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  • provisions of Section 211 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 and Order XX, Rule 12 of the Code of 1908.
  • Section 211 of the Code of 1882 or in Order XXI, Rule 12 of the Code of 1908,
  • Section 211 of the Code of 1882 or Order XX, Rule 12 of the Code of 1908,
  • 1905. Section 211 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882,
  • Section 2, Clause (12), Civil Procedure Code,
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
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  • provisions of Section 211 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 and Order XX, Rule 12 of the Code of 1908.
  • Section 211 of the Code of 1882 or in Order XXI, Rule 12 of the Code of 1908,
  • Section 211 of the Code of 1882 or Order XX, Rule 12 of the Code of 1908,
  • 1905. Section 211 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882,
  • Section 2, Clause (12), Civil Procedure Code,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The litigation concerned approximately 2,720 bighas of land. The plaintiff claimed the land as part of Mahal No. 218 (Mouza Shyampur, Paharpur) after purchasing Mahal No. 218 at a revenue sale (sale held 14 January 1891; confirmed 15 March 1891). The defendant asserted that the lands belonged to Mahals Nos. 219 and 45 of which he was proprietor.

The plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits on 23 December 1903. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit on 27 March 1905. This decree was confirmed by this Court on 22 May 1908. The defendant appealed to His Majesty in Council; the Judicial Committee dismissed the appeal on 20 July 1914 (order in Council made 10 August 1914) in the reported case Surju Kanta v. Sarat Chandra.

The decree-holder applied on 13 December 1915 for assessment of mesne profits in execution of the Order in Council and for delivery of possession. After enquiry, the Subordinate Judge assessed mesne profits at Rs. 85,916 (Rs. 41,712 principal; Rs. 44,204 interest), covering the period from 23 December 1899 (three years prior to suit) to 1 April 1917 (date of delivery of possession). Both parties appealed: the judgment-debtor (defendant) argued the amount was excessive and advanced six distinct grounds of challenge; the decree-holder (plaintiff) argued alternatively that the amount was inadequate. The parties later reached an agreement on the method of assessment (the opinion records that they "agreed that the assessment should be made on the following basis" but the text of that basis is not included in the provided opinion).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree for mesne profits made by the Subordinate Judge in the suit is vague and incapable of execution.
  2. Whether the plaintiff (decree-holder) is entitled to mesne profits for any period antecedent to the institution of the suit.
  3. Whether mesne profits can be allowed only up to three years from the date of the decree made by the Subordinate Judge (27 March 1905), or whether the three‑year period runs from the date of the ultimate (operative) decree (the Order in Council).
  4. Whether the defendant relinquished possession on 18 November 1916 and thus should not be liable for mesne profits after that date.
  5. Whether interest ought to have been allowed on mesne profits at the rate of 12% per annum.
  6. Whether the mesne profits were calculated on an erroneous basis and without adequate inquiry (method of ascertainment / enquiry adopted by the Commissioner).

Arguments of the Parties

Judgment-Debtor (Appellant) - Main Arguments

  • First ground: The decree for mesne profits is vague and incapable of execution.
  • Second ground: The plaintiff is not entitled to mesne profits for any period antecedent to the suit (the appellant argued bona fide trespass or lawful possession under prior proceedings and raised various authorities in support).
  • Third ground: Mesne profits should be allowed only up to three years from the date of the decree of the Subordinate Judge (27 March 1905), i.e., Section 211, C.P.C. (1882) should be applied from that decree date rather than from the Order in Council.
  • Fourth ground: The appellant relinquished possession on 18 November 1916 and thus should not be liable for mesne profits beyond that date.
  • Fifth ground: Interest should not have been allowed at 12% per annum on mesne profits.
  • Sixth ground: The mesne profits have been calculated on an erroneous basis and without adequate enquiry; various objections were pressed as to the method of enquiry adopted by the Commissioner and approved by the Subordinate Judge.

Decree-Holder / Respondent - Main Arguments

  • Respondent maintained that the decree for mesne profits was definite enough and that the claim in the plaint specified the periods (three years prior to the suit and for the period during the suit until delivery) and a rate of interest (1% per month) such that execution and ascertainment were appropriate.
  • On the third ground the respondent contended that the term "decree" in Section 211, C.P.C. (1882) should be understood to mean the ultimate decree which has operative force and is capable of execution (i.e., the Order in Council / Privy Council decree) and therefore the three-year period should be calculated from that ultimate decree.
  • The decree-holder denied any laches and relied on the chronology (Order in Council dated 10 August 1914; application for execution 13 December 1915; delivery of some lands 1 April 1917 and the remainder 21 August 1918) to justify application of the law in his favour.
  • As regards the sixth ground, parties ultimately agreed on an assessment basis (the opinion notes the agreement but does not set out the agreed basis in the provided text).

Table of Precedents Cited

All precedents mentioned in the opinion are catalogued below with the rule or principle for which they were cited (phrasing taken from or limited to the explanation in the opinion) and a concise note of how the Court applied or referenced them in its reasoning.

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kali Krishna Tagora v. Secretary of State for India That a decree, where necessary, may be interpreted by reference to the judgment. Relied upon to show that the decree for mesne profits can be interpreted by reference to the Subordinate Judge's judgment, so that the decree is not indefinite.
Wise v. Rajendur Coomar Roy Cited as a distinguishable authority regarding decrees for mesne profits. Found distinguishable on facts/phrasing and not determinative of indefiniteness in the present case.
Ram Manickya Dey v. Juggunnath Gope Decision followed Wise v. Rajendur Coomar Roy (distinguishable). Not treated as applicable to render the decree indefinite.
Huronath Roy v. Indoo Bhoosun Deb Roy Listed among cases that show the terms of the decree as to period must be strictly adhered to in execution. Used to support principle that terms as to period in mesne profits decrees must be observed in execution.
Ram Lochun v. Munsoor Ali Listed as another authority on strict adherence to decree terms when executing mesne profits. Referenced as part of the body of authorities illustrating that principle.
Janokee Nath v. Raj Kristo Singh Listed among similar authorities about adherence to decree terms. Grouped with other decisions showing the same execution principle.
Bunsee Singh v. Mirza Nuzuf Ali Beg Listed among authorities on execution and adherence to terms. Referenced as authority for strict adherence to decree periods.
Mon Mohun Sirkar v. Secretary of State for India Decision to similar effect about execution of mesne profits decrees. Cited to support that decree-terms must be observed during execution.
Trailokya Nath Roy Chaudhri v. Jogendra Nath Ray Cited in context that where ambiguity exists, presumption may be to allow mesne profits for period allowed by law; also cited for doctrine about ultimate decree. Used to support view on interpretation and, later, to support that time should run from ultimate decree.
Uttamram v. Kishordas Listed among authorities on interpretation of decree by reference to judgment. Referenced as part of authorities justifying reference to judgment/pleadings to interpret decree.
Narayan Govind Manik v. Sono Sadashiv Listed among authorities on interpretation of decree by reference to judgment. Used similarly to justify interpretation by reference to judgment.
Makund Singh v. Saraswati Debt Cited for the proposition that allowance of mesne profits requires determination of annual income, period and rate of interest. Referred to in support of the statement that those elements were left open by the Subordinate Judge for execution-stage ascertainment.
Krishna Behari Roy v. Bunwari Lal Roy Cited to show that an order not challenged is conclusive and cannot be collaterally attacked later. Used to note the finality of unchallenged orders, but also to show interpretation by judgment is permissible.
Mungul Perhsad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri Another authority on finality of orders not challenged. Grouped with other precedents to illustrate conclusiveness of unchallenged orders.
Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari Authority illustrating finality of unchallenged orders. Referenced as part of the same line of authority.
Beni Ram v. Nanhu Mal Authority illustrating finality of unchallenged orders. Mentioned in the same context.
George Henry Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal; Rajeswara Sethupati Avergal v. Velusami Tevar Listed with other authorities on conclusiveness of unchallenged orders and need to consult judgment for interpretation. Referenced as part of the authorities supporting interpretation from judgment and finality doctrines.
Jagatjit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh Authority supporting that reference to the judgment is permissible to interpret a decree. Used to support interpretive approach.
Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh Authority showing that for interpreting Section 211 (Code 1882) or Order XX, Rule 12 (Code 1908), the term "decree" may mean the Privy Council decree. Relied upon later (in para 5) to support that the operative decree is the ultimate decree for calculating the three-year period.
Robinson v. Duleep Singh English authority cited for the proposition that reference to the judgment and pleadings for interpreting a decree is justifiable. Used as foreign authority bolstering the view that decree interpretation by judgment is permissible.
Houston v. Sligo (Marquis) Another English authority supporting interpretation of decrees by reference to the judgment. Used similarly to Robinson v. Duleep Singh.
Surju Kanta v. Sarat Chandra Reported Judgment of the Judicial Committee dismissing the defendant's appeal to His Majesty in Council. This is the ultimate appellate decision (Privy Council) which the Court treated as the operative decree for calculating the three-year period.
Banwari Lal v. Mahesh Cited as authority where sons not entitled to mesne profits after conditional decree (distinguished). Distinguished on facts; the Court held it did not assist appellant's contention.
Ganesa Aiyar v. Amirthasami Authority of the Madras High Court on mesne profits in context of conditional/possession decrees (cited). Distinguished; not applicable to an adverse possessor as in present case.
Bhirgee Nath v. Narsingh Tewari Cited in discussion of analogous authorities. Referenced as authority of similar type (not advancing appellant's position).
Compere v. Hicks Principle that mesne profits may be recoverable only from date of entry where party's title is voided by entry (English authority). Not considered to help appellant; principle distinguished.
Hughes v. Thomas Similar English authority on date of liability for mesne profits (cited). Distinguished and held not to support the appellant.
Peruvian Guano Co. v. Dreyfus English authority applied by Judicial Committee in other Indian cases about mesne profits and related principles. Held inapplicable to advance the appellant's contention here.
Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. English authority on treatment of trespassers and mesne profits (cited). Referenced in discussion of differentiation between bona fide and mala fide trespassers; not advancing appellant.
Palmer v. Wick Steam Shipping Co. English authority cited among others but not held to assist appellant. Not found to support appellant's position.
Juggernath Sahoo v. Syud Shah Mahomed Hossein Judicial Committee decision disallowing mesne profits antecedent to suit where laches was found. Distinguished: no laches imputable to decree-holder in present case.
Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Dutt Authority where under-tenure-holder's antecedent possession was not wrongful; purchaser at revenue sale could claim only rent-equivalent for antecedent period. Distinguished: facts differ because appellant here was an adverse possessor, not an under-tenure-holder.
Darsan Singh v. Bhawani Das Similar authority concerning under-tenure-holders and limits on antecedent mesne profits. Distinguished and held inapposite to cases of adverse possession without payment of rent.
Kalikananda v. Biprodas Pal Reviewed numerous decisions on whether possessor is an encumbrancer. Referenced as part of authorities on encumbrancer question (not decisive here).
Ishan Chandra Bakhsh v. Sefatulla Sikdar Letters Patent Appeal reviewed (cited among authorities about encumbrancer/possession status). Referred to in reviewing the encumbrancer distinction.
Prasanna Kumar Dutt v. Janendra Kumar Dutta Cited among decisions on encumbrancer/possession matters. Mentioned in the context of discussion of encumbrancer authorities.
Debi Saran Singh v. Rajbans Nath Dubey Cited in the context of encumbrancer/co-proprietor matters. Referenced as authority addressing related ownership/possession issues.
Kumar Kalanand Singh v. Syed Sarafat Hossein Cited as indicating that the possessor may become co-proprietor of the defaulting estate in some cases. Referenced among authorities; inapplicable to present facts.
Rahim-ud-din v. Bhabangana Debya Cited for similar co-proprietor/possession propositions. Mentioned as one of the authorities reviewing encumbrancer/co-proprietor positions.
Baikuntha Nath v. Basanat Kumari Dasi Cited in the same body of authorities on encumbrancer/co-proprietor status. Referenced among related decisions.
Aftar Ali v. Brojendra Kishore Roy Cited among authorities on encumbrancer/co-proprietor issues. Listed with similar cases; not held to benefit appellant.
Jitendra Kumar Pal v. Mohendra Chandra Cited among decisions concerning similar possession/title questions. Referenced in the discussion of authorities.
Mohim Chandra Deb v. Pyaryi Lal Cited among related authorities on possession/encumbrancer matters. Mentioned as part of the body of precedent; not determinative here.
Nand Kumar Singh v. Bilas Ram Marwari Patna High Court decision holding that the only decree capable of execution was the Order in Council and mesne profits run from the date of such order. Followed by this Court to support the proposition that the three-year period runs from the ultimate decree (Order in Council).
Ram Charan v. Lakhi Kant Explains the legal effect of appellate disposals (merger of decrees; ultimate decree is operative). Quoted to illustrate that the ultimate decree replaces earlier decrees and is the operative decree for computation of time periods.
Arunachella v. Veludayan Cited as expressing similar view to Ram Charan (Scotland, C.J. observation). Used to support the merger/operative decree principle.
Muhammad Sulaiman v. Muhammad Yar Khan Full Bench decisions cited in support of the doctrine that the ultimate decree is the operative decree. Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that time runs from the ultimate decree.
Luchmun Persad Singh v. Kishun Persad Singh Full Bench decision following Judicial Committee authority on decree-merger doctrine. Referenced to show consistency of the principle across benches.
Pitts v. LaFontaine Judicial Committee authority relied upon in the line of cases about operative decrees. Included among authorities illustrating the merger and operative-decree doctrines.
Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v. Fatima Full Bench decision supporting the doctrine of ultimate operative decree. Referenced in support of the same principle.
Rameswar v. Bhaba Sundari Debi Cited among cases reviewing earlier decisions on operative decree and related issues. Referenced as part of the body of supporting authority.
Aghara Kumar v. Mahomed Musa Cited as a review case on the subject. Referenced among the authorities that discuss operative decree issues.
Brija Lal Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Cited among decisions on the topic of operative decrees and calculation of time. Used as part of supporting authorities.
Gajraj Mati v. Shami Nath Cited among many authorities reviewing the law on operative decrees. Included in the list of cases supporting the Court's conclusion about the operative decree.
Kailash Chandra Basu v. Girija Sundari Debi Cited in the discussion of operative decree vs. primary decree and related points. Referenced as part of the judicial balance of opinion.
Chandra Kanta v. Lakshman Chandra Cited among cases reviewing earlier decisions on the subject. Referenced to show the line of authority.
Brij Narain v. Tejbal Bikram Judicial Committee decision supporting the doctrine that time runs from the ultimate decree. Relied on as a key authority for the proposition that the ultimate decree (Privy Council) is the operative decree for computation of the three-year period.
Batuk Nath v. Munni Dai Cited as distinguishable (dismissal of appeal for default is not an affirmance of the decree). Mentioned to explain exceptions where dismissal by default does not amount to an affirmance.
Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal Similar to Batuk Nath (distinguishable class of cases). Referenced as part of the exceptions to the general rule.
Patloji v. Ganu Cited among cases of a similar class (dismissal for default distinctions). Mentioned as non-contradictory to main doctrine.
Bhola Nath v. Kanti Chundra Cited among cases addressing dismissal for default and related issues. Referenced to distinguish points where dismissal by default was material.
Satvaji Balajirao v. Sakharlal Atmaram Authority favoring view that time prescribed by primary decree is extended by dismissal of appeal. Mentioned as part of divergent judicial opinions on whether time runs from lower court decree or appellate decree.
Noor Ali v. Koni Medh; Thamal v. Abhoyessuri Debi; Rup Chand v. Shamsh-ul-Jehan; Daulat v. Bhukandas; Nanchand v. Vithu; Sakhalchand Rikhawdas v. Velchand Gujar Authorities supporting the view that time fixed by the lower Court is extended by implication upon dismissal of appeal. Grouped as authorities on the one side of the judicial divergence.
Ramaswami Kone v. Sundara Kone; Ghanshiam Lal v. Ram Narain; Gopala Aiyar v. Sannasi; Faijuddi Sardar v. Asimuddi Biswas; Tara Chand v. Brojo Gopal Authorities taking the opposite view that the period fixed by primary Court remains unaffected by dismissal of appeal. Grouped as authorities on the other side of the judicial divergence; the Court observed the balance of authority favours the ultimate decree approach.
Kartic Chandra v. Nilmani Mondal; Hukum Chund v. Pirthichand Lol; Bejoy Chand Mahatab v. Tinkari Banerjee Cited as authorities for the elementary proposition that an appeal does not suspend the operation of a decree. Noted as not affecting the central conclusion about the operative decree for computing three years.
Jayanti Venkayya v. Damisetti Sathiraju Authority confirming that appeal does not suspend operation of decree. Referenced to show that certain appeals do not automatically suspend decree operation; not determinative of the three-year computation question.
Grish Chunder Lahiri v. Shoshi Shikhareswar Roy; Girish Chander Lahiri v. Sasi Sekhareswar Roy Discussed with regard to allowance of interest as part of mesne profits (interest forms integral part but is discretionary); also illustrations of rates applied (6%). Used to illustrate that interest on mesne profits is part of mesne profits and is discretionary; cited as an instance where 6% was allowed.
Ibbs v. Richardson English authority that plaintiff cannot claim mesne profits for any period subsequent to an offer by defendant to restore possession. Recalled as a concession of principle; Court applied this principle but found on facts no genuine offer to restore had been made.
Ishan Chandra v. Ainuddin Mia Authority cited alongside Ibbs on the proposition about offers to restore possession. Mentioned to illustrate the general rule; Subordinate Judge's contrary factual finding was upheld.
Abbas v. Fassih-ud-din Cited in the context of offers to restore and mesne profits. Used as supporting authority for the general proposition but factual finding controlled application.
Malladi Rama Somayajulu v. Brundavanam Pramayya Cited on the same general rule. Referenced similarly.
Shambhu Nath v. Satish Chandra Recent authority (reported) cited in same context concerning offers to restore possession. Referenced as part of the authorities on the point that mesne profits cannot be claimed after genuine offer to restore.
Byjnath Pershad v. Badhoo Singh; Mugun Chunder v. Surbessur Chuckerbutty Authorities holding that all trespassers (bona fide and mala fide) are liable for mesne profits. Used to state that trespassers are liable; from that point distinctions between bona fide and mala fide affect allowances (e.g., collection charges).
Altaf Ali v. Lalji Mal; Dakhina Mohan Roy v. Saroda Mohan Roy Authorities recognising distinction in treatment of bona fide vs mala fide trespassers (e.g., deduction of collection charges for bona fide trespasser). Applied to the factual finding that appellant could be regarded as a bona fide trespasser; influenced the Court to reduce interest.
Glenwood Lumber Co. v. Phlilips; Green v. Biddle Foreign authorities cited among others recognizing the bona fide/mala fide distinction. Referred to illustrate analogous principles in comparative jurisprudence.
Radharaman v. Surnomoyi Debi; Lachmi Narain v. Mazhar Abbas Authorities where interest appeared to have been allowed at 12% on decrees for mesne profits. Noted as instances of 12% awards; Court contrasted these with the ordinary 6% rate prevalent for money decrees for much of the period in question.
Ijjatulla Bhuiyan v. Chandra Mohan Banerji Authority noting that 6% per annum was the ordinary rate of interest allowed on Court decrees in much of the period 1899–1917. Used to justify reducing the interest allowed on mesne profits from 12% to 6% in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed each of the appellant's six grounds in turn and applied legal principles supported by precedent and by examination of the record.

On the first ground (decree alleged to be vague): The Court held the decree was not indefinite or incapable of execution. It relied on authority that a decree may be interpreted by reference to the judgment (Kali Krishna Tagora and others). The Subordinate Judge's decree (dated 27 March 1905) declared liability for mesne profits but left questions of annual income, period and rate of interest to the execution stage; the Court read the decree together with the judgment and plaint and concluded the decree was sufficiently definite for execution-stage ascertainment.

On the second ground (no antecedent mesne profits): The appellant argued bona fide trespass or lawful possession whereas the Court found he was an occupier without title and without payment of rent and that the revenue sale (confirmed 15 March 1891) transferred title to the purchaser retrospectively as of the date of default. The Court distinguished authorities relied on by the appellant (e.g., cases involving under-tenure-holders) and held that the appellant had no right to shelter as a lawful possessor after the confirmation of the revenue sale; consequently mesne profits from 23 December 1899 were recoverable. The Court also rejected the applicability of cases involving laches in the plaintiff which might have disallowed antecedent mesne profits, finding no laches here.

On the third ground (three-year limitation): The Court examined Section 211, C.P.C. (1882), and concluded the correct construction is that the "decree" for the purpose of the three-year limitation is the ultimate decree which terminates the litigation and is operative (i.e., the Order in Council / Privy Council decree). The Court relied on a substantial body of precedent and reasoning about the merger of decrees on appeal (the lower decree being merged in or replaced by the superior Court's decree) and concluded that time runs from the date of the ultimate decree. The Court found the Subordinate Judge correctly held that the three-year period should be calculated from the date of the Order in Council (10 August 1914), not from the date of the trial court decree (27 March 1905).

On the fourth ground (relinquishment of possession on 18 November 1916): The Court acknowledged the general principle (Ibbs v. Richardson, etc.) that mesne profits cannot be claimed after an offer to restore possession, but accepted the Subordinate Judge's factual finding that there was no genuine offer to restore and no effective withdrawal of occupation by the defendant. The Court noted the defendant had continued to contest boundary and identity issues and had litigated to higher tribunals; consequently the Court did not accept the asserted relinquishment and overruled the fourth ground.

On the fifth ground (rate of interest): The Court observed that "mesne profits" by the Code include the profits actually received or which might have been received together with interest, and that interest is an integral part of mesne profits but remains in the Court's discretion. The Subordinate Judge had allowed interest at 12% per annum (as claimed by the plaintiff at 1% per month), but the Court observed that historically six percent was the ordinary rate allowed on decrees for money during much of the relevant period (1899–1917). The Court also considered the distinction between bona fide and mala fide trespassers and concluded the appellant was likely a bona fide trespasser; taking all circumstances into account, the Court reduced the interest rate to six percent per annum and allowed the fifth ground in part.

On the sixth ground (method of enquiry/assessment): Numerous objections were pressed to the Commissioner's method of inquiry. The matter threatened a prolonged further inquiry, but the parties reached an agreement on the basis of assessment. The opinion records that the parties agreed that the assessment should be made on a specified basis, but the provided text does not include the agreed basis itself; the Court therefore records the settlement and does not proceed to impose a differing method in the text supplied.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling:

The Court's dispositive rulings as reflected in the provided opinion are:

  • The first ground (decree alleged to be vague) is rejected — the decree is not indefinite and may be interpreted with reference to the judgment.
  • The second ground (no mesne profits antecedent to suit) is overruled — the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits antecedent to the suit (from 23 December 1899) because the appellant was an occupier without title after the revenue sale confirmation.
  • The third ground (three-year limitation to be calculated from trial court decree) is overruled — the three-year period under Section 211, C.P.C. (1882) is to be calculated from the date of the ultimate operative decree (the Order in Council / Privy Council decision).
  • The fourth ground (relinquishment of possession 18 November 1916) is overruled on the facts — the Subordinate Judge's finding of no genuine offer to restore and no effective withdrawal of occupation is upheld.
  • The fifth ground (rate of interest) is allowed in part — interest on the mesne profits is to be calculated at 6% per annum instead of 12%.
  • The sixth ground (method of enquiry) was subject to settlement between the parties — the parties agreed on an assessment basis (the precise agreement is not contained in the provided text).

Implications and Direct Effects:

- The decree for mesne profits made by the Subordinate Judge stands substantially affirmed by this Court, subject to the modification of the rate of interest (reduced to six percent per annum) and subject to the parties' agreed basis for assessment (the agreed basis is not reproduced in the provided opinion). The Court's construction that the three-year limitation under Section 211, C.P.C. (1882) runs from the date of the ultimate decree (the Order in Council) is a controlling application of long-established precedent reasoning in this case and dictates the period for which mesne profits are allowable here.

- The opinion does not claim to set aside or qualify the general doctrines cited; it applies them to the present facts. The Court did not establish a novel rule beyond application of established principles (operative decree principle; interpretation of decree by reference to judgment; discretion on allowance and rate of interest as part of mesne profits; distinction between bona fide and mala fide trespassers).

Notes on Missing or Unstated Items

This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion. The provided opinion notes that the parties "have agreed that the assessment should be made on the following basis:" but the text of that agreed basis was not included in the material supplied. Therefore, the precise agreed assessment basis and any specific calculations or subsequent orders based on that agreement are not available in the provided opinion and have not been summarized here.

    Raja Sashikanta Acharya v. Raja Sarat Chandra Rai Chaudhuri .

    1. These two appeals are directed against a decree for the ascertainment of mesne profits in continuation of a suit for recovery of possession of land with, mesne profits. Neither the judgment-debtor nor the decree-holder has been satisfied with the decision of the Subordinate Judge; the former considered the amount awarded as excessive, while the latter deemed, the amount inadequate. Consequently, both the parties have appealed, and all the points in controversy between them have been elaborately re-argued in this Court. Upon one material point, however, the parties have, since the close of the arguments, wisely come to an agreement, as will presently, be explained, and the matters which actually require our decision have thereby been substantially reduced to a narrow compass.

    2. subject matter of the litigation was an area of 2720 bighas, approximately, which, the plaintiff claimed as included in Mouza, Shyampur, Paharpur, within his Zemindar Mahal No. 218. The defendant claimed that the lands appertained to and had been permanently settled as Mahals Nos. 219 and 45, of which he was the proprietor. The plaintiff was the purchaser of Mahal No. 218 at a sale for arrears of revenue held on the 14th January 1891 and confirmed on the 15th, March 1891. The plaintiff instituted the present suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits on the 23rd December 19031. The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge on the 27th March, 1905. On appeal to this Court the decree of the Subordinate Judge was confirmed on the 22nd May 1908. The defendant, thereupon appealed to His Majesty in Council, with the result that the Judicial Committee held on the 20th July 1914 that the judgment and decree appealed from should stand and that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. The Judgment of the "Judicial Committee is reported as Surju Kanta v. Sarat Chandra . The order in Council was made on the 10th August 1914. The decree-holder thereafter made the present application on the 13th December 1915 for assessment of mesne profits in execution of the Order of His Majesty in Council. He prayed that possession of the decretal lands might be delivered to him and that mesne profits might be decreed so as to cover a period of three years before the institution of the suit and the period from the date of the institution of the suit to the date of delivery of possession. After a full enquiry, the Subordinate Judge has assessed mesne profits at Rs. 85,916; of this sum Rs. 41,712 represents the principal amount and Rs. 44,204 the interest thereon. The period for which mesne profits have been allowed extends from the 23rd December 1899, that is, from three years prior to the institution of the suit, to the 1st April 1917, when possession was delivered to the decree-holder. This decree has been assailed before us on six grounds, namely, first, that the decree for mesne profits as made in the suit is vague and incapable of execution; secondly, that the plaintiff is not entitled to mesne profits for any period antecedent to the suit; thirdly, that the plaintiff is not entitled to mesne profits for any period subsequent to three years from the date of the decree made by the Subordinate Judge on the 27th March 1905; fourthly, that, in any event, the plaintiff was not entitled to mesne profits after the 18th. November 1916 when the defendant relinquished possession of the decretal lands ; fifthly, that interest should not have been allowed on the profits at the rate of 12 per cent, per annum, and sixthly, that the mesne profits have been calculated on an erroneous basis and without adequate enquiry.

    3. As regards the first ground, we are of opinion that the decree for mesne profits wade in the suit is neither indefinite nor incapable of execution. As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Kali Krishna Tagora v. Secretary of State for India in Council 15 I.A. 186 : 16 C 173 : 12 Ind. Jur. 413 : 5 Sar. P.C.J. 237 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 115 (P.C.) the decree where necessary may be inters preted by reference to the judgment. The decree made by the Subordinate Judge on the 27th March 1905, was in these terms; "that the claim for mesne profits be decreed, the amount of which will be ascertained in the execution department." This decree, it will not be overlooked, was made when the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 was in force and was expressed in terms familiarly used at that time. The claim was set out in the decree in the same terms as in the plaint and was formulated, as follows: "that mesne profits for the disputed lands described in the schedule, for three years previous to the institution of the suit and also for the period after the institution of the suit till date of obtaining possession, may be ascertained, and a decree may be passed for the same, together with interest on the same for each year at the Tate of one per cent, per month." There is manifestly no indefiniteness about the claim for mesne profits. The decision in Wise v. Rajendur Coomar Roy 11 W.R. 200 which was followed in Ram Manickya Dey v. Juggunnath Gope 5 C. 563 : 2 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 966 is clearly distinguishable, and no useful purpose would be served by an attempt to test whether the decree for mesne profits made in this suit is indefinite and incapable of execution by reference to observations made with regard to a decree made in another suit and expressed in different terms. The cases mentioned, as also the decisions in Huronath Roy v. Indoo Bhoosun Deb Roy 6 W.R. Mis. 33, Ram Lochun v. Munsoor Ali 11 W.R. 339; Janokee Nath v. Raj Kristo Singh 15 W.R. 292 and Bunsee Singh v. Mirza Nuzuf Ali Beg 22 W.R. 328 merely show that in executing a dec.ee for mesne profits, the terms of the decree as to the period during which mesne profits are to be allowed must be strictly adhered to; substantially to the same effect is the decision in Mon Mohun Sirkar v. Secretary of State for India 17 C. 968 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 1191. If there were any ambiguity, the presumption might well be made that the Court intended to allow mesne profits for the period allowed by law; Trailokya Nath Roy Chaudhri v. Jogendra Nath Ray 35 C. 1017; Uttamram v. Kishordas 24 B. 149 : 1 Bom. L.R. 638 : 12 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 637; Narayan Govind Manik v. Sono Sadashiv 24 B. 345 : 1 Bom. L.R. 846 : 12 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 764. We hold accordingly that there is no real substance in the first contention of the judgment-debtor-appellant. Indeed, the decree-holder has argued that the decree for mesne profits as made in the suit is so definite and specific, that none of the questions raised by the judgment-debtor (except the question of amount) is really open for discussion. We are not prepared to accept this extreme contention. It is not disputed that the validity of an order made at one stage of a litigation, unless forthwith challenged by an appropriate proceeding in a superior tribunal, must be regarded as conclusive between the parties and cannot be questioned or collaterally attacked at a later stage; see Krishna Behari Roy v. Bunwari Lal Roy 2 I.A. 283 : 1 C. 144 : 25 W.R. 1 : 3 Sar. P.C.J. 559 : 3 Suth. P.C.J. 213 : 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 93 (P.C.); Mungul Perhsad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri 8 I.A. 123 : 8 C. 51 : 11 C.L.R. 113 : 4 Sar. P.C.J. 249 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 32 (P.C.); Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari 11 1. A. 37 : 6 A. 269 : 4 Sar. P.C.J. 489 : 3 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 718 (P.C.); Beni Ram v. Nanhu Mal 11 I.A. 181 : 7 A. 102 : 4 Sar. P.C.J. 564 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 138 (P.C.); George Henry Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal ; Rajeswara Sethupati Avergal v. Velusami Tevar . On the other hand, reference may legitimately be made to the judgment in the suit to interpret the decree and to ascertain what the Court has really decided; see Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secretary of State for Indian Council 15 I.A. 186 : 16 C 173 : 12 Ind. Jur. 413 : 5 Sar. P.C.J. 237 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 115 (P.C.); Jagatjit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh 19 C. 159 : 18 I.A. 165 : 15 Ind. Jur. 749 : 6 Sat P.C.J. 80 : Rafique and Jackson's P.C. No. 125 : 9 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 552 (P.C.); Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh 27 I.A. 209 : 23 A. 152 : 2 Bom. L.R. 278 : 5 C.W.N. 52 (P.C.). That such reference to the judgment, and if need be, to the pleadings is justifiable, is also dear from the decisions in Robinson v. Duleep Singh (1879) 11 Ch. D. 798 : 48 L.J. Ch. 758 : 39 L.T. 313 : 27 W.R. 21 May; In re (1884) 25 Ch. D. 231 at p. 236 : 49 L.T. 770 : 32 W.R. 337 and Houston v. Sligo (Marquis) (1885) 29 Ch. D. 448 : 52 L.T. 96. Now, when we examine the judgment of the Subordinate Judge in the suit it becomes manifest that the only question he determined was the liability of the defendant for mesne profits; He did not consider the annual income, the period of time and the rate of interest,--elements which must be determined before the actual amount of mesne profits can be assessed. Consequently, the decree of the Subordinate Judge, as interpreted by his judgment, leaves no room for controversy that when he directed that "the claim for mesne profits be decreed, the amount of which will be ascertained in the execution department," he decided nothing beyond this that the defendant was liable for mesne profits and that the questions of annual income, period of time and rate of interest, which are all essential factors for the ascertainment of the "amount," were left open for investigation at a later stage. See Makund Singh v. Saraswati Debt 51 Ind. Cas. 98 : 29 C.L.J. 245. The first objection taken by the judgment-debtor consequently fails.

    4. As regains the second ground, the judgment-debtor has contended that he should not be made liable for mesne profits for any period antecedent to the institution of the suit; indeed, it has even been argued that he should not also be made liable for the period of pendency of the suit in the Court of first instance. It has been urged that he was a bona fide trespasser, and in this connection, reference has been made to the decision of this Court, dated the 17th March 1877, in a suit instituted by one Amarchand Lahatta (at that time interested in Mahal No. 218) against the plaintiff in the present litigation (who was then, as now, interested in Mahals Nos. 219 and 45). In that suit, the boundary line between the estates held by the rival claimants was determined. The appellant contends that he was in possession of the disputed lands by virtue of the decision in that suit; but this is not quite accurate, for the evidence in the suit made it abundantly clear that he had overstepped the boundary as demarcated in the earlier litigation. This, however, is not very material. The plaintiff, as purchaser of the estate No. 218 at a sale for arrears of revenue, was not concluded by the decree in the previous litigation, as he ?did not derive his title from the defaulting proprietor but took the estate from the Crown as it stood at the time of its inception as a permanently settled estate. The investigation in the present litigation shows that the delineation of the boundary in the earlier suit was incorrect, and that, in substance, is the basis of the decision of the Judicial Committee. The plaintiff is consequently entitled to recover with mesne profits whatever tract of land has been found to have been included in fact in the estate exposed for sale by the: Revenue Authorities. By no fiction of law can we hold that the appellant was lawfully in possession under the colour of the decree in the previous suit after the revenue sale had actually taken place, which transferred the title to the purchaser with retrospective effect from the date of default whereby the interest of the defaulting proprietor in the estate was in essence determined, as stated by Lord Atkinson in Surja Kanta v. Sarat Chandra . There is. consequently no analogy between the present case and the litigation which culminated in the decision of the Judicial Committee in Banwari Lal v. Mahesh 49 Ind. Cas. 540 : 45 I.A. 284 : 41 A 63 : 21 O.C. 428 : 23 C.W.N. 577 : 6 O.L.J 168 : (1919) M.W.N. 490 (P.C.). That is an authority for the proposition that where, in a suit by the sons to set aside an, alienation by their father, a conditional decree for possession on payment of portion of the consideration found to be binding on the estate is passed, the sons are not entitled to mesne profits, as the possession of the alienee was not unlawful. To the same effect is the decision of the Madras High Court in Ganesa Aiyar v. Amirthasami 44 Ind. Cas. 605 : (1918) M.W.N. 892 : 23 M.L.T 245; see also Bhirgee Nath v. Narsingh Tewari 35 Ind. Cas. 475 : 39 A. 61 : 14 A.L.J. 1161. Nor can the appellant invoke the aid of the principle that, where the party in possession is not a trespasser at all until his title is made void by entry, as where he holds against the reversioner or remainder-man by virtue of a fine levied by the tenant for life, mesne profits can only be recovered from the date of such entry; Compere v. Hicks (1798) 7 T.R. 727 : 101 E.R. 1221; Hughes v. Thomas (1811) 13 East 474 : 104 E.R. 454. The decision in Peruvian Guano Co. v, Dreyfus (1892) A.C. 166 : 61 L.J. Ch. 749 : 66 L.T. 536 : 7 Asp. M.C. 225, which was applied by the Judicial Committee in Dakhina Mohan Roy v. Saroda Mohan Roy 20 I.A. 160 : 21 C. 142 : 17 Ind. Jur. 576 : 6 Sar P.C.J. 366 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 727 (P.C.) also does not advance the contention of the appellant, and the same observation applies to Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 A.C. 25 at p. 30 : 42 L.T. 334 : 28 W.R. 357 and Palmer v. Wick Steam Shipping Co. (1894) A.C. 318 : 6 R. 245 : 71 L.T. 163 There is further no shadow of an imputation of laches on the part of the plaintiff, as there was in the case of Juggernath Sahoo v. Syud Shah Mahomed Hossein 14 B.L.R. 386 : 23 W.R. 99 : 2 I.A. 48 : 3 Sar P.C.J. 419 (P.C.) where the Judicial Committee disallowed mesne profits antecedent to the suit. It has been ingeniously argued, however that the appellant as an adverse possessor was an encumbrancer, and that till he had notice, by institution of this suit, that the purchaser at the revenue sale desired to annul his incumbrance, his possession was lawful, and he could not be held liable for mesne profits. In support of this position, the appellant has invoked the aid of the decisions in Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Dutt 6 Ind. Cas. 69 : 37 C. 559 : 11 C.L.J. 503 : 14 C.W.N. 849 and Darsan Singh v. Bhawani Das 19 Ind. Cas. 974 : 17 C.W.N. 984 which, on examination, are found to be clearly distinguishable and of no assistance whatever to his contention. In these cases, the person in possession was an, under-tenure-holder. The purchaser at the revenue sale brought a suit for ejectment and mesne profits. It was ruled that for the period antecedent to the suit for annulment of the incumbrance, the possession of the under-tenure-holder was not wrongful and that the purchaser at the revenue sale was not entitled to claim by way of damages for use and occupation any sum in excess of what actually represented the rent payable by-the under-tenure-holder. This principle clearly cannot be applied to an adverse possessor, who occupies the land without payment of rent to the proprietor, as if he were the holder of a valid rent-free grant. If the contention of the appellant were to prevail, the result would be entirely different from what happened in Ram Ratan Kapali v. Aswini Kumar Dutt 6 Ind. Cas. 69 : 37 C. 559 : 11 C.L.J. 503 : 14 C.W.N. 849 and Darsun Singh v. Bhawani Das 19 Ind. Cas. 974 : 17 C.W.N. 984 In those cases, the under-tenure-holder was made to pay to the purchaser at the revenue sale rent for the lands in his occupation; here the appellant, who was in possession without title, would be in a more advantageous position and would escape all payment to the rightful owner for the period antecedent to the suit. In this view, it is needless to consider whether the appellant was an encumbrancer, as held in numerous decisions which will be found reviewed in Kalikananda v. Biprodas Pal 26 Ind. Cas. 436 : 21 C.L.J. 265 : 19 C.W.N. 18; Ishan Chandra Bakhsh v. Sefatulla Sikdar 68 Ind. Cas. 219 : 35 C.L.J. 36 : 26 C.W.N. 703 letters Patent Appeal No. 49 of 1920 decided by Mookerjee and Panton, JJ. on the 18th August 1921; Prasanna Kumar Dutt v. Janendra Kumar Dutta 31 Ind. Cas. 801 : 43 C. 779 and Debi Saran Singh v. Rajbans Nath Dubey 43 Ind. Cas. 895 : (1918) Pat 134 : 5 P.L.W. 9 : 4 P.L.J. 29 or became a co-proprietor of the defaulting estate, as indicated in Kumar Kalanand Singh v. Syed Sarafat Hossein 12 C.W.N. 528; Rahim-ud-din v. Bhabangana Debya 1 Ind. Cas. 81 : 13 C.W.N. 407; Baikuntha Nath v. Basanat Kumari Dasi 34 Ind. Cas. 916 : 23 C.L.J. 151; Aftar Ali v. Brojendra Kishore Roy 37 Ind. Cas. 252 : 24 C.L.J. 60; Jitendra Kumar Pal v. Mohendra Chandra 37 Ind. Cas. 239 : 24 C.L.J. 62 and Mohim Chandra Deb v. Pyaryi Lal 39 Ind. Cas. 213 : 25 C.L.J. 99 ; 21 C.W.N. 537 : 44 c. 412. In either view, the essential, fact remains that, as occupier without title and without payment of rent, the appellant was bound to surrender possession of the disputed lands to the revenue sale purchaser when the sale was confirmed on the 15th March 1891. From that date onward, he must be deemed to have unlawfully kept the purchaser out of possession. Consequently, he has no shadow of a grievance when he is called upon to pay mesne profits from the 23rd December 1899 which enables him to escape reimbursement of profits for more than eight years, which in justice belonged to the purchaser but which he has managed to appropriate and retain. In our judgment, the second ground cannot be sustained on any conceivable principle either of law or of justice, equity and good conscience, and must consequently be overruled.

    5. As regards the third ground, the appellant has argued that the decree-holder can be allowed mesne profits only up to the expiry of three years from the date of the decree made by the Subordinate Judge on the 27th March 1905. Section 211 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, which was in force when the decree in this suit was made, was in the following terms: "When the suit is for the recovery of possession of immoveable property yielding rent or other profit, the Court may provide in the decree for the payment, of rent or mesne profits in respect of such property from the institution of the suit until the delivery of possession to the party in whose favour the decree is made, or until the expiration of three years from the date of the decree (whichever event first occurs) with interest thereupon at such rate as the Court thinks fit." The respondent contends that the term "decree" signifies the ultimate decree which alone has operative force and is capable of execution. This argument is supported by the decision of the Patna High Court in Nand Kumar Singh v. Bilas Ram Marwari 43 Ind. Cas. 855 : 3 P.L.J. 116 : (1917) Pat. 377 : 4 P.L.W. 100 which is precisely in point and accords with the decision of this Court in Trailokya Nath Roy Chaudhri v. Jogendra Nath Ray 35 C. 1017. In that case, the decree of the primary Court was made on the 28th November 1905 and allowed recovery of possession with mesne profits from the date of the decree to the date of recovery of possession. This decree was confirmed by the High Court on appeal on the 14th May 1907 and an appeal therefrom to His Majesty in Council was dismissed by the Judicial Committee on the 7th March 1913. It was ruled by the Patna High Court that the only decree capable of execution was the Order in Council and that mesne profits should be allowed up to the expiration of three years from the date of such order. In support of this position, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh 27 I.A. 209 : 23 A. 152 : 2 Bom. L.R. 278 : 5 C.W.N. 52 (P.C.) which shows that, for the purpose of interpreting Section 211 of the Code of 1882 or Order XX, Rule 12 of the Code of 1908, the term "decree" in such circumstances must be taken to mean the decree made by the Privy Council. We may usefully recall here the lucid exposition given by Mr. Justice Dwarkanath Mitter in Ram Charan v. Lakhi Kant 7 B.L.R.704 at p. 714 : 16 W.R. 1 (F.B.) of the true effect of the disposal of an appeal upon the decree of the primary Court: "If the decree of the lower Court is reversed by the Appellate Court, it is absolutely dead and gone; if, on the other hand, it is affirmed by the Appellate Court, it is equally dead and gone, though in a different way, namely, by being merged in the decree of the superior Court which takes its place for all intents and purposes. Both the decrees cannot exist simultaneously." This is in accord with the view expounded by Scotland, C.J., in Arunachella v. Veludayan 5 M.H.C.R. 215 and was subsequently adopted by the majority of the Full Bench in Muhammad Sulaiman v. Muhammad Yar Khan 11 A. 267 (F.B.) : A.W.N. (1889) 55 : 13 Jur. Ind. 427 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.). 598 where the observations of the Judicial Committee in Kristo Kinkur Roy v. Rajah Burrodacaunt Roy 14 M.I.A. 465 : 17 W.R. 292 10 B.L.R. 101 : 2 Suth. P.C.J. 564 : 3 Sar. P.C.J. 62 : 20 E.R. 860 were explained. This principle has been repeatedly approved, and illustrations of its application will be found in Luchmun Persad Singh v. Kishun Persad Singh 8 C. 218 : 4 Shome L.R. 261 : 10 C.L.R. 425 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 140 : (F.B.) which was decided by a Full Bench of this Court and followed the decision of the Judicial Committee in Pitts v. LaFontaine (1881) 6 App. Cas. 482 : 50 L.J.P.C. 8 43 L.T. 519; Muhammmd Sulaiman v, Muhammad Yar Khan 11 A. 267 (F.B.) : A.W.N. (1889) 55 : 13 Jur. Ind. 427 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.). 598 and Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v. Fatima 11 A. 314 : A.W.N. (1889) 107 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 628 (F.B.) which were decided by two Full Benches of the Allahabad High Court, and Rameswar v. Bhaba Sundari Debi 5 Ind. Cas. 304 : 11 C.L.J. 81; Aghara Kumar v. Mahomed Musa 5 Ind. Cas. 723 : 11 C.L.J. 155, Brija Lal Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad 12 Ind. Cas. 669 : 15 C.L.J. 432 : 17 C.W.N. 133; Gajraj Mati v. Shami Nath 36 Ind. Cas. 307 : 39 A. 13 : 14 A.L.J. 853; Kailash Chandra Basu v. Girija Sundari Debi 14 Ind. Cas. 299 : 39 C. 925 : 16 C.W.N. 658 and Chandra Kanta y. Lakshman Chandra 36 Ind. Cas. 460 : 24 C.L.J. 517 : 21 C.W.N. 430 which review many of the earlier decisions on the subject and show that the doctrine is supported by the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Brij Narain v. Tejbal Bikram 6 Ind. Cas. 669 : 37 I.A. 70 : 32 A 295 : 11 C.L.J. 560 : 14 C.W.N. 667 : 7 A.L.J. 507 : 12 Bom L.R. 444 : 8 M.L.T. 57 : 20 M.L.J. 587 : (1910) M.W.N. 392 (P.C.). The decisions of the Judicial Committee in Batuk Nath v. Munni Dai and Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal , are clearly distinguishable, as based on a recognition of the principle that dismissal of an appeal for default is not an affirmance of the decree; to the same class belong the decisions in Patloji v. Ganu 15 B. 370 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 252; Bhola Nath v. Kanti Chundra 25 C. 311 : 1 C.W.N. 671 : 13 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 208; Kailash Chandra Basu v. Girija Sundari Debi 14 Ind. Cas. 299 : 39 C. 925 : 16 C.W.N. 658 and Syam Mandal v. Sati Nath 38 Ind. Cas. 493 : 44 C. 954 : C.W.N. 776 : 24 C.L.J. 523. These decisions do not militate against or weaken the effect of the two decisions of the Judicial Committee in Kristo Kinkar Roy v. Rajah Burrodacaunt Roy 14 M.I.A. 465 : 17 W.R. 292 10 B.L.R. 101 : 2 Suth. P.C.J. 564 : 3 Sar. P.C.J. 62 : 20 E.R. 860 and Brij Narain v. Tejbal Bihrarn 6 Ind. Cas. 669 : 37 I.A. 70 : 32 A 295 : 11 C.L.J. 560 : 14 C.W.N. 667 : 7 A.L.J. 507 : 12 Bom L.R. 444 : 8 M.L.T. 57 : 20 M.L.J. 587 : (1910) M.W.N. 392 (P.C.). The decisions in Kartic Chandra v. Nilmani Mondal 32. Ind. Cas. 931 : 20 C.W.N. 686; Hukum Chund (Juscurn Boid) v. Pirthichand Lol and Bejoy Chand Mahatab v. Tinkari Banerjee 58 Ind. Cas. 741 : 24 C.W.N. 617 do not affect the position, as they are authorities only for the elementary proposition that an appeal does not suspend the operation of a decree: Jayanti Venkayya v. Damisetti Sathiraju 64 Ind. Cas. 470 : 44 M. 714 : 41 M.L.J. 117 : 14 L.W. 180. Nor Can assistance be derived from another class of cases which were pressed upon our attention and which deal with a question of some nicety, namely, when a decree of the primary Court fixes a date for the performance of an act directed thereby, how far the dismissal of an appeal preferred against that decree way be taken to extend by implication, the period prescribed. Upon this matter, there has been some divergence of judicial, opinion. The case of Satvaji Balajirao v. Sakharlal Atmaram 26 Ind. Cas. 754 : 39 B. 175 : 16 Bom. L.R. 778 which followed the decision of the Judicial Committee in. Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh 27 I.A. 209 : 23 A. 152 : 2 Bom. L.R. 278 : 5 C.W.N. 52 (P.C.) supports the view that the time prescribed by the decree of the primary Court is extended by implication upon the dismissal of the appeal. To this category belong the cases of Noor Ali v. Koni Medh 13 C. 13 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 505; Thamal v. Abhoyessuri Debi 4 Ind. Cas. 12 : 13 C.W.N. 1060; Rup Chand v. Shamsh-ul-Jehan 11 A. 346 : A.W.N. (1889) 127 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 648; Daulat v. Bhukandas 11 B. 172 : 11 Ind. Jur. 229 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 113; Nanchand v. Vithu 19 B. 258 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 175; Sakhalchand Rikhawdas v. Velchand Gujar 18 B. 203 : 9 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 643. On the other hand the cases, of Ramaswami Kone v. Sundara Kone 31 M. 28 : 17 M.L.J. 495 : 3 M.L.T. 26; Ghanshiam Lal v. Ram Narain 2 Ind. Cas. 364 : 31 A. 379 : 6 A.L.J. 493; Bhola Nath v. Kanti Chundra 25 C. 311 : 1 C.W.N. 671 : 13 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 208; Gopala Aiyar v. Sannasi 32 Ind. Cas. 401 : 19 M.L.T. 137 : 3 L.W. 29; Faijuddi Sardar v. Asimuddi Biswas 11 C.W.N. 679 and Tara Chand v. Brojo Gopal 18 Ind. Cas. 747 : 17 C.L.J. 120 : 17 C.W.N. 457 maintain the opinion that the period of performance prescribed by the decree of the primary Court remains unaffected by the dismissal of the appeal. The balance of judicial, opinion, as the later authorities stand, is in favour of the view that when time is fixed by the lower Court for payment of money and the decree of the lower Court is confirmed on appeal; the time for payment runs from the date of the decree of the Appellate Court, though the latter decree does not expressly provide that the time for payment should be calculated from the date of the appellate decree. We need: not, for the purpose of the present case, discuss, whether the decisions which take the contrary view may be defended en principle. It has been maintained, however, on behalf, of the appellant that the result of the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Grish Chunder Lahiri v. Shoshi Shikhareswar Roy 27 C. 951 : 27 I.A. 110 : 4 C.W.N. 631 : 10 M.L.J. 356 : 2 Bom. L.R. 709 : 7 Sar P.C.J. 687 : 14 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 622 (P.C.) lends some support to his contention. We have carefully examined the judgment delivered by Lord Hobhouse in the case mentioned, and we are of opinion that there is nothing in the actual decision of the Judicial. Committee which throws light upon the solution of the question raised before us. But our attention has been drawn to the subsequent proceedings reported in Girish Chancier Lahiri v. Sasi Sekhareswar Roy 33 C. 329. It appears that the decree of the Trial Court in the suit was made on the 22nd December 1883 and the decree of the High Court on appeal therefrom was made on the 28th May 1885. A portion of the decretal lands was covered in execution in 1885; the remainder (called Nadiayar) was not recovered till 1891. The Subordinate Judge allowed mesne profits up to the date of recovery of possession. The High Court allowed mesne profits for three years from the date of the decree of the Trial Court. This does not help the contention of appellant in the present case; as possession of some of the properties had been delivered in 1885, it was immaterial whether in respect of those properties, the period of three years was calculated from the decree of the primary Court or the decree of the High Court, because no mesne profits could be allowed after delivery of possession. On the of her hand, in respect of Nadiayar it would be material whether the period of three years should be taken to commence from the decree of the first Court or the decree of the High Court. The point, however, was not argued either before the High Court or before the Judicial Committee in the form now presented to us. Indeed; it was assumed that there were only two possible alternatives, namely, that mesne profits should be allowed for three years from the date of the decree of the First Court, or up to date of actual delivery of possession. The possible bearing of the decree made by the High Court was not considered and there was no judicial pronouncement upon that aspect of the matter. It is manifest that when the question is examined on principle the only solution acceptable is that the period of three years should be calculated from the date of the ultimate decree which is the only decree capable of and brought into execution. Assume that the primary Court dismisses the suit; the High Court confirms this decree; the-Judicial Committee reverses these concurrent decisions and decrees the suit; clearly, the time must run from the date of the decree of the Privy Council. Assume again, that the primary Court decrees the suit the High Court reverses the decision; the Judicial Committee restores the decree of the Trial Court; the time, must plainly run from the date of the decree of the Privy Council, as ruled by the Judicial Committee in Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh 27 I.A. 209 : 23 A. 152 : 2 Bom. L.R. 278 : 5 C.W.N. 52 (P.C.). Finally, as sume that the Trial Court decrees the suit; the High, Court affirms that decree and the Judicial Committee affirms the decree of the High Court; it is difficult to appreciate why the time should not; run from the date of the decree, of the Privy Council, as in the two previous instances; The common principle which governs, all the cases is, that the time runs from the date of the ultimate decree, which terminates the litigation and becomes, as soon as it is passed, the only operative decree between the parties. To assign to the term "decree" in Section 211 of the Code of 1882 or in Order XXI, Rule 12 of the Code of 1908, different significations to suit different combinations of events would be legislation and not interpretation. We do not appreciate how the appellant can, with semblance of justice, make a grievance of the result of this view. He might have, if he had so chosen, accepted the decision of the primary Court and surrendered possession of the disputed lands to the plaintiff; he might have, indeed, so delivered possession to the successful claimant, even if he decided to take the judgment of a superior tribunal on the matters in controversy. Instead of this, he retained possession and continued to enjoy the profits of the lands, while, though defeated at every stage, he fought his opponent strenuously to the highest judicial tribunal in the Empire. He did not, after his defeat in the ultimate Court of Appeal, willingly deliver possession to the successful litigant, for, as will presently appear, even in execution proceedings, he raised an objection as to the identity of the lands, which finally proved unsustainable. No laches can be imputed to the decree-holder. The order in Council was made on the 10th August 1914. The application for delivery of possession and assessment of mesne profits was made on the 13th December 1915. Notwithstanding objection in the execution proceedings, he obtained delivery as to some of the lands on the 1st April 1917, and as to the remainder, on the 21st August 1918. There is no reason why the provisions of the law should, in such circumstances, be strained in favour; of the judgment-debtor so as to enable him to evade restitution of profits which he has appropriated. We hold, accordingly, that the view adopted by this Court in Trailokya Nath Roy Chaudari v. Jogendra Nath Ray 35 C. 1017 by the Patna High Court in Nand Kumar Singh v. Bilas Ram Marwari 43 Ind. Cas. 855 : 3 P.L.J. 116 : (1917) Pat. 377 : 4 P.L.W. 100 is well-founded on principle and places a rational construction upon the provisions of Section 211 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 and Order XX, Rule 12 of the Code of 1908. The Subordinate Judge must consequently be taken to have correctly held that the period of three years should be calculated from the date of the Order of His Majesty in Council and not from the date of the decree of the Trial Court; this applies to all the lands, including the area of 21 bighas mentioned later. The conclusion follows that the third ground urged by, the appellant cannot-be sustained and must be overruled.

    6. As regards the fourth ground, the appellant has urged that he relinquished possession to the decree-holder on the 18th November, 1916, and should not accordingly be held liable for mesne profits subsequent to that date. It may be conceded that, as ruled in Ibbs v. Richardson (1839) 9 A. &. E. 849 at p. 853 : 1 P. & D. 618 : 8 L.J.Q.B. 126 : 3 Jur 102 : 112 E.R. 1436 : 48 R.R. 725 in no case can the plaintiff claim mesne profits for any period subsequent to an offer by the defendant to restore him possession; see also Ishan Chandra v. Ainuddin Mia 5 C.W.N. 720; Abbas v. Fassih-ud-din 24 C. 413 : 12 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 943; Malladi Rama Somayajulu v. Brundavanam Pramayya 12 Ind. Cas. 272 : (1911) 2 M.W.N. 258 and Shambhu Nath v. Satish Chandra 66 Ind. Cas. 49 : 25 C.W.N. 369. But the Subordinate Judge has found that there was no genuine offer to restore the plaintiff to possession and no actual withdrawal from occupation by the defendant. The conclusion of the Subordinate Judge is supported by the significant circumstance that after the Amin had been directed, on the 14th February 1916, to deliver possession, the defendant, on the 5th April 1916; raised objection that the boundary had not been correctly ascertained. This objection was overruled by the Subordinate Judge. The judgment-debtor appealed to this Court, and on the 18th July 1916 obtained a reversal of the order of the Subordinate Judge. When the matter went back to the lower Court, the judgment-debtor took exception to the delivery of an area of twenty one bighas. This objection was successful. The decree-holder thereupon appealed to; this Court; on the 21st August 1918 the order of the Subordinate Judge was set aside, and the decree-holder was held entitled to take possession at that area in execution.-In these circumstances, it does not seem probable that there was a genuine surrender on the 18th November 1916. The fourth ground must thus be overruled as untenable; As regards the fifth ground, the appellant has contended that interest, should not have been allowed on mesne profits at the rate of 12 per cent., per-annum. It has not been disputed that under Section 2, Clause (12), Civil Procedure Code, the expression "mesne profits" means those profits which the person in Wrongful possession actually received or might with ordinary. diligence have received therefrom together with interest on such profits. Consequently, interest should ordinarily be allowed on mesne profits though, as pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Grish Chunder Lahiri v. Shoshi Shikhareswar Roy 27 C. 951 : 27 I.A. 110 : 4 C.W.N. 631 : 10 M.L.J. 356 : 2 Bom. L.R. 709 : 7 Sar P.C.J. 687 : 14 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 622 (P.C.) inasmuch as the interest forms an integral part of mesne profits, the interest is as much in the discretion of the Court as the mesne profits themselves; Harmanoje Narain Singh v. Ramprosad Singh 6 C.L.J. 472 at p. 472. The cases in the books do not seem to disclose a uniform rule as to the rate of interest allowable on mesne profits. Thus, in the case of Grish Chunder Lahiri v. Shoshi Shikhareswar Roy 27 C. 951 : 27 I.A. 110 : 4 C.W.N. 631 : 10 M.L.J. 356 : 2 Bom. L.R. 709 : 7 Sar P.C.J. 687 : 14 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 622 (P.C.) interest was allowed at the rate of 6 per cent, as appears from the report of the subsequent proceedings in Girish Chander Lahiri v. Sasi Sekhareswar Roy 33 C. 329. On the other hand, interest appears to have been allowed at the rate of 12 per cent, in the cases of Radharaman v. Surnomoyi Debi 30 C. 566 : 7. C.W.N. 437 and Lachmi Narain v. Mazhar Abbas 35 C. 1000 at p. 1009 : 12 C.W.N. 650. In the present case the plaintiff claimed interest on the mesne profits year by year at the rate of one per cent, per month. In the written statement, the defendant characterised the claim for mesne profits as untenable and exorbitant. The Subordinate Judge has allowed interest at the rate claimed; but he has not assigned any grounds for his award. It cannot be disputed that whatever may be considered as a fair rate of interest on money since the War, during a considerable portion of the period when the mesne profits decreed in the present -case accrued (1899-1917), six per cent, per annum was considered the ordinary rate of interest and was allowed on decrees for money made by Courts; Ijjatulla Bhuiyan v. Chandra Mohan Banerji 34 C. 954 : C.W.N. 1133 : 6 C.L.J. 255 (F.B.). We must further bear in mind the distinction which has been recognised between the respective liabilities of bona fide and mala fide trespassers. Thus, although it has been held that all trespassers, whether bona fide or mala fide, are liable for mesne profits: Byjnath Pershad v. Badhoo Singh 10 W.R. 486 : 3 B.L.R. 16 (S.N.) : 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 102 and Mugun Chunder v. Surbessur Chuckerbutty 8 W.R. 479 the bona fide trespasser may be allowed to deduct collection charges, while no such concession is made in favour of the mala fide trespasser: Altaf Ali v. Lalji Mal I.A. 518 : 2 Ind. Jur. 500 : 1 Ind. Dac. (N.S.) 408; Dakhina Mohan Roy v. Saroda Mohan Roy 20 I.A. 160 : 21 C. 142 : 17 Ind. Jur. 576 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 366 : 10 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 727 (P.C.). The same distinction has been recognised in other systems; see Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 A.C. 25 at p. 30 : 42 L.T. 334 : 28 W.R. 357; Peruvian Guano Co. v. Dreyfus (1892) A.C. 166 : 61 L.J. Ch. 749 : 66 L.T. 536 : 7 Asp. M.C. 225; Glenwood Lumber Co. v. Phlilips (1904) A.C. 405 : 73 L.J.P.C. 62 : 90 L.T. 741 : 20 T.L.R. 531; Green v. Biddle (1823) 8 Wheaton (U.S.) 1 : 5 Law. Ed. 547. In the present case, the appellant held occupation of a considerable tract of the disputed land under a title which was established in a contested litigation; and although he subsequently overstepped to some extent the boundaries determined therein he may well be considered a bona fide and not a mala fide trespasser. We are of opinion that, in all the circumstances of the case, the interest on the mesne profits should be calculated at six per cent. instead of twelve per cent, per annum. The fifth ground is accordingly allowed in part. As regards the sixth ground, numerous objections were vigorously urged by both sides against the method of enquiry adopted by the Commissioner and approved by the Subordinate Judge for ascertainment of the mesne profits. Indeed, it looked probable at one stage bi the arguments that there was no escape from a further enquiry which was likely to be of a protracted character. The parties, however, have come to a settlement on this part of, the case. They have agreed that the assessment should be made on the following basis:

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