1. This is an appeal against the judgment and the decree of the District Judge of Comilla dated the 23rd January, 1939, reversing the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Comilla dated the 23rd June, 1938.
2. The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the Appellant against the Respondents for recovery of Rs. 2,100 as damages.
3. The facts about which there is no dispute in this appeal are these:—
(1) Defendant No. 2 was appointed Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Brahmanberia Sub-Division in the District of Tipperah in April, 1934. At that time there was a fund known as Momin Fund which was being run by an unregistered society of which the successive Sub-Divisional Officers of Brahmanberia were Presidents. After Defendant No. 2 came to Brahmanberia as Sub-Divisional Officer this unregistered society was registered under the name and style of Co-operative Muslim Education Society, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Society). Defendant No. 2 was elected President of this Society. Defendant No. 3, a Deputy Magistrate, was the second officer of Brahmanberia at that time. He became a member of this Society.
(2) There was a meeting of this Society on the 25th May, 1936. Defendant No. 2 presided over this meeting. At this meeting a resolution (Ex. P1) was passed for approaching the Brahmanberia Municipality for a suitable site for the construction of a Muslim Hall. In this resolution no mention was made about any particular site. A copy of this resolution was forwarded to the Chairman of the Municipality. On the 30th May, 1936, the Municipality passed a resolution (Ex. C) requesting the Secretary of the Society to supply necessary details as to specification, etc., of the proposed building. On the 2nd June, 1936, the Secretary of the Society wrote a letter (Ex. I) to the Municipality. In this letter two alternative sites (50×25 cubits of land on the western bank of the cutchery tank and 100×50 cubits of land on the southern bank of the Lokenath tank known as Silver Jubilee Park) were suggested. On the 4th June, 1936, two petitions (Exs. 20 and 20A) signed by a large number of ratepayers of the Municipality protesting against the free gift of the land on the southern bank of the Lokenath tank were filed in the Municipal Office. On the next day the letter of the Secretary of the Society was considered by the Municipality at a special meeting. The Municipality refused the proposal for a free gift of any land to the Society on the ground that there was no provision in the Municipal Act for making a free gift. On the same date six Commissioners sent a requisition (Ex. E) to the Chairman of the Municipality to convene a special meeting immediately for considering the desirability of granting a piece of land measuring 100×50 cubits on the western portion of the southern bank of the Lokenath tank under a mokarari permanent lease at a nominal rent and without any selami for the purpose of erecting a Muslim Institute by the Society. On the 11th June, 1936, the Municipality by a resolution (Ex. 14A) agreed to grant a permanent mokarari lease to the Society at an annual rent of 4 as without payment of any selami.
(3) On the same day (11th June, 1936) a suit was filed in the 1st Court of the Munsif at Brahmanberia, viz., Title Suit No. 153 of 1936, on behalf of the rate-payers of the Municipality against the Municipality and the Society for a declaration that the resolution granting lease to the Society was null and void and for an injunction restraining the Society from raising any permanent structure on the land. On the next day the Munsif issued interim injunction. This injunction was served on the Secretary of the Society on the morning of the 13th June.
(4) On the 17th June, 1936, a criminal case was filed in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Brahmanberia by Defendant No. 5 against the Plaintiff and his younger brother on the allegation that Defendant No. 5 paid Rs. 600 to the Plaintiff on contract for sale of certain lands but the Plaintiff and his brother denied receipt of the money and refused to execute the kobala. On that day Defendant No. 2 being out on tour the Defendant No. 3 heard the petition of complaint and summoned the Plaintiff under sec. 406 of the Indian Penal Code and fixed 24th June, 1936, for appearance of the Plaintiff in Court. On the 21st June, 1936, the Plaintiff was served with summons. On the 24th June, 1936, Plaintiff appeared before Defendant No. 2. On that day Defendant No. 2 recorded the following order:—
“Accused appears. To furnish bail for Rs. 1,000/. In default to hajat till 9th July, 1936. To 9th July 1936, for evidence.”
After the said order was passed 26 pleaders of the Brahmanberia Bar filed a bail bond on behalf of the Plaintiff. This bail bond was sent to Defendant No. 4 (the Court Sub-Inspector of Police) for enquiry and report about the fitness of the sureties. Defendant No. 4 thereupon asked for time for enquiry. This prayer of Defendant No. 4 was allowed by Defendant No. 2. A pleader then moved the Defendant No. 2 for the release of the Plaintiff on bail. The Defendant No. 2 thereupon verbally ordered that he would release the Plaintiff if the money be put in cash. Thereafter an application (Ex. 11) was filed before the Defendant No. 2 on behalf of the Plaintiff for permission to deposit Rs. 1,000 in cash. Defendant No. 2 thereupon passed the following order:—
“Let the money be deposited in the treasury during the usual hours of its transaction.
The money however was not deposited in the treasury on that date. Plaintiff was then put under handcuff and was sent to the local sub-jail. On the next day, i.e, the 25th June, 1936, two petitions were filed on behalf of the Plaintiff (Exs. 12 and 13). There were two prayers in Ex. 12. The first prayer was for acceptance of the money in the treasury on that day and the second prayer was for permission to deposit the money in the nesarat and for acceptance of the same by the Nazir. No order was passed on the first prayer and the second prayer was refused. The prayer in Ex. 18 was for a direction on the Court Sub-Inspector for expediting the enquiry and for early submission of report by him. The order passed by the Defendant No. 2 on that petition was “C.S.I to report.” On the 26th June, 1936, the money was deposited and the Plaintiff was released. The C.S.I Defendant No. 4 also submitted his report (Ex. 32) on that date.
(5) On 30th June, 1936, the Plaintiff filed an application (Ex. 22) before the District Magistrate of Tipperah for transfer of his case from the file of the Defendant No. 2. The District Magistrate thereupon called for a report from the trying Magistrate (Defendant No. 3). Defendant No. 3 thereupon submitted his report (Ex. 23). The petition for transfer was heard on the 14th July, 1936. On the 11th September, 1936, the Public Prosecutor of Comilla filed an application (Ex. 24) for withdrawal of the criminal case. The Plaintiff was thereupon discharged under sec. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
(6) The Plaintiff thereafter served notices on the Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 under sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and filed the present suit on the 25th November, 1936. Plaintiff's case briefly stated is as follows:—
The Defendant No. 2 as President of the Muslim Co-operative Education Society and the Defendant No. 3 as a member thereof were anxious to utilize a portion of the Silver Jubilee Park for the purpose of constructing a Muslim Institute Hall. In pursuance of this desire they caused the Society to move the Municipality to make a free gift of a portion of this Park for the purpose of constructing the Muslim Institute Hall. After the Municipality refused the request of the Society, Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 threatened, coerced and brought undue pressure upon certain Hindu Commissioners of the Municipality who signed the requisition (Ex. E) with the result that the Municipality passed a resolution on the 11th June, 1936, granting a permanent mokarari lease of a site situated on the Park. The Plaintiff took a leading part both in respect of the petitions of protest and in the institution of Title Suit No. 153 of 1936 in the first Court of the Munsif at Brahmanberia. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 suspected that the Plaintiff was responsible for the institution of the suit and were greatly displeased with the Plaintiff. They therefore determined to harass the Plaintiff and put him into trouble. In pursuance of this determination they caused Defendant No. 2 to file a false criminal case against the Plaintiff on the 17th June, 1936. The Defendant No. 3 without due consideration of the allegations made in the petition of complaint summoned the Plaintiff under sec. 406, I.P.C The allegations in the petition of complaint were entirely false and baseless. The Defendant No. 3 issued the process in consultation with and at the instance of the Defendant No. 2. It was not a bonâ fide order made in the exercise of the Defendant No. 3's powers as a Magistrate and in exercise of his jurisdiction as such. The criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff were conducted in camera and the Plaintiff had no notice of them until 21st June when he was served with summons. Plaintiff appeared in Court of Defendant No. 2 at 11 A.M on the 24th June, 1936, with cash money ready. But his case was not called till 12 A.M on that date. The amount of bail demanded from the Plaintiff was in excess of the amount which was the subject-matter of the criminal charge. The position of the Plaintiff in life was well-known to Defendant No. 2 and in spite of that he passed the order that in default of bail the Plaintiff would remain in Hazat till 9th July, 1936. The pleaders who executed the bail-bond are all respectable and leading members of the Brahmanberia Bar. Their position in life and solvency were known to Defendant No. 2. In spite of that Defendant No. 2 directed the Court Sub-Inspector (Defendant No. 4) to report as to the fitness of the sureties. Defendant No. 4 wanted time to hold local enquiries as to the fitness of the sureties, in consequence of a previous arrangement with Defendant No. 2. As soon as Defendant No. 2 passed a verbal order that if the money be put in cash Plaintiff would be released immediately, the cash money was tendered. This tender was made half an hour before 3 P.M, that is, within the hours of transaction at the treasury. Defendant No. 2 deliberately deferred passing orders regarding the acceptance of the money tendered. He passed orders for deposit of the money in the treasury after 3 P.M which was too late for deposit of money in the treasury. As a result of this delay in passing the order the money could not be deposited in the treasury on the 24th June. According to a prearranged plan Plaintiff was handcuffed and made to walk to the local sub-jail through crowded streets. He was confined in the sub-jail that night. An attempt was made on the 24th June by a pleader on behalf of the Plaintiff to obtain the signature of the Plaintiff on a properly stamped vokalatnama. But this was not permitted by Defendant No. 4. Another attempt was made at the sub-jail but this was also not successful. On the 25th June Plaintiff's prayer for depositing the money with the Nazir of the Court or for accepting the bail bond filed on the 24th June was refused without any reason. Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 caused illegal, wrongful and malicious detention of the Plaintiff from the 24th of June, 1936 to 26th June, 1936. This detention was responsible for immense mental sufferings, agony, bodily pain, humiliation before the public; irreparable loss and injury to the good name and reputation of the Plaintiff who is a pleader of 12 years' standing, practising at Brahmanberia, a landlord and is connected with several public institutions. After the Plaintiff was discharged under sec. 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code inspite of an order for refund of the cash deposit of Rs. 1,000 made by the Additional Magistrate on the 11th September, 1936, the money was not refunded until the 21st September, 1936. The acts and orders of Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in setting up Defendant No. 5 to file a false petition of complaint were illegal and malâ fide and were done with the sole object of unnecessarily and unjustly harassing the Plaintiff and lowering him in the eyes of the public. The Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 acted beyond their judicial powers and in excess of their jurisdiction. Their acts were a trespass upon the person and property of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff was accordingly entitled to get Rs. 2,100 as damages from the Defendants. (Rs. 500 as compensation for wilful, wrongful and malicious prosecution, etc., and detention, Rs. 300 as compensation for physical injury due to illegal handcuffing, Rs. 500 as compensation for loss of good name and reputation, Rs. 600 as compensation for mental agony, Rs. 200 as costs incurred by the Plaintiff in defending the criminal case instituted against the Plaintiff).
4. Written statements were filed by all the Defendants.
5. Defendant No. 1, the Secretary of State for India, challenged the sufficiency and validity of the notice under sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, pleaded the bar of limitation and denied liability for actions of Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 in the discharge of their duties. Defendant No. 5 in his written statement said that the allegations in the petition of complaint filed by him against the Plaintiff were all true and that he had reasonable and probable cause for filing the said criminal case. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 pleaded that they did not set up Defendant No. 5 to file the criminal case against the Plaintiff that the suit was bad for multifariousness that the claim against them was barred by limitation and that the Judicial Officers' Protection Act was a bar to the maintainability of the suit against them. They also pleaded that the claim for damages was excessive. The defence of Defendant No. 4 was that he had nothing to do with the starting of the criminal case and that every thing he did was done by him bonâ fide in the discharge of his duties.
6. The following issues were settled between the parties:—
1. Has the Plaintiff cause of action for this suit?
2. Is the suit bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action?
3. Is the suit barred by limitation?
4. Is the notice under section 80, C.P Code, a valid and sufficient notice?
5. Is the Judicial Officers' Protection Act a bar to the maintainability of the suit as against Defendants NOS. 2, 3 and 4?
6. Was the complaint against the Plaintiff instituted by the combined efforts of the Defendants Nos, 2, 3 and 4? Was the Defendant No. 5 a mere tool in the hands of Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4? Was the complaint false and malicious?
7. Were the acts done and orders passed by the Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in connection with the prosecution and detention of the Plaintiff in Hajat collusive. mala fide, illegal or in excess of their jurisdiction?
8. Were the acts done or orders passed by the Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 done or passed with the object of harassing the Plaintiff or lowering him in the estimation of the public or to cow him down or to cause him mental and physical pain P Has the Plaintiff been lowered in the estimation of the public or has be suffered mental and physical pain by reason of these acts and orders?
9. Did the Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 act as the agents of Defendant No. 1? If not, is the Defendant No. 1 liable?
10. What damages, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled to recover and from which of the Defendants?
11. To what relief, if any, is the Plaintiff entitled?
7. At the time of the hearing of the suit issue No. 2 and issue No. 9 (the claim against the Secretary of State for India) were not pressed. The Subordinate Judge answered issues Nos. 1 and 3 to 5 against the Defendants.
8. As regards issues Nos. 6, 7 and 8 the Subordinate Judge arrived at the following findings:—
(1) That there was a conspiracy among Defendant No. 2 and the prominent members of the Co-operative Muslim Education Society, Ltd., including Defendants Nos. 3 and 5 to put the Plaintiff into trouble and that the criminal case brought by Defendant No. 5 against the Plaintiff was the result of that conspiracy.
(2) That Defendant No. 2 was the real complainant in the criminal case and that Defendant No. 5 was the name-lender.
(3) That the criminal case was false to the knowledge of Defendant No. 5 and that he had no reasonable and probable cause for filing the criminal case.
(4) That Defendant No. 4 was not in the conspiracy from the very beginning, that he was at best guilty of irregularities in the discharge of his duties and that he abused his powers only to please Defendant No. 2.
9. As regards issue No. 10 the finding of the Subordinate Judge was that Plaintiff was entitled to recover Rs. 2,100 as damages against Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 5.
10. The Subordinate Judge accordingly-dismissed the suit against Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 without any costs and passed a decree for Rs. 2,100 as damages against Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 5 with costs.
11. Only Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 appealed to the District Judge. The learned District Judge has arrived at the following findings:—
(1) That the Plaintiff in his plaint did not plead expressly and specifically conspiracy among Defendants Nos. 2 to 5.
(2) That the suit was bad for multifariousness, mis-joinder of parties and causes of action.
(3) That the notice under sec. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code was inadequate and invalid in so far as the tort of malicious prosecution is concerned.
(4) That Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had nothing to do with the filing of the criminal case by Defendant No. 5 against the Plaintiff.
(5) That the acts done and orders passed by Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in the criminal case were lawful and were done and made without malice and in good faith within the limits of the jurisdiction of these Defendants as Magistrates and consequently these Defendants were protected by the Judicial Officers' Protection Act and sec. 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
(6) That the Defendant No. 4 did nothing to please Defendant No. 2 and that he was not guilty of procrastination and delay in conducting his enquiry about the fitness of the sureties who executed the bail bond in the criminal case.
(7) That the Plaintiff has failed to prove that Defendant No. 5 instituted the criminal case without reasonable and probable cause.
12. On these findings the learned District Judge allowed the, appeal of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and dismissed the suit against them with costs in both Courts. The learned District Judge dismissed the suit against Defendant No. 5 with costs in the trial Court and awarded in favour of Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 their full costs in the trial Court under Or. 41, r. 4 and r. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judge further directed that each of the Defendants would get a separate set of costs with a separate pleader's fee.
13. Hence this appeal by the Plaintiff.
14. The learned Counsel on behalf of the Appellant urged only the three grounds in support of this appeal, viz.:—
(1) That the District Judge was in error in awarding costs incurred by Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 in the trial Court.
(2) That the District Judge was wrong in awarding two sets of pleader's fees to Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 for hearing of the appeal, and,
(3) That the District Judge should not have awarded costs to Defendant No. 5 incurred by him in the trial Court.
15. As regards the first point the contention of the learned Counsel is that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to award costs incurred by Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 in the trial Court as they were not parties to the appeal.
16. The District Judge apparently has passed the decree for costs in favour of Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 under Or. 41, rr. 4 and 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Or. 41, r. 4 however contemplates where the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all the Defendants. The suit was decreed against Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 5, but it was dismissed against Defendants Nos. 1 and 4. The decree against Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 5 proceeded on a common ground. There was no decree against Defendants Nos. 1 and 4. The provisions of Or. 41, r. 4 are therefore not applicable.
17. Or. 41, r. 33 of the Code however is in very wide terms. It lays down thus:—
“The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make snob further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the Respondents or parties, although such Respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection.”
18. This rule authorises the Appellate Court to pass any decree which ought to have been passed by the trial Court. On the findings of the trial Judge there cannot be any doubt that the Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 were entitled to get their costs in the trial Court. The trial Judge has given no reasons as to why he did not award any costs in their favour. There cannot be any doubt therefore that the District Judge had power to decree costs incurred by Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 in the trial Court. It is true that these Defendants did not file any appeal or cross-objection and they were not parties to the appeal before the District Judge. Rule 33 however lays down that the Appellate Court can exercise its powers in favour of any of the Respondents or parties. The word “parties” is wide enough to include persons who were parties to the suit in the trial Court but were not parties to the appeal. The District Judge was, therefore, right in awarding costs incurred by Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 in the trial Court.
19. As regards the second point it appears that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 jointly filed one memorandum of appeal. The learned Judge should not, therefore, have directed the Plaintiff to pay Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 two sets of pleaders' fee for the appeal before him.
20. As regards the third point it appears that the decree of the trial Judge against Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 5 proceeded on a common ground. The District Judge in view of his findings was within his power in dismissing the suit against Defendant No. 5 with costs. The decree for costs in favour of Defendant No. 5 although he was not a party to the appeal finds support from Or. 41, r. 4 as well as from Or. 41, r. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
21. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed in part. The decree of the District Judge is modified in the manner indicated above.
22. In the memorandum of appeal to this Court about 34 grounds were taken but only three were pressed. The appeal has substantially failed. Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 will get one set of costs while Respondent No. 5 will get another set of costs from the Appellant in this Court.
C.C