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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff executed a sale-deed dated 2 October 1903 conveying certain lands to the 2nd defendant jointly with the plaintiff's undivided brother (the 1st defendant) for a consideration of Rs. 300. At the time of the conveyance the plaintiff was a minor. The plaintiff brought suit for cancellation of the sale-deed in so far as it affected him and for recovery of his half share on the ground of minority. The District Munsif and the Subordinate Judge (on appeal) held that the plaintiff was estopped by his conduct from recovering the property. The matter proceeded to this Second Appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff, who was a minor at the time of the sale-deed, is entitled to have the deed cancelled in respect of his share and to recover possession.
  2. Whether any alleged false representation of age by the plaintiff was made or proved, and if made, whether it would bar relief.
  3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his conduct (or by subsequent conduct) from repudiating the transaction.
  4. Whether, if the plaintiff is entitled to relief, the Court should impose terms or compensation under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act before granting relief.
  5. What is the effect of the English and other precedents (notably R. Leslie, Ltd. v. Sheill and decisions discussed in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose) on the disposition of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff maintained that he was a minor at the time of execution of the sale-deed and sought cancellation and recovery of his half share on that basis.
  • Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Narayanamurthi) relied upon Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose to argue broadly that under no circumstances should the infant be compelled to pay compensation (though the judgment explains nuances in that authority).

Respondent's (2nd Defendant's) Arguments

  • The written statement alleged that the plaintiff was not a minor when the sale-deed was executed and alternatively pleaded estoppel by the plaintiff's subsequent conduct.
  • It was contended on behalf of the respondent (Mr. Somasundaram) that the minor's failure to dispute that he was a major amounted to a representation by him that he was a major, and therefore he should be precluded from rescinding the transaction.
  • The respondent also argued (through counsel) that English decisions restricting relief against infants should not be extended to cases where the minor comes into Court as plaintiff, i.e., that the position of an infant plaintiff might differ from that of an infant defendant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R. Leslie, Ltd. v. Sheill Holds that, broadly speaking, where the minor is a defendant the matter is concluded in the minor's favour; examined case-law and concluded minors can repudiate transactions unless specific fiduciary/ accountable relationship exists; distinction between restitution (in specie) and repayment creating new liability. The Court regarded this decision as concluding the matter in cases where the minor is a defendant and relied upon its principles in assessing the rights of the infant; cited as decisive authority on aspects of equity and infants' liabilities.
Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Thurstan (and Thurstan v. Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society) Referenced as authority concerning equity and compensation with observations that the array (whether infant is plaintiff or defendant) is not significant; cited in relation to the principle that courts of equity would not order compensation in certain circumstances. Used to support the proposition that the fact of the infant being a plaintiff, rather than a defendant, should not of itself preclude relief; relied upon in construing the scope of equitable relief and statutory discretion under Section 41.
Valentini v. Canall Placed as representative of another group of English cases on the subject; the opinion notes English cases fall into two groups not easy to reconcile. Referenced to show that English case-law is not entirely consistent and that some decisions fall into a different line from Nottingham/Leslie; no detailed application beyond noting the divergence.
Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose Recognised the statutory right under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act to impose conditions/compensation when granting cancellation; discussed the effect of the Judicial Committee's treatment of Section 41. The Court relied on this decision to justify exercising statutory discretion under Section 41 and to impose the condition that the plaintiff repay Rs. 150 before recovering possession; interpreted two passages in the judgment as consistent with allowing statutory discretion to be exercised.
Dadasaheb Dasrathrao v. Bai Nahani The report did not refer to R. Leslie, Ltd. v. Sheill; critiqued on that basis. The Court held the Bombay decision to be vitiated for failing to consider R. Leslie and regarded the Bombay decision as erroneous.
Mahomed Syedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark Accepted R. Leslie as good law (as accepted by the Judicial Committee). Used to support acceptance of R. Leslie's principles as authoritative.
Vaikuntarama Pillai v. Authimoolam Chettiar Mentioned in relation to whether it affects the question at hand. The Court stated that this decision does not affect the present question.
Clarke v. Cobley Cited as an example where equity compelled an infant to restore property obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation (promissory note). Used as an example of restitution where an infant who obtained property by misrepresentation was required to restore it in specie.
Watts v. Creswell Cited among authorities illustrating equity compelling recognition of rights and interests in property in an infant's possession where he misled another. Referred to as illustrative precedent for equitable intervention in respect of property in the infant's possession.
Cory v. Gertcken Cited as an example relating to preventing payment over again to an infant of moneys procured by representation of full age. Used in the line of authorities that demonstrate limited equitable relief in cases of infants who obtained money by misrepresentation in respect of property in their possession.
In re Jones Cited for the proposition that courts should not presume a representation from mere conduct; an assertion of untrue fact must be made by the minor to lose the advantage of minority. Relied upon to reject the respondent's contention that silence or failure to dispute age amounts to a representation.
Stikeman v. Dawson Also cited for the principle that representation cannot be presumed from conduct; an untrue assertion must be made. Used to support the conclusion that mere conduct or silence does not constitute a representation of full age by the minor.
Hamilton v. Vaughan-Sherrin Electrical Engineering Co. (Stirling J.) Contains dicta conceding that if a minor plaintiff had derived benefit, he might not be granted relief without being compelled to refund the advantage secured to him. Referred to in discussion of authorities suggesting that where a minor has derived benefit, equity may require refund as a condition of relief.
Corpe v. Overton Contains observations similar to Hamilton suggesting the minor who has derived benefit may be required to refund before relief. Referred to as supportive material for the line of authority that would impose terms where the infant had obtained benefit.
Ram Ratun Singh v. Shew Nandan Singh Referred to as a case in which the principle that a minor who derived benefit might be required to refund was accepted without discussion. Mentioned as part of the body of authorities touching upon the question of refunding benefits as a condition of relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The judgment comprises reasoned opinions by Coutts Trotter, J. and Seshagiri Aiyar, J. Their reasoning, based solely on the text of the opinion, can be summarized in sequential steps drawn from the judgment:

  1. Facts and proof: The Court accepted that the plaintiff was a minor at the time of the sale-deed. It found no pleaded or proved allegation that the plaintiff made an actual false representation as to his age; the defendant's written statement did not specifically plead a false representation.
  2. On estoppel: Because there was no specific pleading or finding of an actual false representation by the plaintiff, the Court held that the defendant could not rely upon a fraud or misrepresentation argument. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that mere failure to dispute an asserted age amounts to a representation; the authorities (In re Jones and Stikeman v. Dawson) require an assertion of untrue fact to be made before a minor can lose the advantages of minority.
  3. On applicable principles from authorities: The Court examined English authorities and identified diverging lines of authority. It regarded R. Leslie, Ltd. v. Sheill as decisive in cases where the minor is a defendant and noted that the Judicial Committee in other cases had accepted R. Leslie. The Court acknowledged that, except in special fiduciary or accountability relationships, a minor on attaining age is generally entitled to repudiate a transaction. It also discussed the recognized equitable exception where the infant is in possession of property that can be restored in specie (restitution) as distinct from compelling repayment which would create a new liability (repayment).
  4. On statutory discretion: The Court considered Chapter IV of the Specific Relief Act, particularly Sections 39 and 41. Section 41 gives the Court discretionary power to grant or refuse compensation to the party affected by cancellation. The Court interpreted the Judicial Committee's discussion in Mohori Bibee as consistent with the continued existence and applicability of this statutory discretion and therefore considered it proper to exercise that power.
  5. Application to the case: Having found the plaintiff was a minor and no established false representation, the Court nonetheless noted that the plaintiff had benefited from the consideration (the Rs. 300 was received by both brothers) and that the property had risen in value. In the exercise of its Section 41 discretion the Court considered it proper to impose a condition: repayment by the plaintiff of his share of the purchase money before recovery of possession.
  6. Orders and practical consequences: The Court reversed the decree of the Courts below, decreed possession of the plaintiff's half share, and imposed the condition that the plaintiff pay Rs. 150 (his share of the purchase money) within three months. If payment was not made, there would be a charge on the property for the sum. The Court also refused to award costs to the plaintiff and ordered that each party bear their own costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The Court granted the plaintiff a decree for possession of his half share in the property subject to the condition that he repay Rs. 150 (his share of the consideration) to the 2nd defendant within three months; failing payment, there would be a charge on the property for that sum. The Court ordered that the plaintiff should not be awarded costs and that each party should bear their own costs.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The plaintiff obtains cancellation of the sale-deed insofar as it affects his half share and a decree for possession of that half share.
  • The plaintiff must pay Rs. 150 to the 2nd defendant within three months; if he does not, a charge will be created on the property for that sum.
  • No costs are awarded to the plaintiff; each party bears their own costs throughout.

Broader Implications Noted by the Court

  • The Court emphasised the continued relevance of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act as a statutory basis for imposing conditions (including compensation) when granting relief in cancellation suits involving infants, construing Mohori Bibee as leaving statutory discretion intact.
  • The opinion identifies a divergence in English authorities on relief against infants and treats R. Leslie, Ltd. v. Sheill and its acceptance by higher authorities as authoritative in particular contexts (especially where the minor is a defendant), while noting other English decisions fall into a different group.
  • The Court criticised the Bombay decision in Dadasaheb Dasrathrao v. Bai Nahani for failing to take account of R. Leslie, thereby regarding that decision as erroneous for present purposes.

This summary is confined strictly to the matters expressly stated in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the text of the judgment.

    Mallacheruvu Raghavayya v. Mallagheruvu Subbayya

    Coutts Trotter, J. — The facts of this case are very simple. The plaintiff on the 2nd October 1903 executed a sale-deed of certain lands to the 2nd defendant, jointly with his undivided brother, the first defendant for Rs. 300. At the time of the conveyance he was a minor; it is contended that he definitely represented that he was of age and I am not convinced that that allegation if proved, would make any difference in law; but it is sufficient to say that it is not proved.

    A very great number of cases were cited More us, and a very interesting discussion took place. In my opinion the decision of the English Court of Appeal in R. Leslie, Ltd. v. Sheill, concludes the matter, in all eases where the minor is a defendant, and concludes it in his favour. I am not at all satisfied that the law is satisfactorily settled, apart from statutes in eases where the minor is plaintiff, as the English cases seem to me to fail into two groups not easy to reconcile. I may take as representing one group, Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Thurstan and as representing the other, Valentini v. Canall. I desire to express no opinion on the point now. But it is clear that in this country we have a statutory right to impose conditions by Sect. 41 of the Specific Relief Act, and that right is clearly recognised in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose. I regard this as a proper course for exercising that discretion and make it a condition that the plaintiffs shall repay the Rs. 150 to the 2nd defendant before recovering possession of the property. The details of the order are contained in the judgment of my learned brother, which I have had the advantage of perusing.

    I desire to add that the decision in Dadasaheb Dasrathrao v. Bai Nahani is vitiated by the fact that no reference is made either in the report of the arguments or the judgments to R. Leslie, Ltd. v. Sheill(5), a decision approved of in Mahomed Syedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark(6). I think the Bombay decision must be regarded as erroneous.

    Seshagiri Aiyar, J.—The plaintiff and the 1st defendant are members of a joint Hindu family. They executed a sale-deed. Exhibit 1 to the 2nd defendant on the 2nd of October 1903. The consideration recited is three hundred rupees. The suit is brought for the cancellation of that sale-deed in so far as it affects the plaintiff and for the recovery of a half share of the property on the ground that at the time of its execution the plaintiff was a minor. The District Munsif and the Subordinate Judge in appeal both held that the plaintiff was estopped by his conduct from recovering the property. Hence this Second Appeal.

    The written statement of the 2nd defendant does not allege that an actual false representation as to age was made by the plaintiff. In paragraph 4 it is stated “that the plaintiff was not a minor on the date of the execution of the sale-deed as alleged in the plaint but was a major.” Paragraph 9 says that “plaintiff is estopped by his conduct subsequent to his ceasing to be a minor to prosecute this suit, even if the plaintiff was really a minor on the date of the execution of the suit document.” There is no specific issue on the question of any representation. The District Munsif was of opinion that plaintiff must have been aware of his real age, and that therefore he must be deemed to have intentionally represented himself to be a major. The Subordinate Judge is apparently of the same opinion. In the evidence given by the 2nd defendant as his own witness he states in cross-examination “I asked the defendant and plaintiff how old plaintiff was when Exhibit 1 was executed; because we had to give the age in the transfer application. I asked them about the age. I knew the plaintiff's age, even before I asked them about it.” It may be that by implication it is intended to suggest by this evidence that some reply was given by the plaintiff about his age. It is unfortunate that this was not cleared up by the defendant in his re-examination. On these facts it is not open to the defendant to rely upon any actual false representation by the plaintiff as that was not alleged by him, and as there is no finding of any such representation by either of the Courts below.

    Therefore the position is this: The plaintiff at the time of the execution of the conveyance was undoubtedly a minor: and it is not shown that he made any false representation as to his age at that time. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the sale-deed cancelled in respect of his share of the property, and if he is so entitled, whether he should be bound by any equities. I do not think Vaikuntarama Pillai v. Authimoolam Chettiar affects this question. It may be permissible to point out that the decisions relied upon by the learned Chief Justice in that case have since been considered elaborately by the Court of Appeal in England in R. Leslie, Ltd. v. Sheill. Lord Sumner points out that “for a very long time and in many forms equity has interfered to give relief against frauds committed by infants, or has refused it to infants guilty of fraud; but the practice and the principles applicable to such cases were long ill-defined.” Then the Lord Justice proceeds to examine the case-law on the question and says that unless there is a fiduciary relationship or a relationship of accountability between the parties, the minor on attaining age is entitled to repudiate the transaction. One exception to this rule is that if the minor is in possession of property which can be restored in specie he will be compelled to give it back to the person from whom he received it. A distinction is drawn between the cases of restitution and of repayment. If it is a question of repayment involving as it would new liability, personal or otherwise, he holds the minor should not be subjected to it. Lord Justice Kennedy in the same case says: “It appears to me that whilst Courts of Equity have interfered to make an infant restore property found in his possession which he has obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation, e. g., the promissory note in the old case of Clarke v. Cobley; to compel the recognition, in regard to property in his possession, of rights and interests of persons whom he has misled into entering into transactions in regard to it (cf. Watts v. Creswell, and to prevent the payment over again to the infant of moneys of which he was procured the payment already by a representation of full age, as in Cory v. Gertcken there is no case in which I can find that a Court of Equity has given judgment against an infant in circumstances like the present, that is to say, in which it has interfered on the ground of the fraud of the infant, whereby he induced the making of the contract of loan, to order the infant to pay the plaintiff a sum equal to the sum borrowed under the void contract, and so, in effect, to the amount of the principal lent, to give validity as against the infant to a void contract.” Lawrence, J., expressed similar views. This decision was accepted as good law by the Judicial Committee in Mahomed Syedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Dadasaheb Dasrathrao v. Bai Nahani does not refer to either of these decisions. Therefore if the point distinctly arises for consideration whether even though a false representation was made by the infant as to his age, he should be refused relief the question may have to be referred to a Full Bench; but as I stated at the outset there is no ground in this case for holding that an actual false representation was made by the infant.

    Mr. Somasundaram for the respondent contended that the mere fact of the minor not disputing that he was a major is tantamount to a representation by him that he was a major. I am unable to agree with this contention. The authorities seem to establish that it is not open to Courts to presume a representation from conduct. In order that a minor may lose the advantage secured to him by the law, an assertion of untrue fact must be made by him. See In re Jones and Stikeman v. Dawson(7)

    It was next contended by the learned vakil for the respondent that the principle of the English decisions should not be extended to cases where the minor comes into Court as plaintiff. There are dicta in some of the English decisions which to a certain extent support this contention. For example, in Hamilton v. Vaughan-Sherrin Electrical Engineering Co. Stirling J., seems to concede that if the plaintiff who was a minor had derived any benefit he would not be granted relief without being compelled to refund the advantage which was secured to him. Corpe v. Overton also contains observations to a similar effect. In Ram Ratun Singh v. Shew Nandan Singh, that principle Seems to have been accepted without any discussion whatsoever. But after the decision of the Judicial Committee in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose it is not permissible to say that the fact that the infant is a plaintiff and not a defendant should make any difference in the principle to be applied. The observations of Lord Justice Romer in Thurstan v. Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society, which was fully endorsed by the House, of Lords in Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Thurstan, show that the array of the infant in the suit is not a matter of any significance. I am therefore of opinion that the fact that the suit is brought by the infant on attaining age is not a consideration for refusing relief to him.

    The further question is whether the infant plaintiff should not be put on terms before he is granted relief. Chapter IV of the Specific Relief Act applied to both void and voidable contracts. Sect. 39 is clear on the point, Sect. 41 leaves it to the discretion of the Court to grant or refuse, to the party affected by the cancellation, compensation. Mr. Narayanamurthi for the appellant relied upon the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose for the broad proposition that under no circumstances should the infant be compelled to pay compensation. There are two passages in the judgment of the Judicial Committee which although they appear to be in conflict on the face of them are not really so. At page 125, their Lordships refer to Sect. 41 of the Specific Relief Act and point out that as the Courts below had not exercised the discretion vesting in them, the Board were not prepared to direct the award of compensation for the first time. “In the next paragraph they advert to a contention based upon the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity. They point out that if the contract is void ab initio no principle of doing equity would arise. The learned vakil for the appellant contended that this succeeding paragraph must be taken to have given the final answer to the contention as to compensation. I do not think so. In my opinion the two paragraphs are consistent with each other. In the second paragraph their Lordships must be taken to have hold that if the matter rested purely on principles of equity, they would not be prepared to order compensation as that claim was negatived under similar circumstances by the House of Lords in Nottingham Permanent Benefit Building Society v. Thurstan. Their Lordships should not be taken to have held that the statutory rule contained in Sect. 41 of the Specific Relief Act should not be given effect to as it only contained a rule of equity. The net import of the two paragraphs is to declare that the statutory discretion as to compensation does exist and can be exercised by the Courts, but that if relief is claimed on general equitable grounds apart from the statute, such a claim is inadmissible as that would be opposed to the principles laid down by the House of Lords.

    There can be no doubt that in this case the substantial prayer the plaintiff is that the deed executed by him should be cancelled. The Courts below did not consider the question of compensation as in their opinion it was not open to the plaintiff to repudiate the contract at all. We have therefore for the first time to apply our mind as to whether compensation should be awarded or not. Nothing that has been said by Mr. Narayanamurthi has induced me to think that the plaintiff should not be put on terms. The contract was entered into by his own elder brother and although we are not now concerned with deciding whether the sale was for necessary purposes or not, there is no question that the money was actually received by both the brothers and that the plaintiff derived full benefit from the consideration paid by the 2nd defendant. The property had admittedly risen in value considerably, and the plaintiff is enabled by law to get back that property. I think he must be compelled to refund his share of the purchase money before a decree for possession is given to him. I would therefore in reversal of the decree of the Courts below, give a decree to the plaintiff for possession of his half share in the property in suit and would also direct that he do pay within three months from this date to the 2nd defendant 150 rupees being his share of the consideration for the sale. If the money is not paid, there will be a charge upon the property for this sum. I do not think that this is a case in which the plaintiff should be given any costs. I would order that each party do bear his own costs throughout.

    S. S.Appeal allowed.

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    Mallacheruvu Raghavayya v. Mallagheruvu Subbayya
    (Oct 25, 1917)