-western and plot Z, the north-western portions will have to be released as reformation of Estate Alokdia surveyed in 1854 and 1853. It is unnecessary to refer to what was said by the Commissioner with reference to the lands of Mehdinagar. The matter then come up before the Board and by a resolution, dated the 6th March 1896, they concurred with the Commissioner and held as follows:—

    “It is plain that the three tracts of land which were indicated as X, Y and Z in the order of remand belong to the Appellants, and further that the Government has no claim to any part of the land as forming part of an island char. Whether the remaining portions ought to be assessed or not at the next Diara Survey is a matter which can more appropriately be decided when that survey takes place. The Board do not see any means of assessing them now.”

    The proceedings of 1891 as well as those of 1874-1875 do not relate to the lands in dispute in this case, but the Appellant relied upon them to show that the Revenue Survey Map was accepted by Government as the basis upon which the lands were released. So far as the proceedings of 1881 are concerned, they relate directly to the lands in dispute. A large portion of the lands is no doubt covered by those proceedings, as 1,926 bighas were held to appertain to Char Alokdia. The other lands claimed in the suit were not the subject-matter of the proceedings of 1881. But they are claimed by the Plaintiffs in this suit on the basis of the Revenue Surrey Map. So far as the 1,426 bighas are concerned they are covered both by the 1863 Map as well as the Revenue Survey Map.

    The question of the Plaintiffs' title mainly depends upon the construction of the sale notification, dated the 1st May 1863. Government strongly relies upon the fact that the area was stated to be 5,508 bighas 6 cottas 4 chittaks in the sale notification, and it is contended by the learned senior Government pleader that was the only land in existence in 1803 when the estate was sold to Appellants' predecessor-in-title, and it must therefore be taken that only 5,508 bighas passed to the purchaser under the sale.

    Our attention has been drawn to the fact that the revenue of the mehal varied from time to time with the variation of the area under the temporary settlements. It appears from the resumption proceedings of the Settlement Officer of Dacca, dated the 22nd July 1913 that in 1852 the area was 8,271 bighas and the revenue was Rs. 897-9-10.

    Area. Revenue. In 1854 8,149 1,001. In 1859 7,345 1,512-5-7. In 1863 5,508 896-9-1.

    It is contended by the learned Government pleader that when the mehal was sold in 1863 all that it contained was an area of 5,508 bighas. The sale notification, however, refers to the Touzi No. 1071, and had that Touzi been created for the first time in 1863 when the property was sold as consisting of 5,508 bighas only it could be contended that only that quantity of lands was put up to sale. But the Touzi No. 1071 was in existence from before the Revenue Survey. The Plaintiffs applied to the Collectorate for information on the point, and the information was given that in 1845 the estate bore the Touzi No. 1071 of the Faridpore Collectorate. That being so what was sold was Touzi No. 1071; and the notification having stated that the rights which the Government had in the estate was sold, it must be taken that all the interest which the Government had in the estate passed to the purchaser. In para. 7 of the written statement, the Defendant denied that the predecessors-interest of the Plaintiffs “possessed and became by virtue of their said auction-purchase entitled to all the right, title and interest of Government in all the lands (including the then existing as Well as the submerged lands) of the Estate No. 1071, or that the Plaintiffs by virtue of their purchase became entitled to all the lands of the said estate that were recorded in that Thak or Revenue Survey and to the lands that were under water at the time of those surveys.” This indicates that there were submerged lands of Touzi No. 1071 and those lands must have been assessed with revenue;. If the submerged lands were part of Government Zemindary No. 1071 in 1863, the Plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title having purchased Touzi No. 1071, all the lands of that Touzi including the land then existing as well as those submerged at the time of the sale passed to the purchaser, there being no reservation of the submerged lands at the sale in 1863.

    So far as the proceedings of 1881 are concerned it is contended by the learned Government pleader that the only matter that was before the Board of Revenue was the matter of settlement of 1,036 bighas and that the release of 1,426 bighas of lands was not before them. But the Commissioner of Dacca along with his report, dated the 20th March 1882, submitted the “settlement papers of Government Estate No. 10776 island char on the river Jumna received from the Collector of Dacca with his letter No. 1032, dated the 26th October 1881.” The settlement papers and the letter of the Collector of Dacca, dated the 26th October 1881, must have referred to the release of 1,426 bighas, as only 1,036 bighas and odd out of the entire quantity of land was going to be settled. But the letter of the Collector, dated the 26th October 1881, has not been produced by the Defendant, though called upon by the Plaintiff to do so and it is impossible to hold that the settlement papers which showed the release of 1,426 bighas were not before the Board of Revenue. The resolution of the Board of Revenue, dated the 26th April 1894 (para 3), states: “The map of Babu Parbati Cbaran Roy (i.e, that map of Jadu Kanongoe) made in 1880-1881 showing what was released to the Appellants in consequence of his proceedings were the lands actually released.” The Board of Revenue therefore were aware of what was released in 1881, at any rate in 1894.

    It is contended that it was a case of misapprehension on the part of the Collector, but no such case was set up in the pleadings, and if, as we hold, these lands appertained to Touzi No. 1071, no question of misapprehension can arise.

    A number of cases have been cited before us on the question as to what passed by the sale of 1863. The facts of the case of Gunga Naradn Chowdhury v. Radhika Mohun Roy resemble the facts of the present case. In that case the sale certificate stated that whatever zamindari right the Government had in the mehal was vested in the purchaser. Then there was a specification of the mehal under three heads:— The first—Char Jalalpur, etc., within Jalalpur No. 214; the second—the area 14,496 bighas and odd; and the third—the Jama, viz., Rs. 4,144-2-9 with a certain addition. When the Map of 1863 was made, the mehal No. 214 had an area of some 17,000 bighas, but subsequent measurement shows that by a dilution that was diminished to 14,496 bighas. The learned Judges observed:—“We apprehend that the Collector as a public officer and an honest seller apprized the public that the existing area was only 14,496 bighas, and therefore the Government would not guarantee the old area of 17,000 bighas but only that which then existed, and that this specification in no way limited the import which the words of the certificate of sale bore, viz., that the whole of the zamindari rights which belonged to the Government passed to the purchaser. There are no words which tend in any way to restrict the right of the purchaser from claiming thereafter any accretion. The increment is always a contingent right which the zamindar has.” They further observed that there was nothing to show that “the present sudder jama is different from that originally assessed on the mehal.” An application for review was under the ground, among others, that the mehal had been the subject of repeated settlements, the fifth of which was made in 1864, in which the area was-declared to be 17,000 bighas, and the sixth of which was the settlement existing at the time when the Plaintiff purchased showed the mehal to consist of only 14,496 bighas and the rent had varied accordingly. The Court observed:—“Now it seems to us that these circumstances really have no bearing on the question which we pointed out as being unproved, viz., that on the sale, the absolute sale of the proprietary rights to Plaintiff, there had been any alteration in the fixed sudder jama or permanent rent payable to Government on account of the estate. The varying jamas fixed in 1854, and on the other settlements now referred to, were only temporary fluctuating rents of farming leases, and those leases being only for short periods, the rents would of course fluctuate (and might vary very greatly) with the quantity of land of which the farmer was on each occasion put into possession. That question, therefore, stands exactly as it did when we last gave our judgment.”

    The case of Gholam Ali Chaudhury v. The Collector of Backer gunge is distinguishable, as in that case the Thak map, which was relied upon for claiming a larger quantity of land than that mentioned in the sale proclamation, “represented the char as bearing the Touzi No. 4569 which is a different Touzi number from that borne by the mehal which the Plaintiff bought in 1871, and as containing a much larger area than 3994 acres.” There was moreover no evidence of conduct in that case such as is afforded by the several Diara proceedings in the present case.

    In the case of Jogubandhoo Bose v. Koomoodinee Kant Banerjee, the question did not arise between the purchaser and the Government but between two private parties. The “Defendant did not purchase the original khas mehal Kotibaree which had an area of 638 bighas with a rental of Rs. 164, but an estate consisting of 141 bighas, as was found by & measurement made for settlement purposes the year before the purchase, at rental of Rs. 13. The Defendant could have no claim to any reformation of land belonging to the mehal as it originally stood inasmuch as he did not buy that mehal, but a different one of much smaller area and greatly reduced rent.” It is not stated whether a new Touzi number was given at the time of the settlement, but it seems that it was so, as a new and different estate is referred to in the judgment and the Defendant did not purchase the original khas mehal. The above case was followed in Kristo Mohan Bysack v. Collector of Dacca, but there also “the estate purchased by the Plaintiffs was not the originally settled estate bearing the same number on the Touzi. It was a newly constituted Touzi with a very reduced area and a very largely reduced jama.”

    In the case of The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Narendra Nath, the sale notification was to the following effect: Name of Estate and Pergana Sonakhali. Area in acres 3,552 acres 3 R. 26 P. Revenue assessed Rs. 5,865-3-6. Government Road Cess Rs. 58-10-6. Revenue total Rs. 5,923-14-0. Upset price Rs. 11,847-12-0.

    Remarks:— Under khas management.

    The question for consideration was whether the Respondent was entitled to all the lands of the estate. Sonakhali or only to 3,563 acres, the area mentioned in the notification.

    Richardson, J.:— In construing the document observed: “In my opinion, the principal or governing description on the face of this document is the name of the estate. The mere addition of the area in acres and the revenue assessed on that area is not to my mind sufficiently precise or definite to impair the force of the general description ‘Sonakhali’ No boundaries being expressed, whether you take the description ‘Sonakhaii’ or the description ‘3,563 acres,’ evidence might be necessary to identify the subject of the sale. But ‘Sonakhali’ implies the known, or supposedly known, boundaries of Sonakhali. It is equivalent to ‘the estate known as Sonakhaii’ and the case seems to me very near the ordinary case of property described by boundaries with an area added which passes to be inaccurate and falls to be treated as false demonstration. If I am right, the sale certificate conveyed the accreted area.”

    On appeal under the Letters Patent (Richardson, J. and Greaves, J., having differed in opinion), Mookerjee, A.C.J, held (Fletcher and Teunon, JJ., agreeing with him) that “Richardson, J., had correctly held on a true construction of the sale certificate that the governing description is the name of the estate and that what passed to the purchasers was Sonakhali as it stood at the date of the sale.”

    Having regard to the description contained in the sale notification we think it was the ??? Estate No. 1071 which was sold and not merely 5,508 bighas of lands, and if there was an ambiguity, the conduct of the parties would go to show that what was intended to be sold and was sold was the entire estate as shown in the Revenue Survey Map as on three occasions the Government dealt with the Plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title on the footing of the Revenue Survey.

    That being so and the lands having been found to be reformation of the lands of Touzi No. 1071 cannot be again assessed with revenue.

    The result is that the decree of the lower Court is set aside and the Plaintiffs' suit is decreed with costs in both Courts.

    S.C.M

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    Kumar Sankar Roy Chowdhury v. Secretary Of State For India In Council
    (Jun 4, 1924)