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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a reference as to whether a kanomdar (a tenant under a kanom tenure in Malabar) during the period of his occupation is entitled to remove and appropriate to himself all or any of the trees that he has himself planted on the land demised to him on kanom. The jenmi (landlord/plaintiff) had not proved any custom forbidding kanomdars from cutting and appropriating such trees, and the kanomdars had not proved any custom allowing them to do so. The matter reached a Full Bench for decision on the referred question(s). After the Full Bench's ruling in favour of the kanomdar's right to remove such trees (subject to conditions), a second appeal was heard and dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a kanomdar, during the period of his occupation, is entitled to remove and appropriate to himself all, or any, of the trees that he has himself planted on the land demised to him on kanom.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff (jenmi) argued that, in the absence of a contrary custom or contract, the general law forbids a tenant from cutting trees on land held by him under a landlord.
  • The plaintiff relied on several High Court decisions from other parts of India supporting the proposition that tenants cannot cut and appropriate trees; however, the Court noted many of those cases concerned trees not planted by the tenant or depended on special tenures or tenancy acts in other provinces.
  • The plaintiff relied on two decisions of this Court (Appa Rao v. Ratnum, and Bhupati v. Rajah Rangayya Appa Rau), but the Court observed those concerned zamindari tenures and not kanom tenures in Malabar.
  • The plaintiff's vakil also relied on two unreported cases (Changaran v. Chirutha and Unni Kutti v. Chathu) to support the plaintiff's position.

Other Positions Mentioned in the Opinion

  • The opinion records that no custom forbidding the kanomdars to cut and appropriate such trees had been proved by the plaintiff, nor had the kanomdars proved any custom allowing them to do so.
  • The opinion notes arguments raised about the applicability of the Transfer of Property Act (that the kanom grant pre-dated the Act's commencement and that section 117 excludes agricultural leases from section 108), though these contentions were addressed and treated as not decisive by the Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Appa Rao v. Ratnum; Bhupati v. Rajah Rangayya Appa Rau Decisions related to tenants' rights under zamindari tenures. The Court noted these cases dealt with zamindari tracts and had no reference to kanom tenures in Malabar; therefore they were not treated as directly applicable.
Nafar Chandra Pal Chowdhuri v. Ram Lal Pal Authority followed in another case concerning tenancy and trees under the Bengal Tenancy Act. Referenced as precedent followed by a single Judge in Changaran v. Chirutha; the Court considered the Calcutta decisions to turn on the Bengal Tenancy Act and not applicable to Malabar kanom tenures.
Changaran v. Chirutha (unreported) Held that a kanomdar might cut down trees planted by himself but might not appropriate them to his own use. The Court rejected its applicability to kanom tenure in Malabar because the reasoning relied on the Bengal Tenancy Act.
Unni Kutti v. Chathu (unreported) Expressed that prima facie trees form part of the holding and tenant would not ordinarily be entitled to remove them. The Court recorded this view but observed that a later decision (Krishna Patter) undermined the assumption that the trees are necessarily the landlord's property.
Krishna Patter v. Srinivasa Patter Rejected the assumption that property in the tree is in the mortgagor/owner prior to compensation being paid. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the property in a tree planted by the tenant may be the tenant's, thus supporting a right to remove and appropriate the tree absent contrary custom or contract.
Transfer of Property Act — section 108 (clauses (h) and (o)); section 3 definition of "attached to the earth" Clause (h): lessee may remove, during lease, things he has attached to the earth, provided he leaves property in the state received. Clause (o): lessee may use property and its products as a prudent owner would, but must not do destructive acts. Section 3 defines "attached to the earth" (trees, buildings, etc.). The Court treated these clauses as articulating principles of reason and equity applicable to the case: lessee may remove trees he has planted during the lease, subject to leaving the property substantially in the state received. The clauses were read together and applied by analogy to kanom tenures in Malabar.
In the matter of the Petition of Thakoor Chancier Paramanick (Full Bench, High Court of Calcutta) Held that buildings and improvements by a tenant do not by mere attachment become the property of the owner of the soil; tenant entitled to remove materials or obtain compensation. The Court cited this decision to support the proposition that buildings (and by analogous reasoning, trees) erected or planted by a tenant do not automatically become the landlord's property and may be removable by the tenant.
Valia Tamburati v. Parvati Interpreted the object of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act (Act I of 1887) as securing to the tenant the full value of his improvements. The Court relied on the statement to show legislative intent to protect tenants' improvements and as background to conclude tenants' rights in improvements (including trees) are recognized in Malabar.
Achutan Nayar v. Narasimham Patter Under Act I of 1887 a tenant was held entitled to the whole of the value of timber trees planted by himself. The Court cited this decision to support the conclusion that a tenant who can claim the full value of trees under the compensation statute must, logically, be entitled to remove them if he prefers to do so during his term.
Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act (Act I of 1887) and Act I of 1900 (Madras), section 10 and section 7 Statutory scheme dealing with compensation for tenants' improvements; section 10 (Act I of 1900) prescribes three-fourths valuation for timber trees sown or planted by the tenant; section 7 permits removal of items not deemed improvements within time fixed by Court. The Court discussed these Acts to show legislative treatment of trees planted by tenants and to reason that the statutory scheme supports a tenant's property rights in such trees (including a right to remove during tenancy), subject to statutory conditions and equitable considerations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a structured analysis based on facts, precedent, statutory provisions and considerations of equity:

  1. Absence of proven local custom: The Court noted neither party proved a local custom that would control the issue — the jenmi had not proved a custom forbidding removal, and the kanomdars had not proved a custom allowing it. This left the matter to be decided on principle, statutory analogy and precedent.
  2. Distinguishing authorities: The Court distinguished many High Court decisions relied on by the plaintiff because (a) several related to trees not planted by the tenant (a materially different situation), and (b) some were dependent on the special incidents of tenancy or Tenancy Acts in other provinces (e.g., Bengal) not applicable to Malabar kanom tenures. Decisions concerning zamindari tenures were also held inapplicable.
  3. Consideration of unreported decisions: The Court examined two unreported decisions relied on by the plaintiff. Changaran v. Chirutha (following a Calcutta authority) held a kanomdar might cut but not appropriate trees he planted; the Court rejected its applicability because it turned on the Bengal Tenancy Act. Unni Kutti v. Chathu assumed trees were the landlord's property; the Court observed that assumption was undermined by later authority (Krishna Patter).
  4. Statutory analogy to Transfer of Property Act: The Court treated clauses (h) and (o) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act together, read with the definition in section 3 of "attached to the earth" (covering trees and buildings). Clause (h) allows a lessee to remove things he has attached to the earth during the lease, provided the property is left in the state in which he received it; clause (o) allows use of property as a prudent owner would, but forbids destructive or permanently injurious acts. Read together, the Court concluded clause (o) does not curtail clause (h); rather, clause (h) grants a removal right subject to the requirement of leaving the property substantially as received.
  5. Applicability despite temporal and classificatory objections: The Court acknowledged arguments that the Transfer of Property Act post-dated the kanom grant (1874) and that section 117 might exclude agricultural leases from section 108. The Court considered these points beside the mark: it did not assert that the Act applied directly by force, but held the principles in the Act are founded on reason and equity and may be properly adopted to resolve the issue for kanom tenures. The Court also observed kanom-tenants traditionally possess rights greater than ordinary lessees (including absolute entitlement to make improvements and to compensation).
  6. Analogy between buildings and trees: The Court reviewed authority showing buildings erected by tenants have long been treated as removable by the tenant (or compensable), and rejected the strict application of the maxim quicquid plantatur solo, solo credit to such tenant improvements. It found no valid principle to distinguish buildings from trees planted by the tenant and noted the Transfer of Property Act places both in the same category for removal rights.
  7. Legislative context — Malabar compensation statutes: The Court examined the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act (Act I of 1887) and the subsequent Act I of 1900 (Madras). It observed legislative provisions for valuation and compensation for timber and other useful trees planted by tenants and noted that statutory rules and prior judicial interpretation (including Achutan Nayar v. Narasimham Patter) supported the tenant's substantive interest in such trees. The statutory scheme, including provisions allowing removal of items not deemed improvements within a court-fixed period after ejection, reinforced the conclusion that the tenant's property in such items can exist and that removal during tenancy is consistent with legislative intent.
  8. Equitable conclusion: Combining the statutory analogy, precedent, and the local legislative scheme, the Court concluded that if the property in a tree is in the kanomdar who planted it, it follows he must be at liberty to cut and appropriate it in the absence of custom or contract to the contrary, provided he leaves the property substantially in the state in which he received it.
  9. Final practical observation: The Court reasoned that prohibiting a tenant from harvesting a tree that has become marketable during the term of tenancy, while allowing him compensation later, would be unreasonable. This practical consideration supported permitting removal during tenancy subject to leaving the holding substantially as received.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling on the Referred Question: The Full Bench answered the referred first question in the affirmative: a kanomdar during the period of his occupation is entitled to remove and appropriate to himself any trees that he has himself planted, provided that he leaves the property substantially in the state in which he received it.

Disposition of the Second Appeal: The Court later recorded that the Full Bench's ruling was against the appellant and that the second appeal was dismissed with costs.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: A kanomdar who planted trees on his holding may remove and appropriate those trees during his occupation, subject to the condition of leaving the land substantially in the state it was received; conversely, a jenmi cannot prohibit such removal by relying on a general rule unless a contrary custom or contract is proved.
  • Statutory and precedential framing: The Court applied principles analogous to the Transfer of Property Act and relied on local legislative provisions (Act I of 1887 and Act I of 1900) and prior decisions to justify this outcome for Malabar kanom tenures.
  • On precedent: The opinion distinguishes and limits the application of decisions from other provinces and earlier views that assumed trees automatically belonged to the landlord; it adopts a reasoned principle favoring tenants' removal rights in the absence of contrary custom or agreement. The opinion did not purport to overrule any directly on-point binding authority from the Court but established the Full Bench's answer to the referred question.

Note: This summary is limited to the matters expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce facts or conclusions beyond the text.

    Vasudevan Nambudripad v. Valia Chathu Achan

    JUDGMENT

    The question for our decision whether a kanomdar during the period of his occupation is entitled to remove and appropriate to himself all, or any, of the trees that he has himself planted on the land demised to him on kanom. It is found that the (plaintiff) jenmi has not proved any custom forbidding the (defendants) kanomdars to cut and appropriate such trees, nor have the kanomdars proved any custom allowing them to do so. On behalf of the plaintiff it is argued that, in the absence of custom or contract to the contrary, the general law forbids a tenant to out trees on land held by him under a landlord, and a number of cases decided by the High Courts in other parts of India have been cited in support of this proposition. We do not, however, think it necessary to refer in detail to these cases. Many of them relate to trees not planted by the tenant, which of course stand on a footing totally different from that of those planted by the tenant himself. Others depend on the incidents of special tenures in Bengal and the North-Western Provinces and on the terms of the Tenancy Acts in those Provinces. The plaintiff also relies on the decisions of this Court (Appa Rao v. Ratnum, and Bhupati v. Rajah Rangayya Appa Rau), but those cases dealt with the rights of tenants in zamindari tracts and had no reference to kanom tenures in Malabar. So far as we are aware the question of a kanomdar's right to cut down trees planted by himself has not been decided by this Court in any reported case. It was, however, dealt with in two unreported cases which are relied on by the plaintiff's vakil.

    In Changaran v. Chirutha a single Judge, following the decision in Nafar Chandra Pal Chowdhuri v. Ram Lal Pal, held that, though a kanomdar might apparently cut down trees planted by himself, he might not appropriate them to his own use. The Calcutta case turned on the terms of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and it cannot, in our opinion, he regarded as an authority applicable to kanomdars in Malabar. In the second case (Unni Kutti v. Chathu) a Bench of this Court held that, “Primâ Facie, the “trees, &c., form part of the holding and the tenant would not ordinarily be entitled to remove them as they are not inimical to the purpose for which the holding was granted.”

    This decision seems to proceed on the assumption that the trees are the property of the landlord and that the tenant's only right is to receive compensations for them when he is turned out of the holding. That assumption was, however, held to be without foundation in the more recent case of Krishna Patter v. Srinivasa Patter. It was there observed that “this assumption about the property being in the mortgagor even before compensation is paid by him, is not only not supported by any authority but is directly contradicted by the fifth report,” to which reference is then made. If the property in the tree is in the kanomdar who planted it, it seems to us to follow that he must be at liberty to cut it down and appropriate it, in the absence of any custom or contract to the contrary. It seems to us that the principle applicable to the case before us is that laid down in section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, clauses(h) and (o). These clauses are as follows:—

    “(h) the lessee may remove, at any time during the continuance of the lease, all things which he has attached to the earth: provided he leaves the property in the state in which he received it: (o) the lessee may use the property and its products (if any) as a person of ordinary prudence would use them if they were his own; but he must not use, or permit another to use, the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased, or fell timber, pull down or damage buildings, work mines or quarries not open when the lease was granted, or commit any other act which is destructive or permanently injurious thereto.”

    These two clauses must be read together and in conjunction with the definition of the words “attached to the earth” in section 3 of the Act. These words are there declared to mean—“(a) rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs; (b) impeded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings; or (v) attached to what is so imbedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached.”

    Under the Transfer of Property Act, then, a lessee may, during the continuance of the lease, remove trees which he has himself planted, and buildings which be has himself erected, provided he leaves the property in the state in which he received it. The prohibition in regard to the felling of timber and the pulling down of buildings in clause (o) does not limit the right declared in clause (h). It is subject to that right; that is, the lessee must not fell timber or pull down buildings unless the timber has been planted or the buildings erected by the lessee, and he must leave the property in the state in which he received it. It is argued that, as the kanom in the present case was granted in 1874, the Transfer of Property Act, which came into force in 1882, cannot apply to it, and also that section 117 excludes agricultural leases from the operation of section 108.

    Both these statements are, no doubt, true, but they are beside the mark. It may be doubted whether a kanom demise can be regarded as a purely agricultural lease. It always, we believe, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, carries with it the right to erect a dwelling-house and appurtenances on the land, and to plant cocoanut and other trees on any land not already devote to grain cultivation. We do not, however, wish to suggest that the Transfer of Property Act, of its own force, applies directly to the present case, but the rules in the Act to which we have referred are, we think, founded on reason and equity and may properly be adopted as a statement of the law which we ought to apply to the case before us. It must be remembered that the rights of a kanom-tenant in Malabar have always been much higher than the rights of an ordinary lessee. He is, inter alia, absolutely entitled to make improvements, and to receive compensation for them when turned out of the holding, and he is not at liberty to contract himself out of the right.

    It has not, so far as we are aware, ever been doubted but that he could, during the continuance of his demise, pull down or remove any building, erected by himself. Indeed, the rule “quicquid plantatur solo, solo, credit” had been declared inapplicable to buildings even in other parts of India before the Transfer of Property Act was passed. In In the matter of the Petition of Thakoor Chancier Paramanick the Full Bench of the High Court of Calcutta said:—“We think it clear according to the usage and customs the country buildings and other such improvements do not by the mere accident of their attachment to the soil become the property of the owner of the soil, and we think it should be laid down as a general rule that” the tenant who makes an improvement “is entitled either to remove the materials, restoring the land to the state in which it was before the improvement was made, or to obtain compensation for the value of the building if it is allowed to remain for the benefit of the owner of the soil,” We do not think that any valid distinction in principle can be drawn between buildings erected by a tenant and trees planted by him, and it will be observed that the Transfer of Property Act places both in the same category as regards the tenant's right of removal. It is suggested that trees exhaust the ground, but we are not aware that there is any proof of this. Many soils would probably benefit by being opened up and aerated by the planting of trees. There might be more difficulty in restoring ground planted with trees to its original state than in restoring ground covered with buildings, but that is a matter for the tenant to deal with when he removes the trees. If he does it, as the law requires him to do, the landlord will not be injured, and it is difficult to see on what principle the tenant's right to remove the trees could be forbidden.

    If we consider the matter in connection with the right of the tenant to compensation for improvements, we arrive at the same conclusion. The right has always been recognised both as regards trees and buildings in Malabar. The amount of compensation and the principles on which it should be granted, have, no doubt, been the subject of much discussion and of not a few conflicting decisions. In 1887, the local Legislature passed. “The Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act” (Act I of 1887). As observed by this Court in Valia Tamburati v. Parvati, “the object which the Legislature had in view was to secure to the tenant the full value of his improvements.” Much difficulty was felt in deciding what was the value of an improvement effected by planting cocoanut and other fruit trees, since the value of the tree apart from the soil would be trifling, whereas if it was valued as a growing tree with reference to its capacity for producing fruit allowance would have to be made for the fact that its continued productiveness depended on the use of the soil on which it was planted—a use to which the tenant would not be entitled after the term of his lease had expired. This difficulty, however, does not exist in the case of trees which the tenant desires to remove during the term of his tenancy. In the case of Achutan Nayar v. Narasimham Patter, two of the present Bench held that under Act I of 1887 a tenant was entitled to the whole of the value of timber trees planted by himself. It seems to follow from this decision that he must be entitled to remove the trees if he prefers to do so. In the Act which has just been passed by the local Legislature (Act I of 1900) in lieu of Act I of 1887 (Madras), section 10 enacts that “when the improvement consists of timber trees or other useful trees or plants sown or planted by the tenant himself, the compensation to be awarded shall be three-fourths of the sum which the trees might reasonably be expected to realize, if sold by public auction to be cut and carried away.” It is argued from this that the Legislature recognises the landlord's interests in such trees to the extent of one-fourth of their value, but we think the deduction is made rather on account of the compulsory nature of the law which obliges the landlord to pay for the improvement whether he wants it or not. This seems clear from the fact that section 7 of the same Act provides that when a tenant is ejected who has erected any building or planted any tree which the court finds is not an improvement for which he can claim compensation (owing, for instance, to its being unsuitable to the holding), but which can be removed without substantial injury to the holding he may remove the tree or building within a time to be fixed by the Court. If, then, a tenant is allowed, even after the expiry of his tenancy, to remove a tree or building which is not an improvement, it would seem to be unreasonable to forbid him to remove it during his tenancy. The law treats such tree or building as the property of the tenant, and it is not the less his property, because it is of such a kind that he can require the landlord to pay him compensation for it if it be left for the landlord's benefit. It may well happen that a tree planted by a tenant may arrive at maturity and be fit for the market before the expiry of the kanom tenancy. In such a case it would surely be unreasonable to hold that the tenant should he forbidden to utilize his tree, but should be obliged to allow it to deteriorate until the end of his tenancy and then claim compensation for it from the landlord. Whether, then, we have regard to the views of the local Legislature with respect to tenants' improvements in Malabar, or whether we consider the matter on the broad ground of principle, we are of opinion that the first question referred to us should he answered in the affirmative and that a kanomdar during the period of his occupation is entitled to remove and appropriate to himself any trees that he has himself planted, provided that he leaves the property substantially in the state in which he received it. In this view the second question referred to us requires no answer.

    On the appeal again coming on for hearing after the decision of the Full Bench, the Court (Sir Arnold White, C.J, and Davies, J) delivered the following:

    JUDGMENT

    The ruling of the Full Bench is against the appellant. The second appeal must accordingly be dismissed with costs.

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    Vasudevan Nambudripad v. Valia Chathu Achan
    (May 30, 1900)