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  • provisions in S. 253 of the Contract Act
  • S. 45 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • S. 253(1) of the Contract Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Advocates
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  • provisions in S. 253 of the Contract Act
  • S. 45 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • S. 253(1) of the Contract Act
Smart Summary

Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Second Appeal arises from a suit by the plaintiff for recovery of a one-third share in specified immoveable properties and for incidental reliefs. The plaintiff alleged that his deceased brother Yerikalappan, the 2nd defendant, and Nettekallappan (the father of the 1st defendant) were partners in an Abkari business from 1892 to 1904; the suit properties were purchased from partnership funds. The partnership allegedly dissolved in 1904 and the partners recorded a settlement (Ex. A) fixing debts, division of outstandings and providing that immoveable properties purchased with partnership funds should be held in equal shares. The plaint further alleges long continued receipt of one-third of the income by Yerikalappan and thereafter by the plaintiff.

The 1st defendant disputed knowledge of the partnership and asserted that the properties were separate self-acquisitions of his father; he also pleaded limitation and adverse possession. The trial Court (District Munsif) framed multiple issues and entered a decree for partition in the plaintiff's favour. The District Judge on first appeal reversed the trial Court and dismissed the suit partly on points of law and partly on an apparently erroneous mixed finding of fact. The plaintiff brought this Second Appeal. The appellate Judge (the author of the opinion) took a different view and restored the trial Court's decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a one-third share in the suit immoveable properties on the basis of the alleged partnership and the settlement recorded in Ex. A.
  2. Whether the plea of adverse possession by the 1st defendant bars the plaintiff's claim.
  3. Whether Article 106 of the Limitation Act (bar on suits for dissolution and accounts) prevents maintainability of the present suit.
  4. Whether Ex. A is admissible and/or must be registered under the Registration Act (i.e., whether non-registration renders Ex. A inadmissible as affecting immoveable property rights).
  5. What weight should be given to the family partition document Ex. D, which recites a one-third right in favour of the plaintiff's side.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Case

  • The plaintiff alleged a partnership from 1892 to 1904 between Yerikalappan (his brother), the 2nd defendant, and Nettekallappan (father of the 1st defendant).
  • Partnership funds were used to purchase the suit immoveable properties.
  • On dissolution in 1904 the partners settled accounts and agreed that immoveable properties acquired by partnership funds were to be held in equal shares; this settlement is embodied in Ex. A.
  • For many years Yerikalappan and then the plaintiff received one-third of the income, and the plaint prayed for division of the properties held in common.

1st Defendant's (Principal Contesting Defendant) Case

  • Pleaded ignorance of the alleged partnership and of events in 1904 (though a reference to a dissolution about 25 years earlier appears in the written statement).
  • Asserted that the items claimed by the plaintiff were self-acquisitions or separate property of the 1st defendant's father.
  • Raised pleas of limitation and adverse possession.
  • Through a witness (D.W.2) put forward a claim that the plaintiff's brother gave up his share around 1901 (a claim which the Court found contradicted by Ex. A).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachariar (Privy Council) Recognises that on dissolution partners may settle accounts between themselves; where such a settlement has been made, a suit for dissolution and accounts within Article 106 does not arise. The Court relied on this authority to hold that Ex. A, being a memorandum of settlement on dissolution, removes the suit from the bar of Art. 106; therefore limitation under Art. 106 did not defeat the plaintiff's claim.
Gobardhan v. Ganeshi Lal Illustrates that where there has been no settlement of accounts after dissolution and the suit is for dissolution and accounts, Art. 106 applies; in that case the partnership had dissolved in law more than three years before suit, so accounts were barred. The Court distinguished this case: in Gobardhan there was no settlement and the suit was for accounts; by contrast here Ex. A records a settlement, so Gobardhan is inapplicable to bar the present suit.
Samuvier v. Ramasubbier Supports the proposition (drawing on S.253 Contract Act) that immoveable properties purchased with partnership funds are deemed held by the partners as joint owners. The Court used this authority to explain that partnership property vests in partners as joint owners during the partnership and to frame the registration question: where dissolution settlement does not alter partners' shares, Ex. A need not be rejected for want of registration on that narrow factual basis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps, closely following the pleadings and evidentiary material before it:

  1. Acceptance of core facts: The Court accepted the existence of the partnership alleged in the plaint, its dissolution in 1904 and that the suit properties were purchased with partnership funds. It noted that Ex. A (the dissolution memorandum) was not disputed in genuineness by the 1st defendant.
  2. Assessment of the lower appellate Court's factual approach: The Court found the District Judge's factual conclusion to be based on an "obviously erroneous approach", particularly criticising the Judge's treatment of admissions and documentary evidence.
  3. Weight of Ex. D (family partition deed): The Court regarded Ex. D as strong proof against the 1st defendant's assertion of exclusive enjoyment or title. Ex. D explicitly records that the 1st defendant's family had only a one-third share; the Court criticised the District Judge for dismissing that recital as possibly due to ignorance without any plea or explanation by the 1st defendant.
  4. On adverse possession: The Court concluded that, in the face of Ex. D and the 1st defendant's admission in evidence that he never asserted exclusive title against the plaintiff, the plea of adverse possession fails. The Court held that the 1st defendant, as a co-tenant, could not have proved an ouster of the plaintiff.
  5. On missing pages of Ex. A and later partnership accounts: The District Judge had expressed distrust due to disappearance of later pages of Ex. A. The appellate Court found that absence of later pages or accounts was immaterial because neither party pleaded changes to the rights fixed by Ex. A in subsequent transactions; the 1st defendant did not assert that subsequent dealings altered the settlement recorded in Ex. A.
  6. On limitation (Article 106): Applying Gopala Chetty, the Court held that because Ex. A embodies a settlement of accounts on dissolution, the suit is not a barred suit for dissolution and accounts within the meaning of Art. 106. Gobardhan was distinguished because there the accounts had not been settled and the suit was effectively for accounts after dissolution; that situation is unlike the present case.
  7. On registration (Registration Act) objection: The Court analysed whether Ex. A required registration as a transfer affecting immoveable property. It explained that during partnership the title to immoveable property purchased with partnership funds vests in the partners (citing S.253 of the Contract Act and Samuvier v. Ramasubbier). A dissolution settlement might, however, allot particular immoveable items in shares different from previous interests, which could raise registration issues. In the present case, there was no suggestion that Ex. A changed the partners' proportions; Ex. A provided for equal one-third shares (a presumption that aligns with S.45 of the Transfer of Property Act). On this narrow factual basis the Court refused to reject Ex. A for want of registration.
  8. Burden of proof and outcome on title: The Court placed the onus on the 1st defendant to disprove the continuance of title evidenced by Ex. A. Finding that the 1st defendant failed to discharge this onus (and that Ex. D and admissions undermined the defendant's claims), the appellate Court restored the trial Court's finding in favour of the plaintiff on title.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Second Appeal was allowed; the decree of the lower appellate Court (District Judge) was set aside and the decree of the District Munsif (trial Court) restoring partition in favour of the plaintiff was restored. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff, payable by the 1st defendant.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiff's decree for partition (one-third share) is reinstated and the 1st defendant must pay costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court.
  • The Court concluded that Article 106 of the Limitation Act did not bar the suit because Ex. A constituted a settlement of accounts on dissolution, and therefore the suit was not a barred proceeding for dissolution/Accounts within the meaning of Art. 106.
  • The Court ruled that non-production of later partnership accounts or disappearance of later pages of Ex. A did not, on the facts pleaded, undermine the plaintiff's case; absence of registration did not render Ex. A inadmissible on the narrow ground that Ex. A did not alter partners' proportions of interest and therefore did not constitute a registrable transfer changing the nature of their interests.
  • The opinion does not set out a broader, novel rule of law; it applies existing principles (as discussed above) to the facts and restores the trial Court's decree. No new precedent beyond the application of these principles to the facts is articulated in the text of the opinion.

Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was allowed. (N.R.R.)

    Panyam Thirumalappa v. Alasyam Ramappa And Others S

    This Second Appeal arises out of a suit for the recovery of the plaintiff's one-third share in certain items of immoveable property and for incidental reliefs. It is the plaintiff's case that his deceased brother Yerikalappan, the 2nd defendant and Nettekallappan the father of the 1st defendant were partners in an Abkari business from 1892 to 1904, that out of the funds of that business they purchased the suit properties, that in 1904 there was a dissolution and settlement of accounts between them evidenced by Ex. A, that under that arrangement provision was made for the discharge of debts and for division of the outstandings and that as regards the immoveable properties which had been purchased with the funds of the partnership, the three partners agreed that they should be entitled to the same in equal shares. The plaint adds that for many years after the date of the Ex. A, Yerikalappa and after his death the plaintiff as his surviving brother were receiving his 1/3 share of the income of the suit properties. The plaint prayed for division of the immoveable properties thus held in common. The 1st defendant who is the principal contesting defendant, pleaded ignorance of the alleged partnership and of all that is said to have happened in 1904 though in the written statement some kind of reference is made to a dissolution 25 years ago. The positive case put forward on behalf of the 1st defendant was that the items now claimed by the plaintiff to be the common properties of the partners were the self-acquisitions or separate properties of the 1st defendant's father and the 1st defendant also raised pleas of limitation and adverse possession.

    A number of issues were framed in the case and they were substantially decided in the plaintiff's favour by the 1st Court which gave him a decree for partition. On appeal, the learned District Judge reversed the trial Court's decree and dismissed the suit partly on certain grounds of law and partly on what may best be described as a mixed finding. Hence this Second Appeal by the plaintiff. So far as the lower appellate Court's judgment can be described as embodying a finding of fact, such finding is based on such an obviously erroneous approach to the case that I am unable to accept it as a finding binding on me.

    The learned District Judge accepts the existence of the partnership alleged in the plaint and its dissolution in 1904 and also seems to agree with the trial Court's view that the items of immoveable property now claimed were purchased with the funds of that partnership. Though with reference to Ex. A he makes some observations suggesting a feeling of distrust in his mind, I do not read them as throwing any doubt on the genuineness of Ex. A, because the 1st defendant himself accepts its genuineness. What seems to have oppressed the learned Judge is that in spite of Ex. A the 1st defendant's father was allowed to have the properties registered in his own name during all the time that he lived, i.e, up to 1918 and that he was allowed to enjoy the properties exclusively. The strongest disproof of the exclusive enjoyment or exclusive title of the 1st defendant's family is the admitted partition deed Ex. D in that family which proceeds on the footing that the family had only a third share in these items; and without any conceivable reason or explanation, the learned Judge brushes it aside with the remark that the recital in Ex. D that the 1st defendant's family was entitled only to a third share in those properties might be due to the ignorance of the 1st defendant as to the exact properties to which he and his father are entitled. The 1st defendant never pleaded ignorance and till he came into the witness box he had never suggested that there has been any mistake in this respect in Ex. D. Even when he was put questions about Ex. D, he non-chalantly pretended ignorance that there was any such statement in Ex. D. It passes my comprehension how the learned Judge when asked to consider the weight of an admission of that kind by a party could ignore it on some guess of his own without any plea or explanation by the party making the admission.

    If it were necessary for the case, I should be prepared to say that Ex. D is the strongest proof that the 1st defendant's family must have been giving to the other two sharers their shares of the income; but it is not necessary for the purpose of the case to come to any such finding. It is sufficient to rely upon Ex. D for two purposes (1) to repel all suspicion which the learned Judge gratuitously casts on Ex. A, because so late as in 1921 Ex. D asserts just the one-third right which Ex. A gave to the 1st defendant's family and (2) to negative the plea of adverse possession; the 1st defendant candidly admits in the witness box that he never asserted any exclusive title in himself to the knowledge of the plaintiff and in the face of the claim of a title only to one-third in Ex. D it is impossible to hold that the 1st defendant who was only a co-tenant could ever have proved ouster of the plaintiff.

    The learned Judge's suspicion against Ex. A seems to have been excited by the disappearance of the later pages in Ex. A. No question has been put suggesting any particular hypothesis as to this disappearance. In the very nature of things the book could not have been in the plaintiff's custody from the outset and so long as the genuineness of Ex. A is undisputed, it seems to me immaterial for the purpose of the decision of the questions raised in this case, what happened in the course of the later business said to have been carried on in partnership between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant's father. If the 1st defendant had pleaded that in connection with the later partnership the rights of the parties as settled at the time of Ex. A had been changed, I can understand a comment about the disappearance of the later pages in Ex. A or the non-production of the accounts relating to the later partnership. Neither in the written statement nor in his evidence did the 1st defendant put forward any such case. His whole case was that the property was, from the very beginning, the separate property of his father except as regards a one-third in certain items in respect of which the case as put forward through D.W 2 was that the plaintiff's brother gave it up some time in 1901. This last story is clearly disproved by Ex. A. In this state of the pleadings, I am unable to appreciate the learned Judge's criticism against the plaintiff's case, on the ground that the Court has not been put in possession of any information as to what happened in connection with the later partnership. Neither party made these later transactions any part of the case and the plaintiff was therefore not called upon to adduce any information about what happened during that later partnership. Knowing something of the habits of the people of this country, I am unable to attach any importance to the registry in the revenue records in the 1st defendant's father's sole name or to the issue of patta in his name. In the face of Ex. D, these considerations seem to me very slender to base any argument upon. I have therefore no doubt that the 1st defendant on whom the onus should properly be laid of disproving the continuance of the title evidenced by Ex. A has wholly failed to discharge that onus and that on that ground the finding of the trial Court in plaintiff's favour on the question of title should be restored.

    The learned District Judge has also decided against the plaintiff on two points of law (1) a question of limitation and (2) a point of registration. So far as the decision on the question of limitation is concerned, I am unable to accept the learned Judge's conclusion that Art. 106 is any bar to the maintainability of the present suit. In Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachariar the Privy Council recognise the possibility that on a dissolution the partners may settle the accounts of the partnership between themselves. If that has been done, there is no longer any question of a suit for dissolution and accounts within the meaning of Art. 106. That is just what happened in this case. Ex. A is admittedly a memorandum drawn up on the dissolution of the partnership and embodying the settlement between the partners as to their respective rights on settlement of the accounts of this partnership. I fail to see how any question of Art. 106 arises after that stage. The decision in Gobardhan v. Ganeshi Lal(2) cited before me by the learned counsel for the respondent is clearly distinguishable. In that case, there had been no settlement of accounts between the partners after dissolution and the suit itself was brought as one for dissolution and taking of accounts. The Court however found that by reason of the death of one of the partners, the partnership had become dissolved in law more than three years before the institution of the suit. It was therefore obviously a case in which the accounts of a dissolved partnership had to be taken. To such a suit Art. 106 clearly applies. An attempt was then made to dissociate so much of the plaintiff's claim as related to certain items of immoveable property from the bar under Art. 106. The learned Judges, if I may say so, rightly held that such a dissociation was impossible. It was not a suit governed by Art. 142 or Art. 144; the immoveable properties were claimed on the very ground that they formed part of the partnership assets and where the accounts had not been taken, no Court could grant relief in respect of some items alone of the partnership without taking the accounts of the partnership as a whole. It is in those circumstances that the learned Judges observed that a right to a division of the house could not be established until after a full account had been taken of all the partnership assets and as a suit for the latter purpose was barred, it was not possible to grant any independent relief in respect of the items of immoveable properties alone.

    The objection under the Registration Act has caused me greater difficulty, not on the particular ground adopted by the learned District Judge but on a somewhat different ground. The learned District Judge speaks of a transfer of title from the partnership to the partners individually, as the reason for insisting upon the registration of Ex. A. That perhaps is not a correct way of putting it; because a partnership is not a legal entity like an incorporated body and during the subsistence of the partnership the title to immoveable properties brought into the partnership or purchased with its funds vests in the partners and not in the partnership as such. As pointed out in Samuvier v. Ramasubbier it follows from the provisions in S. 253 of the Contract Act that all immoveable properties purchased with partnership funds must be deemed to be held by the partners as joint owners. Though Ex. A is therefore not a transfer from the partnership to the individual partners, there can be no doubt that a settlement arrived at on a dissolution might vest the immoveable properties of the partnership in the former partners in proportions very different from the interests held by them during the subsistence of the partnership. S. 253(1) of the Contract Act provides that the share of each partner in the partnership property is the value of his original contribution increased or diminished by his share of profit or loss. It would thus follow that while partners may be joint owners of the partnership property they need not necessarily be owners in equal shares. On a dissolution, when the partners settle their affairs, they may either allot to one or other of them particular items in entirety or in varying shares not necessarily in the particular proportion of the share of each partner in the whole partnership property. There is much to be said in favour of the view taken in Samuvier v. Ramasubbier that a question of registration may arise in such cases, though there is also authority to the contrary. If in the present case there was anything to suggest that the arrangement under Ex. A gave to various partners shares in immoveable property different from the shares which they held prior to the dissolution, the question of registration of Ex. A might have been a more serious difficulty in the plaintiff's way. But there has been no suggestion anywhere that during the partnership stage the partners were not entitled to equal shares and if all that happened at the time of Ex. A was that their respective rights and liabilities were fixed in particular ways as regards the moveable assets and that as regards the immoveable property they continued to hold the same shares in them as they had prior to the dissolution, I do not feel that I am bound to reject Ex. A on the ground of non-registration. Under S. 45 of the Transfer of Property Act the presumption in the case of the co-owners, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is that they held the property in equal shares and that is just what Ex. A provides for. It is on this narrow ground that I have come to the conclusion that Ex. A is not inadmissible on the ground of want of registration.

    I accordingly allow the Second Appeal and setting aside the decree of the lower appellate Court restore the decree of the District Munsif with costs here and in the lower appellate Court, payable by the 1st defendant.

    (Leave granted.)

    Appeal allowed.

    N.R.R

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    Panyam Thirumalappa v. Alasyam Ramappa And Others S
    (Apr 27, 1937)