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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a reference under s. 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code arising from a commitment order made by Mr. Majid under s. 213, committing certain persons to take their trial in the Court of Sessions. The Sessions Judge of Monghyr wrote a letter recommending that that committal order should be quashed. The High Court's jurisdiction to quash such a committal is invoked under s. 215, which permits quashing only on a point of law.

The underlying occurrence involved the death of one person (named Durgi in the committing Magistrate's order) and injuries to another person (Biram) as well as injuries on the side of the complainant. The opinion records several discrepancies in the prosecution case: alterations as to the place of occurrence, differences between the account given to the committing Magistrate and the first information, the discovery of two spear heads in the chest of the deceased that appeared to be without shafts (with mud in one socket), and that during recording of the First Information the complainant appeared to be reading from a paper and being prompted by a person named Gulab.

The committing Magistrate considered these points, noted the presence of at least six eyewitnesses, concluded that the discrepancies did not entirely demolish the prosecution case, found that Durgi was murdered and Biram injured by a sharp instrument, and held that a prima facie case had been made out against the accused. The Sessions Judge, after discussing the discrepancies at length, concluded that the prosecution evidence was entirely incredible and that there was no prima facie case, hence his recommendation to quash the committal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Sessions Judge's recommendation to quash a committal made under s.213 can be entertained by the High Court under s.215 — i.e., whether the recommendation advances a point of law that justifies quashing.
  2. Whether the disbelief of the prosecution case or a finding of insufficiency/untrustworthiness of evidence by a Sessions Judge (or other court) constitutes a point of law entitling the High Court to quash a committal, as opposed to being a matter of fact.
  3. What legal test should be applied in deciding whether a committal ought to stand — specifically, whether the correct test is the English rule (absence of evidence when taken at its face value) or the narrower statutory interpretation of "no evidence" under the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Arguments of the Parties

Sessions Judge's Position (Recommendation to Quash)

  • The Sessions Judge examined the prosecution evidence and the discrepancies at length and concluded that the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution was "entirely incredible."
  • On that basis he held there was no prima facie case on the record and recommended that the committal order be quashed.

Committing Magistrate's Position

  • The Magistrate considered the discrepancies (place of occurrence changes, spear heads, prompting of the complainant) but, having regard to the presence of at least six eyewitnesses, concluded that those discrepancies did not entirely demolish the prosecution case.
  • The Magistrate found that a prima facie case was made out, stating that "Durgi was brutally murdered, and Biram had injuries caused by a sharp instrument" and formally held a prima facie case existed.

Counsel Supporting the Sessions Judge (Mr. Hasan Imam)

  • Pressed the Court to accept the Sessions Judge's recommendation and relied principally on the case of Jogeshwar Ghose v. King-Emperor, arguing that the principles in that case authorized quashing when there is, in effect, insufficient evidence as a matter of law.
  • Advanced an interpretation of portions of Jogeshwar Ghose and related provisions (with reference in the opinion to s.239 and s.289) to support the contention that a committal should not stand where, on legal analysis, the evidence would not justify sending the case to a jury.

Counsel Opposing the Reference (Mr. Pugb)

  • Relied on the case of Sheobux Ram v. Emperor to contend that whether evidence is sufficient or not is a question of fact (appraisement of evidence) and not a point of law permitting quashing under s.215.
  • Thus, insisted that the Sessions Judge's disbelief of the prosecution amounted to a factual conclusion and did not present a point of law upon which the High Court could quash the committal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jogeshwar Ghose v. King-Emperor Articulates that absence of evidence to warrant a commitment is a point of law; the Court must consider whether there is such evidence as would justify the case going before a jury; if a presiding judge would withdraw it from a jury, commitment should not stand. The Court examined the language of this decision, acknowledged potential ambiguity, and interpreted its statements in light of English law and related statutory provisions (s.239 and s.289). The opinion treats Jogeshwar Ghose as relevant but subject to the narrower distinction between "no evidence" and unsatisfactory evidence.
Sheobux Ram v. Emperor Emphasizes that appraisal of evidence (whether evidence is strong or weak, sufficient or insufficient to justify conviction) is a question of fact and not a question of law; provides the test (per Harington J.) that one must assume the whole of the evidence against the accused to be true and ask whether a judge could leave the case to a jury. The Court treated this case as directly on point and persuasive: it supports the proposition that a committal can only be quashed on a point of law and that disbelief or evaluation of evidential weight is for the trial fact-finders, not for quashing under s.215. The Court relied on the test articulated by the judges in that case.
Queen-Empress v. Munna Lal Holds that the expression "there is no evidence" in s.289 cannot be extended to mean no satisfactory, trustworthy or conclusive evidence. Used to support the narrower interpretation of "no evidence" — i.e., that "no evidence" means literally absence of evidence, not merely that evidence is unsatisfactory or untrustworthy.
Burjorji Nowroji Kelawallax v. Emperor Observes that where a Magistrate has exercised his discretion to commit, the case stands differently than if the accused had been discharged; it reinforces respect for the committing Magistrate's exercise of discretion. Referred to as authority indicating judicial reluctance to lightly disturb a committal where a Magistrate has exercised discretion to commit, and as supporting the conclusion that interference is inappropriate where the question is one of factual appraisal.
Mahamed Moidin v. Emperor Collected and discussed authorities on the question whether committal may be quashed for insufficiency; treated as part of the body of authorities on the subject. Referred to in the opinion (through the Burjorji judgment) as part of the collected authorities substantiating the Court's conclusion on the proper approach to committals and quarrels over evaluation of evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the narrow legal task: to decide whether the Sessions Judge's recommendation for quashing the committal was founded on a point of law (which would justify intervention under s.215) or on a factual appraisal (disbelief of the prosecution) which does not constitute a legal ground for quashing.

Step-by-step analysis as reflected in the opinion:

  1. The Court started from the statutory position that a committal made under s.213 can be quashed by the High Court only on a point of law under s.215.
  2. It examined the factual record discussed by both the committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge: the killing and injuries, discrepancies in the prosecution account (place of occurrence, differing statements, spear heads without shafts with mud, prompting of the complainant), and that the Magistrate nonetheless found at least six eyewitnesses and concluded a prima facie case existed.
  3. The Court then interrogated the reasoning in the Sessions Judge's letter and found that the Sessions Judge had reached his conclusion by disbelieving the prosecution evidence in its entirety — an evaluation of credibility and sufficiency.
  4. The Court analyzed the authorities relied upon by the parties, beginning with Jogeshwar Ghose v. King-Emperor, noting language in that judgment that might suggest a court should consider whether the evidence would justify sending the case to a jury. The Court explained that that language must be read in context and in light of English law and pertinent statutory provisions (s.239, s.289), which distinguish between literal absence of evidence and evidence unsatisfactory in quality.
  5. The Court then considered Sheobux Ram v. Emperor and related authorities (including Queen-Empress v. Munna Lal and Burjorji Nowroji Kelawallax). It emphasized the point made in those cases that the appraisal and balancing of evidence — whether strong or weak, sufficient or insufficient to justify conviction — is a question of fact for trial judges and juries, not a point of law for the High Court on a reference under s.215.
  6. The Court applied the tests articulated in those authorities (notably the Harington J. formulation: assume the whole of the evidence telling against the accused to be true and ask whether there is a case which a judge could leave to a jury) and concluded that the Sessions Judge's approach — rejecting the prosecution by disbelieving its evidence and treating the insufficiency as a legal ground — was an exercise of factual judgment, not a legal determination.
  7. On that basis, the Court found the Sessions Judge's recommendation rested on a factual appraisal (disbelief/untrustworthiness of evidence) rather than on a point of law which would empower the High Court to quash the committal under s.215. Consequently, the reference was held to be legally invalid.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court rejected the reference. The Sessions Judge's recommendation to quash the committal was bad in law because it was founded on disbelief of the prosecution evidence (a matter of fact) rather than on a point of law that could justify quashing under s.215.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The recommendation of the Sessions Judge to quash the committal was not accepted; the reference was rejected and the committal stands (the opinion concludes with "Reference rejected").
  • Scope: The opinion emphasizes that quashing a committal under the applicable statutory scheme is limited to questions of law (e.g., literal absence of evidence) and does not include substitution of the High Court's view for the trial court's appraisal of credibility or weight of the evidence. The Court therefore did not disturb the committing Magistrate's exercise of discretion in finding a prima facie case where such findings were essentially factual.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel precedent beyond applying the settled distinction — drawn from the cited authorities — between questions of law (entitling quashing) and questions of fact/appraisement of evidence (not entitling quashing).

End of summary based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.

    Emperor v. Nawal Kishore Missir And Others

    1. This is a reference under s. 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge of Monghyr recommends that the order made by Mr. Majid, committing certain persons to take their trial in the Court of Sessioa should “be quashed. Undoubtedly the commitment order was made under s. 213 of the Criminal Procedure Code and it can be quashed, therefore, only by reason of the” jurisdiction given to the Court under s. 215 of that Code. That section states that such commitment can be quashed by the High Court only on a point of law.

    2. As a result of the occurrence which gave rise to the charge in this case one person lost his life and another person was more or less seriously wounded and on the side of the complainant also I understand certain injuries were received. Now it would appear that there are discrepancies in the prosecution story which would give rise to a suspicion, for instance, the place of occurrence has been altered. The story as told by the witnesses before the committing Magistrate in that particular differs from that set out in the first information. Another matter in this connection is that there were two spear heads found in the chest of the deceased which from their appearance, would give rise to the suggestion that they had not been there in the first instance, at the time and place of the occurrence; they are spears without shafts and the place in the spear head in one case where the shaft in ordinary circumstances would be placed was, as I understand from the facts on the record, full of mud.

    3. At the time of the recording of the First Information it appears that at first, the complainant had a paper in his hand from which he appeared to be reading which was taken from him, also at the same time there was a person named Gulab who appeared to be prompting him.

    4. Now the learned Magistrate in his commitment order has discussed these matters and has stated the extent to which, in his view, they may tell against the prosecution case. But having regard to the fact that there are at least no less than six eyewitnesses, after giving due weight to the arguments on behalf of the defence in respect of which these discrepancies to which I have referred give rise he states: “I have carefully considered all these points and have come to the conclusion that they do not entirely demolish the prosecution case”; and then he goes on to say that “Durgi was brutally murdered, and Biram had injuries caused by a sharp instrument.”

    5. That the Magistrate once having stated that, namely, that the discrepancies do not entirely demolish the prosecution case, can there be any doubt that he exercised his discretion properly when he says in a latter part of his order:

    “I hold that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused.”

    6. The learned Sessions Judge in his letter of recommendation discusses these discrepancies at length, and it is quite clear that he is of the view that the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution _ in the circumstances is entirely incredible, and he, therefore, is of the opinion that there is no kind of prima-facie case on the record. Therefore, his recommendation.

    7. Now I am in no way concerned with the facts of this case. I have to ask myself whether the learned Sessions Judge has advanced as his reason for a recommendation to this Court, a point of law. Quite, clearly, on the face of his letter of recommendation, he has come to the conclusion at which he has arrived by reason of the fact that he disbelieved the prosecution story in its entirety.

    8. Mr. Hasan Imam in support of the recommendation of the learned Sessions Judge presses me with the case of Jogeshwar Ghose v. King-Emperor(1). ln that case this-question under e. 215 arose, and in the course of the judgment of the Court it is stated, after a certain discussion of the fact:

    “It may be contended that that fact is for the corsideration of the Jury.”

    9. The prosecution in the case was for perjury, and the main point upon the facts was whether two different statements which had been made by the accused were entirely contradictory and it, is to these that the learned Judges referred when they say it may be pointed out that the fact is for the consideration of the Jury. But the judgment gees on to state:

    “But this Court has undoubtedly to consider whether there is such evidence as would justify the case going before a Jury. If the case is such that the Presiding Judge would, if he had the power, withdraw it from the Jury, we think it would not be right to allow the commitment to stand.”

    10. And in an earlier part of the judgment the learned Judges state:

    “Insufficiency of evidence has never been treated as a ground for quashing a commitment, but this Court following the principle laid down by the Courts in England has held that the absence of evidence to warrant a commitment is a point of law and may furnish a good ground for quashing the commitment.”

    11. Nov if I am to take the law in England as my guide in this respect, there can be no doubt, as to what is meant by ‘insufficiency of evidence’ in the sense in which the Court referred to in the case in Jogeshwar Ghose v. King-Emperor. Insufficiency of evidence according to the Law of England is this, the taking of evidence and believing it, and, therefore, taking it at its face value, it aces not constitute or disclose a case against she accused.

    12. Now any difficulty which might arise from the decision in the case of Jogeshwar Ghose. v. King-Emperor arises, in my opinion, by reason of the language used by the learned Judges which would from one point of view give rise to some ambiguity. As I understood the argument of Mr. Hasan Imam, who appeared in support of this reference, he would have me interpret the statement which I first read, namely, “If the case is such that the Presiding Judge would, if he had power, withdraw it from the Jury” on a consideration of s. 239. But as I understand his argument this morning, he appears to contend that that was not the case that he was advancing during the course of his argument yesterday afternoon. But whether I misunderstood Mr. Hasan Imam, or not, I would venture to suggest that the words which I have read which appear in the course of the judgment in the cass in Jogeshwar Ghose v. King-Emperor are to be interpreted by a reference to s. 209, Section 289 of the Criminal Procedure Code, lays down the procedure of a Sessions Judge in a Sessions trial, and it clearly lays down that he has no power to withdraw a case from the Jury, but in certain circumstances in a trial by Jury, he is entitled to direct the Jury to return a verdict of not guil-y. But that gives him such power only where, as sub-s. (2) of s. 239 states, there is no-evidence. That seems to me a mere declaration of what I staged to be the law in England in this regard.

    13. Mr. Pugb, who appears against the reference, quotes a case, Sheobux Ram v. Emperor(2) Before I go into the details of that case, 1 would say that Mr. Hasan Imam states that this case which Mr. Pugh has referred to does not deal with this principle at all but the case in Jogeshwar Ghose v. King Emperor is an authority on this point if there be such.

    14. As I have already stated, any difficulty which arises from the case in Jogesh-war Ghose v. King-Emperor, is duo to the somewhat ambiguous language which was used by the learned Judges in that case. But when we come to a consideration of the case in Seobvx Ram v. Emperor it seems difficult to contend that this principle was not present to the minds of the Judges. At any rate this much is clear that before they could come to a consideration of the point which was before them, they were bound to consider and to be satisfied in their owu minds if the principle could apply to the facts and in that sense in any event they dealt with this question specifically. There was a difference of opinion between Mr. Justice Henderson and Mr. Justice Geidt and it was referred to a third Judge Mr. Justice Harington.

    15. The difference of opinion between the two first named Judges was as to whether the facts constituted a crime; in other words whether the facts as set out, if believed, did constitute the offence of abetment. Mr. Justice Henderson in considering the question before him states:

    “But apart from this consideration I have no hesitation in finding for the reasons which 1 have stated that there is nothing in the evidence recorded by the Deputy Magistrate or by the Assistant Settlement Officer to show that the petitioner abetted the commission of any offence” “It is not,” he adds “as I have said a question of the value, of evidence. In my opinion there are no materials whatsoever from which it can be inferred that the petitioner abetted the offences”.

    16. In a later part of his judgment he states:

    “Even if it be possible to say that there is some evidence which might be considered against the petitioner it is, I consider, of such an exiguous character that it might be and I think ought to be disregarded”.

    17. Mr. Justice Geidt in the course of his judgment states: “As regards the second ground” that is the point which we are considering in this case “Mr. Jackson has contended that there is no evidence that the petitioner abetted”.

    18. Now he states the principle in a later part of his judgment in these words:

    “It is in my view, quite outside our duty on this occasion to express an opinion whether from these materials the correct inference is that the petitioner did or did not know of the falsity of the evidence and did or did not instigate the giving and using of the false evidence. That is a question for Judges of fact.”

    19. And he further states: “Whether these considerations override the facts which I have mentioned as relevant is a matter which cannot be decided without an appraisement of evidence and a balancing of probabililes……………A commitment once made to a Court of Sessions can be quashed only on a point of law. Whether the evidence be strong or weak, sufficient or insufficient to justify a conviction is a question of fact and not of law”.

    20. It is quite clear from the judgments of the two judges, who disagreed as to whether the evidence did constitute an offence that they laid down quite clearly that the appraisement of the evidence was a question of fact and not a question of law. The matter, as I have stated, was referred to Mr. Justice Harington, and in the course of his judgment in preparing himself to consider the facts of the case, he states:

    “The test which in my opinion should he applied to decide whether a committal ought or ought not to be made on the facts is this—assuming that the whole of the evidence telling against the accused is true, is there a case which a Judge at atrial could leave to a Jury?”

    21. I fail to see how the case in Jogeshwar Ghose v. King-Emperor disagrees with the decision in Sheobux Ram v. Emperor. But this matter has been further considered in other cases. If in fact s. 289 gives any guidance, the matter is put beyond doubt in the case of Queen-En press v. Munna Lal(3) where it is stated that the expression “there is no evidence” in s. 289 cannot be extended to mean no satisfactory, trustworthy or conclusive evidence. But, as I have said, this matter has been futher considered in other cases which have been brought to my notice. One is the case of Burjorji Nowroji Kelawallax. Emperor(4). This is not an authorized report, but I propose to refer to it because it refers to other cases on this matter, and, in the course of the judgment in the case, Mr. Justice Fawcett stated:

    “The Magistrate may be right or wrong in supposing that it was a case which he ought to have committed; but he has exercised his discretion, and I think the case stands on a very different footing to what It would be if he had discharged the accused and we had been asked to interfere and direct a committal.”

    22. In the course of that judgment, the learned Judge referred to the case of Mahamed Moidin v. Emperor(5) where the authorities on this case had been collected and discussed, and the conclusion at which I have arrived on this point is substantiated.

    23. Now what I have to ask myself in-the light of these authorities is whether the Sessions Judge has recommended the quashing of (his commitment on a point of law, or is his recommendation based on the supposition that the evidence is not sat isfactory, trustworthy or conclusive. To discuss that question in the light of the letter of reference of the Sessions Judge would be idle. On the face of it, he has come to the conclusion that he does not believe the prosecution evidence, and, therefore, from that point of view he says that there is no prima facie case. For these reason?, in my judgment, the reference is bad in law and it must, therefore, be rejected.

    24. Reference rejected.

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    Comments

    Emperor v. Nawal Kishore Missir And Others
    (Jan 11, 1929)