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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 488, Criminal Procedure Code,
  • Indian Majority Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 488, Criminal Procedure Code,
  • Indian Majority Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A Rule nisi was issued calling on the District Magistrate of 24-Parganas and the opposite party, Manorama Debee, to show cause why the Police Magistrate of Alipore's order dated 21 August 1934 — which refused the petitioner's prayer for exemption from further payment of a monthly allowance for the maintenance of the child Shanibhunath under section 488, Code of Criminal Procedure — should not be set aside. The petitioner argued (1) that Shanibhunath, then 17 years old, was not a "child" within section 488, and (2) that the child was capable of maintaining himself and therefore the petitioner was not bound to continue payments. The child (Shanibhunath) and the petitioner gave evidence in court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the term "child" in section 488, Code of Criminal Procedure, excludes a 17‑year‑old (i.e., whether "child" requires infancy or non‑puberty).
  2. Whether the child is able to maintain himself such that the petitioner is no longer legally bound to pay the monthly allowance under section 488.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • "Child" in section 488 means an infant who has not attained puberty; a 17‑year‑old therefore is not a child under that provision.
  • The child is now able to maintain himself (being 17 and able to work) and the petitioner is not obliged to keep him in school or support him further under section 488.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishnaswami Ayyar v. Chandravadana Support for interpreting "child" in relation to capacity/maturity. Relied on as authority in concluding that "child" includes persons under majority as understood under the Indian Majority Act.
Shanno Devi v. Daya Ram Support for interpreting "child" in relation to capacity/maturity. Relied on similarly to support the conclusion that a person under 18 is a "child" within section 488.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court observed that "child" is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and, in the absence of a statutory definition, construed "child" as a person incompetent to enter into a contract or enforce a claim. Relying on the Indian Majority Act (which makes persons under 18 incompetent to contract) and the cited authorities, the court held that a person under 18 is a "child" within section 488 and rejected the petitioner's first contention.

On the second contention — that the boy could now maintain himself — the court relied on the child's deposition that he was in the second class of a High English School and that it was "out of the question" for him to obtain suitable employment given his status as a schoolboy. That statement was not challenged in cross‑examination and the petitioner did not contradict it. The court also accepted that, given the social position ("bhadraloke class") of the petitioner and the boy, it was unrealistic to expect the boy to seek and obtain suitable manual employment. On this basis the court concluded it could not say the boy was able to maintain himself and rejected the petitioner's second contention.

Holding and Implications

Rule discharged.

Implications: The court refused to grant the petitioner's application to set aside the Police Magistrate's order refusing exemption from further payment. The effect is that the petitioner's challenge to that order did not succeed. The opinion contains no discussion of broader legal implications or the setting of a new precedent beyond its application to the present facts.

    Hemantakumar Banerji v. Manorama Debee

    Nasim Ali, J.:— This Rule was issued upon the District Magistrate of 24-Pargands and the opposite party, Manorama Debee, to show cause why the order of the Police Magistrate of Alipore, dated the 21st August, 1934, refusing the petitioner's prayer for exempting him from further payment of the monthly allowance for the maintenance of the opposite party's child, Shanibhunath, under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should not be set aside.

    The first ground urged in support of the Rule is that Shambhunath is no longer a child within the meaning of section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inasmuch as he is now 17 years old and is quite competent to earn his livelihood. It is argued by the learned advocate on behalf of the petitioner that a child, as contemplated by section 488, is an infant, who has not yet attained puberty. The word “child” has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. In the absence of any statutory definition or anything to the contrary in the Act, I am inclined to hold that “child” is a person, who is incompetent to enter into any contract or to enforce any claim under the law. Under the Indian Majority Act, a person, who has not attained the age of majority, i.e, 18, is incompetent to contract and is, therefore, a child within the meaning of section 488. [See Krishnaswami Ayyar v. Chandravadana and Shanno Devi v. Daya Ram .] I am, therefore, unable to accept this contention.

    The second point, that was urged by the advocate, was that the child is not now unable to maintain himself and consequently the petitioner is no longer bound under the law to maintain him. The learned advocate argues that, though the boy is now reading in school, the petitioner is not bound to keep him in school, as section 488, Criminal Procedure Code, does not confer upon the child the right to better his prospects by staying in school at the expense of the father. It was also argued that he is now sufficiently grown up to earn his own livelihood by working in some factory. It appears that the boy was examined as a court-witness. In his deposition he stated as follows:—

    I read in the second class of a High English School. It is out of the question for me to get an employment suitable to my status and life as I am only a student of the second class of a high school.

    This statement was not challenged in cross-examination by the petitioner. The petitioner was also examined as a court-witness. He did not, in his evidence, contradict the statement of the boy. Under these circumstances, I am not in a position to say that the boy is now able to maintain himself. The learned advocate also contended that there was no evidence in this case that the boy ever made any attempt to get any employment and, consequently, it could not be said that he failed to get any employment. The petitioner as well as the boy belong to a bhadraloke class. It cannot be expected that he would make an attempt to earn his livelihood by working as a cooly. As he is now in school, the petitioner did not suggest, either in his evidence or during the cross-examination of the boy, that, regard being had to the social position of the petitioner as well as of the boy, it could be expected that at this age the boy would be able to find a suitable employment, even if he made any attempt in that direction. This contention has, therefore, no force.

    The Rule is accordingly discharged.

    Rule discharged.
    G.S

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    Comments

    Hemantakumar Banerji v. Manorama Debee
    (Jan 2, 1935)