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  • O. 21, R. 2 (old Section 258) of the CPC,
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  • O. 21, R. 2 (old Section 258) of the CPC,

    Lodd Govindoss Krishna Doss Petitioner v. Ramadoss Vishnadoss Counter-Petitioner .

    Sadasiva Aiyar, J.:— The only questions for decision in this appeal are, (a) whether the compromise agreement put forward by the judgment-debtor (appellant) is an adjustment of the decree in whole or in part under O. 21, R. 2 of the CPC, and (b) whether the learned Judge was right in declining to decide the question whether the terms of the agreement were as alleged by the appellant.

    2. I am clear that the adjustment referred to in O. 21, R. 2 (old Section 258) of the CPC, is a transaction which extinguishes the decree as such in whole or in part and results in a satisfaction of the whole or a portion of the decree in respect of the particular relief or reliefs granted by the decree. A transaction by which the parties agree to vary the mode by which the reliefs granted by the decree are to be realised in execution in that suit or the time when the decree becomes executable, is not an adjustment of the decree but is a transaction which attempts to vary the terms of the decree, leaving the altered terms to stand in the place of the terms of the decree so as to constitute a new executable decree [see the observation of Turner, C.J, in the Full Bench decision in Mallamma v. Venkappa(1), bottom of page 282, as to the meaning of the word “adjustment.”] To allow such a variation is clearly against the policy of the Code of Civil Procedure as shown by the Privy Council decision in Kotaqhiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Vellanki Venkatarama Rao(2). It is only under the provisions of O. 20, R. 11, and the provisions relating to appeals and reviews that the terms of a decree could be varied. O. 23, R. 4, also makes it clear that compromises after decree cannot be recorded and cannot form the foundations of orders affecting the rights of parties under the decree.

    3. The argument of Mr. Seshachariar (the appellant's learned Vakil), that the terms of Section 47 of the CPC give jurisdiction to executing Courts to inquire into the terms of agreements varying the stipulations in a decree, ignores the consideration that enquiries in a suit or in execution proceedings should be confined to matters the decision with reference to which matters could be taken advantage of by the parties in the proceedings in the suit or execution itself.

    4. As regards the case in Sham Lal v. Hasari Mal(3) while the decision on the findings of fact in that case seems to be correct, I dissent with great respect from the observations as to the scope of O. 21, R. 2, found in the judgment of Coxe, J., in that case. I, therefore, concur in the conclusions of Bakewell, J., and would dismiss the appeal with costs.

    Napier, J.:— I concur.

    S.N/R.K

    5. Appeal dismissed.

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    Lodd Govindoss Krishna Doss Petitioner v. Ramadoss Vishnadoss Counter-Petitioner .
    (Feb 11, 1915)