Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Hon'ble Sir.Justice Charles Arnold White, Chief
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Hon'ble Sir.Justice Charles Arnold White, Chief
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The sole issue in this second appeal was whether the plaintiff could sue in his own name to recover property belonging to the devasom of the fourteenth defendant, demised on kanom to the first defendant. In June 1892 the fourteenth defendant and other adult members of the devasom executed to the plaintiff a document (exhibit Y) called a lease alias Kuthaka Karar. That document had previously been judicially interpreted by the High Court in Appeal No. 191 of 1898 and held to be an authority coupled with an interest and irrevocable. The plaintiff's suit to recover devasom properties had been dismissed by the District Munsif and by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that the document did not enable the plaintiff to recover devasom properties in a suit brought in his own name. This appeal challenges those dismissals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff can sue in his own name to recover property belonging to the devasom of the fourteenth defendant demised on kanom to the first defendant.
  2. Whether the document (exhibit Y) authorises the plaintiff to bring suit in his own name by virtue of being an authority coupled with an interest or as an agent with interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff contended that by the document he became an agent with interest and therefore had the right to sue in his own name.
  • In support the plaintiff relied on authorities including Williams v. Millington, Robinson v. Rutter, Gray v. Pearson and Pestanji Mancharji Wadia v. Matchett, and text-books cited for the proposition that an agent with interest may sue in his own name.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's separate legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Appeal No. 191 of 1898 The High Court held the document (exhibit Y) to be an authority coupled with an interest and irrevocable. The court noted this prior holding as the judicial interpretation of exhibit Y.
Williams v. Millington Agents who contracted with the defendant (as auctioneers) and had an interest were held entitled to sue in their own names. The court observed this case supports only the narrower proposition that agents who made the contract with the defendant may sue in their own names; it is distinguishable from the present case.
Robinson v. Rutter Same principle as Williams v. Millington regarding agents who contracted with the defendant being able to sue in their own names. The court treated it similarly to Williams v. Millington as supporting a limited exception where the agent contracted with the defendant.
Gray v. Pearson Where there is no contract between the plaintiff and the defendant there is no privity; the proper person to sue is the person whose right was violated; exceptions (agents, auctioneers, factors) are in truth limited. The court relied on this decision to emphasize lack of privity: unless the contract sued on was made by the agent there is no cause of action in the agent's name, so the plaintiff could not sue in his own name here.
Pestanji Mancharji Wadia v. Matchett An irrevocable power of attorney was recognised where the attorney had a pecuniary interest as consideration; the principal could not sue to the exclusion of the attorney who had the irrevocable power. The court held this case did not touch the present question; it concerned an irrevocable power of attorney and did not establish a right to sue in the attorney's name in circumstances like the present.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the plaintiff's contention that he was an agent with interest and therefore entitled to sue in his own name. It found the plaintiff's stated proposition too broad. The court distinguished authorities (Williams v. Millington, Robinson v. Rutter) where the agents had themselves contracted with the defendant (e.g., as auctioneers) and so could sue in their own names. The court relied on Gray v. Pearson to stress the privity requirement: if the contract for whose breach the action is brought was not made by the agent there is no privity between agent and defendant and the agent has no cause of action in his own name. The court explained that the mere grant of authority after a contract does not create privity enabling a third party to sue. It found that the authority in exhibit Y did not purport to give the plaintiff the right to sue in his own name, and nothing else in the record authorised the plaintiff to sue the defendant in his own name.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — the second appeal is dismissed with costs.

Implications: The court affirmed the dismissals below and held that the plaintiff could not sue in his own name because there was no privity and the document did not confer a right to sue in his name. The opinion records no broader precedent beyond applying established privity principles and the prior interpretation of exhibit Y.

Show full summary ...

    Subrahmania Pattar v. Narayanan Nayar

    JUDGMENT

    The only question argued before us in this second appeal is whether the plaintiff can sue in his own name to recover certain property belonging to the devasom of the fourteenth defendant and demised on kanom to the first defendant.

    In June 1892 the fourteenth defendant and the other adult members of the devasom executed to the plaintiff the document put in as exhibit Y which is called a lease alias Kuthaka Karar. This document has already been the subject of judicial interpretation by the High Court in Appeal No. 191 of 1898, and it was then held to be an authority coupled with an interest and was irrevocable.

    The plaintiff's suit was dismissed both by the District Munsif and by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that the document did not enable the plaintiff to recover devasom properties in a suit brought in his own name.

    It was argued before us that by the document in question the plaintiff became an agent with interest, and that he, therefore, had a right to sue in his own name and Williams v. Millington, Robinson v. Rutter, Gray v. Pearson, and other cases and text-books were cited in support of this proposition, and Pestanji Mancharji Wadia v. Matchett was also cited as a further authority for the same proposition. The proposition as stated is in our judgment too wide. In Williams v. Millington and Robinson v. Rutter the agents who were held entitled to sue were agents who had made the contract with the defendant as auctioneers, and it was held that, though they had contracted as agents having an interest, they were entitled to sue in their own names. In Gray v. Pearson the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. There, there was no contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff was merely the manager for others and the words used by Willes, J., in his judgment, to which our attention was called, do not assist the plaintiff's contention. He says the proper person to bring the action is the person whose right has been violated. Though there are certain exceptions to the general rule, for instance, in the case of agents, auctioneers or factors, these exceptions are in truth more apparent than real, &c. The real proposition of law, which these and other cases establish, is that where an agent enters into a contract as such, if he has interest in the contract, he may sue in his own name. Unless the contract for the breach of which the action is brought is one made by the agent I he has no cause of action because there is no privity between himself and the defendant, and Montague Smith, J., in his judgment in Gray v. Pearson puts this point says. “There is no privity between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The contract is; between the defendant and the other members of the association.” The mere fact that after a contract has been made between A and B, A gives G authority to act for him for a consideration, does not create any privity between C and B, so as to enable C to sue B for breach of his contract with A. If there is a breach and C wishes to sue B, he must do so in the name of A, that is in the name of the person whose right has been violated.

    The case of Pestanji Mancharji Wadia v. Matchett does not in any way touch the question. There, Matchett had given Pestanji a power of attorney to sue one Nowell for a debt due to Matchett out of which Pestanji was to pay himself a debt due to him from Matchett, but in spite of this power Matchett had himself sued Nowell for the debt to the exclusion of Pestanji. There the Court held that the power was irrevocable, because Pestanji had a pecuniary interest which was consideration for the power, and in the result, Pestanji having been joined as a co-plaintiff, the Court entered judgment for the amount due to Pestanji first, the balance, if any, to be paid to Matchett. Here the action was brought in Matchett's name, and all that the case decided was that Matchett, having given an irrevocable power of attorney to Pestanji, could not sue to the exclusion of Pestanji.

    In the case before us there is no privity between the plaintiff and the defendant. The authority to bring suits in the document does not purport to give the plaintiff the right to sue in his own name, and so far as we are aware, nothing else has happened which could authorize the plaintiff to sue the defendant in his own name.

    We are of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff's suit was rightly dismissed in the Courts below, and we dismiss this second appeal with costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.
    Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

    Comments

    Subrahmania Pattar v. Narayanan Nayar
    (Sep 7, 1900)