Das, J.:— (After stating the facts, as set out above, proceeded as follows):—
Two questions arise upon the arguments that have been advanced by the parties; first, what meaning are we to attach to the word “resumption” occurring in section 14 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act; and, secondly, whether it can be said that an interest was created in favour of the defendants by the grantee of the tenure or any of the successors of the grantee.
The second question is a short one and may be disposed of at once. The defendants themselves rely upon a title created in their favour by Udai Nath. Udai Nath was undoubtedly in possession of the tenure and in his view rightfully in possession thereof. The defendants have all along claimed that they were in possession of a sub-tenancy properly created in their favour by Udai Nath who, according to them, was the successor of the original grantee. This being the case of the defendants, they ought not to complain if they are not put in a better position than if they were what they pretend. In my opinion, the word “successor” in section 14 of the Act means not only a successor de jure but also a successor de facto. That being so, I must hold, upon the case of the defendants themselves, that an interest was created in their favour by the successor in interest of the original grantee and section 14 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act will apply provided the suit has been brought within time.
This brings me to the question of limitation; and the decision of this question must depend upon the meaning of the word “resumption” in section 14 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. The extreme argument on behalf of the plaintiff is that resumption means actual re-entry upon the tenure and that as reentry took place on the 21st June, 1915, his suit brought on the 20th August, 1919, is well within time. The extreme argument on behalf of the defendants is that “resumption” means the happening of an event entitling the landlord to resume the tenure and the contention is that as that event happened in 1895, the suit is clearly barred by limitation. I am unable to accept the extreme contention put forward on behalf of the defendants. In my opinion resumption means an entry upon the land; and the problem for our investigation is whether re-entry is equivalent to actual physical possession of the land. An alternative argument was suggested by Mr. B.C De and it is 1 this: that re-entry is equivalent to institution of proceedings with a view to resume the land and he contends that as the suit for resumption was brought in 1896, time began to run in favour of the defendants from that year. In my opinion this argument is entitled to succeed. As I understand the position, resumption is nothing more than an unequivocal demand for possession so as to operate as a final election by the landlord to re-enter. Although the event which entitled the plaintiff to resume the tenure had happened, it was not obligatory on the plaintiff to resume the tenure. He might indeed have resumed it or have made a fresh grant to the person actually in possession of the tenure or have allowed the defendants to remain in possession of the disputed lands paying a rent for the same to him. It was, therefore, necessary for the plaintiff to resume the tenure before he could be heard to say that the interest of the defendants has been annulled. Until the final election to resume the tenure was made, the defendants were entitled to say that they were in possession of an interest in the disputed lands by virtue of a transaction created in their favour by one against whom no action had been taken by the plaintiff and as such they were entitled to remain in possession of that interest. I think, therefore, that resumption means an unequivocal demand for possession which operates as a final election by the landlord to re-enter upon the land. This unequivocal demand for possession took place in 1896 and operated, in my opinion, as a resumption of the tenure. The present suit having-been brought more than twelve years from the date of the unequivocal demand for possession, is clearly barred by limitation.
I would dismiss this appeal with costs.
Ross, J.:— I agree.
Appeal dismissed.