Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Revision No. 176 of 1974

Judges

R.M Sahai, J.

Acts

Section 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act
Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — R.M. Sahai, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant challenged a conciliation order passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on the ground of fraud. The applicant pursued remedies up to the stage of the Deputy Director of Consolidation without success and thereafter instituted a civil suit. The opposite party raised an objection that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. According to the opinion, the trial court decided the matter "in the negative" on that objection, while the appellate court decided "in affirmative." The plaint alleged that the conciliation was obtained by inducement and fraud: specifically, that the opposite party had obtained the applicant's thumb impression on plain paper and that those impressions were thereafter used as a compromise before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, and the applicant claimed to be the sole sirdar.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a suit challenging a conciliation order passed under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act on the ground of fraud is barred by Section 49 of the Act.
Whether consolidation courts have jurisdiction to consider the validity of a document obtained by fraud (i.e., whether they can treat such a document as void) or whether a document that is voidable must be set aside by a competent civil court before it loses legal effect.
How the legal distinction between a void document and a voidable document (including the distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of a document and as to its contents) affects the forum in which relief must be sought.
Whether the fact that the applicant previously agitated the matter up to the Deputy Director of Consolidation affects the equity or discretion of the civil court to grant relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

Counsel for the applicant relied on authorities reported in Noor Khan v. Board of Revenue (1977 AWC 394) and Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna (1976 AWC 412 and 1966 RD 147) to urge that a suit for cancellation of an order passed under Section 9 was not a proceeding regarding which relief could have been obtained from the consolidation courts, and therefore the suit in civil court was maintainable.

Respondent's Arguments

Counsel for the respondent relied on Chandra Shekhar v. Director of Consolidation (AIR 1972 Alld. 76; 1974 Unreported Revenue Cases 41 and other cases in the same volume) and Chet Ram v. Director of Consolidation (1970 AWR 775) to defend the appellate court's decision.
The respondent also relied on Ramzan Ali v. Mt. Satul Bibi (AIR 1948 Alld. 244) and Kalka Prasad Ram Charan v. Harish Chandra (AIR 1957 Alld. 25) to argue that this Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant because the applicant had already agitated the matter up to the Deputy Director of Consolidation, there was no equity in his favour, and justice had been done between the parties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Noor Khan v. Board of Revenue, 1977 AWC 394	Relied upon by applicant to contend that a suit for cancellation under Section 9 was maintainable in civil court because such relief could not have been obtained from consolidation courts.	The court recorded that the applicant relied on this decision but did not rest its ruling on it; the court stated it was not necessary to consider the respective contentions based on these authorities.
Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna…, 1976 AWC 412; 1966 RD 147	Relied upon by applicant in support of the proposition that the suit was maintainable in civil court.	Noted as relied upon by the applicant; the court did not base its decision on these authorities and observed it was unnecessary to consider those contentions further.
Chandra Shekhar v. Director of Consolidation, AIR 1972 Alld. 76; 1974 Unreported Revenue Cases 41 (and other cases)	Relied upon by respondent to defend the appellate court's order and support the proposition that consolidation courts' decisions should be upheld.	Recognized as relied upon by the respondent; the court indicated the respective contentions need not be examined in view of the principles drawn from higher precedents.
Chet Ram v. Director of Consolidation, 1970 AWR 775	Relied upon by respondent in support of the appellate court's view.	Cited as part of respondent's line of authorities; the court did not expressly apply this authority to resolve the matter because the decision turned on other precedents regarding fraud, void and voidable documents.
Ramzan Ali v. Mt. Satul Bibi, AIR 1948 Alld. 244	Relied upon by respondent to argue equity and discretionary grounds against granting relief to the applicant who had previously litigated the matter.	The court noted reliance on this case but did not base its final decision on it; the court concluded the revision failed on the legal principles it applied.
Kalka Prasad Ram Charan v. Harish Chandra, AIR 1957 Alld. 25	Relied upon by respondent to support the position that there was no equity in favour of the applicant and that the court should not exercise discretion to grant relief.	Noted as relied upon; the court did not decide the matter on the basis of this authority and concluded the revision failed for reasons explained in the judgment.
Gorakhnath v. H.N. Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 535; AIR 1973 SC 2451	Established the distinction between documents that are wholly or partially void (which any court or authority may disregard) and documents that are voidable and require cancellation by a competent court before they cease to have legal effect. Addressed whether consolidation authorities could consider the validity of documents obtained by fraud, inducement or misrepresentation.	The court relied on this decision to hold that consolidation courts can consider and adjudicate a void document, but where a document is merely voidable and requires cancellation it must be set aside by a competent civil court; this principle was central to the court's reasoning.
Ningawwa v. Byreppa, AIR 1968 SC 957	Held that a contract or transaction induced by fraud is ordinarily voidable (not void), and emphasized the distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of a document (which may render it void) and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents of a document (which is generally voidable).	The court applied this authority to determine that where the nature/character of the document itself is challenged (as was alleged by the applicant), the transaction may be void; on the facts alleged (challenge to the character of the conciliation/compromise), the matter fell within the principle in Ningawwa and could be agitated before consolidation courts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the statutory bar in Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act, which excludes the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of:

declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders; and
adjudication of any right arising out of consolidation proceedings in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken.

The court observed that a suit challenging conciliation proceedings on the ground of fraud and seeking a declaration that the order is null and void is not a suit for declaration and adjudication of the rights of a tenure holder (first category), but it might fall within the second category contemplated by Section 49.

The court then addressed the central legal controversy — whether consolidation courts can consider the validity of a document obtained by fraud, inducement, or misrepresentation — by relying primarily on Gorakhnath v. H.N. Singh. The court quoted and applied the principle that a distinction must be made between:

cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it may be disregarded by any court or authority; and
cases where a document is merely voidable and requires being set aside (cancelled) by a competent court before it ceases to have legal effect.

Applying that distinction, the court held that consolidation authorities are empowered, by necessary implication of their statutory powers, to adjudicate and declare documents effective or ineffective when the document is void. By contrast, where the legal effect of a document can only be taken away by cancellation or setting aside, consolidation authorities do not possess power to cancel the deed; such a document remains binding unless cancelled by a court competent to do so.

The court further invoked Ningawwa v. Byreppa to explain that fraud generally renders a transaction voidable; however, fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of a document (as opposed to its contents) can render the transaction void. On the facts as pleaded in the plaint — that the conciliation was obtained by inducement and that the opponent used the applicant's thumb impression on plain paper as a compromise — the applicant "unmistakenly challenged the character of the document." The court concluded that if the inducement were found true, it would render the document void, and therefore such a claim could properly be—and in fact was—agitated before the consolidation courts. The court found that the case fell squarely within the principle in Ningawwa.

Having reached this legal conclusion (that the nature of the document was challenged and that the consolidation forum could consider a document rendered void by fraudulent inducement), the court stated it was unnecessary to further consider the detailed contentions advanced by the parties based on the other authorities they cited.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision dismissed.

Direct consequences:

The revision filed by the applicant fails and is dismissed.
Each party shall bear its own costs.

Broader implications (as reflected in the opinion):

The court affirmed the legal principle distinguishing between a document that is void (which consolidation authorities may adjudicate and disregard) and a document that is voidable (which must be set aside by a competent civil court before it ceases to have legal effect).
When a plaintiff challenges the character of a document such that fraud, inducement or misrepresentation renders it void, that controversy may be agitated before consolidation authorities; conversely, where only the contents are misrepresented and the transaction is merely voidable, civil courts retain the role of cancelling the instrument.
The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying and following the distinctions in Gorakhnath and Ningawwa; the court expressly stated it did not need to decide other contested authorities relied upon by the parties.

K.J.C

Show full summary ...

Baij Nath v. Binda

R.M Sahai, J.:— Having unsuccessfully challenged the conciliation order passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer under Section 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act on the ground of fraud upto the stage of Deputy Director Consolidation the applicant filed the suit, which, on an objection raised by the opposite party of being barred under Section 49 of the Act, was decided in the negative by the trial court but in affirmative by the appellate court.

2. The learned counsel for the applicant relying on a number of decisions reported in Noor Khan v. Board of Revenue, 1977 AWC 394, Ram Nath… v. Smt. Munna…., 1976 AWC 412 and 1966 RD 147, has urged that the suit for cancellation of an order passed under Section 9 was not a proceeding regarding which any relief could have been obtained from the consolidation courts as such the suit was maintainable. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relying on Chandra Shekhar v. Director of Consolidation, AIR 1972 Alld. 76, 1974 Unreported Revenue Cases 41 and two other cases in the same volume at pages 121 and 250, Chet Ram v. Director of Consolidation, 1970 AWR 775 has strenuously defended the order passed by the appellate court. He has also relied on Ramzan Ali v. Mt. Satul Bibi, AIR 1948 Alld. 244 and Kalka Prasad Ram Charan v. Harish Chandra, AIR 1957 Alld. 25 in support of his argument that this court should not exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant as he having agitated the matter once upto the Deputy Director of Consolidation there was no equity in his favour and justice having been done between the parties the revision should be dismissed. Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act excludes jurisdiction of Civil Court in regard to:

(a) declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders.

(b) adjudication of any right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken.

3. A suit challenging conciliation proceedings on ground of fraud and seeking declaration that the order is null and void is not a suit or proceeding for declaration and adjudication of the rights of a tenure holder. It may however be said that such proceeding may be covered by the second category contemplated in Section 49 of the Act. The controversy whether a consolidation court can consider the validity or otherwise of a document which is obtained by fraud, inducement or misrepresentation has now been set at rest in Gorakhnath v. H.N Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 535 : AIR 1973 SC 2451. It was observed:

“We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such an appropriate alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interest in land which are subject matters of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interest in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but, where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it.”

4. The effect of interpretation of law is that a void document can be considered and adjudicated by the consolidation courts but a document which is only voidable and needs a declaration or adjudication by a competent court then the matter can be agitated only in the civil court and the jurisdiction of the consolidation courts shall be barred.

5. In Ningawwa v. Byreppa, AIR 1968 SC 957 it was held by the Supreme Court:

“It is well established that a contract or other transaction induced or tainted by fraud is not void but only voidable at the option of the party defrauded……………. The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof.”

6. With reference to the former it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of latter, it is merely voidable. On the facts of the case it was found by the Supreme Court that the doner while executing gift deed fraudulently included plot nos. 91 and 92 in the gift deed. This was held a misrepresentation of the contents of document and not a fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the character of a document.

7. In the plaint the applicant claimed to be sole sirdar as the conciliation was obtained by inducement and practising fraud on him. The opposite party was alleged to have obtained thumb impression of the applicant on plain paper and he subsequently after opposite party's assertion of possession, on enquiry, came to know that those thumb impressions have been utilised as compromise before the Assistant Consolidation Officer. The applicant therefore unmistakenly challenged the character of the document. The effect of inducement if found true was to render the document void. Such a claim could be and was in fact agitated before the consolidation courts. As the nature of the document itself was challenged the case was squarely covered by the principle laid down in Ningawwa's case (supra).

8. In view of what has been stated it is not necessary to consider the respective contentions advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the applicant and respondent. The result is that this revision fails and is dismissed. But the parties shall bear their own costs.

K.J.C

9. Revision dismissed.

Baij Nath v. Binda

Judgment Summary — R.M. Sahai, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

Respondent's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Baij Nath v. Binda

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