J.V Gupta, J.:— This is defendants' second appeal against whom the plaintiffs' suit was partially decreed by the trial Court, but decreed in toto by the lower appellate Court
2. The brief facts of the case which are not in dispute are that the plaintiffs-respondents Nos. 1 to 3, were the owners of the land measuring 330 kanals 18 marlas situated in village Tohana, Tahsil and District Hissar. They executed the agreement dated July 15, 1963, Exhibit D.W 1/1, to sell this land in favour of Ram Narain, defendant-appellant No. 2 and received Rs. 41,000/- as the sale consideration. The possession of the land, in dispute, was also given and he was given the option to get the sale deed registered either in his name or in the name of any other person of his choice at any time he desired. On the same day, a registered power of attorney was also executed in the name of the said Ram Narain by them. He was authorised to sell, mortgage or to alienate the suit land in his own favour or in favour of anybody else. He was also authorised to conduct any litigation as regards that land on their behalf. It was also provided therein that the power of attorney could not be revoked till the land had been alienated or sold. This power of attorney was cancelled by them on June 17, 1965, Exhibit P.W 5/1, and intimation to this effect was given to Ram Narain, defendant-appellants. On November 24, 1965, Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant, filed the suit against the plaintiffs respondents and Jagdish Chand, on the allegations that he was the owner in possession of the suit land; that the plaintiffs-respondents had no right to deny his title and that they should be restrained from interfering with the enjoyment of his proprietary rights and possession thereof. They were sued through their mukhtiar, Ram Narain, defendant-appellant. The defendant-appellant appeared in the Court on November, 25, 1965, and admitted the claim of Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant. On the basis of the statement made by mukhtiar Ram Narian, defendant-appellant Romesh Mohan, defendant appellant's suit was decreed by the Additional Subordinate Judge vide order dated November 25, 1965. By the present suit, the plaintiffs wanted to get the said decree set aside and as a consequential relief, they also sought possession of the suit land.
3. In the plaint, the plaintiffs did not make any mention of the agreement to sell executed by them in favour of Ram Narain, defendant-appellant. On the other hand, they pleaded that defendant-appellant Ram Narain was given possession of the land, in dispute only to manage it on their behalf and to realise its rent etc. Since he started mismanaging the land and misappropriating its proceeds to his own use, they cancelled the power of attorney executed by them in his favour of June 17, 1965, Exhibit P.W 5/1. It was further alleged that the defendant appellant had no right to concede the claim of Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant on their behalf in the suit filed by him against them. It, was further alleged that on the date when Ram Narain filed the written statement, i. e., November 25, 1965, he was no longer their attorney and, therefore, he was incompetent to admit the claim of Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant, on their behalf. They further pleaded that the decree obtained by the defendant-appellant was based on fraud and his collusion with Ram Narain, defendant-appellant and, thus, not binding upon them. The difendants-appellants have filed their separate written statements. They denied the plaintiffs claim at laid in the plaint. It was pleaded that Romesh Mohan defendant-appellant, was the owner in possession of the suit land and that the plaintiffs had no right to, dispossess him. It was further pleaded that the total sale consideration of Rs. 41,000/- was paid to the plaintiffs and that the possession of the suit land was delivered to the defendants as the owners. According to the defendants, the land, in dispute, had been, purchased for the benefit of defendant appellant. Romesh Mohan whereas Ram Narain, defendant appellant acted only as a benamidar. Thus, it was pleaded (that it he plaintiffs had no right to cancel the irrevocable, power of attorney executed by them in favour of Ram Narain, defendant appellants. It was further pleaded that Ram Narain, defendant-appellant, conceded the claim of Romesh Mohan defendant appellant in the suit filed by the latter on the basis of the instructions given to him by the plaintiffs it was denied that the decree dated November 25, 1965 was based on fraud or collusion as alleged. On the pleading of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:
1. Whether there is any unauthorised amendment of the plaint? If SO, which is that portion and to what effect?
2. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form?
3. Whether the plaintiffs have got the locus standi to institute the present suit?
4. Whether the decree dated November 25, 1965, in suit No. 356 of 1965, has been obtained by the defendants by fraud, mis-representation and collusion and is illegal and not binding upon the plaintiffs?
5. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from instituting the present suit by their conduct and acts?
6. If issue No. 2 is not proved whether defendant No. 1 is the owner in possession of the land which constitutes the subject-matter of the decree dated November 25, 1965, for consideration?
7. If the plaintiffs succeed in their suit whether the defendants are entitled to any amount by way of improvements and additions as alleged in the written statement? If so, to what amount?
8. Relief.
4. On the most material issue No. 4, the trial Court recorded the finding in the following terms:
“The plaintiff: could not tell specifically as to since when Romesh Mohan has been in possession of the land, in dispute; perhaps Ram Narain gave possession of the land in dispute, to Romesh Mohan some time after the execution of the agreement of sale and since then he has been in its possession. There is nothing on the record to disbelieve the statements of Ram Narain and Romesh Mohan, defendants, that Romesh Mohan was, in fact in possession of the land, in dispute, at the time of the decree dated November 25, 1965 and even earlier. Therefore, no fraud or misrepresentation was practised by Ram Narain in admitting Romesh Mohan to be in possession of the land, in dispute, on the date of the decree although as held above, he was not its owner at that time. Therefore, the decree dated November 25, 1965, is not binding on the plaintiffs only to the extent as it relates to the declaration of ownership in favour of Romesh Mohan. The rest of the decree being based on facts is valid and binding upon the plaintiffs. The issue is decided accordingly.”
5. Under issue No. 6 the trial Court found that the plaintiffs were debarred from claiming the possession of the suit land from Ram Narain, defendant-appellant, since they had given the possession thereof to him in part performance of the agreement to sell after the receipt of the sale consideration. Ultimately, the that Court passed the decree in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants to the effect that the decree dated November 25, 1965, passed by the Subordinate Judge, Hissar in civil suit No. 365 of 1965, declaring Romesh Mohan defendant-appellant to be the owner of the land in dispute, was illegal and not binding upon them but their suit for possession thereof was dismissed in view of the finding under issue No. 6. Dissatisfied with the same, both the parties filed separate appeals. The lower appellate Court dismised the appeal filed on behalf of the defendants, but accepted the one filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the trial Court was modified and the plaintiffs were granted the decree for declaration as well as for possession as claimed in the plaint. Dissatisfied with the same, the defendants have come up in second appeal to this Court.
6. As stated earlier, the facts no more disputed now are that the plaintiffs executed the agreement to sell, Exhibit D.W 1/1 and received the entire sale consideration of Rs. 41,000/- and delivered possession of the suit land in pursuance thereof to Ram Narain, defendant-appellant. On the same day, they also executed a power of attorney in favour of Ram Narain, defendant-appellant, Exhibit P.W 5/3, which was duly registered authorising him to manage the property and to get in transferred either in his own name or in the name of any person of his choice. It was specifically provided there in that the said power of attorney was irrevocable on the part of the plaintiffs till the land was sold. In view of these facts, the controversy in this appeal is centred around the question whether the power of attorney, Exhibit P.W 5/3 was irrevocable and therefore, in spite of its revocation on June 17, 1965, Exhibit P.W 5/1, Ram Narain, defendant No. 2, still continued to be an agent of the plaintiffs and as such, the decree suffered by him on behalf of the plaintiff in the suit filed by Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant, was valid and whether the plaintiffs having parted with the possession of the suit land in part performance of the agreement to sell and having received the total sale price were still entitled to claim the possession back Simply because no regular sale deed was executed and registered in favour of either of the defendants.
7. The main contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the power of attorney, Exhibit P.W 5/3, was irrevocable on account of the following reasons:
(i) because of the agreement to this effect itself between the parties when it was agreed that it was irrevocable; and
(ii) in view of the provisions of section 202 of the Indian Contract Act, which reads:—
Where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject-matter of the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of such interest.”
8. Thus argued the learned counsel that the provisions of section 202 of the Contract Act are applicable to the transfers of the immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act (hereafter called the Act) in view of the provisions of section 4 of the Act, which reads:—
“The chapters and sections of the Act which relate to contracts shall be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. And sections 54 paragraphs 2 and 3, 59, 107 and 123 shall be read as supplemental to the Indian Registration Act, 1908.
9. According to the learned counsel, for the plaintiffs-respondents no interest was created in the property agreed to be sold by merely executing the agreement, Exhibit D.W 1/1, in favovr of Ram Narain, defendant, because section 54 of the Act, inter alia provides that a contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract; that a sale of such property shall take place, on terms setttled between the parties and that it does not, of itself, create any interest in, or change on, such property, and, therefore, the provisions of section 202 of the Contract Act, (as reproduced above), were not attracted in the present case. On the other hand, the argument raised on behalf of the appellants is that the agreement of itself may not create any interest in the property, but in the present case on the facts admitted, interest was created in the suit property when its possession was delivered and the total sale price was received in pursuance of the agreement. I find force in this contention. In a somewhat similar situation, it was observed in Rabindra Nath v. Harendra Kumar . AIR 1956 Cal 462., that the answer to such question depends on the nature of the agreement for sale in each case. The language of section 54 emphasises that of itself a contract for sale does not create any interest or charge on the property. But very often a contract for sale does not stand by itself where there is part payment of the purchase price or payment of what is called the earnest money in that event section 55 (6)(b) of the Act, would be attracted and it will be treated as though the ownership of the property had passed and there is a charge far part of the purchase money paid.” In the present case the agreement. Exhibit D.W 1/1, was not a mere agreement to sell, but more than that became practically, the transaction was complete in all respects except the execution of the regular sale deed and the registration thereof. Thus interest was created in the property under the agreement and the provisions of section 202 of the Contract Act are applicable to the facts of the present case. Moreover, the words, “an interest in the property which forms the subject-matter of the agency” occurring in section 202 of the Contract Act, are of wide amplitude than the words, “interest in or charge on, such property,” in section 54 of the Act. It is true that the mere execution of the agreement for sale without doing anything more will not create any interest in the property to be sold, but where the vendor has received the sale price and in pursuance of the agreement to sell possession thereof has been delivered to the prospective vendee, then it could not be successfully argued on the basis of section 54 of the Act that no interest was created in the property. The words, of itself in section 54 of the Act, are very material to reach the right conclusion in a given case. Thus, on the facts of the present case, the irresistible conclusion is that in view of the provisions of section 202 of the Contract Act, as well as became of the agreement itself the power of attorney, Exhibit, P.W 5/3, was irrevocable. Ram Narain, defendant appellant continued to be the agent of the plaintiffs respondents in spite of any cancellation of the power of attorney, Exhibit P.W 5/3. Thus, the decree suffered by Ram Narain, on behalf of the plaintiffs in the suit filed on behalf of Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant, was binding on them. In any Case, it could not be held to be invalid or to have been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation as alleged in the plaint. In view of the said finding the second limb of the question formulated above, does notarise. However independent of the power of attorney, and the said decree the defendants are entitled to protect their possession of the suit land-which they got in performance of the agreement on payment of the entire sale price. There was nothing more to be done in furtherance of the agreement. Exhibit P.W 5/3, on the part of the vendee as he had paid the whole sale price and had taken possession of the suit land. It was for the plaintiffs to execute the regular sale deed in favour of Ram Narian, defendant appellant, or in favour of any other person he may so choose. This, the plaintiffs failed to do in spite of the telegram, Exhibit D.W 3. Not only that, in the present case, the plaintiffs nowhere pleaded that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement; rather they denied the execution of the agreement in the first instance and also the receipt of the sale price of Rs. 41,000/-. If was only during the trial that on account of the overwhelming evidence led on behalf of the defendants, the plaintiffs had to admit the execution of the agreement to sell as well as the receipt of the sale price by them. From the evidence, of the defendants the suit by Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant, was filed at the instance of the plaintiffs in order to get the necessary transfer made by way of the consent decree. However, it may or may not be so, but it is immaterial for the purposes of the present controversy. Ram Narain, defendant-appellant, in order to safeguard his interest and to debar the plaintiffs from doing any mischief, in future; after receiving the sale price, also got the irrevocable power of attorney in his favour. As observed earlier, the plaintiffs never pleaded any such agreement or admitted the receipt of any sale price, but filed the simple suit for the cancellation of the decree on the basis of fraud and collusion etc. As held earlier, the question of any fraud etc. did not arise because the plaintiffs had already washed off their hands from the land, in dispute, by receiving the entire sale price and handing over its possession besides executing the irrevocable power of attorney in favour of Ram Narain, defendant-appellant. The equitable considerations as embodied in section 53-A of the Act, are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. In a similar situation, it was held in Venkatesh v. Mallappa . AIR 1922 Bom 9 2., that the plaintiff who sells an immovable property to defendant, cannot claim possession from defendant vendee who has paid the purchase money and has been all along in possession though no sale-deed has been executed. The equitable principles which should be applied, to such facts are perfectly clear. Similarly, in Maneklal v. H.J Ginwalla & Sons . AIR 1950 SC 1., it was held:—
“Where in an action to eject a lessee on the ground that her had no registered deed of lease executed in his favour the defendant lessee takes the plea of part performance and proves that there was a written and signed contract of lease in his favour and that he had taken possession in accordance with the terms of the agreement and had built a factory on the land and also that he was paying rent to the plaintiffs in accordance with that agreements the defendant is entitled to retain possession in spite of an absence of the registered deed.”
10. The learned counsel for the appellants also strenuously relied upon the Full Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court in Milkha Singh v. Mst. Shankari . AIR 1947 Lah 1. wherein the Court by majority held that section 53-A of the Act, did not, in terms, apply to Punjab, but the principles embodied therein applied. It was further held.—
“Section 53 A is based on the equitable principles which were previously applicable to the whole of India, including the Province of the Punjab and even after the enactment of that section which is not applicable to the Punjab the principles embodied therein are applicable to the Punjab and therefore the position in the Punjab in respect of the defence of part performance is exactly the same as in the Provinces where the Transfer of Property Act is in force.
11. However, the argument liaised on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents was that the provisions of section 53-A of the Act were not applicable to the State of Punjab and that the equitable principles embodied therein could not be invoked in view of the proviso to section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, which reads as follows:—
“Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act. 1882, to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1897, or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be affected by registered instrument”
12. Thus, argued the learned counsel, the Full Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court in Milkha Singh's case (supra), required reconsideration as it goes contrary to the statutory provisions of section 49 of the Indian Registration Act. According to the learned counsel, equitable principles hold the field only if there is no specific statutory bar in invoking the principles. However, in the present case, I am of the considered opinion that section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, is not at all applicable, because there was no document which required registration and could be used under the proviso to section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, for a collateral purpose or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of section 53-A of the Act Admittedly, the agreement to sell, Exhibit, D.W 1/1 did not require registration and as such, the question of the applicability of section 49, Indian Registration Act, as contended on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents did not arise Moreover, it is always to be born in mind that while administring justice equity always plays an important part and the Courts cannot lose sight of the equities and, the help a wrongdoer on mere technicalities. There is seldom any conflict between equity and statutory law because the law aims at securing justice and, therefore, the Courts dispense justice to the party in whose favour justice lies though in accordance with law.
13. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon Nathulal v. Phoolchand . 1969 3 SCC 120, to contend that the defence of part performance was available only if the conditions essential thereto, enumerated below, are fulfiled:
(i) that the transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty;
(ii) that the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract;
(iii) that the transferee has one some act in furtherance of the contract; and
(iv) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.
14. According to the learned counsel, in the present case, the transferee has failed to fulfil condition No. (iii), and (iv) as he has not done something in furtherance of the agreement to sell.
15. I do not find any, merit in this contention. In the present case, there was nothing to be done on the part of the defendants is furtherance of the agreement to sell. As a matter of fact. It was for the plaintiffs to execute the sale deed in favour of the defendant which they failed to do and even did not plead in the present case that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement. Thus, the conditions laid down by the Supreme Court in Nathulal's case (supra), are not applicable to the facts of this case.
16. A controversy was also raised on behalf, of the respondents that according to the findings of the Courts below, the possession under the agreement was delivered to Ram Narain, defendant appellant, whereas admittedly, now the possession is with Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant who claimed himself to be the owner of the suit property, in view of the decree obtained by him against the plaintiffs-respondents through Ram Narain defendant. Thus, argued the learned counsel that Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant, was not entitled to seek protection, of the provisions of section 53-A of the Act, as he was not a party to the agreement. To my mind, this controversy is without any meaning.
17. Admittedly, under the agreement to sell as well as under the power of attorney executed on the same day, the plaintiffs authorised Ram Narain, defendant, either to get the sale deed executed in his own favour or in the name of any other person whom he chose. In view of that stipulation, it does not lie in the mouth of the plaintiffs to contend that the possession of Romesh Mohan, defendant appellant, on the suit land is not protected under section 53-A of the Act. Moreover, the provisions of section 53-A inter alia clearly contemplate that the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract. In this case, it is not disputed that Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant claimed himself to be the owner in possession of the suit property by reason of the agreement Executed on behalf of the plaintiffs in favour of Ram Narain, defendant-appellant. The suit was filed by Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant, because according to the defendants the sale prince was paid by Romesh-Mohan, defendant-appellant, though the agreement was executed in favour of Ram Narain, defendant-appellant. Ram Narain and Romesh Mohan, defendants-appellants are near relations, i.e, Ram Narain is the masar of Romesh Mohan. Any arrangement between Ram Narain and Romesh Mohan, defendants-appellants, does not effect the rights of the plaintiffs once they have received the total sale price and have landed over the possession under the agreement, Exhibit D.W 1/1. Thus, whether Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant, is in possession of the suit property or it is Ram Narain, defendant appellant who get the possession of the suit land in pursuance of the agreement, it becomes immaterial as regards the present controversy between the parties is concerned. As observed earlier, Ram Narain, defendant appellant, was authorised by the plaintiffs to get the sale deed executed either in his own name or in the name of any other person whom he nominated. Under the decree obtained by Romesh Mohan defendant-appellant, he claimed and the power of attorney executed by the plaintiffs in favour of Ram Narain, defendant-appellant. Thus it does not lie in the mouth of the plaintiffs to contend that Romesh Mohan defendant-appellant, was not entitled to continue in possession under the agreement. This also settles the controversy between the parties as to whether the transaction was benami as alleged on behalf of the defendants. In either situation, Ram Narain, defendant appellant, who admittedly got possession of the suit land in pursuance of the agreement, was competent to transfer the same in favour of any other person. If he admitted the claim of Romesh Mohan, defendant-appellant, in the suit filed by him against the plaintiffs, it was in consonance with the terms of the agreement and the power of attorney which was given to him. As regards the plaintiffs, they have no right to claim back the possession of the suit property after having received the total sale money and after having delivered the possession in pursuance thereof.
18. As a result of the above discussion, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed with costs.
R.M.S
Petition allowed.
section 202 of the Contract Act,