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    Mrs. M. Lal v. Mahadeo

    Reuben, J.:— Petitioner was the appellant in First Appeal no. 230 of 1946. This appeal was dismissed on the 26th November, 1947, as the result of her failure to comply with a peremptory order to file the printing cost. Hence, this petition for vacating the order of dismissal and for restoring the appeal to the file, on the ground that the petitioner was prevented by illness from complying with the order of the Court.

    An application of this sort does not come within the provisions of Order XLI, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code, and there was at one time considerable doubt as to the proper provision of law under which such an application can be entertained. In Ramhari Sahu, it was treated as an application under the rules of the High Court. This was overruled by a Full Bench of the same Court in Fatimunnissa v. Deoki Pershad which took the view that the application is entertainable by way of a review of judgment—a view adopted by a Division Bench of this Court in Anant Potdar. So far as this Court is concerned, the question is now set at rest by the decision of the Full Bench in Ramkhelawan Singh, which held that such an application lies under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which preserves the inherent powers of the Court to act ex debitio justiciae.

    Mr. U.N Sinha, on behalf of the opposite party, has urged that the petition is barred by limitation, having been filed beyond the period prescribed in Article 168 in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. He points out that this Article refers in general terms to an application

    “for the readmission of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution”,

    and relies for his contention on a decision of a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court reported in S.A Ganny. That decision is distinguishable on the facts because, as was pointed out by Carr, J. at pages 392 and 393 of the report, the application for readmission in that case was filed under Order LII of the Civil Procedure Code, as then in force in Burma. Far from supporting Mr. U.N Sinha, that case supports the view that Article 168 has no application to the case before us—I refer to the passage in the judgment of Page, C.J at page 387, where he cites Shrimati Lakhmoni Dassi, Wadia Gandhi, and Rajah Narendra Lal Khan as authorities for the proposition that “Article 168 would apply only to applications to re-admit appeals dismissed for want of prosecution as provided or contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure”. The same view was expressed by Carr, J. at page 391:—

    “I think that it must be held, on authority, that the Articles in the Third Division of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act apply only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, and applications ejusdem generis.”

    In the present case, I do not think it necessary to examine the cases cited above and the other reported cases, going back to Baimanekbai; supporting the view that Division III of Schedule I to the Limitation Act, 1908, in which division Article 168 occurs, refers to applications under or contemplated by the Civil Procedure Code. The answer to Mr. U.N Sinha's contention is, in my opinion, that the Court is here called on to exercise its inherent powers, and that power is not affected by the law of limitation. This is the view expressed by Shah, J. in a case which is exactly in point [Sonubai. As put by Mahmud, J., “the law of limitation relates to the action of parties, but not to the action of the Court” and “the mere fact that one of the parties had made an application asking the Court to exercise that power will not …… render the action of the Court subject to the rule of limitation.” [Raghunath Das, and Dhan Singh].

    In Jagdip Narain Singh, Chapman, J. took the view that Article 168 applies to an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This was merely by way of an obiter dictum, for the case before the Bench was disposed of, Roe, J., concurring, on the ground that the Court below acted rightly in disallowing an application made after the period of limitation which would apply to suits or applications asking for a similar remedy. Their Lordships, therefore, merely laid down a principle according to which the inherent power should be exercised. A similar view as to this principle was expressed by Shah, J., at page 653 in Sonubai and by Chaudhuri, J., at page 253 in Lakhimoni Dassi.

    Mr. U.N Sinha has also cited Ajodhya Mahton. That decision is merely an authority that, where a definite period of limitation is provided by law within which action must be taken, a court is not entitled to extend such period by purporting to act under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This follows from the fact that provision made in the law for a particular relief necessarily excludes any inherent power in the Court to grant that relief. Therefore, if the party has put it out of its power to claim that relief by allowing the period limited for the application to elapse, it is not open to the Court to grant that remedy in exercise of inherent power. Here, however, the relief sought is not covered by any provision of law and the inherent power of the Court to grant the remedy is preserved. Let us now consider the petition on the merits.

    The First Appeal was filed by the petitioner on the 22nd July, 1946, and she paid a court fee of Rs. 1,883-4-0 thereon. There is nothing calling for remark in the progress of the case till the peremptory order was passed on the 11th October, 1947, directing the filing of Rs. 288-12-0 as printing cost within six weeks, in default of compliance with which order the Appeal stood dismissed on the fixed date. From the unchallenged affidavit of Baijnath Mistri, supported by the certificates of two Calcutta. Doctors, we learn that the petitioner fell seriously ill in May, 1947, was removed to the Presidency General Hospital at Calcutta where she was an in patient from the 12th May, 1947, to the 14th July, 1947, and was under the treatment of the aforesaid two doctors from the 20th August, 1947, to the end of December, 1948, during which time she was not allowed to communicate with outsiders and could not transact any business. It was only on the 28th December that, happening to meet her lawyer at Calcutta, she came to know that her appeal had been dismissed for default. Her application for the restoration of the appeal was filed on the 20th January. On the other side the only suggestion to the contrary is that the petitioner has a manager, one Sukhram Babu, and that there is also a grown up daughter living with her. The affidavit to this effect is sworn by a person who admittedly has no personal knowledge, and we see no reason to disbelieve the affidavit of Baijnath Mistri to the effect that, during this time, the petitioner had no one to look after her affairs. The petitioner had spent a considerable sum of money in instituting and taking preliminary steps in the appeal. There is no suggestion that she was in any financial difficulty, and it is not likely that she would knowingly allow her appeal to be dismissed for her failure to deposit the small sum asked for as printing costs. I would, therefore, accept her story that she did not know of the Court's order in time to comply with it and was unaware of the dismissal of her appeal till towards the end of December.

    In the circumstances found by me, the delay in the filing of this petition becomes excusable.

    On the above grounds, I would allow this petition and direct that the First Appeal no. 230 of 1946 be restored to the file and the printing cost be deposited within one month from today. This order will be conditional on the petitioner paying three gold mohurs as compensation to the other side. This sum, or the receipt of the Advocate of the opposite party acknowledging receipt of this amount, should be deposited in Court within one month from today. Failing this deposit, the petition will stand dismissed; hearing fee, three gold mohurs.

    Shearer, J.:— I agree.

    S.H
    Application allowed.

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    Mrs. M. Lal v. Mahadeo
    (May 6, 1948)