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  • sub-sec. (3) of sec. 435 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898)
  • sec. 15 of the High Court's Act (24 and 25 Vic.,
  • sec. 13 of the Evidence Act
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  • sub-sec. (3) of sec. 435 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898)
  • sec. 15 of the High Court's Act (24 and 25 Vic.,
  • sec. 13 of the Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Full Bench Opinion on Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure

Factual and Procedural Background

This Full Bench opinion arises from a reference made by Judges who heard two Rules (Case Nos. 730 and 834) challenging proceedings under section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure.

Case No. 730: Proceedings under section 145 were instituted by the Sub-Divisional Officer of Tangail. Abdul Jabbar Chowdhry and others were the first party; Brojendra Kumar Roy Chaudhuri (predecessor in interest of the Petitioner before the High Court) was the second party. The Magistrate had made an order for attachment under section 146, and the Petitioner obtained a Rule to show cause why that order should not be set aside on three grounds: (1) the Magistrate had no authority to add parties; (2) certain necessary parties (tenants) had not been made parties; (3) the facts found did not authorise an order under section 146.

Case No. 834: Also arising under section 145. The Magistrate passed an order in favour of the first party; the second party obtained a Rule to show cause why the order should be set aside on three grounds: (1) that there was no information on institution showing likelihood of a breach of the peace; (2) that a single proceeding dealing with distinct parcels claimed by different persons was bad; (3) that the order was based upon a local investigation which the Magistrate was not competent to make.

The Judges who heard these Rules, being unable to agree with views in several earlier authorities, referred multiple legal questions to a Full Bench for determination.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Are proceedings under section 145 bad for want of jurisdiction because the Magistrate, on the information before him, made parties only those who were actually in dispute and likely to cause a breach of the peace, when during proceedings it appears some other party is interested and likely to be affected by the order—i.e., is the Magistrate bound to stay such proceedings?
  2. Is a Magistrate, before taking proceedings under section 145, bound to inquire to ascertain who have, or claim to have, any right to possession (actual possession or possession through receipt of rent from tenants) of the lands in dispute?
  3. If the Magistrate takes fresh information and adds further parties, are such subsequent proceedings separate and distinct (necessitating a fresh starting point), or are they in continuation of the original proceedings so as to relate back to the original date?
  4. Are proceedings under section 145 bad for want of jurisdiction because some person claiming possession of the lands (not originally a party likely to cause a breach of the peace) has not been made a party even if such person has not appeared and raised objection?
  5. Are proceedings under section 145 bad for want of jurisdiction because some of the parties are concerned only with possession of a portion of the lands in dispute (i.e., where dispute embraces several distinct parcels)?
  6. Whether sub-section (3) of section 435 of the present Code (Act V of 1898) places orders under sections 145 and 146 altogether out of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, or whether revision remains possible under section 15 of the High Court's Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104)?

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced by those challenging the Magistrate's proceedings (as reported)

  • It was contended (notably by Mr. Hill on behalf of petitioners) that the words “parties concerned in such dispute” meant all persons claiming a right to possession; therefore, unless all such persons were made parties the Magistrate's proceedings were bad for want of jurisdiction.
  • It was argued that orders under sections 145 and 146 affect civil rights (they forbid disturbance of possession) and therefore it would offend elementary principles of justice to affect persons who have not been parties to the proceedings.
  • In the case-specific Rules, the petitioners raised discrete procedural objections: lack of authority to add parties; omission of necessary parties (tenants); absence of information of likelihood of breach of the peace; improper local investigation; and that a single proceeding dealing with multiple parcels was improper.

Arguments advanced on the other side (as reported)

  • It was contended that the special jurisdiction of Criminal Courts under section 145 is limited to preventing breach of the peace and that the Magistrate must be able to act promptly; thus he should not be required to make elaborate inquiries to bring every possible interested person before him.
  • It was argued that omission to make certain persons parties is, at most, a matter of discretionary procedure for the Magistrate and does not, in all cases, vitiate jurisdiction.
  • Reliance was placed on authorities (e.g., Kunund Narain Bhoop and Protap Narain) said to support the position that proceedings may be properly confined to disputants likely to cause disturbance and that the Magistrate's discretion in selecting parties is permissible.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Chunder Das Mentioned among cases dealing with how defect of parties affects proceedings under section 145. The Court referenced it as part of authorities that supported the view that non-joinder may vitiate proceedings; the Full Bench preferred a different view in light of the present Code.
Laldhari Singh Cited concerning whether multiple claimants and complex landlord/tenant disputes require separate proceedings under section 145. The Bench discussed Laldhari Singh and considered practical difficulties in requiring separate proceedings for each plot; answered questions against rigid application of that case.
Anesh Mollah Cited among authorities on defect of parties in section 145 proceedings. The Court noted it as authority supporting non-joinder vitiation but held that the present statutory provisions change the rule.
Mangal Haidar Cited for the proposition that omission to make necessary parties may vitiate proceedings under section 145. The Court treated it as part of older line of authorities but held that current Code provisions (sub-sec. (3), (5), (7)) alter the position.
Raja Rameshwar Cited on the question whether joinder of parties vitiates proceedings under section 145. The Bench referred to it among cases prompting the reference; the present Full Bench gave answers that constrained the scope of that authority.
Kunund Narain Bhoop Relied upon to support contention that omission to make persons parties cannot affect validity; that Magistrate's discretion suffices. The Court held that the principles in Kunund Narain Bhoop are no longer fully applicable in view of later statutory amendments (particularly sub-sec. (3) of s.145).
Protap Narain Singh v. Rajendro (Protap Narain v. Rajendra) Previously held that substitution/addition of parties might invalidate proceedings; relied on by some as controlling authority. The Bench held that the Full Bench judgment in Protap Narain Singh is obsolete as to the point because sub-sec. (3) of section 145 (publication) modifies the law and that the Protap rule cannot be treated as binding for the current Code.
Narendra Nath Sirkar v. Kamalbashini (Privy Council) Privy Council observations on older law were referred to in the course of argument. The Bench said that having regard to those observations it was not profitable to pursue extensive historical discussion, the present Code being clear.
In the matter of Brojendra Kumar Chowdry Referred to in connection with limits of revisional jurisdiction under section 15 of the High Court's Act. The Court cited it as part of the authorities showing that section 15 revision is narrower than section 435 but still available where orders are made without jurisdiction.
Nilmoni Singh v. Taranath Cited among cases discussing the scope of revisional jurisdiction under section 15 of the High Court's Act. Used to illustrate the limits of High Court revision distinct from section 435 jurisdiction.
Muhammad Suleman v. Fatima Cited in the same context as above (limits of revisional jurisdiction). The Court cited it as an example of cases delineating the reach of section 15 revision.
Brij Mohun v. Rai Uma Nath Example cited for description of orders made without complying with material preliminary conditions. Referenced to show what constitutes jurisdictional error under section 15 revision.
Gopi Mohun v. Taramoni Similar citation concerning orders made without jurisdiction and revisional scope. Referred to for the proposition that certain procedural non-compliance may render an order amenable to revision under section 15.
Baggs' (Baggs) case Cited in support of the proposition that a person affected by a section 145/146 order should have the opportunity to be heard and that such order may operate prejudicially as evidence. The Court relied on Baggs' case as authority consistent with the view that persons claiming actual possession should have an opportunity to be heard; supported the conclusion that omission to allow such intervention may involve jurisdictional error.
Dinomoni v. Brojo Mohini Cited in relation to section 13 of the Evidence Act (that the order will be evidence against a person not made party). The Court used this authority to illustrate how an order under section 145 may prejudice a non-party because it can be used as evidence under the Evidence Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench considered the interplay between the purpose of section 145 (to prevent breaches of the peace) and the procedural prescriptions of the Code. The Court's analysis proceeded along several lines:

  • Statutory purpose and scope: The Bench emphasized that section 145 is remedial and preventive, enacted to avert breaches of the peace by resolving disputes about actual possession promptly and summarily. The section's object is not to function as a civil adjudication of substantive title.
  • Meaning of “parties concerned in such dispute”: The judges interpreted this phrase as primarily indicating those who claim actual possession (persons "in present possession"), not every person with a mere claim to a right to possession. The scope of inquiry under the section is limited to the fact of actual possession, irrespective of merits of civil title.
  • Effect of amendments (sub-sections (3), (5), (7) of section 145): The Court held that these provisions (publication of order near the subject of dispute; allowing any person interested to intervene; substitution of legal representatives) enlarge the Magistrate's powers to summon or permit intervention by other persons, and make earlier Full Bench decisions (notably Protap Narain Singh) inapplicable in part under the current Code.
  • Distinction between jurisdictional defect and procedural irregularity: The Court concluded that misjoinder or non-joinder of parties ordinarily constitutes a procedural irregularity and does not ipso facto deprive the Magistrate of jurisdiction. However, if the Magistrate refuses to allow the intervention of a person who plainly claims actual possession on the ground that the law does not permit adding parties (i.e., on a mistaken view that he lacks power), such refusal amounts to a declination of jurisdiction and is amenable to revision under section 15 of the High Court's Act.
  • Revisionary jurisdiction of the High Court: The Bench held that although sub-section (3) of section 435 (Act V of 1898) excludes certain Chapter XII proceedings from revisional jurisdiction under section 435, the High Court retains revisional power under section 15 of the High Court's Act to correct orders made without jurisdiction, including those resulting from application of an inappropriate procedure or failure to comply with material preliminary conditions.
  • Practical considerations and expediency: The Court repeatedly stressed practical difficulties and the need for prompt summary disposal. Requiring the Magistrate to identify every conceivable interested person before instituting proceedings would hamper the statutory object. Conversely, publication and intervention provisions are safeguards to protect absent interested persons.
  • Multiple parcels and aggregate disputes: The Bench noted it is impossible to lay down a rigid rule in all cases; where a dispute is single in character though covering several plots, one proceeding may suffice; where independent disputes relate to distinct parcels, separate proceedings ought to be the course. This is treated as a matter of discretion and procedure, not generally jurisdictional.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Full Bench held that, generally, proceedings under section 145, CrPC are not automatically void for non-joinder or misjoinder of parties; such defects are ordinarily irregularities not affecting the Magistrate's jurisdiction. However, if a Magistrate refuses to allow the intervention of a person who clearly claims actual possession on the mistaken ground that he lacks power to add parties, that refusal is a declination of jurisdiction and the order is open to revision by the High Court under section 15 of the High Court's Act.

Direct Consequences and Practical Implications:

  • The Magistrate's jurisdiction under section 145 arises when he is satisfied from the information before him that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists; the Magistrate must act to prevent breach of the peace.
  • The phrase “parties concerned in such dispute” should be understood to include those claiming actual possession; the Magistrate should endeavour to bring such persons before him and may summon or cause publication under sub-section (3) to enable others to intervene.
  • Addition or substitution of parties under the present Code does not necessarily require starting a fresh proceeding, except in cases where fresh parties correspond to a fresh dispute; the usual effect is continuation of the original proceeding.
  • Non-joinder of a person who neither appeared nor protested does not by itself render the proceeding void for want of jurisdiction.
  • Orders under sections 145/146 are subject to revision by the High Court under section 15 of the High Court's Act when they are made without jurisdiction (including where material procedural conditions prescribed by statute have not been complied with), notwithstanding certain exclusions from revisional jurisdiction under section 435 of the Code.
  • The Full Bench stated that earlier Full Bench authority (Protap Narain Singh) must be read in light of current statutory provisions (notably sub-sec. (3) of s.145) and cannot be treated as fully binding for present cases.

Disposition in these particular references: The Full Bench answered the referred questions largely in the negative where they asked whether non-joinder or joinder vitiated jurisdiction, with the qualification described above concerning refusal to permit intervention. The cases were returned to the Division Bench which made the reference, with the Full Bench's answers.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content and statements contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion text.

    Krishna Kamini Chowdhurani And Others v. Abdul Jabbar Chowdhry And Others Opposite Party.

    Prinsep, C.J:— I agree in the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Hill. The matters under consideration have been so fully discussed in the order of reference and in his judgment that there is little to add.

    The reported cases to which dissent has been expressed in the order of reference seem to have proceeded on the ground that proceedings under sec. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, should be regulated on the same principles as if the Magistrate were trying a civil suit involving a right to possession and that unless all persons having any possible claim are made parties to those proceedings, they are bad for want of jurisdiction. That was also the argument addressed to us by Mr. Hill. But the law does not require this nor is it the object of proceedings under sec. 145 that the Magistrate should deal with the matter before him as if he were acting as a Civil Court. The object in view is to prevent a breach of the peace by determining the actual possession of land, etc., in dispute between certain parties who are likely on this account to break the peace. The Court has, however, recognized that a determination of actual possession between the disputing parties might affect the rights of absent parties really in possession and that such persons are entitled to be heard. That seems to me to be going beyond the letter of the law and also the object in view. It may be very desirable that such parties should be heard so as to avoid a possible injustice by determining in their absence an issue which may affect their rights. But whether a particular person should or should not be brought in, is a matter on which the Magistrate should exercise his discretion. The law nowhere declares that such person is entitled to come into the proceedings and therefore although in refusing to hear him the Magistrate may not be exercising his discretion properly, it cannot be said that such refusal amounts to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction under the law. The object in view is to prevent a breach of the peace between certain parties found to be in dispute by determining the subject-matter of that dispute, not the determination of actual possession or a right to possession in regard to all persons who may possibly be concerned in such a matter. It is the duty of the Magistrate to avoid doing injustice to others when holding his proceedings, so as to arrive at the final order in regard to actual possession, but his jurisdiction cannot be affected by the fact that he may not have heard one who was not mentioned in the information on which he has acted as in dispute or in the order in writing on which his proceedings have been taken. The final order has effect only until a competent Court has determined “the rights of the disputing parties thereto or the person entitled to possession thereof.” By this means the probable breach of the peace is prevented. This is the paramount consideration and I may appropriately point out that ??? so been regarded in respect of ??? under sec. 144 which may ??? person from the exercise of his ??? rights of property because such ??? is likely to cause a breach of the ??? There are many reported cases on ??? subject in which, for instance, the ??? to hold a hât (market) on a man own land has been prohibited for this reason.

    The judgment of the Full Bench in Protap Narain Singh is obsolete in consequence of the modification of the law by the enactment of sub-sec. (3), for the obvious object of directing a public notification to be made on the locality of the order in writing taking proceedings under sec. 145 can have been only with the intention of enabling others than those personally served with such order to come in if they are affected by the proceedings taken.

    As one of the referring Judges I would here explain that the third point put to the Full Bench proceeded only on that judgment being in force.

    On the last point referred I would desire to state that it is impossible to lay down any general rule in regard to proceedings of a Magistrate under sec. 145 and how far they should be confined in each case to a particular plot of land claimed by one of the parties. Suppose, as in the case of Laldhari Singh, a number of persons backed by their landlord is disputing with others backed by their landlord in regard to ??? lands and from the inform-??? the Magistrate they are ??? combination. As between the ??? landlords there would be no ??? but to require the Magistrate ??? separate proceedings in respect ??? plot of land claimed by each of ??? raiyats, would be to require him to undertake what would be almost impossible from the intricate character of such proceedings. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate would depend upon the nature of the information on which he has acted. If the dispute so brought to his notice is one likely to cause a breach of the peace, it would be Impossible to characterise his proceedings as without jurisdiction because in the course of the judicial enquiry subsequently held the claims of some of the parties related only to particular plots of land out of the entire area in question. His findings should naturally be directed to possession of particular plots; but that he did not take separate proceedings in respect to each plot would not invalidate his entire proceedings. What might be the nature of a suit brought to set aside the final order passed in respect to possession-proceeding of the Magistrate seems to me to be irrelevant. The object of the Magistrate's proceedings is to prevent a breach of the peace shown to be likely to take place from the police-report or other information on which he has acted and he has sufficiently complied with the law if he finds possession of the lands in dispute in respect to each of the claims made. It cannot be justly said that his proceedings are without jurisdiction. I would therefore answer the last point referred in the negative.

    Banerjee, J.:— These two cases were heard together.

    Case No. 730 arises out of a proceeding under sec. 145, Cr. P.C, instituted by the Sub-Divisional Officer of Tangail, in which Abdul Jabbar Chowdhry and others were the first party, and Brojendra Kumar Roy Chaudhuri, predecessor in interest of the Petitioner before this Court, was the second party. The Magistrate having made an order for the attachment of the property in dispute under sec. 146, Cr. P.C, the Petitioner obtained a Rule calling on the other side to show cause why the order should not be set aside on three grounds, namely,

    1. That the Magistrate had no authority to add parties;

    2. That certain necessary parties, namely, the tenants, had not been made parties;

    3. That the facts found did not authorise an order under sec. 146.

    Case No. 834 arises out of another proceeding under sec. 145. The Magistrate having passed an order in favour of the first party, the second party obtained a Rule calling upon the former to show cause why the order should not be set aside on these grounds, namely,

    1. That the Magistrate had no information upon the date of the institution of the proceedings that there was any likelihood of a breach of the peace;

    2. That the dispute being between different persons claiming different parcels of land, the institution of one proceeding dealing with them altogether was bad;

    3. That the order was based upon a local investigation which the Magistrate was not competent to make.

    The learned Judges who heard these two Rules being unable to agree with the view taken in certain cases, namely, Ram Chunder Das, Laldhari Singh, Anesh Mollah and Mangal Haidar, on the questions, how far defect of parties vitiates proceedings under sec. 145, and how far a Magistrate is bound to enquire as to who the parties to the dispute are, and in the case of Raja Rameshwar, on the question whether the joinder of parties vitiates such proceedings, have referred the two cases to a Full Bench for the determination of the following points:—

    Are proceedings held under sec. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, bad for want of jurisdiction because the Magistrate on information before him has made parties to such proceedings only those who are actually in dispute and who are likely by such dispute to cause a breach of the peace, when in the course of the proceedings so taken it is brought to his notice that some other party is interested in the subject-matter of the dispute, that is, is likely to be affected by the order to be passed in respect of the possession of the land in dispute? Is the Magistrate bound to stay such proceedings?

    Is a Magistrate before taking proceedings under sec. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, bound to make inquiry to ascertain who have, or claim to have, any right to possession, either actual possession, or possession through receipt of rent from tenants claiming to ??? lands in dispute?

    If he does take fresh ??? further information since ??? such proceedings separate and ??? or are they in continuation of the ??? proceedings, so as to relate back in ??? of time to the date on which they ??? first taken?

    Are proceedings under sec. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, bad for want of jurisdiction because some person, claiming to have possession in some way of the lands or of a portion of the lands in dispute, has not been made a party although he was not one of the parties in the dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, so far as appeared from the information on which the Magistrate acted, and even if such person has not appeared and raised any objection on this account?

    Are proceedings under sec. 145 bad for want of jurisdiction because some of the parties are concerned only with possession of a portion of the lands in dispute?

    Before proceeding to consider these questions, I think it necessary to determine whether the effect of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 435 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) is to place orders under secs. 145 and 146 altogether out of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, for, if that is so, it would be useless to discuss the questions referred to us.

    Though sub-sec. (3) of sec. 435 by declaring that proceedings under Chap. XII (in which secs. 145 and 146 are included) are not proceedings within the meaning of sec. 435, excludes orders under secs. 145 and 146 from the revisional jurisdiction of this Court so far ??? jurisdiction is conferred by sec. ??? it cannot be said that such ??? are placed beyond this Court's ??? of revision under sec. 15 of the High Court's Act, 24 and 25 Vic., c. ???. The limits of this power [See In the matter of Brojendra Kumar Chowdry(7), Nilmoni Singh v. Taranath(8), Muhammad Suleman v. Fatima(9)] are no doubt narrower than those of the powers conferred by sec. 435, it being confined to cases where orders are made by a Subordinate Court declining jurisdiction vested in it by law, or are made without jurisdiction—a description which includes orders made by the application of any form of procedure to cases to which it does not apply and also those made without complying with the material preliminary conditions required to be satisfied by the procedure prescribed. See Brij Mohun v. Rai Uma Nath(10) and Gopi Mohun v. Taramoni(11).

    That being the case, let us consider how far the errors in the proceedings referred to in the questions, affected the jurisdiction of the Magistrate so as to make those proceedings open to revision by this Court.

    The first question referred to this Full Bench relates to the meaning of the expression “parties concerned in such dispute” occurring in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 145, and to the effect of an omission to make any of such parties parties to the proceeding. On the one hand it is urged that the special jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts to deal with the question of possession being conferred only for preventing breach of the peace, the only persons who can be made parties to a proceeding under sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are those engaged in a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace; that it would defeat the object of the section which is to enable the Magistrate promptly to settle disputes about possession, if he were to be held bound to make an elaborate enquiry as to who are the different parties interested in the subject of the dispute; and that it being left to the discretion of the Magistrate to make such persons parties to the proceeding as he may think fit, omission to make any person a party cannot affect the validity of the proceeding, especially when it is not open to the Magistrate to add any party after the case has been commenced. And in support of this contention the cases of Kunund Narain Bhoop and Protap Narain v. Rajendra are relied upon.

    On the other hand it is argued that as orders under secs. 145 and 146 bind the whole world, the words “parties concerned in the dispute” must mean all persons interested in the subject-matter of the dispute likely to be affected by any order made in relation to possession thereof; that it would be contrary to first principles to make any such order in the absence of parties who may be affected by them; and that if a Magistrate makes an order under either of those two sections without having before him all the necessary parties, his proceedings are in contravention of the procedure prescribed, and the order should be held as made without jurisdiction. And Bagg's case, Laldhari Singh, Anesh Mollah and Mangal Haidar are cited in support of this argument.

    The old law on the subject was discussed at some length in the course of the argument; but having regard to the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Narendra Nath Sirkar v. Kamalbashini I do not think it profitable to pursue that discussion, when the present Code of Criminal Procedure is clear on the point.

    I am of opinion that though the jurisdiction of a Criminal Court to deal with questions of disputed possession under sec. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code is of a limited character, and arises only when the dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace, and though in the exercise of such jurisdiction the Magistrate must, to prevent any breach of the peace, act with all possible promptness, yet when once the existence of such a dispute is made out to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, and he acquires jurisdiction to entertain the case, such jurisdiction cannot be said to be limited to calling upon the parties actually engaged in the dispute, but must extend to his calling upon all parties interested in the dispute, that is claiming actual possession of the subject of dispute, to appear in person or by pleader and to his calling upon or allowing any ??? party, though not originally ??? called upon to do so, to enter ??? at any subsequent stage of the proceedings if the facts disclosed show such appearance to be necessary; and if the Magistrate refuses to make such party a party to the proceeding, on the ground of want of power in him under the law to add any party to the proceeding, and not of absence of interest in such party in the subject of dispute as a matter of fact, the Magistrate declines a jurisdiction vested in him by law, and his order may be set aside as involving an error of jurisdiction, and he may be directed by this Court under sec. 15 of the High Court's Act (24 and 25 Vic., c. 104) to proceed according to law.

    The view I take is in accordance as well with the letter as with the spirit of the law.

    Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts in sub-sec. (1) that when a Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace exists concerning any land (I refer only to so much of the section as bears upon this case) he shall make an order in writing requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to enter appearance, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. The law then requires parties concerned, that is, interested in the dispute, and not merely those engaged in it, to be made parties and requires them to put in their claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. Every person who lays claim to actual possession of ??? subject of dispute is, therefore, necessary party under sub-sec. (1).

    Passing over sub-sec. (2), which does not bear on the present question, we find important changes introduced by sub-secs, (3), (5) and (7) of the present Code. Sub-sec. (3) requires the publication of the order at or near the subject of dispute, which is intended to serve as a general notice to all persons interested, sub-sec. (5) allows any person interested other than the parties expressly required to attend, to intervene and show that there is no real dispute existing, and sub-sec. (7) evidently contemplates the substitution of the legal representatives of deceased parties. These new provisions, in my opinion, make the principles laid down in the cases of Kunund Narain Bhoop and Protap Narain Singh no longer applicable to cases unaer sec. There is a general notice to all persons concerned in the dispute now required to be published, and new parties may intervene or be substituted in the course of the proceeding.

    It is argued that when a new party is introduced, the old proceeding must be at an end, and the Magistrate must be satisfied again that there is a dispute still existing likely to cause a breach of the peace. No doubt it is easy to conceive of eases where with the substitution of new parties, the former likelihood of a breach of the peace may cease to exist, as when the old disputants die leaving minor heirs whose properties are taken charge of by the Court of Wards. But as a rule, the mere addition of parties to a pending proceeding under sec. 145 does not imply cessation of the original likelihood of a breach of the peace, and does not, therefore, require the initiation of any fresh proceeding.

    Then as regards the delay that may be caused by the addition of parties who may claim to cross-examine the witnesses already examined and to adduce further evidence, the remedy is provided by the new proviso to sub-sec. (4) which authorizes the Magistrate in cases of emergency to attach the subject of dispute.

    If the letter of the law thus clearly supports the view I take, the spirit of the law is still more clearly in favour of the same view, for apart from the question whether an order under sec. 145 or sec. 146 is binding on the whole world,—a question which I do not determine, but to which an affirmative answer is favoured by the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 145 and sub-sec. (2) of sec. 146,—such an order must prejudicially affect a person who claims to be in possession of the subject of the dispute, but is not made a party to the proceeding, as it will be evidence against him under sec. 13 of the Evidence Act (see Dinomoni v. Brojo Mohini(15) and he will have at least to apply to the Magistrate for the withdrawal of the order; and if that is so, it is but fair and just, that he should have an opportunity of defending his case before such an order is made. [See Baggs' case, Maxwell on Statutes, 3rd Ed., p. 511],

    This view is in accordance with the cases of Ram Chunder Das, Laldhari Singh v. Sukdeo Narain, Anesh Mollah and Mangal Haldar.

    I would therefore answer the first question in the negative, subject to this qualification that if the Magistrate refuses to allow the intervention of a party claiming an interest in and actual possession of the subject of dispute, not on the ground of his having no such interest but on the ground of the law not authorizing the addition of any such party, his order is open to revision by this Court.

    The second question referred to us must be answered in the negative. The Magistrate should do his best to ascertain who the parties concerned in the dispute in a case under sec. 145 are. But his order cannot be pronounced to be vitiated by any error of jurisdiction, merely because such enquiry has not been made or carried far enough.

    The second alternative of the third question also should, in my opinion, be answered in the affirmative, and the first alternative in the negative, if the fresh proceeding referred to in the question is the result not of any fresh dispute arising, but of fresh parties concerned in the old dispute being added as parties. I have already pointed out that by reason of the new provisions introduced into the present Code, sec. 145, sub-secs. (3), (5), and (7), fresh parties may be added, or substituted, such addition or substitution not putting an end to the original proceeding, and the rule laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Protap Narain against such substitution or ??? can no longer hold good.

    The fourth question should, I think, be answered in the negative: a mere allegation that some person who does not appear and raise any objection has a claim to possession, cannot vitiate the proceeding for want of jurisdiction.

    The fifth and last question should also, in my opinion, be answered in the negative, the fault in the proceeding which is referred to in that question being in the nature of an irregularity not affecting the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

    I would accordingly return the cases to the Division Bench which has made this reference, with the foregoing answers to the questions referred to us.

    Hill, J.:— Of the questions discussed at the hearing of these references those only are really material which relate to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, since it is only in cases in which a Magistrate has either acted without jurisdiction or improperly declined to exercise his jurisdiction, that this Court has now authority to interfere with his proceedings under sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In order therefore to bring these cases within the jurisdiction of this Court it must be shown “that the Magistrate acted in one or other of the ways mentioned. Otherwise we have no power of interference.

    The two cases referred may be dealt with together, for all that I propose now to do is to express my views upon the questions submitted to us by the learned ??? Judges, the ultimate disposal ??? being in their hands.

    Hill's contention on behalf of the ??? in the first case was that it ??? to the jurisdiction of the ??? that all persons concerned ??? the dispute which sec. 145 contemates should be made parties to the proceeding and that if they are not, the proceedings are bad for want of jurisdiction. He contended that by parties concerned in the dispute was meant all persons claiming a right to possession of the land, & c., the subject of dispute, and that it was therefore necessary that all such persons should be brought into the proceeding in order to give the Magistrate jurisdiction to make the ultimate order for which the section provides. He also pointed out that order is to forbid all disturbance of the possession of the person whom the Magistrate declares to be in possession until evicted in due course of law, and he argued that the effect of the order being consequently to adjudicate upon the civil rights of persons interested in the land, it would be opposed to the most elementary principles of justice that any one should be affected by it who had not been a party to the proceeding.

    I do not propose to follow Mr. Hill through the very numerous authorities which he cited in support of these positions. Nor do I think that the historical treatment of the subject with which he dealt so skilfully is likely to throw much light upon the actual question now before us. The law, as it now stands, is the result of very recent legislation and I think that sec. 145, although not perhaps altogether free from difficulties, may be interpreted without recourse being had to, extraneous sources of information; all that need, I think, be said from this point of view is that the section as it now stands is virtually a re-enactment of the corresponding section of the Code of 1882 with however what appears to me to be a somewhat important addition relative to the summoning of parties and another by which a person interested who has not been summoned to attend before the Magistrate is enabled to show that no dispute exists or has existed. There are, besides, the new provisions as to abatement contained in cl. (7), and the provisos to cl. (4).

    In entering upon a consideration of the section it is, I think, important to bear in mind the purpose with which it was enacted. It occurs in that part of the Code which relates to the prevention of the offences, and its object is to bring to an end by a summary process disputes relating to land, etc., which are in their nature likely, if not suppressed, to end in breaches of the peace. The maintenance of the public peace was the object before the mind of the Legislature and where that supreme object is in view there can be no question but that the convenience and even the rights of individuals must at times be sacrificed for its attainment. It would therefore, I think, be improper, as the tendency has sometimes been, to lean too much in attempting to construe the section upon analogies derived from suits and other civil proceedings, the results of which are very different from those of a proceeding under the section and in which the rights of individuals inter se are alone in question. It is assumed as a possible consequence of a proceeding under sec. 145, that the owner of property may temporarily be deprived of possession of what is rightfully his and be subjected to other inconveniences. But this and such like considerations it was presumably necessary to subordinate to the imperative necessity of preserving the peace.

    Turning to the section itself, the principal point dwelt on at the hearing was the meaning of the words “parties concerned in such dispute,” the contention being, as I have mentioned, that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is dependant on his having all such persons before him. I cannot assent to that view. But in order to answer the different questions submitted to us by the reference it is necessary that I should say something as to what I understand to be the proper interpretation of the words in question. Having regard to the object to which the proceeding is directed, I mean by that the ascertainment of the persons actually in possession at the time of the initial order under cl. (1). I should feel disposed to think that they were intended to indicate all persons claiming to be then in possession and I think that the Magistrate should endeavour to bring all such persons into the proceeding. But the scope of the inquiry under the section is confined to the fact of actual possession, irrespective of the merits of the claims of the parties concerned. A claim therefore merely to a right to possession, as distinguished from a claim to be in possession, would be outside the scope of the enquiry. And this is, I think, shown with sufficient clearness both by the provisions of cl. (1) of the section regarding the matter ??? the written statements of the ??? are to be directed and cl. (4) ??? prescribes the question upon ??? Magistrate is, if possible, to give ??? I am unable therefore to ??? the view which has been taken in ??? cases that all parties interested in ??? claiming a right to the property in dispute are entitled to be or should be made parties to the proceeding, No doubt the difference may be slight in practice inasmuch as persons who claim to be entitled to landed property usually claim to be in possession of it. But the test is not, I think, the true one, and if it were to be adopted it would lead to the creation of numerous difficulties in the application of the section and greatly impair its practical utility. Regard must be had moreover to the sources of the Magistrate's information and to what the nature of that information is likely to be. What is most likely to be conveyed to him is that, so and so and so and so are disputing about the possession of land and that, if he does not intervene there will be a breach of the peace and it is upon the basis of the information conveyed to him, as it seems to me, that the Magistrate is in the first instance to select the persons whom he will require to attend his Court for the purpose of laying their claims before him. How is he to ascertain, in order that his proceeding may be properly constituted, who all the persons interested in or claiming a right to the property in dispute are? To require him to do so would be to impose on him in some cases an almost impossible task and would undoubtedly have the effect of unduly prolonging and greatly embarrass ??? proceedings and of depriving ??? in many instances of their ??? character. What, I conceive, ??? intended, was to bring the ??? to a prompt termination and to ??? the parties concerned in it to set ??? differences at rest, without delay and ??? for all, by having recourse to the ??? Courts. But proceedings under the ??? have too frequently, as any one acquainted with the criminal business of this Court must be aware, been protracted to a most lamentable degree by the application of such principles as those I have referred to above. On the other hand it seems to me difficult to say that the dispute can be a matter of no concern to persons other than the actual disputants, when the result of the order passed under the section may be to remove from possession a third party who is not a disputant.

    Cl. (3) of the existing section has however enlarged the powers previously reposed in the Magistrate as to the summoning of the parties. I was at first disposed to think that the clause was introduced for the purpose of regulating the issue and service of process generally under the section, thereby leaving it virtually to the discretion of the Magistrate what persons he would make parties to the proceedings. But on further consideration I think the intention was to empower the Magistrate, after he has issued the order provided for by cl. (1) to the persons who from the original information given him it appears are claiming to be in possession, to bring in any other persons who from subsequent information it may seem to him proper to have before him. But the scope of the enquiry is not thereby enlarged. The copy which may be served under the clause is to be a copy of the order mentioned in cl. (1) which requires the party to whom it is addressed to state his claims as to the fact of actual possession and cl. (4) confines the enquiry to the same fact. The clause in question was, I think, intended to be only supplementary to cl. (1). Then the clause further provides for the publication of a copy of the order in a conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute probably with the intention of guarding against collusive proceedings as well as to give to any one interested who may, through an oversight or otherwise, not have received a summons, an opportunity of coming in with his claim and also to notify generally to all persons in the locality that a proceeding under the section has been set on foot. But I would say again that I do not think this general invitation was intended, any more than the power given to the Magistrate of summoning additional parties, to have the effect of altering the character of the enquiry. The only material question still remains, the fact of actual possession.

    Then by cl. (4) it is provided that after the requirements of cls. (1) and (3) have been complied with, the Magistrate without reference to the merits of the claims of “such parties” to a right to possession is to peruse their statements, & c., and come, if possible, to a decision as to the fact of possession. The words “such parties” here must, I think, be interpreted with reference to the words in cl (1), “the parties concerned in such dispute,” and must bear the same meaning, the effect being to restrict the enquiry to the parties concerned in the dispute, in the sense I have mentioned above, notwithstanding that persons other than these may have been summoned by the Magistrate or may have come in of their own accord on the publication of the copy of the order in the locality.

    It appears to me, I may add, from a consideration merely of the language used, as distinguished from the nature of the proceeding, that the words “the parties concerned in such dispute” must have been intended to extend to persons other than the actual disputants. There may, I think, be a dispute between A and B which is likely to cause a breach of the peace to which C is not strictly a party but in which he is nevertheless concerned as claiming to be in possession. Had it been intended to confine the proceeding to the actual disputants, I think the appropriate words would have been “the parties disputing.” Had it, on the other hand, been intended to include all persons interested in or claiming a right to possession of the lands, & c., language conveying that meaning would presumably have been used.

    Such being, in my opinion, the meaning of the words in question and the means prescribed by the Legislature for bringing the parties concerned before the Magistrate, the section next provides that the Magistrate shall enter upon the enquiry. Up to that point it appears to me that the Magistrate has very wide powers with respect to the persons whom he will bring into the proceeding. He may alter or add to the array of parties, either of his own motion, or, on the application of any one claiming to be concerned in the dispute in the sense that he claims to be in possession. ??? order is no doubt intended to ??? within which claimants are ??? but it would not, I think, be ??? of any materiality, if after the ??? fixed but before the opening ??? actual enquiry, parties were ??? From that time onwards, however ??? seems to me, that it was not ??? subject to the provisions of cl. (7), the any new parties should be brought it. The “person interested” who is em powered under cl. (5) to show that no dispute exists or has existed, does not, of course, come in for the purpose of joining in the proceeding but for the purpose of bringing it to an end. But the section contains no provision for the addition of parties after the commencement of the enquiry and it was, no doubt, considered that the power, conferred on the Magistrate by cl. (3), of summoning such persons as he might deem proper and the means prescribed by the same clause for giving publicity to the fact that a proceeding under the section had been set on foot, provided a sufficient guarantee that before the actual enquiry is entered upon all parties really concerned will either have been summoned to attend the proceeding or will have had the opportunity of doing so afforded them if they care to avail themselves of it. It would lead to much inconvenience and delay if it were held that any one claiming to be concerned in the dispute was entitled to come in and join in the proceedings after the commencement of the enquiry. It would probably be necessary in such a case to start the enquiry afresh as the party added would have a right to have ??? taken in his presence and ??? claimants successively were to ??? in, in this way, it is evident that ??? proceeding might be indefinitely pronged. I do not say that if the Magistrate, for sufficient reasons, thought proper after the commencement of the enquiry to bring in an additional party that his proceedings would therefore be bad, but I think that he would, in doing so, be acting in contravention of the intention of the Legislature. I ought, while on this point, to add that in my opinion the Full Bench decision in Protap Narain Singh v. Rajendro Narain Singh cannot, in view of the alteration of the law introduced by cl. (3) of sec. 145 as it now stands, be regarded as a binding authority on the construction of the section.

    Then as to the question of jurisdiction, on being satisfied of the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning land, etc., within his local jurisdiction, the duty, which is imperative, is cast upon the Magistrate of taking action under sec. 145. The two essentials are that there should be a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace and that the dispute should concern land, etc. The section does not primarily contemplate cases in which there have already been overt acts of violence. All the disputants may be persons of peaceable disposition, but if the dispute is in its nature of such a kind that it is likely, having regard to the known conditions of society, to lead to a breach of the peace, that is enough to warrant the Magistrate's intervention and to give him jurisdiction over the subject of dispute. Upon the existence of those conditions and those conditions only is the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, in my opinion, dependent. The object, I think, is to take the subject of dispute, so to speak, out of the hands of the disputants and to constitute one of them whose possession the law will protect, its custodian, until the other has established his right (if any) to possession in a Civil Court. In certain instances, indeed, the Magistrate is authorized himself to take possession so that none of the parties concerned may have possession until a Civil Court has decided upon the right. But be this as it may, questions of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties do not ordinarily go to the jurisdiction. A Magistrate would no doubt be acting without jurisdiction if he entered upon his enquiry without having issued the orders contemplated by cl. (1) of the section. But questions of whether A ought to have been added as being a person likely to be affected by the proceeding or B omitted as not being concerned in it, or whether C was added at too late a stage and such like are questions of procedure by which, in my opinion, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is not affected.

    There is lastly the point raised by the fifth question referred. Upon this question it is not very easy to generalize. But I should think that when there are independent disputes relative to distinct parcels of land they ought to be dealt with in separate proceedings. When on the other hand the dispute is one, the fact that it embraces several distinct parcels of land is not, in my opinion, sufficient to necessitate an independent proceeding in respect of each. The matter is not however one which, as it appears to me, affects the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

    For the foregoing reasons, I would answer the questions submitted to us as follows:—

    Q.I—To the first branch of the question my answer is, no.

    To the second branch:—I do not think that the Magistrate would be bound to stay the proceedings.

    Q. II.—I think the Magistrate ought before entering on his enquiry under cl. (4) of the section (though not as a preliminary to the institution of the proceeding for which latter purpose all that is requisite is that the Magistrate should issue the orders provided for by cl. (1) to the parties named in the information) to satisfy himself to the best of his ability, on the information before him, as to who are the persons claiming to be in present possession of the subject of dispute, but that he is not concerned to ascertain what persons have or claim to have mere rights to possession.

    Q. III.—I am not quite clear as to the intention of this question. But assuming it to relate to the addition of a party after the initiation of the proceeding, I would say, that there is no necessity for a fresh proceeding in consequence of such addition assuming the party added to have been concerned originally in the dispute which is the foundation of the proceeding. Up to the time when the enquiry begins, I think parties may now be added. If they are added after it has begun, I think that would be an irregularity. But I do not think it would be necessary, in consequence, to ??? a fresh proceeding; but evidence obviously taken ought, if the parties added require it, to be again taken their presence.

    Q. IV.—No.

    Q. V.—No.

    Brett, J.:— I agree with Mr. Justice Hill and have nothing to add to what he has said in his judgment.

    Henderson, J.:— I also agree with the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Hill.

    H.P.C

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    Krishna Kamini Chowdhurani And Others v. Abdul Jabbar Chowdhry And Others Opposite Party.
    (Jul 21, 1902)