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  • Rule 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code of 1608
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Rule 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code of 1608
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal challenged the refusal of a temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to grant a lease. The plaintiff relied on an alleged agreement made on 8 January 1909 with the father of the infant defendant, which was subsequently affirmed by the defendant’s mother and guardian. The suit was instituted on 23 May 1911, followed by an application under Rule 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code of 1908 to restrain dealings with the property during the litigation. [1]

The Subordinate Judge refused the injunction because the plaintiff sought to prevent the owner from granting a lease to another person for potentially several years. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that refusal would seriously prejudice him. [1]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a temporary injunction should issue to preserve the property during the pendency of a suit for specific performance, notwithstanding the doctrine of lis pendens. [1][2]
  2. Whether the injunction should be granted subject to security and an undertaking to compensate the defendant for loss if the suit failed. [2]

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The refusal of an injunction could seriously embarrass or prejudice the plaintiff during the litigation. [1]
  • The plaintiff challenged the view that notice of the proceedings and the doctrine of lis pendens provided sufficient protection. [1][2]

Respondent's Arguments

  • Relying on Turners v. Wight and Mati Lal Pal v. Preo Nath Mitra, the respondent contended that a transferee with notice of the litigation would be bound by its result. [1]
  • The respondent argued that the balance of convenience had to be considered and that the Subordinate Judge’s discretionary refusal should be respected. [2]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Turners v. Wight That a purchaser during litigation would be bound by lis pendens. The Court rejected this as insufficient protection and held that the weight of authority favoured granting an injunction. [1][2]
Mati Lal Pal v. Preo Nath Mitra That an intended transferee with notice would be bound by the litigation. The respondent relied on the case, but the Court declined to treat lis pendens as a bar to injunctive relief. [1]
The Great Western Railway Company v. The Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway Co. The Court may preserve property in its existing status during litigation without deciding the merits, where a substantial question requires determination. The Court adopted this principle as governing the application for a temporary injunction. [2]
Echliff v. Baldwin An example of preserving property during litigation by injunction. The case was cited as supporting the principle stated in The Great Western Railway Company. [2]
Curtis v. Marquis of Buckingham An example of preserving property during litigation by injunction. The case was cited as supporting interim preservation of the subject matter. [2]
Spiller v. Spiller An example of preserving property during litigation by injunction. The case was cited in support of maintaining the status quo pending adjudication. [2]
Hood v. Aston Lis pendens is not necessarily the best protection and does not deprive a suitor of the more effective protection of an injunction. The Court used this reasoning to reject the respondent’s reliance on lis pendens alone. [2]
Subba Naidu v. Haji Badsha Support for granting an injunction notwithstanding the contrary view in Turner v. Wight. The case was cited as part of the authority favouring the contrary view. [2]
Madras Railway Co. v. Thomas Rust Support for interim protection during litigation. The case was cited with Subba Naidu as supporting the Court’s approach. [2]
Hadley v. London Bank of Scotland Where there is a clear and valid contract for sale, the vendor should not transfer the legal estate to a third person, even if that person would be affected by lis pendens. The Court held that this principle was consistent with considering the balance of convenience. [2]
Preston v. Luck Further support for restraining dealings with property despite the potential operation of lis pendens. The case was cited in support of the injunction. [2]
Chandra Nath Pal v. Sree. Gobind Chaudhri Granting an injunction subject to security and protection against loss. The Court relied on the principle in directing additional security and an undertaking to compensate the defendant. [2]
Shadiram v. Abdul Ali Granting an injunction on protective terms. The case supported the conditions imposed on the appellant. [2]
Howard v. Press Printers Granting interim relief subject to safeguards. The case was cited as authority for requiring security and compensation protection. [2]
Chappell v. Davidson Granting an injunction subject to protective conditions. The case supported the conditions attached to the injunction. [2]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court held that the mere fact that a future transferee would be bound by lis pendens did not make an injunction unnecessary. A transfer could still embarrass the plaintiff in pursuing the original claim, and lis pendens was considered less effective protection than an injunction. [1][2]

The governing principle was that the Court may preserve property in its existing condition while rights are being determined, without deciding the merits, provided that a substantial question exists between the parties. The Court concluded that this principle applied to the plaintiff’s claim. [2]

Although the balance of convenience was a relevant consideration, the Court found it consistent with restraining the owner from transferring the property where there was an asserted valid contract. The Subordinate Judge’s discretionary decision was subject to appellate correction, and the Court considered an injunction appropriate in the circumstances. [2]

To protect the defendant against potential loss, the Court made the injunction conditional upon additional security and the appellant’s undertaking to compensate the defendant if the suit was dismissed. [2]

Holding and Implications

Temporary injunction granted. The appellant was directed to furnish additional security of Rs. 1,000, in addition to security already provided, and to give the required undertaking. The injunction restrained the defendant from dealing with the subject matter of the litigation for six months. [2]

The Subordinate Judge was directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously. If the suit remained undisposed of after six months for reasons not attributable to the plaintiff, including fault by the defendant, the plaintiff could apply for continuation of the injunction. The injunction proceedings’ costs were made costs in the suit, and the hearing fee was assessed at three gold mohurs. [2]

The decision directly preserved the property pending adjudication and imposed safeguards for the defendant. The opinion does not state that a new broader precedent was established.

    Pramatha Nath Roy v. Jagannath Kishore Lal Singh Deo

    1. This appeal is directed against an order by which the Court below has refused to grant a temporary injunction during the pendency of a suit for specific performance of an agreement to grant a lease. The plaintiff founds his cause of action upon a contract alleged to have been made with him by the father of the infant defendant on the 8th January 1909, and subsequent to his death, affirmed by his widow, the mother and guardian of the infant. The suit was commenced on the 23rd May 1911 and seven days later, an application was presented under Rule 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code of 1608 for an injunction to restrain the defendant from dealing with the property during the pendency of the litigation. The Subordinate Judge has dismissed the application on the ground that as the plaintiff seeks an injunction to restrain the defendant from granting a lease to any other person till the disposal of the suit, and as that may take years, he could not justly issue such an injunction upon the person to whom the property admittedly belongs. This view has been controverted on behalf of the appellant, and it has been pointed out that the plaintiff may be seriously embarrassed if the injunction is not granted. On behalf of the respondent, it has been contended, on, the authority of the decisions in Turners v. Wight 4 Beav. 40 : 49 E.R. 252 : 55 R.R. 9 and Mati Lal Pal v. Preo Nath Mitra 13 C.W.N. 226 : 9 C.L.J. 96 : 3 Ind. Cas. 696 that the intended transferee would be bound by the result of this litigation, as admittedly he has notice of the present proceedings, it is, consequently, not necessary for the protection of the plaintiff that an injunction should be granted in his favour. In our opinion, this view cannot be supported.

    2. The principle applicable to cases of this description was lucidly stated by Lord Cathuham, L.C., in the case of The Great Western Railway Company v. The Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway Co. 2 Ph. 597 at 602 : 5 Rail. Cas. 241 : 17 L.J. Ch. 243 : 12 Jur. 106 : 78 R.R. 178: "it is certain that the Court will in many cases interfere and preserve property in status quo during the pendency of a suit, in which the rights to it are to be decided, and that without expressing, and often without having the means of forming, any opinion as to such rights. It is true that no purchaser pendente lite would gain a title; but it would embarrass the original purchaser in his suit against the vendor, which the Court prevents by its injunction. Such are the cases of Echliff v. Baldwin 16 Ves. 267 : 10 R.R. 178; Curtis v. Marquis of Buckingham 3 V. & B. 168 : 13 R.R. 174; Spiller v. Spiller 3 Swanst. 556 : 19 R.R. 276. It is true that the Court will not so interfere, if it thinks that there is no real question between the parties; but seeing that there is a substantial question to be decided, it will preserve the property until such question can be regularly disposed of. In order to support an injunction for such purpose, it is not necessary for the Court to decide upon the merits in favour of the plaintiff." To the same effect are the observations of Lord Eldon, L.C. in the case of Hood v. Aston 1 Russel 412 at 416 : 25 R.R. 93: "It is true, that, even if the Court were not to act, they would still have the security of lis pendens. But it is quite a new doctrine to me that a security like that, which is far from being the best that a prudent man would wish to have, is to deprive the suitor of the more effectual protection of an injunction, or that the Court, because it acts on the doctrine of lis pendens, will not prevent, if possible, the necessity of proceeding on such a principle." Our attention was however, invited on behalf of the respondent to the case of Turner v. Wight 4 Beav. 40 : 49 E.R. 252 : 55 R.R. 9 where Lord Langdale, M.R., refused an injunction during the pendency of a suit for specific performance of a contract, on the ground that the purchaser would be bound by the doctrine of lis pendens. But the cases to which we have referred make it abundantly clear that the weight of authority is in favour of the contrary view. See also Subba Naidu v. Haji Badsha 26 M. 168 : 13 M.L.J. 13; Madras Railway Co. v. Thomas Rust 14 M. 18 The learned Counsel for the respondents has finally contended that regard must be had to the balance of convenience of the parties. This may be accepted as the settled doctrine; but it is not inconsistent with the rule laid down in Hadley v. London Bank of Scotland 3 De. G.J. & Smith 63 : 11 Jur. (N.S.) 554 : 12 L.T. 747 : 13 W.R. 978 where Lord Justice Turner observed as follows: "I have always understood the rule of the Court to be, that if there is a clear valid contract for sale, the Court will rot permit the vendor afterwards to transfer the legal estate to a third person, although such third person would be effected by lis pendens." See further Preston v. Luck 27 Ch. D. 497. It is also true, as argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent, that the Subordinate Judge, in the exercise of his judicial discretion, has refused to grant an injunction; but the exercise of that discretion is liable to correction by this Court as the Court of Appeal; and we are clearly of opinion that, in the circumstances of this case, the injunction ought to be granted. Such injunction, however, will be granted only upon terms as to security, and upon undertaking given by the. appellant to compensate the defendant for any loss that may result to him in the event of the dismissal of the suit. We make this order in accordance with the principle recognised in the cases of Chandra Nath Pal v. Sree. Gobind Chaudhri 6 C.W.N. 308; Shadiram v. Abdul Ali 1 A.L.J. 527; Howard v. Press Printers 74 L.J. Ch. 100 : 91 L.T. 718 : 53 W.R. 98 and Chappell v. Davidson 8 De G.M. & G. 1 : 114 R.R. 1. We direct accordingly that in addition to the security already furnished by the appellant, he do furnish security to the extent of Rs. 1,000. If this order is carried out, we further direct that a temporary injunction be granted restraining the defendant from dealing with the subject-matter of the litigation in any manner for six months from this date. We also direct the Subordinate Judge to take up the suit for disposal as speedily as possible. If, upon the expiry of six months, it transpires that the hearing of the suit has not been completed by reason of any fault on the part of the defendant, or for any reason for which the plaintiff is not to; blame, the plaintiff will be at liberty to apply to this Court for continuance of the injunction for a further period. The appellant undertakes to furnish security within seven days after notice of the arrival of the record in the Court below shall have been given to his Pleader. The costs of the injunction proceedings will be costs in the suit. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at three gold mohurs.

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    Pramatha Nath Roy v. Jagannath Kishore Lal Singh Deo
    (May 7, 1912)