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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Fazl Ali, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This reference required deciding whether, when the father of a Hindu joint family is adjudicated insolvent under the Provincial Insolvency Act, the Insolvency Court or its receiver has power to sell the joint family property including the interest of the insolvent's minor son. The question arose in the context of prior decisions under the Provincial Insolvency Act and under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, and in light of a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (referred to in the text as 6 Lah 11 / 6 Lah 1). The Bench framed three specific questions for determination: the principal question on the power of sale by the Court/receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act, and two additional questions asking whether certain earlier decisions of this Court were correctly decided.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, upon adjudication of a Hindu father as insolvent under the Provincial Insolvency Act, the Insolvency Court or the receiver has power to sell the property of the joint Hindu family including the interest of the minor son(s) of the insolvent.
  2. Having regard to the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 6 Lah 1, is the law correctly stated in the decisions of this Court in 8 PLT 2789 and 14 PLT 6310?
  3. Was the case in 17 PLT 39 correctly decided?

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments Advanced Before the Court

  • It was contended that long-standing High Court decisions holding that the Insolvency Court or receiver has the same power over joint family property as the insolvent (including power to sell a son's interest to pay the father's antecedent debts not contracted for illegal or immoral purposes) are incorrect and require re-examination in view of the Privy Council decision in 6 Lah 11.
  • A twofold argument was advanced from that decision: (1) because the definition of "property" in the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (construed by the Privy Council) is identical to the definition in the Provincial Insolvency Act, the father's power to sell the whole ancestral property (including the son's interest) cannot be said to be "property of the insolvent" within the statute; and (2) even if Section 52 of the Presidency Towns Act might make the joint family property available for payment of the father's debts, the Provincial Insolvency Act lacks a corresponding provision, so the Court or receiver under the Provincial Act cannot sell such property.
  • Another contention (addressed by the court) was that the Privy Council's language should be read narrowly and that its observations did not deprive receivers or courts under the Provincial Act of the power to realize the father's capacity to sell the joint property in appropriate cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
6 Lah 11 (Privy Council) / referenced also as 6 Lah 1 The Privy Council observed that S.2 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act appears to contemplate an absolute and unconditional power of disposal, whereas the father's power to dispose of joint family property is conditional on debts being liable to be satisfied out of that property. The court considered the Privy Council's observations central to the challenge of earlier High Court views. It analysed the Privy Council passage, concluded that the definition of "property" in S.2(d) is not exhaustive, and held that those observations did not prevent treating the father's peculiar disposal power as "property" for the purposes of the Provincial Insolvency Act.
17 PLT 392 Referred to as a Division Bench decision that favoured the argument that, under the Provincial Insolvency Act, the Court/receiver cannot sell the son's interest because there is no corresponding provision like S.52 of the Presidency Towns Act. The court noted that this Division Bench decision had lent support to the argument under consideration but proceeded to re-examine the issue and ultimately disagreed with that outcome (see determination on 17 PLT 39 below).
53 All 239 (Mukerji and King, JJ.) Contains an exhaustive discussion and a passage by King, J. explaining the limited nature of the father's undivided share and emphasizing the anomalous result if the receiver's powers did not include the father's power to dispose of joint property to pay debts. The court reproduced King, J.'s passage approvingly and relied upon it to support the view that the father's valuable right and power of disposing of joint family property should be regarded as part of the property or capacity which can vest in the receiver.
49 Mad 849 Cited as one of the authorities showing that High Courts have explained the Privy Council decision and continued to apply the earlier view that receiver/court could realize the father's disposal power. Used as supporting evidence that several High Courts have interpreted the Privy Council decision in a manner consistent with leaving intact the earlier view that the father's disposal power is realizable for payment of debts.
55 Bom 1106 Cited alongside other High Court decisions as part of the body of authority explaining the Privy Council judgment. Relied upon as part of the consensus among High Courts that the pre-existing view (that the receiver can effect sale to satisfy the father's debts) should be adhered to.
6 Lah 493 Referenced in the text among multiple authorities that interpret the Privy Council decision. Counted among decisions which, taken together, clarify the effect of the Privy Council ruling and support the conclusion that the father's disposal power can be made available in proper cases.
17 PLT 7178 (referred to as a recent Judicial Committee decision) Stated to have held that, under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, the capacity to exercise the father's power to sell joint family property vests in the Official Assignee under Section 52(2)(b). The court treated this as settling the law for cases under the Presidency Towns Act and used the reasoning by analogy to support the conclusion that the absence of express words in the Provincial Act does not exclude the father's disposal power from the meaning of "property."
8 PLT 2789 and 14 PLT 6310 (also cited in shorter forms 8 PLT 278 and 14 PLT 63) Earlier decisions of this Court dealing with the father's power over joint family property and its availability to creditors/receivers. The court held that these two cases were correctly decided so far as they bear on the principal question (i.e., that the receiver/court can realize the father's disposal power to pay antecedent legitimate debts).
17 PLT 39 An earlier decision held to have favoured the view that the receiver/court could not sell the son's interest under the Provincial Act. The court concluded that 17 PLT 39 was not correctly decided and that its outcome as to the principal question should not be followed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by observing that stare decisis and a long course of High Court decisions supported the view that the Insolvency Court or its receiver has the same power over joint family property as the insolvent father, enabling sale of the father's and his son's interests to pay antecedent legitimate debts. The Privy Council decision in 6 Lah 11/1 raised a challenge to that position because it indicated that the word "property" (as defined in S.2(e) of the Presidency Towns Act) appears to contemplate an absolute and unconditional power of disposal, whereas the father's power over joint property is conditional on there being debts liable to be satisfied out of that property.

The court analysed the textual provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act relevant to the dispute — in particular Section 28(2) which states that, upon adjudication, "the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a receiver" and Section 59 which empowers the receiver to "realize the property of the debtor" and to "sell all or any part of the property of the insolvent." The crucial issue was whether the peculiar right the Hindu father has under Hindu law to sell his son's interest for payment of his debts falls within the "property of the insolvent" as intended by the statute.

On statutory interpretation, the court emphasised that the definition in S.2(d) ("Property includes any property over which ... any person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit") uses the word "includes" and is therefore not exhaustive. The court reasoned that the ordinary, broad meaning of "property" — rights which may be turned into money or whose worth can be assessed in money — should govern unless the statute clearly restricts it. Relying on accepted principles (citing Lord Langdale and text authority), the court concluded that the father's power to bring the son's interest to sale is a valuable right or capacity that falls within "property" in the ordinary sense.

The court further relied on the reasoning in 53 All 239 (King, J.) which highlighted the anomalous position if only the father's undivided share (in a very limited sense) vested in the receiver but the father's substantial power of disposing of joint property did not. The court observed that the Privy Council's objections had been explained in subsequent cases, and that most High Courts continued to adhere to the earlier view. The Bench also noted the Judicial Committee's later ruling (17 PLT 7178) that under the Presidency Towns Act the Official Assignee's capacity to exercise the father's disposal power vests under Section 52(2)(b); by analogy and by application of the ordinary meaning of "property," the absence of precisely corresponding words in the Provincial Act could not have been intended by the legislature to produce a contrary consequence in mofussil areas.

The court addressed the logical and principle-based consequences: the receiver, in his dual role representing both the insolvent and the creditors, must be able to exercise the powers the insolvent could exercise to pay debts; it would be incoherent if a private decree-holder could attach and sell the joint family property (including the sons' interests) while the receiver could not.

On this analysis the court answered the principal question in the affirmative (subject to the limitation that debts must be antecedent and not contracted for immoral or illegal purposes), and answered the secondary questions by upholding two earlier decisions of this Court so far as they bear on the principal question and by holding that 17 PLT 39 was not correctly decided.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): When a Hindu father is adjudicated insolvent under the Provincial Insolvency Act, the interest of his son or sons in the family property does not vest in the Court or the Receiver, but the Court or the Receiver has power to sell the joint family property including the interest of the minor son or sons of the insolvent for the payment of his antecedent debts not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the receiver or Insolvency Court under the Provincial Insolvency Act may realize (by sale) the joint family property to pay the insolvent father's antecedent legitimate debts, even though the sons' interests do not themselves vest absolutely in the Court or receiver upon adjudication.
  • The Bench held that the earlier decisions of this Court cited as 8 PLT 2789 and 14 PLT 6310 were correctly decided insofar as they bear upon the principal question, while the decision in 17 PLT 39 was not correctly decided.
  • The decision interprets the term "property" in the Provincial Insolvency Act broadly (not as an exhaustive, restrictive definition) and emphasises that absence of an express provision in the Provincial Act corresponding to Section 52(2)(b) of the Presidency Towns Act does not necessarily produce a different substantive outcome in relation to the father's disposal power.
  • No novel statutory doctrine was created beyond the court's interpretative conclusion; the opinion reaffirms and explains the reach of existing authority and statutory language as applied to the Provincial Insolvency Act.

Order: Order accordingly (the three-Judge Bench delivered concurring opinions: Fazl Ali, J.; Courtney-Terrell, C.J.; and James, J.).

    Bishwanath Sao And Others v. Official Receiver And Others

    Fazl Ali, J.:— The principal question to be decided in this reference is whether upon the father of a Hindu joint family being adjudicated insolvent under the Provincial Insolvency Act, the Insolvency Court or the receiver has power to sell the property of the joint Hindu family including the interest of the minor son of the insolvent. If we act on the maxim stare decisis there can be no difficulty whatsoever in deciding this question, because in a long course of decisions under the present Insolvency Act as well as the enactments which preceded this Act it has been held that the Insolvency Court or the receiver appointed by it has the same power over the joint family property as the insolvent had and can therefore sell not only the interest of the father who has been declared insolvent but also the interest of his son or sons in order to pay off such of his antecedent debts as are not shown to have been contracted for any illegal or immoral purposes. It is however contended before us that these decisions are not correct and at any rate the matter requires further examination in view of the decision of the Privy Council in 6 Lah 11. In that case a Hindu son instituted a suit to establish his right of preemption in respect of certain property which adjoined the ancestral property of the family to which he belonged; but the suit was resisted on the ground that his father having been declared an insolvent the whole property including his interest had vested in the Receiver and that consequently he was not entitled to preempt. This objection found favour with the High Court but their Lordships of the Judicial Committee overruling the decision of the High Court held that it was not the intention of the statute under which the case had been decided (that statute being the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act) that on the insolvency of a father the joint property of his family should at once vest in the Official Assignee. It may be stated here that the question whether the Official Assignee could sell the entire family property including the interest of the son for the payment of the just debts of the father did not arise directly before the Judicial Committee. Their Lordships however referred to S. 2(e) of the Act which defines the word ‘property’ and to S. 52(2)(b) which provides that:

    The property of the insolvent divisible among his creditors shall comprise the capacity to exercise and to take proceedings for exercising all such powers in or over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the insolvent for his own benefit.

    2. Section 2(e) states that ‘property’ includes any property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit and after referring to this provision their Lordships observed as follows:

    The father's power to dispose of the joint property is not absolute but conditional on his having debts which are liable to be satisfied out of that property and S. 2 seems to contemplate an absolute and unconditional power of disposal.

    3. As to S. 52 their Lordships said:

    It may be that under the provisions of S. 52 or in some other way that property (the joint property of the family) may in a proper case be made available for the payment of the father's just debts.

    4. The argument which is founded upon these observations is twofold: (1) that as the definition of the word ‘property’ in the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act which was construed by the Privy Council is identical with the definition in the Provincial Insolvency Act, it can no longer be held that the power which the father has to sell the whole of the ancestral property including his son's interest in satisfaction of his just debts (debts which were not contracted for illegal or immoral purposes) is property of the insolvent within the meaning of the statute; and (2) that though having regard to the language of Section 52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, it might be possible to hold that under that Act the joint family property including the interest of the son is available for the payment of the father's legitimate debts, there being no similar provisions in the Provincial Insolvency Act, such property cannot be sold by the Court or the Receiver in cases arising under the latter Act. The argument is a plausible one and as it seems to have found favour with a Division Bench of this Court in 17 PLT 392 and several distinguished Judges of other High Courts, it becomes necessary to examine the matter with care. The provisions of the Insolvency Act which are relevant to the present discussion are contained in S. 28(2) and S. 59. S. 28(2) runs as follows:

    On the making of an order of adjudication, the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a receiver as hereinafter provided, and shall become divisible among the creditors ….

    5. The words have been underlined [itali cized] by me. Again S. 59 lays down:

    Subject to the provisions of this Act, the receiver shall, with all convenient speed, realize the property of the debtor and distribute dividends among the creditors entitled thereto, and for that purpose may sell all or any part of the property of the insolvent.

    6. It is quite clear from these provisions that the whole of the insolvent's property is available to the receiver for the payment of his legitimate debts and therefore the crucial question to be considered is whether the power or the right which the father has under the Hindu law to sell his son's interest for the payment of his proper debts is “property of the insolvent” within the meaning of the statute. Now, as I have already indicated, in S. 2(d) of the Act it is stated that:

    Property includes any property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit.

    7. The view which seems to have prevailed in all the High Courts in this country before the decision of the Judicial Committee in Sat Narayan's case was that this clause was wide enough to cover the power of the father to sell his son's interest for the payment of his legitimate debts. But in almost all the cases which have been decided recently it has been held that this view must be abandoned in the light of the observations of the Privy Council that the words quoted above seem to contemplate an absolute and unconditional power of disposal and not a power which could be exercised only upon proof that the property had to be sold for the payment of antecedent debts and that the debts had not been contracted for any illegal or immoral purposes. The actual words used by the Privy Council in this connection are these:

    The father's power to dispose of the joint property is not absolute but conditional on his having debts which are liable to be satisfied out of that property; and S. 2 seems to contemplate an absolute and unconditional power of disposal. And if the later sections of the Act are examined, it becomes apparent that this cannot have been the intention of the Statute.

    8. The words “And” and “this” have been underlined [italicized] by me. One of the arguments which was addressed to us was that this passage has been generally misunderstood and that what their Lordships intended to point out was that the apparent meaning conveyed by the words used in S. 2(d) could not be their real meaning, because such a meaning was not in consonance with the intention of the statute. This argument becomes plausible if we read the word and as ‘but,’ and if we remember that the underlined [italicized] word this could have reference only to what was said in the previous sentence as to the apparent meaning of S. 2. Assuming, however, that this interpretation of their Lordships' judgment is not correct, it seems to me to be quite clear that the definition of the word “property” in Section 2(d) of the Prov. Insole. Act, is not exhaustive but was inserted only to emphasize the fact that certain kinds of property, which in ordinary parlance may not be regarded as the property of the insolvent, are to be treated as “property” for the purpose of the Insolvency Act. It is to be noticed that in defining the various words which were intended to be defined in S. 2 sometimes the word “means” has been used and sometimes the word “includes” has been used. It seems to me to be clear that when in an interpretation clause it is stated that a certain term includes so and so, it is implied that the term retains its ordinary meaning whatever else it may mean. If therefore it is held that the definition of the word “property” in S. 2 is not exhaustive, it becomes necessary to consider whether the peculiar right of disposal which the father has over his son's interest in the joint family property is or is not property within the ordinary meaning of the term. The word “property” as far as I am aware has not been exhaustively defined in any Indian statute; but to use the language of Lord Langdale:

    It is the most comprehensive of all terms which can be used inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have: see, (1835) 5 LJ Ch 87.3

    9. I do not wish to encumber this discussion by referring to the wide range of rights and objects to which the word “property” has been held to be applicable, but I think that it can be legitimately held that the word “property” as used in the Provincial Insolvency Act includes, to use the language of the learned author of a well known text book, all valuable right or rights which may be turned into money or whose worth can be assessed in money (William's Principles of the Law of Real Property, Edn. 24, 1926, p. 4). This simple definition of the word “property” is in my opinion comprehensive enough to include the right which the father has of bringing to sale his son's interest to pay his own legitimate debts. The position of the father in a Hindu joint family is a peculiar one and if we give a restricted meaning to the word “property” and construe it to mean only those objects and rights over which the father has an absolute power of disposal, the question as to what is the whole property of the father which vests in the Receiver under S. 28, when he has been declared insolvent, would be surrounded with many difficulties and it may even be questioned whether strictly speaking any property would vest in the Receiver. The question has been dealt with so exhaustively by Mukerji and King, JJ. in 53 All 239,4 that I shall content myself by reproducing the following passage from the judgment of King, J.:

    It must be remembered that the father's power of disposal of his own undivided share is no greater than his power of disposing of the entire co-parcenary property. His undivided share only belongs to him in the sense that it would fall to his share in the event of a partition. I doubt whether his undivided share can properly be said to be “vested” in him. The share is indefinite and fluctuating in extent. The ownership of the co-parcenary property is vested in the whole body of co-parceners. No individual member can claim that he has a definite share. The father's power of disposal of his undivided share is conspicuous by its absence. He cannot dispose of it by gift or by will. On his death intestate it does not pass to his heirs. He cannot even alienate it for value without the consent of his co-parceners. In short his power of dealing with his undivided share is no greater than his power of dealing with the co-parcenary property as a whole. Considering that the father can be said to ‘own’ his undivided share in a very limited sense, and that he has no special power of disposing of that share, I think it will be very anomalous, if only his undivided share vests in the receiver, while his very valuable right and power of disposing of the joint family property for discharging his personal debts does-not so vest.

    10. I may state here that the decision of the Privy Council in 6 Lah 1 has been explained in a series of cases and almost all the High Courts are now agreed that the view which prevailed before that decision should be adhered to: see, 49 Mad 849,5 53 All 239, 55 Bom 1106 6 Lah 493.7 The matter has also been set at rest by the Judicial Committee in their recent decision in 17 PLT 7178 so far as cases arising under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act are concerned. In that case it has been held that though upon the adjudication of a Hindu father as insolvent the son's interest in the family property does not vest in the Official Assignee, yet the capacity to exercise the power of the insolvent father to sell the joint family property for his antecedent debts not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes vests in him under Section 52(2)(b) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. As I have already stated there is no provision in the Provincial Insolvency Act corresponding to Section 52(2)(b) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, but their Lordships have at least in one passage referred to S. 17 of that Act which does correspond to Section 28 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. However that may be, I think that the legislature could never have intended that while in the Presidency-towns the Official Assignee should be able to sell the undivided share of the son to pay the father's debt, the Court or the receiver should not have such a power in the mofussil towns. It is to be remembered that the Presidency Towns Insolvenoy Act was enacted in 1909, whereas the Provincial Insolvency Act was enacted 11 years later in 1920. In Section 52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act all that is enacted is that the property of the insolvent shall comprise the capacity to exercise and to take proceedings for exercising all such powers in or over or in respect of property as might have been exercised by the insolvent for his own benefit at the commencement of his insolvency or before his discharge. This provision merely emphasizes that the capacity to exercise the powers referred to therein is a species of property. The mere absence therefore of words corresponding to those used in S. 52 which merely refer to a species of property cannot restrict the meaning of the word “property.” This word, as I have already stated, has ordinarily a very wide meaning and might, even without there being any express provision specifying what it does and what it does not comprise, embrace all those rights and interests which are said to be comprised within the term “property” according to Section 52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. As the law applicable to the Presidency-towns was modelled on the English law, most of the provisions in the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act have been copied from the English Bankruptcy Act and Section 52 of the former Act is almost a verbatim reproduction of S. 38 of the latter Act. Some of these provisions however may not have been reproduced in the Provincial Insolvency Act because they were considered redundant or unnecessary.

    11. I think that under the old decisions it was possible to take the view that under S. 28 the whole property which the father could sell voluntarily to pay off his debts is by operation of law transferred to the Court or the Receiver. This view can no longer be taken, because it has been definitely held by the Privy Council that upon the adjudication of a Hindu father the son's interest in the family property does not vest in the Official Assignee or the Receiver. This decision, however, does not affect the view that a Receiver, by his peculiar position under the Act, may be taken to represent the insolvent as well his creditors. If he represents the insolvent, it would be illogical to hold that he cannot exercise the power which the insolvent could exercise to pay off his debts; and similarly it would be contrary to principle to hold that though the holder of a simple decree against the father can attach and sell the joint family property including the interest of his sons, the Receiver is unable to do so. In my opinion the answer to the first question which has been submitted to us for decision should be given in the following terms: When a Hindu father is adjudicated insolvent, the interest of his son or sons in the family property does not vest in the Court or the Receiver, but the Court or the Receiver has power to sell the joint family property including the interest of the minor son or sons of the insolvent for the payment of his antecedent debts not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes. The second and the third questions which have been referred to this Bench have been formulated in these terms:

    (2) Having regard to the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 6 Lah 1 is the law correctly stated in the decisions of this Court in 8 PLT 2789 and 14 PLT 6310?

    (3) Was the case in 17 PLT 39 correctly decided?

    12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I think that our answer to these questions should be that the first two cases, namely 8 PLT 278 and 14 PLT 63, were correctly decided so far as the decision in these cases bear on the first question, and that the third case, namely 17 PLT 39, was not correctly decided.

    Courtney-Terrell, C.J:— I agree.

    James, J.:— I agree.

    K.B/A.L

    13. Order accordingly.

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    Bishwanath Sao And Others v. Official Receiver And Others
    (Oct 20, 1936)