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  • section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by order XXI, rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.A
  • article 12 of the Limitation Act.
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  • section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by order XXI, rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.A
  • article 12 of the Limitation Act.
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Kalidin executed a mortgage dated 13 June 1873 in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 10. The defendants (decree-holders) brought a suit on the basis of their mortgage and caused certain property to be sold in execution. A share was included in the sale which was not included in the mortgage or in the decree. The decree-holders themselves purchased at the sale and obtained possession of the property. The present suit was brought by the judgement-debtor (the plaintiff) to recover the excess share sold.

The trial court granted the plaintiffs a decree. The lower appellate court dismissed the defendants' appeal. The defendants then appealed to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure barred the plaintiff's suit.
  2. Whether Order XXI, Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (having regard to Rules 89–91, and in particular Rule 90) barred the plaintiff's suit.
  3. Whether Article 12 of the Limitation Act barred the plaintiff's suit.
  4. Whether the sale of the excess share was a nullity.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Defendants)

  • The suit was barred by section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • The suit was barred by Order XXI, Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (with reliance, ultimately, on Rule 90 as involving material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale).
  • The suit was barred by Article 12 of the Limitation Act.

Respondents' Arguments (Plaintiffs / Judgment-Debtors)

  • None of the pleas (section 47, Order XXI rule 92, limitation) barred the suit.
  • The sale of the excess share was in fact a nullity; consequently, no question of limitation under Article 12 could arise.
  • The respondents relied on the Privy Council decision in Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari to support the contention that sales and sale-certificates in excess of the decree may be treated as having no effect.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari Authority for refusing effect to confirmation of sale and sale-certificate where property inserted in excess of what was decreed. The court considered the Privy Council decision "in point" and adopted its reasoning to hold that the sale of the excess share in the present case was a nullity; accordingly no question of limitation under Article 12 arose.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each pleaded bar in turn.

Section 47 CPC. The Court observed that although many cases were cited by the appellants in support of the proposition that section 47 constituted a bar, none definitively decided that an auction-purchaser is to be treated as the representative of the decree-holder for purposes of section 47. The Court noted that some prior decisions treated proceedings between a judgment-debtor and an auction-purchaser as coming within section 47, but those decisions did not consider the effect of the absence of the decree-holder from the proceedings. The Court found no adequate reason to treat the auction-purchaser as the decree-holder's representative in this proceeding and held that section 47 did not bar the present suit.

Order XXI, Rule 92 CPC (and Rules 89–91; focus on Rule 90). The Court accepted that certain questions involving an auction-purchaser may be within the bar of Rule 92, but emphasized that only matters within the scope of Rules 89, 90 or 91 fall within that bar. Only Rule 90 was potentially relevant here. The Court noted admissions and deficiencies in the record: it was admitted that the decree included only the mortgaged property; the sale-certificate included an additional share not in the mortgage or decree; and there was no evidence indicating at which stage (application for execution, sale proclamation, or sale-certificate) the mistake first occurred. Counsel for the appellants conceded that no documentary or oral evidence identified when or how the mistake occurred. The appellants therefore sought to rely on paragraph 8 of the plaint, which generally alleged that "Defendants Nos. 1 to 10 played this trick..." but the Court found that paragraph to be only a general plea that more than the mortgaged share had been sold and a belief that the mistake resulted from some trick. There was no pleaded or tried issue of fraud, and the relief sought was for proprietary possession on establishment of rights in the excess share—not for setting aside the sale on fraud. For these reasons the Court held that Order XXI, Rule 92 did not bar the suit.

Article 12, Limitation Act. The appellants contended the suit was barred by Article 12. The respondents countered that the sale was a nullity, so limitation under Article 12 did not apply. The Court agreed with the respondents. It framed the plaintiff's case as asserting that the court had sold property with which the execution proceedings had no concern and that the whole proceeding was therefore a nullity, entitling the plaintiff to recover possession. The Court relied on the Privy Council decision in Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari, where the Privy Council refused to give effect to confirmation of sale and a sale-certificate where property had been inserted in excess of the decree. Applying that decision, the Court concluded the sale of the excess share in the present case was a nullity and therefore no question of limitation under Article 12 arose.

Disposition. On the combined basis of the above analyses — that section 47 did not bar the suit, Order XXI Rule 92 did not bar the suit, and that the sale of the excess share was a nullity so Article 12 did not apply — the Court dismissed the defendants' appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed with costs.

Direct consequences for the parties: the decree and decree-holder's sale are not allowed to defeat the plaintiff's claim in respect of the excess share sold; the appellate challenge by the defendants fails and the trial court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs stands as affirmed by this Court. The Court treated the sale of the excess share as a nullity and held that, in those circumstances, limitation under Article 12 did not bar the plaintiff's suit.

The opinion resolves the specific procedural and substantive bars raised (section 47 CPC, Order XXI Rule 92 CPC, Article 12 Limitation) on the facts before the Court. The text does not set out any broader statement that the Court intended to establish as a general precedent beyond its holdings on these points in this case.

Decision excerpt: "Appeal dismissed."

    Bulaqi Das v. Kesri

    Boys and Iqbal Ahmad, JJ.:— This defendants' appeal arises out of a suit for possession instituted under the following circumstances. Kalidin executed a mortgage, dated the 13th of June, 1873, in favour of the defendants Nos. 1 to 10, who later brought a suit on the basis of their mortgage, and brought some property to sale. A share was included in the sale which was not included in the mortgage or in the decree. The decree-holders themselves purchased and obtained possession. The present suit was brought by the judgement-debtor to recover the excess sold.

    The trial court gave the plaintiffs a decree, and the lower appellate court dismissed the defendants' appeal. The defendants again appeal to this Court.

    It has been again contended for the appellants here, as it was in the courts below, that the suit is barred by section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by order XXI, rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and by limitation. For the respondents, in addition to contesting that none of these pleas barred the suit, it has been further urged that the sale was in fact a nullity. We will proceed to consider first the plea of the appellants based on section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    A large number of cases have been quoted to us on behalf of the appellants in support of their proposition that section 47 constituted a bar to the present suit.

    It is, however, unnecessary for us to consider those cases in detail, for they can all be swept aside by one general criticism which covers them all, and that is that no case has been quoted to us in which the question has been definitely considered whether an auction-purchaser can be held to be the representative of a decree-holder for the purposes of section 47, and in which that question has also been definitely answered in the affirmative. The most that it has been possible to show on behalf of the appellants is that there have been some cases in which it was held that a proceeding came within section 47 to which only the judgement-debtor and the auction-purchaser were parties, but the effect of the absence of the decree-holder from the proceedings was not considered. It is only necessary to add that we ourselves can find no adequate reason of any sort for treating the auction-purchaser as a representative of the decree-holder, at any rate in the present proceeding. We hold, therefore, that section 47 did not constitute a bar to the present suit.

    Next, does order XXI, rule 92, constitute a bar? It is clear that there are questions in which an auction-purchaser is involved which may come within the bar of rule 92; but it is not all questions in which an auction-purchaser is involved that come within that bar, but only those which come within the scope of one or other of the rules 89, 90 and 91. Of these three rules, we need only consider rule 90. It will be noted that when setting out above the facts of this case we did not state at what stage the mistake crept in. For the appellants it was admitted that the property which was included in the decree was only the property which was included in the mortgage. There was, therefore, no mistake in the decree. In the sale-certificate a share was included which was not included in the mortgage or in the decree. But we have no information at all as to whether the mistake first crept in the sale-certificate or whether it first appeared in the application for execution or whether it first appeared in the sale-proclamation. We specifically and in very clear terms asked counsel for the appellants what evidence there was to indicate at which of these three stages the mistake first occurred, and he told us in equally unmistakable terms that there was no evidence available—documentary or oral—on this point, and it was impossible to say from the record when and where the mistake occurred. At a later stage of the case, when endeavouring to establish that the suit was barred by rule 92 counsel found himself in some difficulty. Of the three rules 89, 90 and 91, he could only rely upon rule 90, and in examining the phraseology of that rule he found himself compelled to allege that the plaintiff had based his suit on a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale. It was naturally difficult for him to establish this in face of the admission, which the material on the record compelled him to make, that there was no information at all as to when or how the mistake had occurred. He could only fall back upon paragraph 8 of the plaint which reads:

    “Defendants Nos. 1 to 10 played this trick, that they alleged in the suit and the decree that the 4 annas, etc., share also includes an unmortgaged proportionate share of 6 pies. But they did not mention the unmortgaged 6 pies share and its proportionate share in the sale proceedings.”

    It is clear that in some circumstances the plaintiff might well be held bound by a statement in his pleadings, but into this particular statement we cannot read anything more than a general plea by the plaintiff that in some way or other more than the share mortgaged has been sold, and a natural belief in his mind that this mistake was due to some trick of the decree-holder. We are further confirmed in giving this and no more effect to the statement in paragraph 8 by the fact that the appellants themselves were constrained to admit before us that there is no evidence on the record at all as to how the mistake occurred, or at what stage it occurred. There was no issue on the point of fraud or relating to any trick of the decree-holder. We are again confirmed in our view as to the nature of the suit by the relief actually claimed. The plaintiffs asked in relief (a) that on the establishment of their rights in the excess share sold they may, on the dispossession of the defendants, be awarded proprietary possession. The relief asked for was not for the setting aside of the sale on the ground of fraud. We hold, therefore, that the suit was not barred by order XXI, rule 92.

    The third plea raised on behalf of the appellants was that the suit was barred by article 12 of the Limitation Act. This plea is answered by a contention on behalf of the respondents that the sale was in fact a nullity, and that no question of limitation under article 12 could arise. With this latter view we agree. There was no prayer to have the sale set aside, nor was such prayer necessary. The plaintiff's case was straightforward and simple and may he stated as follows:— “The court has sold property of mine, with which the proceedings before it from the outset had no concern whatever. The court has no more power to do this than a private individual would have had. The whole proceeding is a nullity, and I am entitled to get back possession of my property.”

    We have been referred on behalf of the respondents to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakur Barmha v. Jiban Ram Marwari, and we think that decision is in point. In that case the decree-holder had got certain property inserted in the sale-certificate in excess of that which had been sold, find their Lordships of the Privy Council refused all effect to the confirmation of the sale and the sale-certificate and all subsequent proceedings of the auction-purchaser. In view of our opinion that the sale of the excess share in this case was a nullity no question of limitation under article 12 can arise.

    As a result of these findings on the above four points the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Bulaqi Das v. Kesri
    (Feb 9, 1928)