1. This application has been filed by the appellants that Bela Singh, respondent No. 6, has died on April 9, 1971, and his legal representatives as detailed in para 4 should be brought on the record. This application was filed by them on March 17, 1972. The reason for delay which has been given is that appellant No. 2 has its office situated at Chandigarh and, as such, could not know in time about the death of Bela Singh. They further claim that the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, ???, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) or to the appeals filed under section 110-D of the Act. The learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 has vehemently contested this application and has submitted that the appeal has abated in toto on account of death of Bela Singh.
2. The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) has got no application to the proceedings under the Act or in appeals which are filed under section 110-D of the Act.
3. The learned counsel for the respondents controverts this position and submits that in case of appeals in the High Court, there is no specific procedure which has been prescribed by any law. The High Court has to apply the procedure which it applies in the case of other appeals pending before it as a Court of civil jurisdiction.
4. It has been admitted by the learned counsel for both the parties that the rules have been framed under the Act for the proceedings to be taken under the Act before the Tribunal. There is no specific provision by which Order 22 of the Code has been made applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal under the Act. There is also no provision in the rules which makes the said order applicable in appeals before this Court. Mr. M.M Punchhi, in support of his arguments, relied on a Full Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court reported as. The Muncipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari . 1969 A.C.J 276.. In the said judgment, the Full Bench observed that an appeal against the award to the High Court is made in its ordinary civil jurisdiction. Similary, in a Full Bench decision of this Court in Shanti Devi v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Ambala . 1971 A.C.J 247. it was observed that the High Court while hearing appeals under section 110-D of the Act, acts as a ‘Court’ and a proceeding even if at its inception has a semblance of an arbitration proceedings, does not retain its character as such in appeal. From the aforesaid discussion, the learned counsel for the respondents wants me to infer that the provisions of the Code are applicable in the proceedings in appeal against the awards of the Tribunal under the Act. He submits that the proceedings are civil proceedings and this High Court decides such appeals in its civil jurisdiction and, therefore, the Code is applicable to such proceedings. The aforesaid observations had been made in a different context. The proposition which was before the Full Benches was as to whether an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent was maintainable against the decision of the Single Judge and whether that decision could be termed as judgment as contemplated in clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The observations of the Full Benches are with respect to the Letters Patent Appeals. Mr. Punchhi cannot take any benefit of those observations for the purposes of application of the Code. In my view, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents does not hold good. The Rules which have been framed under the Act provide the procedure which is to be followed by the Tribunals. In case the Legislature or the rule-making authority thought that the provisions of the Code or its Order 22 was to be made applicable in the proceedings before the Tribunals or before the High Court in appeals, they could very well do so. I am, therefore, of the view that the provisions of Order 22 of the: Code are not applicable in proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. In this view. I am also supported by Chuharmal Issardas v. Haji Wali Mohammed and Ram Sahai v. Rabia Begum.
5. The next submission which has been made by the learned counsel for the respondents is that even if Order 22 of the Code is not applicable, the general principles regarding abatement will apply and the appeal would stand abated. The learned counsel for the appellants controverts this position also. He submits that in case of the death of a claimant in the proceedings before the Tribunal or in appeal, the claim or the appeal does not abate in spite of the death of the sole claimant or any of the claimants. I may clearly state that in this appeal. I am concerned with the death of the claimant who is now a respondent in appeal. Any observations in this order will hold good in case of death of a claimant either at the stage of the claim or in appeal. The observations will not apply in the case of death of other persons. Under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 110 can be made in the case of death resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. A proviso has been added to sub-clause (1) which lays down that where all the representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. The reading of the aforesaid sub-section and the proviso clearly shows that the claims are filed by the claimants in a representative capacity. Though the amendment has been made in the said section by Act 56 of 1969, but even earlier, section 110-A provided that the claims could be filed in case of death from accident by the legal representatives of the deceased. The reading of the aforesaid sections clearly shows that the claims were filed in a representative capacity. In case, any person who has filed the claim dies, the proceedings started in a representative capacity do not abate. If the other claimants are already on the record, they can continue the proceedings. If the deceased was the sole claimant, his legal representatives or the persons for whose benefit the claim has been filed, could be brought on the record. Such proceedings can be equated with suits brought under Order 1, rule 2 of the Code after complying with the requirements of that provision. In the case of suits under Order 1, rule 8, of the Code, the death of any one or more of the parties to such a suit or in appeal do not make the suit or appeal abate. The reason for this principle is that the persons who have brought the suit in a representative capacity represent the whole class of persons and if the representative or the representatives die, the other person or persons whom the deceased represent still are deemed to be parties to those proceedings and, therefore, the question of abatement does not arise. This view has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chuharmal Issardas case (supra). The learned Judges in that case observed that the provisions relating to abatement contained in Order 22 of the Code have no application to the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. The same view has been taken by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Ram Sahai v. Rabia Begum. The observations of the learned Judge are as follows:—
“The provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been made applicable to proceedings for compensation filed under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. This implies that the provisions relating to abatement contained therein have also no application to such proceedings. The underlying principle is that proceedings of this kind are not brought by or against a person in his personal capacity, but are brought by or against him as a representative of a class of persons who should be constructively held to be parties to the proceedings.”
6. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations and hold that the principles of abatement do not apply to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act and the legal representatives of the deceased, if they are not already on the record, can be brought on the record at any time. The present appeal in the aforesaid circumstances does not abate and the appellants can implead the legal representatives of deceased Bela Singh even at this stage.
7. Mr. L.M Suri has also argued that some of the legal representatives of the deceased are already on the record. In case, it is held that the provisions of Order 22 of the Code are applicable to these proceedings, even then the appeal does not abate. His contention is that if some of the legal representatives of the deceased are already on the record, then the suit or the appeal even under Order 22 of the Code does not abate. In support of his contention, he has relied on the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram.
“Even on the alternative ground that Mahavir Prasad being one of the heirs of Saroj Devi there can be no abatement merely because no formal application for showing Mahabir Prasad as an heir and legal representative of Saroj Devi was made. Where in a proceeding a party dies and one of the legal representatives is already on the record in another capacity, it is only necessary that he should be described by an appropriate application made in that behalf that he is also on the record, as an heir and legal representative. Even if there are other heirs and legal representatives and no application for impleading them is made within the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act the proceeding will not abate. On that ground also the order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained.”
8. I am bound by the aforesaid observations. Even if some of the legal representatives are on the record, the proceedings do not abate and the application for bringing other persons on record can be made at any time. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents that Mrs. Charan Kaur, respondent No. 4, and Hardip Singh, respodent No. 5, are the legal representatives of the deceased. Even otherwise, according to the Schedule appended to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, they are class I heirs. Though in the application filed by the learned counsel for the appellants they have not been shown to be heirs, yet it does not make any difference. In view of this matter also, the application for impleading other legal representatives is maintainable.
9. In view of my above findings. I grant the application and order that the notices may be issued to the legal representatives of the deceased as given in para 4 of the petition. There is, however, no order as to costs.