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  • s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act
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  • s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ghose and Pratt, JJ.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit was instituted by a decree-holder (plaintiff) against the judgment-debtor and a person (defendant No. 1, the ijaradar) to whom the judgment-debtor had granted an ijara (lease) of property that the decree-holder had caused to be attached in execution of his decree. The attachment allegedly occurred on 29 September 1891; the ijara was executed on 7 November 1896.

According to the plaint, after the attachment a Receiver was appointed to take charge of the property and to make over the proceeds to the plaintiffs and other attaching creditors. While the Receiver was in possession, the ijaradar presented the ijara pattah before the Receiver and asked that the rent payable under the ijara be received. The plaint does not state what occurred on that application. The plaintiffs alleged that the ijara had been granted at a very low rent to hamper recovery by the decree-holders, and prayed for a declaration that the ijara of 7 November 1896 was null and void as against them.

The Subordinate Judge negatived the defendant's objections and granted the declaration sought by the plaintiffs. The ijaradar appealed that decree to the Court delivering this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs have any cause of action to seek a declaration that the ijara is invalid as against them.
  2. Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether the question should have been determined by the Court executing the decree rather than by a separate suit).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Decree-holders') Arguments

  • The ijara was executed after attachment and was presented to the Receiver while the Receiver was in possession; the plaintiffs were entitled to have the property applied towards satisfaction of their decree.
  • It was alleged the ijara had been granted at a very low rent with the object of creating difficulties for recovery of the money due to the plaintiffs and other decree-holders.
  • The plaintiffs therefore sought a declaration that the ijara dated 7 November 1896 was null and void as against them.

Defendant No. 1 (Ijaradar / Appellant) Arguments

  • The question raised by the decree-holders should have been decided by the Court executing the decree under section 241 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as stated in the plaint/contest), rather than by a separate suit.
  • There was no attachment properly so-called upon the property.
  • The property was only a maintenance grant for the lifetime of the judgment-debtor and therefore could not be attached and sold.
  • A further contention was whether the plaintiffs had any cause of action.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lalji Mal v. Nand Kishore Held that a purchaser of property under attachment (subsequent purchaser) must be treated as a "representative" of the judgment-debtor for the purposes of s.244; matters arising in execution are to be adjudicated under s.244. The Court relied on this case to support the proposition that a party who acquires an interest in property after attachment can be a "representative" within s.244, and thus the present ijaradar might be such a representative.
Madho Das… (Defendant) v. Ramji Patak… (Plaintiff) Discussed the position of a purchaser of property affected by a decree for sale (i.e., the status of purchasers in execution contexts). The Court cited the discussion in that case (as referred to in Lalji Mal) to reinforce the view that purchasers/assignees of interests affected by execution may be treated as representatives of the judgment-debtor.
Gur Prasad v. Ram Lal Accepted the view that a purchaser is a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s.244, rendering certain suits not maintainable. The Court noted that the same view was accepted in this later case, supporting the conclusion that acquisition of an interest post-attachment can make a person a representative in execution proceedings.
Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar Full Bench consideration of the meaning of "representative" in s.244: indicates a wider significance than "legal representative", including a person who is a representative in interest of the judgment-debtor. The Court relied on the broader interpretation from this Full Bench decision to conclude that the ijaradar could be a representative in interest of the judgment-debtor for the purposes of s.244.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two analytical stages.

  1. Cause of Action Inquiry:

    The Court first considered whether the plaintiffs had any cause of action. It observed that the terms of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act (with illustrations (d) and (g) quoted in the opinion) would support a case like the present one. The illustrations demonstrate that a person entitled as reversioner or a person in possession may obtain a declaration of their right when a lesser interest is asserted by another. Thus, the Court stated that if the ijarapattah had been set up before the Receiver in respect of attached property from which the plaintiffs were entitled to satisfaction of their decree, the plaintiffs would be entitled to seek a declaration that the ijara was invalid and inoperative as against them.

  2. Execution-Proceedings / Representative Question under the Code of Civil Procedure:

    The Court then considered whether the matter ought to have been dealt with under section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the opinion reproduces and relies on the text of that section). The Court recognized that the Receiver's act of receiving rents and applying collections towards satisfaction of decree-holders' claims formed part of the execution of decrees, and so the dispute related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.

    The pivotal question therefore was whether the ijaradar could be regarded as a "representative" of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s.244. The Court acknowledged some difficulty in that characterization but, after reviewing authorities (Lalji Mal v. Nand Kishore; Gur Prasad v. Ram Lal; Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar and the discussion in Madho Das… v. Ramji Patak…), concluded that the term "representative" had a wider connotation than merely a legal representative and could include a person who was a representative in interest of the judgment-debtor.

    Applying that principle, the Court held that the ijaradar, having acquired a substantial interest in the property by ijara (entitled to appropriate a portion of proceeds and bound to pay only a small share as rent), could be regarded as a representative of the judgment-debtor with respect to the transferred share of proceeds. The Court compared the situation to a scenario where the judgment-debtor sold a significant share of the property: the assignee would be a representative quoad that share.

    On this basis the Court concluded that the contention of the appellant—that the present suit was not maintainable under section 244 (the opinion later refers to "s. 214 of the Code" when giving the conclusion)—should prevail.

The Court therefore found it unnecessary to discuss further questions raised before it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The Court held that the dispute concerning the ijara and the Receiver's dealings with the proceeds related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and that the ijaradar could be treated as a "representative" of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of the relevant provision of the Code of Civil Procedure invoked in the opinion. On that procedural ground, the separate suit was not maintainable.
  • The Court noted that the successful objection by the defendant was one of form (procedural) and did not go to the merits; since the Subordinate Judge had decided the merits in favour of the plaintiffs, the Court ordered that each party should bear their own costs in both Courts.
  • The opinion does not announce or describe any broader rule beyond the application of existing authority to the facts; the direct effect is the dismissal of the suit and the cost order described above.

Disposition: Appeal decreed. (M.N.R.)

    H. Mathewson v. Gobardhan Tribedi

    Ghose and Pratt, JJ.:— This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by a decree-holder against his judgment-debt or and a person to whom the judgment-debtor had granted an ijara of the property, which he (the decree-holder) had caused to be attached, in execution of his decree. The attachment is said to have taken place on the 29th September, 1891, and the ijara was executed on the 7th November, 1896.

    The facts, as set out in the plaint, are that, after the property was attached at the instance of the decree-holder, a Receiver was appointed by the Court to take charge thereof, and to make over the proceeds of the property to the plaintiffs and the other attaching creditors; and that subsequently, while the Receiver was in possession of the property, the defendant No. 1, the ijaradar, presented before the Receiver the ijara pattah and asked that the rent payable by him under the ijara might be received. But what took place upon that application being made is not stated. It is, however, alleged that this ijara was granted at a very low rent with the object of throwing difficulties in the way of recovery of the money due to the plaintiffs, and the other decree-holders. The plaintiffs upon these allegations asked that if might be declared that the said ijara of the 7th November, 1896 was null and void as against them.

    The suit was contested by the ijaradar upon the ground that the question raised by the decree-holders should be decided by the Court, executing the decree under s. 241 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that there was no attachment properly so-called upon the property, and that the property in question being only a maintenance grant for the lifetime of the judgment-debtor, could not be attached and sold. A further question was raised, namely whether the plaintiffs had any cause of action.

    The Subordinate Judge has negatived all the objections of the defendant, and given the plaintiffs the declaration that they asked for.

    The defendant, the ijaradar, has appealed against this decree.

    Two main points have been discussed before us by the learned vakil for the appellant: first, whether the plaintiffs have any cause of action, and secondly, whether the suit is barred by the provisions of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It would seem that these two questions are intimately connected with each other. Taking the first question however by itself, we should not be prepared to say that the plaintiffs have no cause of action. The terms of s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act are such as would favour a case like this. We need only refer in this connection to two of the illustrations given in that section. The first of these two illustrations, namely (d), is: “A alienates to B property in which A has merely a life-interest. The alienation is invalid as against C, who is entitled as reversioner. The Court may, in a suit by C against A and B, declare that C is so entitled.” The other illustration, (g), is: “A is in possession of certain property. B, alleging that he is the owner of the property, requires A to deliver it to him. A may obtain a declaration of his right to hold the property.” It is, we think, impossible to say that, if the ijarapattah was set up by the defendent, the ijaradar, before the Receiver, in respect of a property which had been attached at the instance of the plaintiffs, and from which property they (the plaintiffs) were entitled to have their decree satisfied, upon such a claim being preferred by the ijaradar, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to come to Court and ask for a declaration that the ijara set up by the defendant is invalid and inoperative as against themselves. But, however that may be, if the plaintiffs or the Receiver, had brought the matter to the notice of the Court, the Court would have, as we take it, made some order or other upon the matter, viz., whether the Receiver was hound to receive from the ijaradar the rent payable under the ijara pattah or should he in accordance with the orders of the Court, which had been made receive the whole of the collections from the property in question. Here comes the consideration of the question, whether this matter could have been dealt with under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The words of that section are:—

    “The following questions shall be determined by order of the Court executing a decree and not by separate suit (namely):— (c)” —omitting (a) and (b) which are not material for the purpose of the present question—“Any other questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.”

    There can be no doubt that the matter that was raised upon the application of the ijaradar was a matter relating to the discharge or satisfaction of the decree, which was then being executed, as we take it, because the action of the Receiver in receiving the rents and profits of the property under orders of the Court and applying the same towards satisfaction of the claims of the various decree-holders was a part of the execution of decrees. That being so, the only question which demands consideration is whether the ijaradar could be regarded as a representative within the meaning of the section. For, if he might be so regarded, there could be no doubt that the question now raised by the plaintiffs might well have been dealt with by the Court executing the decree. Whether the defendant No. 1, who, subsequent to the alleged attachment, took a lease of the property, and is bound under the lease to pay only a portion of the usufruct of the property as rent thereof for a term of years, is a representative of the judgment-debtor, is a question which is not altogether free from difficulty. But having regard to some of the cases to which our attention has been called by the learned vakil for the appellant, we are not prepared to say, that he is not a representative within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code. In the case of Lalji Mal v. Nand Kishore(1), where a decree-holder brought a suit for declaration that in execution of his decree a certain-property, which had been attached at his instance, but which had subsequent to the said attachment been sold to another party, was liable to be brought to sale in execution of his decree, it was held that the purchaser was a representative within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code. The learned Judges in the course of their judgment, made, amongst others, the following observations:—

    “Convenience, which is not always a good reason for laying-down, a proposition of law, would suggest that a sale which was confrary to the provisions of s. 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should, if challenged by the decree-holder, be a matter to be adjudicated upon under s. 244. In our opinion, as the property in question was under attachment at the time the sale took place, the purchaser must be treated as a representative, of the judgment-debtor, on the same principle as he would have been a representative of the judgment-debtor by reason of his purchase, if the decree had been one for sale of a particular property. The position of a purchaser of a property affected by a decree for sale was discussed by this Court in Madho Das…(Defendant); v. Ramji Patak…(Plaintiff).*.” And they accordingly dismissed the suit upon that single ground.”

    In a later case before the same Court, namely, the case of Gur Prasad v. Ram Lal(2), the same view was accepted. In that can the plaintiff was the purchaser, and it was determined that the suit brought by him was not maintainable, it being held that he was a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    Then, in a case decided by a Full Bench of this Court, namely, the case of Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar(3) the question was raised what, was the exact significance of the word “representative” as mentioned in s. 244 of the Code. The facts of that case were that after a mortgage decree was passed, the equity of redemption subsisting in the mortgagor was sold in execution, of a money decree at the instance of a third party, and the question was raised, whether in the course of the execution of the mortgage decree, he (the purchaser) could be allowed to come in under s. 244 as a representative of the judgment-debtor. It was held that he could come in, and it seems to us that, though the observations that were made by Mr. Justice Banerjee, who delivered the judgment of the Court, had reference to the facts of the particular case before them, yet they were such as to indicate that the word “representative” occurring in s. 244 had a wider significance than “legal representative;” namely, that it includes a person, who is a representative in interest of the judgment-debtor; and this is the view which was substantially accepted by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Lalji Mal v. Nand Kishore, to which we have already referred.

    Having regard to the principle that underlies these cases, we think we ought to hold that the ijaradar in this case is a representative of the judgment-debtor, and it does not, to our minds, make any substantial difference in that principle, that he has not acquired the whole interest of the judgment-debtor. Suppose the latter sold a fifteen-sixteenth share of the property, which had been attached in execution of a decree, could it be rightly said that, because he retained in his hands a one-sixteenth share, therefore the assignee of the fifteen-sixteenth share of the property was not his representative quoad that share? The ijaradar in this case has under his ijara acquired a substantial interest in the property, he is bound under the terms of his ijara to pay, as it is alleged, a small share of the proceeds of the property, he being entitled to appropriate to himself the rest; and, so far as regards the share of the proceeds which has thus been transferred to him, though for a term of years, he might well be regarded as a representative of the judgment-debtor.

    Upon these grounds we are of opinion that the contention raised by the learned vakil for the appellant that the present suit is not maintainable, having regard to s. 214 of the Code, ought to prevail.

    In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to discuss the other question raised before us.

    The result is that this appeal will be allowed and the suit dismissed, but having regard to the fact that the objection, which has been raised by the defendant, and upon which he has succeeded, is an objection as to the form of action, and does not really go to the merits of the case, and, inasmuch as the merits were in the Court below found entirely against him and in favour of the plaintiffs' we think that each party should bear his own costs in both Courts.

    M.N.R
    Appeal decreed.

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    Comments

    H. Mathewson v. Gobardhan Tribedi
    (Dec 20, 1900)