1. This is a plaintiff's application in revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. It is directed against an order setting aside an ex parte decree and restoring the suit on certain conditions mentioned in the order of restoration.
2. The relevant facts may be briefly stated. An ex parte decree for a certain sum of money was passed on 27-7-1944. On 2-8-1944 an application for setting aside the ex parte decree and restoration of the suit was filed by the defendant and it was supported by an affidavit. On the same day he filed another application praying that he might be permitted to furnish personal security in lieu of cash deposit. It appears that the Court granted the application for giving a personal bond as security in lieu of cash deposit and on 10-8-1944 the bond was filed. In due course notice was issued to the plaintiff and after considering the objections filed on behalf of the plaintiff the Court on 2-11-1944 set aside the ex parte decree and restored the suit on certain conditions. The learned Judge expressed the opinion that there was nothing on the record to show that the security was insufficient but the security bond was not properly worded. In view of this, the learned Judge felt that the defendant-applicant should be called upon to deposit the decretal amount, in cash and this was made as one of the conditions for restoration. On 25-11-1944 an application was made by the plaintiff complaining that the order of the Court dated 2-11-1944 had not been carried out. In consequence of this, the plaintiff submitted that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree and restoring the suit must be dismissed. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned Judge, on 23-12-1944, passed an order to the effect that the conditions attached to his order restoring the suit passed on 2-11-1944 had been duly complied with and in terms of the order the suit must be considered to be restored. The plaintiff has now come up in revision to this Court challenging the order of restoration. Technically, this application in revision is defective inasmuch as in terms it seeks the setting aside of the last order passed by the learned Judge on 2-12-1944 and does not specifically refer to the order of restoration which was passed on 2-11-1944 but the grounds taken in the application largely deal with the original order passed on 2-11-1944. I have accordingly heard learned counsel for the parties with regard to the merits of the original order dated 2-11-1944 as well.
3. Learned counsel for plaintiff-applicant has strenuously contended that the mandatory provisions of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act not having been complied with the Court below had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decree. He has further contended that the affidavit filed in support of the application for restoration of the suit was defective and was consequently not a piece of legal evidence on which the Court below could have acted as it did. In view of the sequence of events detailed above, it is quite clear that the application for restoration was filed on 2-8-1944 and the personal bond as security in compliance with the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Small Cause Courts Act was filed on 10-8-1944. All this took place clearly within thirty days of the passing of the ex parte decree on 27-7-1944. Thereafter notice was issued to the plaintiff and after hearing learned counsel for both the parties the Court on 2-11-1944, as mentioned above, passed the order of restoration subject to certain conditions. No doubt one of the conditions attached to the order of restoration was that the defendant-applicant was directed to deposit the decretal amount in cash instead of the personal bond which he had been allowed to file on 10-8-1944. This, according to the learned Judge himself, was done simply because the security bond was not properly worded inasmuch as the surety had put in a condition that he would be liable only if money was not realised from the applicant (defendant). The learned Judge had in an earlier part of his order clearly indicated his view about the sufficiency of the security because he had said: “There is nothing on the record to show that the security is insufficient.”
4. In effect, therefore, the substitution of a cash deposit in place of the personal bond originally allowed by the Court to be filed was not, according to the learned Judge himself, on account of any insufficiency in the security filed but purely on account of a formal defect in the language used in the security bond. No compliance with the conditions affixed to the order of restoration of 2-11-1944 could possibly be effected within the thirty days of limitation counted from the 27-7-1944. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the provisions of the proviso to Section 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act are mandatory. Again, it has been held in many cases both by this Court as well as other High Courts, that the security contemplated by the proviso may be furnished, even after the application has been made provided it is forthcoming within the period of thirty days as provided by Article 164, Limitation Act. Further it has been held that even the giving of directions by the Court with regard to the nature of the security in lieu of cash deposit may also be postponed to any time within the thirty days of the period of limitation prescribed. Reference may be made here to a Full Bench decision of this Court in 1931 A.L.J 10491. It has been pointed out by the learned Judges in that case that the language of the proviso is very unhappy and is incapable of literal application. The main question before the Full Bench related to the proper interpretation of the proviso to Section 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act. The conclusions reached by the learned Judges, after a survey of the relevant case-law and the examination of the language of S. 17, along with the proviso, may be briefly summed up thus:
The applicant must present his application for setting aside the decree together with the security demanded before the expiration of the thirty days of limitation as provided by Article 164 of the Limitation Act. If the security filed be in pursuance of a direction by the Court and the Court accepts the security without question and directs a notice to issue before limitation has expired, it, by necessary implication, gives a direction that the security furnished is sufficient to its mind. As observed by Mukerji, J. at p. 1053:
“A party cannot suffer by the Act of a Court and, therefore, we must accept the position that the Court has given the direction, according to law, to the furnishing of the security actually furnished, where the Court instead of rejecting the application of the defendant directs that a notice should issue.”
Again at page 1057 Boys, J. observed:
“If filed within the thirty days and accepted by the Court expressly or impliedly by the issue of notice the application is a good application, though it will be open to the decree-holder to challenge the nature and sufficiency of the security and to the Court under O. 9 R. 13 to make such further conditions as it thinks fit.”
At page 1059 Sulaiman A.C.J observed:
“In the present case although the security was deposited without obtaining any previous direction the Court ordered notice to issue before the period expired. It must accordingly be deemed to have by implication given the necessary direction.
Of course, the question whether the security is sufficient and satisfactory need not be finally determined during the period of thirty days. Indeed, the plaintiff decree-holder may come in afterwards and challenge its sufficiency. The mere fact that it is found afterwards that the security was sufficient (insufficient?), would not make the deposit of the security within the time in any way defective.”
5. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was filed within the period of thirty days. I The Court allowed the application for filing personal security on 8-8-1944 clearly within the period of limitation. The personal bond as security was filed by the applicant on 10-8-1944; this again was clearly within the period of limitation. Notice to the decree-holder opposite party was issued on 15-8-1944. This again was clearly before the limitation of thirty days had expired. In view of the principles laid down by the Full Bench, it seems to me that in this case the requirements of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act must be held to be fulfilled in reference to the application itself. As mentioned already, it was certainly open to the decree-holder to challenge the nature and sufficiency of the security and to the Court under O. 9, R. 13 of the CPC, to by down such further conditions as it thought ??? Viewed in this light, the order of the Court ??? dated 2-11-1944 may be considered to ??? the order of the Court passed under O. 9, R. 13 of the CPC, and the conditions attached to this order to the effect that the decretal amount be ??? in cash and that Rs. 15 be paid by the applicant as damages to the opposite party ??? 25-11-1944 may be treated as conditions ??? by the Court under those provisions. That the Court had very wide discretion with regard to the imposing of such terms as a ??? to the order of restoration as it thought it before setting aside the ex parte order is clear from the provisions of O. 9, R. 13 of the CPC.
6. Reference might be made in this connection to the case in A.I.R 1920 Pat. 6602, where wo learned Judges of the Patna High Court had to consider the question as to the terms which ??? Court had power to impose under O. 9, R. 13 of the CPC, as a condition for restoring the case or rehearing. It was observed at page 661 by Dawson-Miller, C.J (with whom Das, J. agreed):
“It seems to me that the terms which the Court has power to impose as condition for restoring the case for rehearing are of a threefold nature. The Court may, first of all, impose conditions as to the payment of costs; ??? may, secondly impose conditions as to payment into Court and, in my opinion this covers the payment into Court of the decretal amount or some portion thereof or payment into Court of costs; and thirdly, it may impose other conditions as it may think fit….”
7. The application filed by the plaintiff opposite party on 25-11-1944 to the effect that as the conditions imposed by the order dated 2-11-1944 had not been complied with the application for restoration must be deemed to stand dismissed, or should be dismissed and the final order passed by the Court on 23-12-1944 declaring that the earlier order had been duly complied with and, therefore, the suit stood restored are fully consistent with the view of the matter I have taken above. It follows, therefore, that there is no question of a want of jurisdiction of the Court below in passing the order of restoration that it has done.
8. To my mind, in this case there is no question of an extension of limitation for compliance with any of the requirements of the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The result, therefore, is that I dismiss this application with costs.
9. Application dismissed.