1. The present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order dated 12-7-88 passed by the Perganadhikari, Kichcha, Nainital, directing that in the meanwhile the petitioner Devi Sharan may not be administered oath of office of the Pradhan.

2. The profile of the petitioner's case may be set out briefly. The petitioner was elected in the last general elections held on June 5, 1988. He was a candidate for the office of Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha, Dhanpur, Vijaipur, Block Gederpur, Distt. Nainital, along with respondent No. 4 Jagdish Singh. But on counting of ballot papers on 6th June, 1988 the petitioner was declared elected. An election petition has been filed by respondent No. 3, who filed an application for interim order with prayer that successful candidate, the petitioner, may be restrained from taking oath of office of Pradhan. The impugned order dated 12-7-88 was passed in favour of respondent No. 4 on the election petition. Sri K.S Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned order was without jurisdiction inasmuch as there is no provision either in the U.P Panchayat Raj Act or under the Code of Civil Procedure that after declaration of result of the election of Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha the successful candidate cannot take oath of the office of Pradhan. In other words, the result of the election of the office of Pradhan cannot be stayed in a democratic set up. Sri T.P Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4 Sri Jagdish Singh, on the other hand, urged that under the circumstances of the case of a short while the oath was not to be administered to the petitioner and thereafter the election petition itself could be decided. As the Code of Civil Procedure applies to the trial of election petition in view of R. 25 of the U.P Panchayat Raj Rules, hence temporary injunction cam be granted under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 and S. 151, C.P.C

3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the impugned order cannot be sustained. Ex. abundanti cautela, the statutory provisions of Sec. 12-C(1) to (8) of the U.P Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (for short the Act), are set out:

“12-C. Application for questioning the elections.—

(1) The election of a person as Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha or as member of a Gaon Panchayat including the election of a person appointed as a Panch of the Nyaya Panchayat under S. 43 shall not be called in question except by an application presented to such authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed on the ground that—

(a) the election has not been a free election by reason that the corrupt practice of bribery or undue influence has extensively prevailed at the election, or

(b) that the result of the election has been materially affected—

(i) by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination; or

(ii) by gross failure to comply with the provisions of this Act or the rules framed thereunder.

(2) The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices of bribery or undue influence for the purposes of this Act:

(A)(1) Bribery, that is to say, any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or by any other person with the connivance of a candidate of any gratification to any person whomsoever, with the object directly or indirectly, of including—

(a) a person to stand or not to stand as or to withdraw from being, a candidate at an election or

(b) an elector to vote, refrain from voting at an election; or as a reward to—

(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn his candidature; or

(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting.

(B)(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of a candidate or of any, other person with the connivance of the candidate with the free exercise of any electoral right:

Provided that without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of this clause any such person as is referred to therein who—

(i) threatens any candidate, or any elector, or any person in whom a candidate or any elector is interested, with injury of any kind including social obstracism and excommunication or explusion from any caste or community; or

(ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or an elector to believe that he or any person in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or elector within the meaning of this clause.

(3) The application under sub-sec. (1) may be presented by any candidate at the election or any elector and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed.

Explanation.— Any person who filed a nomination paper at the election whether such nomination paper was accepted or rejected, shall be deemed to be a candidate at the election.

(4) The authority to whom the application under sub-sec. (1) is made shall, in the manner of—

(i) hearing of an application and the procedure to be followed at such hearing,

(ii) setting aside the election or declaring the election to be void or declaring the applicant to be duly elected or any other relief that may be granted to the petitioner, have such powers and authority as may be prescribed.

(5) Without any prejudice to the generality of the powers to be prescribed under sub-sec. (4) the rules may provide for the summary hearing and disposal of an application under sub-sec. (1).

(6) Any party aggrieved by an order of the Prescribed Authority upon an application under sub-sec. (1) may, within thirty days from the date of the order, apply to the District Judge for revision of such order on any one or more of the following grounds, namely:

(a) that the Prescribed Authority has, exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law;

(b) that the Prescribed Authority has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested;

(c) that the Prescribed Authority has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

(7) The District Judge may dispose of the application for revision himself or may assign it for disposal to any Additional District Judge, Civil Judge or Additional Civil Judge under his administrative control and may recall it, from any such officer or transfer it to any Other such officer.

(8) The revising authority mentioned in sub-sec. (7) shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed and may confirm, vary or rescind the order of the Prescribed Authority or remand the case to the Prescribed Authority for re-hearing and pending its decision pass such interim orders as may appear to it to be just and convenient.”

4. It is the elementary rule of interpretation of statutes that to interpret a particular provision it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Every part of the statute and the section has to be read together. In other words the interpretation of statutes has to be textual and also contextual. It is said that passing from the external aspects of the statutes to its contents the construction is to be made of all the parts together and not of one part only by itself. (See Attorney General v. Brown, (1920) 1 KB 773).

5. In Maxwell on “The Interpretation of Statutes” (12th Edition), page 76, there is the following statement:

“The words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject, or in the occasions on which they are used and the object to be attained.”

6. There is a Latin maxim “Averbis Legis Non Est Recedendum”, which means that from the words of law there must be no departure.

7. In order to make correct interpretation of a statute the legislative intent must be gathered and the rule that statute must be read as a whole equally applies to a section which must be read as a whole. (See Osmania University Teachers' Association v. State of Andhra Pradesh, ((1987) 4 SCC 671 : AIR 1987 SC 2034; Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babu Bhai Shankar Lal Pandey, (1987) 1 SCC 606 : AIR 1987 SC 849).

8. Applying these elementary rules of interpretation to the problem of interpreting S. 12-C of the Act a long with other provisions, a bare reading of S. 12-C as a whole would make it evident that sub-sec. (4) of S. 12-C deals with the power of the Prescribed Authority while trying the election petition. The object and reasons of a statute or its long heading, very often then provide some guide to the interpretation of a statute. But the same cannot certainly override the specific provision contained in a section. The Statement of the Object and Reasons for passing the U.P Panchayat Raj Act, 1948, are to establish and develop Local Self-Government in the rural areas of Uttar Pradesh and to make better provision for the village administration and development. Keeping in view the Object and Reasons of the Act and the long title the provisions of S. 12-C of the Act read with R. 25 of the Rules and O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 and S. 151, C.P.C may be interpreted. S. 12-C enacts power and procedure of the Prescribed Authority for entertaining and disposing of the election petition challenging the election of the office of Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha or a Member of the Gaon Panchayat. The relief that can be granted by the Prescribed Authority has been given under sub-s. (4) of S. 12-C of the Act. In the result on the success of election petition the election can be set aside or the election held can be declared to be void or the applicant can be declared to be duly elected. But no provision has been made for grant of any interim relief by staying the operation of the result of the election during the pendency of the election petition. Whereas sub-sec. (8) of S. 12-C provides the powers of Revising Authority. It has been provided that the Revising Authority can confirm, vary or rescind the order of the Prescribed Authority or remit the case to the Prescribed Authority for re-hearing and also the Revising Authority can pass an interim order as may appear to it to be just and convenient. The only irresistible conclusion is that in case the election can be set aside or the election has been declared to be void or the applicant has been declared to be duly elected, in that event the Revising Authority can pass an interim stay staying the operation of the order of the Prescribed Authority in such matters. But in respect of the Prescribed Authority no such power has been given.

9. At the same time it may be stated that as a corrolary to earlier principle of interpretation, the power of the Court is to interpret the statute as it is and not add or subtract from it. In the instant case if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted, that would mean to add more provision under S. 12-C(1) to (4), which is not there in respect of grant of interim stay. As regards the application of R. 25 of the U.P Panchayat Raj Rules, it has been provided that as nearly as may be the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply. Rule 25 does not provide that the Code of Civil Procedure would apply in its entirety. The provisions of O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of temporary injunction cannot, therefore, be made applicable to the election petition and temporary injunction cannot be granted. Even under S. 90(2) of the Representation of the People Act where the Code of Civil Procedure applies, the election of a Member of Legislative Assembly or Member of Parliament cannot be stayed by the Election Tribunal. After hearing the election petition the result of election can be set aside or the election can be declared to be void or the election petitioner can be declared to be successful or similar other reliefs can be granted, but no interim relief can be granted by staying the operation of the effect of election.

10. Earlier there was some controversy about the interpretation of provisions of as regards aforesaid. An application under Art. 227 of the Constitution was filed and a Division Bench of this Court in Rameshwar Dayal v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Ghatampur, AIR 1963 All 518 interpreting S. 12-C or R. 25 and S. 151, C.P.C and O. 39, C.P.C held as under:

“Since the language used in R. 25 of the U.P Panchayat Raj Rules is exactly similar to that used in S. 90(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 it must be interpreted in the same manner. Once a certain meaning is assigned to the words used in S. 90(2), even though with the aid of S. 92, the same meaning should be given to the words used in R. 25, even though the rules contain no provision corresponding to S. 92.

Neither the U.P Panchayat Raj Act nor the Rules thereunder contain any provision expressly authorising a Sub-Divisional Officer hearing an election petition to grant any interim relief for the duration of the petition.

Rule 25 which lays down that, subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules, every election petition will be tried by the Sub-Divisional Officer, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the C.P.C 1908, to the trial of suits, does not confer upon a Sub-Divisional Officer all the powers that are conferred upon a Court by the C.P.C

Section 151, Civil P.C expressly speaks of “power” to make orders. Injunction is a relief according to Ss. 52 and 53 of the Specific Relief Act and this relief is a matter of power, not procedure. Therefore, a Sub-Divisional Officer hearing an election petition has not the powers conferred upon Civil Courts by Ss. 94 and 151 and Orders 39 and 41, C.P.C

The Sub-Divisional Officer hearing an election petition of the sitting Pradhan against his opponent who was duly declared elected as Pradhan, has no power to withhold the transferring of the charge of the office of Pradhan from the petitioner to the opponent pending the disposal of the election petition.”

11. The matter can be viewed from another angle. S. 12-C has to be read along with other sections including S. 12 having an important bearing on the point S. 12 provides that after the establishment of Gaon Sabha there shall be constituted a executive committee thereof called the Gaon Panchayat. S. 12(7) enacts that the members of the Gaon Panchayat shall be elected by the members of the Gaon Sabha from amongst themselves and their number shall be such as may be prescribed. The Pradhan and Up Pradhan elected for the Gaon Sabha shall be ex-officio Pradhan and Up Pradhan of the Gaon Panchayat and shall have the right to speak in and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of the Gaon panchayat. In this way the intention of the legislature is that, after the constitution of Gaon Sabha including the Pradhan and Up Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha there must be constituted a Gaon, Panchayat and its members have to be elected in a democratic republic like ours where the authority vests in the people and the legislature is committed to establish and develop a Local Self-Government in the rural areas and to make better provision for village administration and development. The intendment of law givers is that the village people should, in all minor cases, be able to settle their own disputes through a local tribunal and they must have a local Self-Government for certain units. With the changing norms of the society the Gaon Sabha and the Gaon Panchayat are the basic important units of the administration and they cannot be ignored. Once the circle of election has started it has to complete its round in accordance with the provisions made under the Act and the procedure prescribed under the Rules. Even after the election of Pradhan against whom so far nothing has been proved in accordance with law, it is only after the election petition is allowed in accordance with law or some irregularities are pointed out and proved, only then under S. 12-C(4) the Prescribed Authority can set aside that election. But before that the process cannot be permitted to be disturbed as no provision has been made for grant of interim stay. As there was special provision for grant of temporary injunction by the Revisional Authority, in case the legislature wanted any interim stay to be granted by the Prescribed Authority during the pendency of the election petition, that provision must have been specifically made.

12. The right to contest the election for the post of Pradhan or any other office is not a fundamental right nor a common law right, rather it is a statutory right and for that purpose U.P Panchayat Raj Act is a complete Code in itself. Whatever reliefs have been provided under it, that could be availed of by any candidate. In the present case S. 12-C was the only section under which relief could be claimed by any candidate. S. 12-C(4) is silent about any interim order being granted during the pendency of election petition. It is only when the revision is to be filed that the application for interim stay could be made. I am accordingly of the considered opinion that the legislature never intended that any interim order could be granted to any candidate during pendency of election petition. Hence the order granting the interim relief cannot be sustained.

13. In case the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted that would amount to add something more and to read or create a specific provision for grant of temporary injunction by the Court which was conspicuous by its absence in sub-s. (4) of S. 12-C. This would also be a question as to whether under these circumstances the intention of legislature was obvious by creating a provision for interim stay when the revision was filed. Whereas there was no such provision when the election petition was pending would it be possible to assume it or to create it. It is better to quote a statement of law in American Jurisprudence, Vol. I, page 838-839 (pages 36 and 37) as follows:

“The prime object of construction of laws is to ascertain and to carry out the intention of legislature. The Courts themselves have no power to legislate and may not amend an act directly or indirectly by construction. (See Guiseppi v. Walling, (1944) 324 US 244)……. It is for the Courts to ascertain the intent of legislature, neither to add nor subtract, delete or distort. (See Bersky v. Board of Regents, (1953) 347 US 442).

14. It is thus manifest that the legislature while enacting S. 12-C deliberately did not make any provision for grant of interim injunction or interim stay or for staying operation of the result of election under S. 12-C(4).

15. Applying the principles of posteriori and priorari reasonings I am of the view that the Perganadhikari trying the election petition under S. 12-C with the help of R. 25 etc., has no power to grant temporary injunction, nor he has got any power to stay operation of election for the office of Pradhan, nor he has power to stay the handing over charge to the elected Pradhan, nor he can pass an order that the oath may not be administered to the elected Pradhan.

16. As regards the relief claimed or the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the legality of the order passed on the transfer application, no such relief has been claimed in respect of tranasfer application or any order passed thereon in the present petition. It would, therefore, not be justified to make any observation in respect of the legality or otherwise of the transfer application or the order passed thereon. It will be open to the petitioner, if so advised, to challenge it separately. In the premises aforesaid, the present petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 12-7-88 staying the oath being administered to the successful candidate, the petitioner, is hereby quashed hereby direct respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that the petitioner shall be administered oath and given charge of office of Pradhan forthwith. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

17. Petition allowed.