Before I can dispose of the point of law raised in this petition, it is necessary to know:—
(1) Whether the debt of Rs. 473 from Nellayyappa Pillai to his wife Velammal was stridhanam in the hands of the latter.
(2) Whether Nellayappa Pillai at his death was possessed of sufficient assets for the discharge of his debt from his estate.
(3) Whether Velammal did any act denoting an intention of satisfying the debt due to her out of her husband's estate.
The Subordinate Judge is requested to return findings on these issues within six weeks after adducing evidence.
Ten days will be allowed for filing objections to the finding after notice of return of the same shall have been posted up in this Court.
[In compliance with the above order, the Subordinate Judge submitted the following]
FINDING
1st issue:—The account (Ex. A. 1) has sufficiently been proved to be a genuine account. The witness called on the defendant's side admits that the entries at page 6 of Ex. A-1 up to 10th Karthigai are in the hands of Velammal's husband Nelliappa Pillai himself. He also admits that the last item (receipt of Rs. 1??? in Velammal's favour) found at page 95 of the account (Ex A-1) is in the hand of Nellyappa Pillai. In that page the balance from page 6 has been brought forward. Hence there can be no doubt as to the truth of the debt itself. P.W.I swears that the debt is Velammal's stridhanam and there is no evidence contra. The fact that her husband has opened a separate ledger in her name shows that it is her separate property.
2nd issue:—It is admitted that Nellyappa Pillai left assets to the extent of Rs. 25,000 at his death.
3rd issue:—There is no evidence that Velammal did any act indicating an intention of satisfying the debt out of her hushand's estate.
[This Civil Revision Petition came for final hearing, on the 3rd day of October, 1918, and this day, before His Lordship Spencer, J.]
Mr. N. Kunjithapatham for the Petitioner.
Mr. K. V. Sesha Aiyangar for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
The facts necessary to be stated for the disposal of the question of law raised in this petition are these. One Nellayappa Pillai died in January, 1915 leaving a widow and a daughter born of a former wife; also about Rs. 25,000 assets. The widow was a creditor of her husband's estate to the extent of Rs. 473 which he owed her for her stridhanam. In January, 1916, the widow made a will devising this debt of Rs. 473 to the plaintiff and died shortly after. The plaintiff brought this suit to recover the amount from the daughter, who succeeded to the estate of her father after the widow's death. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, holding that it was not maintainable on the ground that, by the widow becoming possessed of assets whereby she could have paid off her own debt, the debt became extinguished. For this proposition he relied upon certain observations occurring in Hossainara Begam v. Rahimannessa Begam, and in Chitty on Contract, page 774 (4th Edition). In the former, which was a case of a mortgagee appointed as administrator of his mortgagor's estate, it was stated that possession of assets amounts to payment on the principle that there is an extinguishment of the debt if the person who is to receive the money is also the person who ought to pay, reference being made to Williams on Executors, 10th Edition, Volume I, page 1058 and to Wankford v. Wankford. These deal with the case of a debtor making a creditor his sole executor and leaving assets which come into that executor's hands. It is not alleged in this case that Nellayappa Pillai made his widow his executor in law or that she took out letters of administration to his estate. The principle which applies to executors does not extend to widows as such. A Hindu widow succeeding to her husband's estate is in a different position from an executor. This has often been pointed out. I will cite only one of the recent decisions of the Calcutta High Court—Sudhir Chandra Das v. Gobinda Chandra Boy where the position of an executor was defined by Chitty J., in the following and other words:
“It was argued that, as a widow or a guardian of a minor or a Shebait was a manager, therefore an executor, who was also a manager, stood in the same position. The argument is obviously fallacious. The analogy is in no sense complete, and the cases which deal with the peculiar powers of widows, guardians or Shebaits have really no bearing upon the present question*** An executor under statute is the legal representative of a deceased person for all purposes and all the property of the deceased person vests in him as such.**** The executor is therefore in many respects in a different position from a Hindu widow succeeding to her husband's estate, a guardian of a minor, or a Shebait of an idol. The estate of the testator is absolutely vested in the executor for the purpose of administration and he can deal with it as he pleases, subject of course to his responsibility for the due administration of the estate.”
An attempt has been made to support the Subordinate Judge's decision by invoking the doctrine of merger. In this country the only statutory merger is that created by Sect. 101, Transfer of Property Act, which runs thus:—
Where the owner of a charge or other incumbrance on immovable property, is or becomes absolutely entitled to that property, the charge or incumbrance shall be extinguished unless he declares, by express words or necessary implication, that it shall continue to subsist, or such continuation would be for his benefit.”
Now the widow's stridhanam in the present suit was at law not a charge or incumbrance within the meaning of this section as it was not attached to any land. Again in equity the question of merger is one of intention, the presumption being that a person having a right to act in one of two ways is assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have acted according to his interest (Vide Gokaldas Gopaldas v. Puranmal Premsukh Das. In the case of a limited owner the presumption is against merger, as it is not for his or her advantage that the charge should sink for the benefit of the remainderman (Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 13, page 147). It is not for the advantage of a widow to pay off her stridhanam debt out of the income of her husband's estate as she is entitled to enjoy the whole of the income of the estate. The obligation she is under to discharge her husband's debts is a religious and a moral obligation. Moreover, if intention is to be gathered from circumstances, the inference in this case is that the debt was intended to be kept alive; for not only has the Subordinate Judge found on the 3rd issue remanded to him that there was no evidence that the widow did any act indicating an intention of satisfying the debt out of her husband's estate, but the very fact of her making a will bequeathing the debt to the plaintiff denotes an intention on her part to keep it alive. On this preliminary point the Subordinate Judge's decision must therefore be reversed and the suit will be remanded for disposal on the other issues arising in the case. Costs will abide and follow the result.
C. K.Petition allowed: Case remanded.